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ABSTRACT 
Thinking about Schizophrenia, Thinking about Schizophrenic 
Thinking, and Schizophrenic Thinking 
J•P. Barham 
The thesis t r e a t s o f schizophrenia as a s o c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n ; 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n i s given to the way i n which schizophrenics speak and t h i n k , 
and to the ideas and p r a c t i c e s t h a t have developed around them. Such 
ideas and p r a c t i c e s - both s c i e n t i f i c and n o n - s c i e n t i f i c - i t i s argued, 
have been generated by the requirements of l i v i n g i n Western s o c i e t i e s . 
The i n q u i r y i s i n three p a r t s . F i r s t , a d e t a i l e d study of the way i n 
which a s i n g l e chronic schizophrenic p a t i e n t engages w i t h the w o r l d . 
Second, a consideration of p r e v a i l i n g approaches to the study of language 
and thought i n schizophrenia. Singled out f o r s p e c i a l emphasis i s the 
personal construct theory approach t o the study of thought d i s o r d e r ; 
close a t t e n t i o n i s given to an examination of r e p e r t o r y g r i d s taken from 
a number of chronic schizophrenic p a t i e n t s . The account of schizophrenic 
thought t h a t i s given by personal c o n s t r u c t theory i s shown to be 
inadequate i n i t s own terms, and more gen e r a l l y as s e r v i c i n g human 
i n t e r e s t s t h a t are f a l s i f y i n g both of schizophrenics and of non-
schizophrenics. The f i n a l s e c t i o n b u i l d s on the e a r l i e r d i s cussion, 
and introduces m a t e r i a l from other sources, to suggest t h a t , t y p i c a l l y , 
the ideas and p r a c t i c e s t h a t have been developed around schizophrenics 
i n the name of a p a r t i c u l a r v e r s i o n of science have had as t h e i r 
f u n c t i o n the r e s t o r a t i o n of forms of order, relevance and r e l a t i o n to 
which, i n our s o c i e t y , we s t r o n g l y adhere and of which the schizophrenic 
i s d i s r u p t i v e . Some suggestions are made as to the requirements f o r an 
a l t e r n a t i v e form of response and r e l a t i o n to the t r i b u l a t i o n s o f 
schizophrenics, and f o r a formal c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n of the way i n which 
the schizophrenic engages w i t h the w o r l d . 
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I . INTRODUCTION 
Only those who know and r e s p e c t s t a s i s i n prog r e s s , 
who have once and more than once given up, who have 
s a t on an empty s n a i l s h e l l and experienced the 
dark s i d e of Utopia, can e v a l u a t e p r o g r e s s . 
(Glinter Grass, "From the D i a r y of 
a S n a i l " . ) 
7 
Or as, when an underground t r a i n , i n the tube, stops too 
long between s t a t i o n s 
And the conversation r i s e s and slowly fades i n t o s i l e n c e 
And you see behind every face the mental emptiness 
deepen 
Leaving only the growing t e r r o r of n o t h i n g to t h i n k about. 
(T.S. E l i o t , 'East Coker', 118-121) 
Above a l l t h i s i s an essay about h i a t u s i n the order o f the person 
and our response t o i t . Michel Foucault, i n h i s a s t o n i s h i n g c h r o n i c l e 
of the forms of d i v i d e t h a t Western C i v i l i z a t i o n has e s t a b l i s h e d between 
reason and non-reason, t e l l s us t h a t : 
The c o n s t i t u t i o n of madness as a mental i l l n e s s . . . a f f o r d s 
the evidence of a broken dialogue, p o s i t s the separation 
as already e f f e c t e d , and t h r u s t s i n t o o b l i v i o n a l l those 
stammered, imperfect words w i t h o u t f i x e d syntax i n 
which the exchange between madness and reason was made. 
The language of p s y c h i a t r y , which i s a monologue of 
reason about madness, has been est a b l i s h e d only on the 
basis of such a s i l e n c e (1967, p p . x i i - x i i i , emphasis 
i n the o r i g i n a l ) . 
Madness, as Roger Bastide puts i t , "n'est pas un f a i t , mais un 
probleme" (1971, p.54). Schizophrenia i s not a given but a c o n s t r u c t i o n ; 
i n t o what i s o r i g i n a l l y an e r u p t i o n of the o u t l a n d i s h and the unaccountable 
i n t o the c i r c l e of a s s o c i a t i o n i n a household, p s y c h i a t r y interposes a 
t e c h n i c a l perspective t o guide and c o n t r o l our response to i t . We are 
steered away from the muddle and p e r p l e x i t y t h a t the schizophrenic 
engenders i n us i n t o the secluded c i t a d e l s of p s y c h i a t r i c thought. The 
responses t h a t we have developed towards those forms of behaviour t h a t 
8 
we term schizophrenic i s , I suggest, a sp e c i a l case of what Mary Douglas 
c a l l s " p o l l u t i o n behaviour". " P o l l u t i o n behaviour", Mary Douglas w r i t e s , 
" i s the r e a c t i o n which condemns any obj e c t or ideas l i k e l y to confuse or 
c o n t r a d i c t cherished c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s " (1966, p.48). I n any c u l t u r e worthy 
of the name we f i n d various p r o v i s i o n s f o r " d e a l i n g w i t h ambiguous or 
anomalous events" ( i b i d . p.52). I f uncleanness i s matter out of place, 
schizophrenia from t h i s p o i n t of view can be looked upon as c l a s s i f i c a t i o n 
out of place. Part of our task w i l l be to i l l u m i n a t e the f i n e r character-
i s t i c s of these cherished c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s and the forms of d i s r u p t i o n 
t h a t the schizophrenic i n f l i c t s upon them. As w i t h uncleanness we must 
approach the issue through order: "Uncleanness or d i r t i s t h a t which 
must not be included i f a p a t t e r n i s to be maintained" ( i b i d . p.53). 
I s h a l l endeavour t o show t h a t , as w i t h ideas about d i r t , the only way 
i n which ideas about schizophrenia make sense i s " i n reference to a t o t a l 
s t r u c t u r e of thought whose key-stone, boundaries, margins, and i n t e r n a l 
l i n e s are hel d i n r e l a t i o n by r i t u a l s of separation" ( i b i d . p.54). 
R i t u a l s of separation t h a t show themselves both i n the p r a c t i c e s t h a t 
we develop, and i n the systems of ideas t h a t we generate, around the 
forms of diso r d e r ; these - p r a c t i c e s and ideas - t i e together as p a r t of 
a whole symbolic system t h a t i s also a system of s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s . 
This i s not , of course, how we have u s u a l l y approached the issue of 
schizophrenia. Rather than t r e a t i n g our ideas about schizophrenia as 
generated by the requirements of the p r a c t i c e of l i v i n g - as e s t a b l i s h i n g 
something about how we order ourselves, both at the l e v e l of the person 
and i n r e l a t i o n t o each other - we have tended to d i v e r t the whole 
subject i n t o a category a p a r t , as having to do w i t h a 'something' c a l l e d 
medicine or science.^" Much of the discussion about schizophrenia takes 
place w i t h i n a closed c i r c l e of discourse: the categories of i t s thought -
the c a r e f u l l y n u r t u r e d items of knowledge about schizophrenia - are l i f t e d 
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out of the sets of human r e l a t i o n s and i n t e r e s t s w i t h i n which they were 
f i r s t of a l l forged and to which they are a c o n t i n u i n g form of address. 
I f t h i s i s t r u e of the way i n which we look upon schizophrenia as a 
s t r u c t u r e of knowledge, i t i s also tru e of the way i n which, t y p i c a l l y , 
we have approached the schizophrenic h i m s e l f . Strange ideas and 
b e l i e f s the schizophrenic may w e l l have, but we have tended too o f t e n 
to divorce them from t h e i r context and study them as i s o l a t e d categories 
of thought. Mary Douglas berates students of ' p r i m i t i v e b e l i e f s ' f o r 
t h e i r assumption t h a t such b e l i e f s are p a r t of an organised system of 
thought. They were, Mary Douglas argues, never intended to be looked 
upon i n t h i s way, and measured against such standards they i n e v i t a b l y 
f a l l s h o r t . The proper approach i s to see them as t i e d i n w i t h a 
p r a c t i c e of l i v i n g . As Mary Douglas puts i t the ideas "are not j u s t 
l i n k e d t o i n s t i t u t i o n s . . . they are i n s t i t u t i o n s . . . T h e y are a l l compounded 
p a r t of b e l i e f and p a r t of p r a c t i c e " ( i b i d . p.108). From t h i s p o i n t of 
view i t i s a mistake t o compare "one type of thought w i t h another instead 
of comparing i n s t i t u t i o n s " ( i b i d . p.112). 
Mary Douglas shows us how ideas and p r a c t i c e s - whether s c i e n t i f i c 
or otherwise - are generated to do a job of work t h a t whatever else i t 
may be i s unequivocally s o c i a l . Taking a lead from Douglas I s h a l l 
c h a r a c t e r i s e schizophrenia as a s o c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n . I t i s , w i t h o u t 
doubt, a very strange i n s t i t u t i o n . A cursory i n s p e c t i o n w i l l r eveal 
t h a t i t i s , f o r example, very u n l i k e the s c i e n t i f i c communities t h a t 
Thomas Kuhn describes i n h i s monograph 'The S t r u c t u r e of S c i e n t i f i c 
Revolutions' (1962). For one t h i n g i t i s much l a r g e r . Indeed f a r 
from being a small c o t e r i e of s p e c i a l i s t s h i v e d away i n a q u i e t corner 
of academic space, the i n s t i t u t i o n of schizophrenia i s a rambling, 
sprawling a f f a i r . Kuhn w r i t e s of the " u n p a r a l l e l e d i n s u l a t i o n of 
mature s c i e n t i f i c communities from the demands of the l a i t y and of 
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everyday l i f e " ( i b i d . p.164). I n our case, however, the boundaries and 
fences round the i n s t i t u t i o n are not as f i r m as they might be; they are 
p u l l e d t h i s way and t h a t ; i n places there are cracks. I f we now 
approach closer to the door we w i l l detect t h a t there are even disputes 
over who has the a u t h o r i t y to be gate-keeper. And once i n s i d e we w i l l 
soon see t h a t the whole discussion i s frau g h t w i t h d i s s e n t : myriads of 
sub-groups, some o f them even c l a i m i n g ownership of the i n s t i t u t i o n , some 
2 
of them p e t i t i o n i n g f o r i t s d e m o l i t i o n , and a l l of them going about t h e i r 
3 
business w i t h r e s o l u t e purpose. 
Somewhere deep down i n the c e l l a r s of the i n s t i t u t i o n are the men 
and women on whose behalf the whole e d i f i c e has been b u i l t : the 
schizophrenics themselves. To f i n d one's way, past a l l the a c t i v i t y 
i n the upper parts of the b u i l d i n g , t o see them i s not always easy; 
the o b s t r u c t i o n i s less p h y s i c a l than i n s t i t u t i o n a l : one may pejrhaps_ 
be persuaded t h a t such an exercise i s unnecessary - the r e a l i t y i s 
a f t e r a l l known, imprinted on the data schedules i n the u p s t a i r s 
l a b o r a t o r i e s ; or, more l i k e l y , t h a t only an accompanied excursion, 
hedged around by procedural requirements and by psychological t e s t 
proformats, i s per m i s s i b l e . To take oneself o f f to the c e l l a r s , and 
i n s t a l l oneself there f o r a d u r a t i o n w i t h o u t any s p e c i a l i s t hand-luggage 
i s , w i t h i n the mores of the p r e v a i l i n g sub-culture of the i n s t i t u t i o n , 
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deviant. 
Indeed amidst a l l the clamour schizophrenics are sometimes q u i t e 
f o r g o t t e n . We do not have t o l i s t e n very c a r e f u l l y to the conversations 
t a k i n g place a l l around us t o n o t i c e t h a t , interwoven w i t h the t a l k 
about schizophrenia, sometimes he l d below the surface, and sometimes q u i t e 
e x p l i c i t l y t o the f o r e , are a host of preoccupations about how we l i v e 
our l i v e s together i n s o c i e t y : about, f o r example, r a t i o n a l i t y and 
11 
i r r a t i o n a l i t y ; about the boundaries between common sense and s c i e n t i f i c 
knowledge; about various aspects of man's a l i e n a t i o n . We may perhaps be 
reminded of Arnold Van Gennep's (1960) metaphor of s o c i e t y as a house 
w i t h rooms and c o r r i d o r s ; danger, Van Gennep t e l l s us - and we s h a l l 
have reason to r e c a l l t h i s l a t e r — l i e s i n t r a n s i t i o n . 
A s u b s t a n t i a l p a r t of the i n s t i t u t i o n , however, i s given over to 
the e l a b o r a t i o n and development of models and constru c t i o n s t o describe 
and account f o r various features of the schizophrenic's b e h a v i o u r . I t 
i s these t h a t h o l d the i n s t i t u t i o n together and thus the schizophrenic 
w i t h i n i t . The f e a t u r e of the schizophrenic's behaviour which 
engenders most p e r p l e x i t y and discomfort i n those w i t h whom he comes 
i n t o contact i s the way i n which he t a l k s . ^ Schizophrenia, B l e u l e r 
t e l l s us, " i s characterised by a s p e c i f i c type of a l t e r a t i o n of t h i n k i n g , 
f e e l i n g and r e l a t i o n to the e x t e r n a l w o r l d which appears nowhere else 
i n t h i s p a r t i c u l a r f ashion" (1911, p.14 ) . And the a l t e r a t i o n of 
t h i n k i n g , B l e u l e r argued, manifests i t s e l f i n a disturbance i n the 
p a t i e n t ' s use of language. I n a review of curr e n t t h i n k i n g t h a t i s a 
prescribed i t e m i n the p s y c h i a t r i c t r a i n i n g c u r r i c u l u m we are t o l d 
t h a t : 
Disturbances i n the form of thought and speech are 
diagnostic...Whether the disturbance of language 
i s primary can only be a specula t i o n a t the present 
time, but i f there i s a defect or p e c u l i a r i t y i n 
the schizophrenic's way of construing the world 
then t h i s i s l i k e l y t o be associated w i t h a 
d i f f e r e n c e or p e c u l i a r i t y i n the use of language 
(For r e s t and A f f l e c k , eds., 1975, p.22). 
Fi s h , i n h i s celebrated mongraph, w r i t e s t h a t formal thought d i s o r d e r i s 
"d i a g n o s t i c of schizophrenia i f coarse b r a i n disease can be excluded... 
Formal thought disorder i s one of the u n i f y i n g features of schizophrenia. 
A l l schizophrenics show some formal thought disorder i f t h e i r i l l n e s s 
l a s t s long enough" (1976, p.29). Any serious c o n s i d e r a t i o n of the ideas 
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and p r a c t i c e s which have developed i n response t o the p e r p l e x i t i e s of 
the schizophrenic's behaviour, then, must pay p a r t i c u l a r a t t e n t i o n to 
the kinds of constructions which have been erected around the language 
of the p a t i e n t ; and most notable among these - a cornerstone of the 
i n s t i t u t i o n i n p o i n t of f a c t - i s the n o t i o n of thought d i s o r d e r . 
On approaching the i n s t i t u t i o n the w e l l - t u t o r e d research worker 
w i l l , i f he i s wise, waste l i t t l e time over the a c t i v i t y a t the door or 
i n the h a l l , nor w i l l he l i n g e r long i n the c o r r i d o r . With f o r t h r i g h t 
step he w i l l proceed i n t o the inner sanctuary of the i n s t i t u t i o n to 
which only those w i t h the proper c r e d e n t i a l s are admitted and enter, 
l e t us imagine, one of the rooms marked 'Studies of Thought Disorder'. 
Here he w i l l f i n d an atmosphere q u i t e d i f f e r e n t from t h a t which p r e v a i l s 
i n c e r t a i n other parts of the i n s t i t u t i o n , and e s p e c i a l l y at the 
boundaries. The boundaries, he w i l l be t o l d , must be maintained; 
w i t h the help o f science he w i l l l e a r n how to r e p a i r them.^ Quickly 
he w i l l d i v e s t himself of the bewilderment of h i s experiences at the 
gate, and s e t t l e i n t o the cumulation of knowledge i n one of a number 
of p u z z l e - s o l v i n g t r a d i t i o n s . His mentors w i l l perhaps compare the 
process of discovery to "the a d d i t i o n of b r i c k s to a b u i l d i n g " by which 
s c i e n t i s t s "add another f a c t , concept, law or theory to the body of 
i n f o r m a t i o n supplied i n the contemporary science t e x t " (Kuhn, 1962, p.140). 
He w i l l , i n a d d i t i o n , be encouraged to l e a r n the received versions of 
g 
the h i s t o r y of h i s d i s c i p l i n e . His chosen paradigm w i l l provide him 
"not only w i t h a map, but also w i t h some of the d i r e c t i o n s e s s e n t i a l 
f o r map-making" ( i b i d . p.109); not o n l y , t h a t i s , w i t h a theory and a 
set of o p e r a t i o n a l procedures, but also w i t h an est a b l i s h e d order of 
r e l a t i o n s h i p to the.world of 'raw experience'. The terms of h i s 
r e l a t i o n s w i t h the i n s t i t u t i o n o f schizophrenia and w i t h schizophrenics 
themselves cease to be problematic; he i s w e l l taken care o f . So much 
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so indeed t h a t h i s adopted o r i e n t a t i o n may come to seem ' n a t u r a l ' t o 
him. I n t h i s event i t i s u n l i k e l y t h a t he w i l l n o t i c e — or accord any 
s i g n i f i c a n c e to - the remarkable d i f f e r e n c e s w i t h i n the i n s t i t u t i o n of 
schizophrenia i n the d u r a t i o n and i n t e n s i t y of the r e l a t i o n s h i p between 
p r o f e s s i o n a l worker — whether he be a c l i n i c i a n , a research worker, 
or both - and the schizophrenic p a t i e n t . A recent memorandum of the 
Royal College of P s y c h i a t r i s t s (1974) t e l l s us t h a t : " I n an average 
mental h o s p i t a l a long-stay p a t i e n t i s l i k e l y to see a doctor f o r only 
ten minutes or so every three months. Even a r e c e n t l y admitted p a t i e n t 
i s seen by a doctor an average of only twenty minutes each week". The 
average research r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h a p a t i e n t i s cursory; a t a generous 
estimate we may perhaps allow an hour or so f o r any one p a t i e n t , and 
most of t h i s given over, not to relatedness t o the p a t i e n t , but to 
experimental procedures. At the other end of the spectrum we f i n d , 
f o r example, Harold Searles who r e p o r t s (1972) on a p a t i e n t - t h e r a p i s t 
r e l a t i o n s h i p t h a t a t the time of w r i t i n g had extended over a p e r i o d of 
eighteen years; and Marion M i l n e r i n her study 'The Hands of the L i v i n g 
God' (1969) describes the treatment of a schizophrenic g i r l over a 
per i o d of f i f t e e n years and more. For our research worker, t h a t i s 
to say, i t i s u n l i k e l y t h a t these f a c t s w i l l c a r ry any i m p l i c a t i o n f o r 
g 
the s t r u c t u r e of the knowledge t h a t i s developed. 
One of the major d i f f i c u l t i e s t h a t stands i n the way of any attempt 
to e s t a b l i s h a reasonably clear-headed, and y e t s t i l l personal, view of 
what someone who has been diagnosed schizophrenic i s a c t u a l l y l i k e , and 
of the p e r p l e x i t i e s and discomforts t h a t such a person presents f o r us, 
i s t h a t the space between the p a t i e n t and ourselves i s i n o r d i n a t e l y 
c l u t t e r e d . For one t h i n g , as we h i n t e d at i n our f a b l e about the 
i n i t i a t i o n of the research worker, and as we s h a l l explore i n more 
d e t a i l l a t e r on, t e c h n i c a l m a t e r i a l i s m makes o f the schizophrenic an 
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o b j e c t i n i t s own guise. However, as i f t h a t were not enough, the 
d i f f i c u l t y does not end w i t h the e c c e n t r i c i t i e s of s c i e n t i f i c method. 
The i n s t i t u t i o n of schizophrenia provides, i n a d d i t i o n , a range of 
d i s t r a c t i o n s , some of them, on f i r s t t a s t i n g , more tempting than o t h e r s . 
Consider, f o r example, the elevated h i s t r i o n i c s of the a l t e r c a t i o n s 
between the American p s y c h i a t r i s t and psychoanalyst Thomas Szasz and 
various members of the p s y c h i a t r i c establishment i n recent years. Most 
r e c e n t l y (1976) Szasz d i d b a t t l e w i t h Professor S i r M a r t i n Roth i n the 
pages of the B r i t i s h Journal o f Psychiatry. Szasz very s k i l f u l l y , i f 
po l e m i c a l l y , gives the l i e t o the o f f i c i a l versions of the 'discovery' 
of schizophrenia t h a t have been meted out to us, but i f we should then 
look t o him f o r an a l t e r n a t i v e form of response to the h i a t u s of 
schizophrenia, or indeed f o r a more i n c i s i v e analysis of why schizophrenia 
has come to receive the k i n d of response t h a t t y p i c a l l y has been given 
to i t , we s h a l l be disappointed. For Szasz the whole matter i s t i d i e d 
up i n a series of statements about on the one hand the coercions of 
society and more e s p e c i a l l y the zealous behaviour of the p s y c h i a t r i c 
establishment, and on the other a se r i e s of oppositions between 
'disease' and 'deviance', and between 'disease' and 'disagreement'. 
Si r M a r t i n Roth (1976), f o r h i s p a r t , b i t e s back hard, and a f f i r m s -
l e s t we ever had reason to doubt i t - t h e w o r l d l y wisdom of the medical 
e s t a b l i s h m e n t . ^ 
I t i s easy t o be befooled by e i t h e r of these two opposing discourses, 
and other examples are not hard to come b y . ^ We would do w e l l to r e s i s t 
however, f o r both of them press t h e i r claims i n the service of i n t e r e s t s 
t h a t whatever we may t h i n k about them qua i n t e r e s t s , make f o r a decimated 
rendering of the schizophrenic and h i s predicament. A h i n t of what 
from the conventional standpoint such an i n t e r e s t might be i s given t o 
us by Anthony Clare i n h i s much praised monograph on the woes of p s y c h i a t r y . 
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I n schizophrenia, Clare t e l l s us, "there i s a ' p e r m e a b i l i t y ' of the 
b a r r i e r between the i n d i v i d u a l and h i s environment" (1976, p.156). On 
the face of i t a commonplace piece of received wisdom - the loss of 
'ego-boundaries' - but one has, I t h i n k , i f one i s not unquestioningly 
to swallow i t whole, to enforce the question of what, from a reverse 
perspective, these 'blockades' between the i n d i v i d u a l and the 
environment i n f a c t c o n s i s t i n f o r the o r d i n a r y person. To pursue t h i s 
matter f u r t h e r here would be t o pre-empt our l a t e r discussion. I t i s 
enough on t h i s p r e l i m i n a r y t o u r of various landmarks w i t h i n the 
i n s t i t u t i o n of schizophrenia to be aware of the d i f f i c u l t i e s . To reach 
the schizophrenic p a t i e n t one has to t r e a d across a space t h a t i s 
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c l u t t e r e d w i t h assumptions, pre-conceptions, and s p e c i a l i s e d i n t e r e s t s . 
Assumptions and i n t e r e s t s of one's own one must surely have but the 
nature of the p r e v a i l i n g c u l t u r e w i t h i n the space i s not a l t o g e t h e r 
conducive e i t h e r to t h e i r r e c o g n i t i o n or to t h e i r unmasking. I t i s easy 
i n a l l t h i s t o f a l l a t h r a l l t o b i n a r i e s t h a t f a l s i f y and t o disown one's 
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own perceptions, even to the extent of renouncing one's own language. 
Some of these d i s t r a c t i o n s we s h a l l t r y to avoid a l t o g e t h e r ; to 
others we s h a l l pay more d e t a i l e d a t t e n t i o n . To be b r i e f , i n what 
f o l l o w s we s h a l l set ourselves three tasks. The f i r s t i s to f orce our 
way past the b u s t l e i n the upper p a r t s of the i n s t i t u t i o n i n t o the lower 
confines where the schizophrenics themselves are to be found. Here -
a f t e r a r a t h e r lengthy and nervous p r e l i m i n a r y - we s h a l l stay f o r a 
considerable period. To borrow from Foucault's perhaps somewhat dramatic 
terminology, we s h a l l t r y to break through the "monologue of reason about 
madness" to discover what a chronic schizophrenic i s a c t u a l l y l i k e - how 
he speaks and t h i n k s - i n the context of our r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h him. We 
s h a l l t r y to make ourselves the instrument of knowledge; not however by 
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b r a c k e t i n g our s u b j e c t i v i t y , but by i t s c o n t r o l l e d employment. This 
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accomplished we s h a l l , i n Section I I I , r e t u r n u p s t a i r s , and devote 
ourselves to a co n s i d e r a t i o n of some of the construc t i o n s t h a t have been 
placed on the language and the thought of schizophrenics. To some of 
these we s h a l l give r a t h e r scant a t t e n t i o n . * " ' We s h a l l , however, examine 
i n d e t a i l the personal construct theory approach to the study of 
schizophrenic thought d i s o r d e r as exe m p l i f i e d i n r e p e r t o r y g r i d s ; the 
specia l a t t r a c t i o n here i s t h a t we s h a l l be able to make renewed s o r t i e s 
to the downstairs quarters to o f f - s e t the d e s c r i p t i o n s of others against 
what we have l e a r n t from our own e x p l o r a t i o n s . Hopefully the exercise 
w i l l teach us a l i t t l e more about schizophrenics; beneath the surface 
however, and o c c a s i o n a l l y making i t s e l f e x p l i c i t , we s h a l l be probing 
another k i n d of i n q u i r y about the human i n t e r e s t s t h a t underpin 
endeavours such as these t h a t have been c a r r i e d out i n the name of 
science. I n the f i n a l s e c t i o n we s h a l l b r i n g these considerations to 
the f o r e and pursue "them more generally. What i s i t about the behaviour 
of the schizophrenic, we s h a l l ask, t h a t r e q u i r e s t h a t i t be hedged 
around w i t h these kinds of procedures? Of what i s the behaviour of 
the schizophrenic d i s r u p t i v e ? I s h a l l introduce some evidence from 
various quarters t o suggest t h a t i t i s our assumption about the manner 
i n which the £self' i s constructed - and thus the order of the person 
as i t i s est a b l i s h e d i n our c u l t u r e - t h a t i s d i s r u p t e d . By way of 
conclusion I t r y t o i n d i c a t e what i s r e q u i r e d of us i f we are not to 
i s o l a t e the schizophrenic from our understanding i n the service of 
what i s a formidable, b u t f o r a l l of t h a t conventional, c u l t u r a l i n t e r e s t . 
Hence, then, the three parts to my t i t l e : the language and thought of 
the schizophrenic h i m s e l f , the c i t a d e l s of thought t h a t have been erected 
around him, and the way i n which these i n t e r a c t on each other. 
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Before we proceed with, our f i r s t task some a d d i t i o n a l remarks are 
i n order about what I s h a l l , and s h a l l n o t , be concerning myself w i t h 
here. I have already, i n a general way, stressed the l u r e of f a l s i f y i n g 
b i n a r i e s i n the i n s t i t u t i o n of schizophrenia. One such i s the question, 
much a i r e d i n recent years, of whether mental i l l n e s s i n general, and 
schizophrenia i n p a r t i c u l a r , c o n s t i t u t e s i l l n e s s . I n c e r t a i n quarters 
at l e a s t the whole problem of schizophrenia has been made to t u r n on 
t h i s question as though once i t can be shown t h a t schizophrenia i s not 
an i l l n e s s i n the p o s i t i v i s t i c sense o f an inherent d i s o r d e r or disease 
which a l a r g e p a r t of the p s y c h i a t r i c establishment c l a i m t h a t i t i s , 
then schizophrenics can be dispatched t o the general category of s o c i a l 
deviants or t o the ranks of people w i t h whom we disagree. But t h i s i s 
to add befuddlement t o befuddlement. To show t h a t schizophrenics are 
not i l l according t o one conception of ' i l l n e s s ' does not n e c e s s a r i l y 
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imply t h a t they are not i l l according t o another conception. David 
Morgan po i n t s us i n the r i g h t d i r e c t i o n when he w r i t e s t h a t : "From a 
s o c i o l o g i c a l p o i n t of view...the question i s not whether mental i l l n e s s 
i s i l l n e s s . . . b u t why i t i s t h a t c e r t a i n forms of s o c i a l deviance are 
t r e a t e d as symptoms of i l l n e s s and explained as a form of disease" 
(1975, p.271 s,emphasis i n the o r i g i n a l ) . 
Nevertheless there i s more to i t than t h i s . As we s h a l l see 
p r e s e n t l y one of the major f a i l i n g s o f the p r e v alent approaches to the 
study of language and thought of schizophrenics i s t h e i r r e f u s a l to 
engage i n any s i g n i f i c a n t depth w i t h the d e t a i l and complication of the 
s t a t e of a f f a i r s t h a t the p a t i e n t presents us w i t h ; what we are given 
i n s t e a d , f o r the most p a r t , i s a trunchated d i s c i p l i n a r y cadaver. However 
the c r i t i c s of the p s y c h i a t r i c establishment, and o f the concept of 
i l l n e s s , have not done much b e t t e r . From the w r i t i n g s of Thomas Szasz, 
f o r example, i t appears t h a t the e d i f i c e of p s y c h i a t r i c c l a s s i f i c a t i o n 
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and l a b e l l i n g once dismantled the schizophrenic i s f r e e to walk away; 
and b e t t e r t h a t he should go i n one d i r e c t i o n and we i n another. Just 
as much as the denizens of the p s y c h i a t r i c establishment Szasz and h i s 
colleagues maintain t h e i r discourse at a considerable distance from 
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the phenomena they p u r p o r t t o be concerned w i t h . ' 
The r e a l problem, I want to suggest, i s a problem of response and 
r e l a t i o n ; and matters of response and r e l a t i o n - i f we are to take them 
s e r i o u s l y - can only be worked out from a p o s i t i o n of p r o x i m i t y to the 
phenomena of concern. The context to which problems of response and 
r e l a t i o n must be r e f e r r e d i s given t o us by David Morgan. He suggests 
t h a t : 
...whereas i n t r a d i t i o n a l s o c i e t i e s s t a b i l i t y and 
order are t y p i f i e d by enduring r e l a t i o n s of s o c i a l 
l i f e , i n i n d u s t r i a l s o c i e t i e s we f i n d the s i t u a t i o n 
reversed. Against a background of s o c i a l d i v e r s i t y , 
c o n f l i c t and^ change, images of coherence, r e g u l a r i t y 
and order are s y m b o l i c a l l y expressed by the more 
comprehensible and c o n t r o l l a b l e w o r l d of inanimate 
t h i n g s . This d i s j u n c t i o n between the r a t i o n a l l y 
determinable o r d e r - o f things and the complexity 
of s o c i a l l i f e i s o b j e c t i f i e d par excellence by 
the e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l p r i o r i t y we accord t o the ^ 
t h e o r e t i c a l models of p h y s i c a l science (1975, p.279). 
And f u r t h e r : 
I n t h i s context...the t h e o r e t i c a l achievements of 
science are less s i g n i f i c a n t than i t s i d e o l o g i c a l 
f u n c t i o n i n shaping and l e g i t i m a t i n g secular b e l i e f s . 
I n i n d u s t r i a l s o c i e t y , the r a t i o n a l i t y of science has 
become accepted a p r i o r i as a symbol of order, 
coherence and t r u t h . I t s i d e o l o g i c a l f u n c t i o n 
c o n s t i t u t e s an i n t e g r a t i n g system of shared o r i e n t a t i o n s 
and s o c i a l b e l i e f s which render otherwise i n e x p l i c a b l e 
s i t u a t i o n s amenable to r a t i o n a l a p p r a i s a l and t e c h n i c a l 
c o n t r o l . Accordingly we might expect t o f i n d the 
i d e o l o g i c a l a r t i c u l a t i o n of those b e l i e f s most evident 
i n r e l a t i o n to those areas of s o c i a l experience which, 
mediated by moral and emotional c o n f l i c t s , 
p a r a d o x i c a l l y l e a s t conform to the p o s i t i v i s t i c conception 
of order represented by the world of inanimate t h i n g s . 
That i s , the symbols of order are most l i k e l y t o be 
stressed i n r e l a t i o n to human problems we l e a s t under-
stand. From t h i s p o i n t of view, the ' s c i e n t i f i c ' 
e xplanation of i n s a n i t y as a n a t u r a l disease not only 
enhances the r a t i o n a l i t y and a u t h o r i t y of e s t a b l i s h e d 
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p r a c t i c e s and b e l i e f s , but i t does so p r e c i s e l y 
because i t invokes an i d e o l o g i c a l conception of 
order t h a t has i n c r e a s i n g l y l e g i t i m a t e d and 
permeated the i n s t i t u t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e of s o c i a l 
l i f e and made ps y c h i a t r y and p s y c h i a t r i c 
judgements i n c r e a s i n g l y r e l e v a n t t o the problem 
of human existence i n the i n d u s t r i a l s t a t e 
( i b i d . pp.279-80). 
To r e — a f f i r m the p o i n t I s h a l l i n what f o l l o w s be concerned w i t h 
the m o b i l i s a t i o n of symbols of order " i n r e l a t i o n to human problems we 
l e a s t understand". Questions about i l l n e s s t o u t c o u r t , however, 1 
leave aside. 
Nor i n the course o f t h i s p r e s e n t a t i o n do I r e p o r t on any work of 
my own w i t h f a m i l i e s of schizophrenic p a t i e n t s . I t may w e l l be asked -
given my concern w i t h the b u s t l e ( i n t e l l e c t u a l and otherwise) around the 
schizophrenic - why not. The most compelling reason f o r t h i s omission 
i s unashamedly p r a c t i c a l ; as w i l l , I hope, s h o r t l y be apparent I had 
more than enough on my hands w i t h the immediate p a t i e n t s I was working 
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w i t h . There i s also another reason, only p a r t l y a r a t i o n a l i s a t i o n of 
the former: f a m i l y s t u d i e s , under the guise of di s c o v e r i n g an 
i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y to the schizophrenic's p e c u l i a r i t i e s i n the pa t t e r n s 
of behaviour w i t h i n the f a m i l y , have tended to remove themselves too 
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e a s i l y from the d e t a i l of the p a t i e n t ' s behaviour. By i s o l a t i n g the 
p a t i e n t from a p o t e n t i a l context of i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y we are for c e d , 
thereby, to stay close t o the r e a l p e r p l e x i t y . 
F i n a l l y , as must be apparent from what I have already s a i d , i t i s 
not p a r t of my purpose to c o n t r i b u t e to the e l a b o r a t i o n and refinement 
of the es t a b l i s h e d e d i f i c e of p s y c h i a t r i c c l a s s i f i c a t i o n . I s h a l l n o t , 
f o r example, concern myself w i t h the n i c e t i e s of the sub-divisions w i t h i n 
the d i a g n o s t i c framework of schizophrenia. I t w i l l be enough, f o r my 
purposes, t h a t the p a t i e n t s I discuss here have a f i r m diagnosis of 
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schizophrenia, t h a t they are deemed t o be chronic schizophrenics, t h a t 
on the basis o f c l i n i c a l evidence they are regarded as being thought 
disordered, and t h a t they f a l l w i t h i n the thought disordered range on 
the Bannister and F r a n s e l l a g r i d t e s t of schizophrenic thought disorder 
(1966). As f a r as the concept of thought disorder i s concerned I s h a l l 
n ot concern myself w i t h the d i s t i n c t i o n s described by Fish (1976) between 
disorders of the form of thought, of the stream of thought, of the 
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possession of thought, and of the content of thought. As Fish himself 
remarks " t h i s i s a purely a r t i f i c i a l scheme" ( i b i d . p.29). I n Section 
I I I . 2 i n p a r t i c u l a r our emphasis w i l l be, t a k i n g a lead from Bannister 
(1960, 1962), on thought process disorder, but here and elsewhere 
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matters of content w i l l i n t r u d e themselves. 
S i m i l a r l y my st r e s s i n a l l t h a t f o l l o w s i s on how we t h i n k about 
the whole business of schizophrenia - both at the l e v e l of what our 
experience of the i n d i v i d u a l schizophrenic engenders i n us, and of the 
ideas and p r a c t i c e s t h a t we have generated around him. I make no claims 
to o f f e r a developed d e s c r i p t i o n of the 'basic defect' i n schizophrenia. 
Nevertheless, as a concession i n t h i s d i r e c t i o n , i n an appendix to 
Section IV, I set out some ideas as t o the requirements f o r a formal 
c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n of the schizophrenic's r e l a t i o n to the worl d , 
p a r t i c u l a r l y as regards h i s p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n language. 
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Notes 
Bastide (1971) discusses the r e l a t i o n s between ideas about 
psychosis and the s t r u c t u r e of s o c i e t y . Michel Foucault puts the 
matter thus: 
...our s o c i e t y does not wish to recognize i t s e l f 
i n the i l l i n d i v i d u a l whom i t r e j e c t s or locks up; 
as i t diagnoses the i l l n e s s i t excludes the p a t i e n t . 
The analyses of our psychologists and s o c i o l o g i s t s 
which t u r n the p a t i e n t i n t o a deviant and which seek 
the o r i g i n of the morbid i n the abnormal are 
t h e r e f o r e above a l l a p r o j e c t i o n of c u l t u r a l 
themes. I n f a c t a s o c i e t y expresses i t s e l f 
p o s i t i v e l y i n the mental i l l n e s s e s manifested 
by i t s members; and t h i s i s so whatever status 
i s given to these morbid forms: whether i t 
places them a t the centre of i t s r e l i g i o u s 
l i f e as i s o f t e n the case among p r i m i t i v e peoples; 
or whether i t seeks to e x p a t r i a t e them by p l a c i n g 
them outside s o c i a l l i f e , as does our own 
c u l t u r e (1954, p.63). 
See a l s o , more g e n e r a l l y , on ideas and s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s , i n 
a d d i t i o n to the source c i t e d , Douglas (1975), e s p e c i a l l y 
Preface and Chapters 14 and 17. _ . . 
e.g., Menninger, e t . a l . (1963) who propose the a b o l i t i o n not only 
of the concept of schizophrenia but of a l l d i a g n o s t i c categories. 
The heat t h a t i s generated i s r e a d i l y seen i n the f o l l o w i n g , a 
l e t t e r from Gwynneth Hemmings, the Secretary of the Schizophrenia 
Association of Great B r i t a i n , w r i t i n g from an address i n 
Caernarvon: 
Our s o c i e t y , and e s p e c i a l l y our mentally s i c k , 
can no longer a f f o r d those p s y c h i a t r i s t s who do 
not regard schizophrenia as a wholly medical 
disease...One B r i t i s h p s y c h i a t r i s t r e c e n t l y 
wrote: 'The whole emphasis today i s to regard 
mental i l l n e s s as a breakdown i n i n t e r - p e r s o n a l 
r e l a t i o n s h i p s ' . Another wrote t o the 'Observer': 
'Medication does not a f t e r a l l preclude 
psychotherapy'. Would t h a t i t did...Our a s s o c i a t i o n 
i s determined t h a t p s y c h i a t r i s t s s h a l l give up 
t h e i r o l d c o n d i t i o n i n g which makes them make 
remarks l i k e these. They must accept the medical 
model o f schizophrenia or p e r i s h ignominiously 
( l e t t e r , 'The L i s t e n e r ' , 29 J u l y , 1971). 
The review pages and correspondence columns of 'New S o c i e t y 1 and 
'The L i s t e n e r ' seem on occasions to perform an admirable c l o a c a l 
f u n c t i o n i n these matters. We can see from the f o l l o w i n g example 
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t h a t a l l i s not w e l l i n the i n s t i t u t i o n o f schizophrenia. The 
w r i t e r i s a p s y c h i a t r i s t , and the book r e f e r r e d to i s Hirsch and 
L e f f ' s (1975) c r i t i c a l review of f a m i l y studies of schizophrenia. 
The book, so Hugh Freeman t e l l s us, i s a n t i - e n v i r o n m e n t a l , and 
demonstrates t h a t w i t h very few exceptions environmental studies 
of schizophrenia " t u r n out to be s l o p p i l y conceived, performed 
w i t h l i t t l e regard f o r s c i e n t i f i c method, and u n c r i t i c a l l y 
supported". I t w i l l , Hugh Freeman hopes, deter f u t u r e students 
from "fashionably reproducing i n t h e i r essays the idea t h a t 
schizophrenia i s an i n v e n t i o n of f a s c i s t bourgeois p s y c h i a t r i s t s " . 
He continues: 
I n the o r d i n a r y way of things an academic work of 
t h i s k i n d would be a matter of concern only f o r 
those p r o f e s s i o n a l l y i n v o l v e d . But f o r more than 
a decade schizophrenia, and the way i t i s handled 
i n developed s o c i e t i e s have become s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l 
and c u l t u r a l issues of enormous general s i g n i f i c a n c e . 
This process r e a l l y began w i t h the w r i t i n g s of Laing 
which have had w o r l d wide readership on a scale 
p r e v i o u s l y unknown f o r any psychological w r i t e r . 
I t has also i n v o l v e d a t o t a l r e j e c t i o n of p r i n c i p l e s 
of s c i e n t i f i c method which have developed ever 
since the Renaissance. L i t t l e a t t e n t i o n has been 
paid to the small voice of reason, and I p r e d i c t 
t h a t t h i s book w i l l not be a best s e l l e r among 
r a d i c a l teachers o f sociology, t h a t Hirsch and 
L e f f w i l l not be interviewed by trendy j o u r n a l i s t s 
i n expensive r e s t a u r a n t s , t h a t David Mercer w i l l 
n o t dramatise t h e i r f i n d i n g s f o r t e l e v i s i o n , and 
t h a t these w i l l not be f i l m e d by Garnett and Loach 
as occurred w i t h the Laingian v e r s i o n . However 
those who want to know the t r u t h about schizophrenia 
w i l l never spend a more i n f o r m a t i v e h a l f - h o u r than 
on the chapter 'What has been e s t a b l i s h e d ' i n t h i s 
book - a triumph o f s c i e n t i f i c honesty (New Society, 
4 September, 1975, pp.534-5). 
Alas, the 'ordinary way of t h i n g s ' i s w i t h us no more. This i s a l l 
good fun and a b i t extreme! I t does however b r i n g out the ' p u r i t y 
and danger' theme i n the i n s t i t u t i o n of schizophrenia: the t u s s l e 
to p r o t e c t the v i r t u e of science from the i n f i d e l i t i e s and wanton 
pr o m i s c u i t i e s of u n - s c i e n t i f i c invaders. 
The idea of schizophrenia as an i n s t i t u t i o n w i t h the schizophrenics 
i n the c e l l a r s was sparked o f f i n my mind by the reading of a 
l e t t e r t h a t Freud wrote t o Ludwig Binswanger. Binswanger had 
d e l i v e r e d an address i n commemoration of Freud's e i g h t i e t h b i r t h d a y 
i n which he discussed the extent to which psychoanalysis had 
o v e r s i m p l i f i e d and c o n s t r i c t e d human r e a l i t y . He sent Freud a 
copy and Freud r e p l i e d as f o l l o w s : 
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Dear Friend! A sweet s u r p r i s e your l e c t u r e ! 
Those who heard you and reported to me were 
v i s i b l y untouched by i t ; i t must have been too 
d i f f i c u l t f o r them. I n reading i t I r e j o i c e d 
over your b e a u t i f u l prose, your e r u d i t i o n , the 
scope of your h o r i z o n , your t a c t i n disagreement... 
But, of course, I don't b e l i e v e a word of what 
you say. I've always l i v e d only i n the p a r t e r r e 
and basement of the b u i l d i n g . You c l a i m t h a t 
w i t h a change of viewpoint one i s able t o see 
an upper s t o r y which houses such d i s t i n g u i s h e d 
guests as r e l i g i o n , a r t , e t c . You're not the 
only one who t h i n k s t h a t , most c u l t u r e d 
specimens of homo natura b e l i e v e t h a t . I n 
t h a t you are conservative, I r e v o l u t i o n a r y . 
I f I had another l i f e t i m e of work before me, 
I have no doubt t h a t I could f i n d room f o r 
these noble guests i n my l i t t l e subterranean 
house... (quoted i n Needleman, ed., 1968, 
pp.3-4). 
5. The i n s t i t u t i o n of schizophrenia i n t h i s country a t l e a s t s t i l l 
reposes on the foundations e s t a b l i s h e d by Kraepelin. I t was 
Kraepelin i n 1898 who f i r s t o u t l i n e d the concept o f dementia 
praecox. I n a remarkable statement Robert Kendell w r i t e s : 
"Although few contemporary p s y c h i a t r i s t s are content w i t h t h i s 
framework and even fewer would regard e i t h e r manic-depressive . 
i l l n e s s or schizophrenia as disease e n t i t i e s i n the t r a d i t i o n a l 
sense, we continue to use t h i s K r a e p e linian e d i f i c e i f only 
because i t i s f a m i l i a r and we have n o t h i n g b e t t e r to put i n i t s 
place" (1972, p.383). 
The concept of schizophrenia i t s e l f was f i r s t introduced by 
B l e u l e r (1911). I n an i n t e r e s t i n g a r t i c l e , S t i e r l i n (1967) 
delineates Bleuler's confusing h e r i t a g e . Most American and 
E n g l i s h readers are f a m i l i a r only w i t h Bleuler's monograph 
'Dementia Praecox or the Group of Schizophrenias'. O r i g i n a l l y 
published i n 1911 as a volume of Aschaffenburg's 'Handbuch' an 
English t r a n s l a t i o n appeared i n 1950. I n Germany, however, the 
monograph was never r e p r i n t e d and Bleuler's ideas became known 
through h i s textbook of p s y c h i a t r y of which s i x e d i t i o n s were 
published i n Bleuler's l i f e t i m e . The accounts of schizophrenia 
given i n the textbooks suggest a very d i f f e r e n t perspective from 
t h a t which we f i n d i n the o r i g i n a l monograph. I n B l e u l e r ' s 
o r i g i n a l work the boundaries of the concept of schizophrenia are 
threatened. S t i e r l i n w r i t e s : 
The border between schizophrenia and other p s y c h i a t r i c 
conditions became b l u r r e d . Schizophrenia, which 
B l e u l e r had undertaken to d e l i n e a t e more c l e a r l y 
and, so t o speak, more m i c r o s c o p i c a l l y than had 
ever been attempted before, seemed to d i s s o l v e 
i t s e l f as a c l e a r - c u t e n t i t y . I n emphasising t h a t 
schizophrenic symptoms exaggerated normal experiences, 
t h a t the psychological s e t t i n g was a l l important, 
and t h a t there e x i s t e d many a b o r t i v e and l a t e n t 
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forms of schizophrenia, B l e u l e r indeed threatened 
the very K r a e p e l i n i a n e d i f i c e which he had set 
out t o complete and underpin (1967, p.999). 
Overwhelming c r i t i c i s m , S t i e r l i n t e l l s us, was d i r e c t e d against 
B l e u l e r 1 s psychological theory i n which he had a p p l i e d the ideas 
of Freud. Gruhle, Bumke, and Hoch repudiated i t i n whole or 
major p a r t . Not only had psychoanalysis been allowed t o creep 
i n t o the domain, but B l e u l e r had i m p l i c i t l y questioned the 
assumptions on which p s y c h i a t r y rested. We can i d e n t i f y , 
S t i e r l i n w r i t e s , " b i t t e r emotional undertones i n the c r i t i c i s m 
launched at him". As a consequence from 1913 on B l e u l e r began 
to move away from Freud and c l o s e r to academic p s y c h i a t r y . He 
became more i n t e r e s t e d i n c l a i m i n g organic causes f o r the 
disturbance o f schizophrenia. S t i e r l i n concludes: " I n a sense 
he never seems to have given up on the task of r e c o n c i l i n g the 
two p s y c h i a t r i c t r a d i t i o n s but t h i s task c l e a r l y overtaxed him" 
( i b i d . p.1001). 
For a l l of t h i s - as Kendell's remark quoted above suggests - B l e u l e r 
by comparison to Kraepelin has had r a t h e r l i t t l e i n f l u e n c e i n t h i s 
country. Anthony Clare w r i t e s : " I n B r i t a i n , p s y c h i a t r i c p r a c t i c e 
i n the main favoured the K r a e p e l i n i a n approach w i t h i t s emphasis 
on possible b i o l o g i c a l c a u s a t i o n ^ i t s use of r e l a t i v e l y s t r i n g e n t 
and narrow diagno s t i c c r i t e r i a , and i t s somewhat modest acknowledge-
ment of the r o l e of psychodynamic aspects i n the c o n d i t i o n " 
(1976, p.119). 
6. A f t e r a period steeped i n the j o u r n a l s , out of contact w i t h 
schizophrenics themselves, one sometimes has t o f i g h t q u i t e hard t o 
remind oneself t h a t there i s no such ' t h i n g ' as schizophrenia. 
Mendel, i n t r o d u c i n g a recent book on schizophrenia, w r i t e s : 
"A book on the t o p i c o f schizophrenia w r i t t e n i n the 1970's 
i s n e c e s s a r i l y a book of c l i n i c a l observation and of s p e c u l a t i o n . . . 
The only data we have are the observed behaviour of people who 
experience the d i f f i c u l t y we c a l l schizophrenia" (1976, p.2). 
From t h i s a l l else f o l l o w s . I t i s , as I s h a l l t r y to show, a 
s t a r t i n g p o i n t - the p o i n t , t h a t i s , of d i r e c t contact and 
experience between oneself and a schizophrenic - t h a t one must 
n e i t h e r f o r g e t nor abandon. 
7. See f o r example Bannister's paper 'The L o g i c a l Requirements of 
Research i n t o Schizophrenia' (1968). Bannister argues t h a t 
schizophrenia i s an unusable concept i n a s c i e n t i f i c context 
because i t s boundaries are not i n order. I t " f a l l s s h o r t of the 
rigorous d e f i n i t i o n a l requirements which must be met by concepts 
used i n a s c i e n t i f i c context". And more s t r o n g l y : "Research i n t o 
schizophrenia as such should not be undertaken. Research can take 
as i t s s t a r t i n g p o i n t some c h a r a c t e r i s t i c which (whatever i t s 
h i s t o r i c a l a s s o c i a t i o n w i t h the concept of schizophrenia) can be 
defined i n i t s own r i g h t , e.g., thought d i s o r d e r , delusions" 
(1968, p.182). On f i r s t reading the argument i s e n t i c i n g : I 
would agree t h a t research i n t o schizophrenia 'as such' i s of 
d o u b t f u l value. However a l o t i s t h r u s t i n t o t h a t 'as such'. 
Peter Winch helps us unravel what i s at issue: 
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. . . i t i s q u i t e mistaken i n p r i n c i p l e to compare the 
a c t i v i t y of a student of a form of s o c i a l behaviour 
w i t h t h a t o f , say, an engineer studying the workings 
of a machine...If we are going t o compare the s o c i a l 
student to an engineer we s h a l l do b e t t e r to compare 
him to an apprentice engineer who i s studying what 
engineering - t h a t i s , the a c t i v i t y of engineering -
i s a l l about. His understanding o f s o c i a l phenomena 
i s more l i k e the engineer's understanding of h i s 
colleagues' a c t i v i t i e s than i t i s l i k e the engineer's 
understanding of the mechanical system which he 
studies (1958, p.88). 
B r i e f l y our argument runs thus. The p r e v a i l i n g tendency i s to t r e a t 
schizophrenia - i . e . , the forms of s o c i a l behaviour subsumed under 
the concept - as i f i t were a machine. Bannister asserts t h a t t h i s 
won't do, and w i t h t h i s we would agree. For our p a r t we have put 
the emphasis on what the a c t i v i t y i n r e l a t i o n to schizophrenics 
i s a l l about: hence our concern w i t h the i n s t i t u t i o n of 
schizophrenia. But here we p a r t company w i t h Bannister, f o r 
Bannister i s t r o u b l e d not by the idea of t r e a t i n g schizophrenia 
as i f i t were a machine, but because i t i s a r a t h e r poor machine: 
i t threatens to f a l l apart. And i n i t s stead he would s u b s t i t u t e 
a b e t t e r one. Just what the consequence of t h i s i s i n h i s own case 
we discuss i n I I I . 2 . 
8. For a standard work on the h i s t o r y of p s y c h i a t r y , s t i l l widely 
quoted, see Z i l b o o r g (1940). 
Andrew S k u l l has t h i s to say about the orthodox treatments: 
Most p s y c h i a t r i c h i s t o r i a n s have been i n c l i n e d 
to equate the s h i f t from r e l i g i o u s or demonological 
explanations of i n s a n i t y towards a conception of 
i t as i l l n e s s w i t h the progress of science. As 
ideology an account of the establishment o f a 
medical monopoly over the treatment of i n s a n i t y 
i n these s i m p l i s t i c terms has obvious value, 
c r e a t i n g a myth w i t h powerful p r o t e c t i v e f u n c t i o n s 
f o r the p r o f e s s i o n of p s y c h i a t r y . As e x p l a n a t i o n , 
however, i t s adequacy i s d i s t i n c t l y more dubious, 
inasmuch as i t completely ignores the s o c i a l 
processes i n v o l v e d i n any such t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of 
perspectives (1975, p.221). 
S k u l l , i n two f a s c i n a t i n g papers (1975, 1976) documents how 
p s y c h i a t r i s t s i n England " f i r s t gained c o n t r o l over t h a t 
type of deviance which must be assumed t o form t h e i r core 
area of competence, namely i n s a n i t y " (1975, p.218). The 
medical p r o f e s s i o n , he suggests, where i t was weak on 
s c i e n t i f i c evidence was strong on p o l i t i c a l s t r a t e g y and 
the capacity to hood-wink the l a y community. However, 
Monro, a leading p r o t a g o n i s t of the medical p r o f e s s i o n 
i n i t s incursions i n t o the domain of i n s a n i t y , when 
brought before the Select Committee of 1815 to i n v e s t i g a t e 
the conditions i n asylums was forced to make the damaging 
admission t h a t : 
26 
I do not t h i n k medicine i s the sheet anchor; 
i t i s more by management t h a t those p a t i e n t s 
are cured than by medicine...The disease i s 
not cured by medicine i n my o p i n i o n . I f I 
am obliged to make t h a t p u b l i c I must do so 
(1975, p.230. Ref. from House of Commons, 
Report of Select Committee, 1815, p.99). 
Not so many years l a t e r the Journal of Mental Science - the forerunner 
of the B r i t i s h Journal of Psychiatry - could w r i t e i n an e d i t o r i a l : 
" I n s a n i t y i s purely a disease o f the b r a i n . The p h y s i c i a n i s now 
the responsible guardian of the l u n a t i c and ever must remain so" 
(October, 1858, Vol. I I ) . 
The d i f f i c u l t y w i t h S k u l l ' s work i s t h a t though he ably documents 
the s o c i a l processes w i t h i n the p r o f e s s i o n of p s y c h i a t r y he tends 
to w r i t e as though the whole problem of mental i l l n e s s , and our 
response to i t , i s t o be viewed i n r e l a t i o n to the machinations 
of a p a r t i c u l a r p r o f e s s i o n a l group. The same i s of course t r u e 
t o an even greater extent of the w r i t i n g s of Thomas Szasz (e.g., 
1976). As we s h a l l see, i n my judgement a r a t h e r d i f f e r e n t account 
i s needed, at l e a s t as f a r as schizophrenia i s concerned. 
On the h i s t o r y of schizophrenia see also Szasz (1976). 
9. Features of t h i s k i n d - from a c l i n i c a l standpoint a t any r a t e - are 
o f t e n t a l k e d about i n the language of- -manpower shortage'. That 
r e s t r i c t i o n s on intimacy are q u i t e c l e a r l y f u n c t i o n a l can be seen 
from a number of sources. Anthony Clare (1976) quotes from John 
Strauss (1973) to the e f f e c t t h a t : "The b e t t e r a c l i n i c i a n knows 
a p a t i e n t the harder i t i s t o make a diagnosis". Clare h i m s e l f , 
d iscussing the a t t r a c t i o n of the ' t y p o l o g i c a l ' model of diagnosis 
f o r the vast m a j o r i t y of p s y c h i a t r i s t s i n t h i s country /remarks 
t h a t many p s y c h i a t r i s t s "working i n large h o s p i t a l s w i t h a p a t i e n t 
load t h a t makes i t d i f f i c u l t t o get t o know each p a t i e n t to any 
s i g n i f i c a n t extent...focus more on the disease type than on the 
p a r t i c u l a r p e c u l i a r i t i e s of the i n d i v i d u a l ' s s t a t e (some may p r e f e r 
to work t h i s way)" ( i b i d . p.142). Furthermore, "when i n d i v i d u a l 
d i f f e r e n c e s are s c r u t i n i z e d w i t h some care, i t can t u r n out to be 
a troublesome task to assign a l l but the most ' t y p i c a l ' p a t i e n t s 
to the prescribed categories" ( i b i d . p.143). 
Kuhn (1970) suggests t h a t science operates not by r u l e s but by 
shared examples. The d i f f i c u l t y f o r the human sciences i s t h a t 
the examples may not be constant. They may change independently 
of our i n t e r v e n t i o n , or appear d i f f e r e n t l y according to the p o s i t i o n 
we take up i n r e l a t i o n to them. And more p e r t i n e n t l y , i n order to 
maintain a semblance of constancy we must always ma i n t a i n the same 
r o l e i n r e l a t i o n to them. Feyerabend captures the i d e a l of ' p u r i t y ' 
t h a t u n d e r l i e s the t r a d i t i o n a l research r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h the 
schizophrenic: 
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...our h a b i t of saying 'the t a b l e i s brown' when 
we view i t under normal circumstances, w i t h our 
senses i n good order, but the 't a b l e seems to be 
brown' when e i t h e r the l i g h t i n g c o n d i t i o n s are 
poor or when we f e e l unsure i n our capacity of 
observation expresses the b e l i e f t h a t there are 
f a m i l i a r circumstances when our senses are 
capable of seeing the world 'as i t r e a l l y i s ' 
and o t h e r , e q u a l l y f a m i l i a r circumstances, when 
they are deceived...All these are a b s t r a c t and 
h i g h l y d o u b t f u l assumptions which shape our 
world w i t h o u t being accessible to a d i r e c t 
c r i t i c i s m (1975, p.31). 
A more complex f o r m u l a t i o n of the way i n which dimensions such as 
time, the r e l a t i o n s h i p between p a t i e n t and research worker, and the 
s t r u c t u r e of the knowledge t h a t i s produced^interact on each other 
i s i n terms of the concepts of ' c l a s s i f i c a t i o n ' and 'framing' as 
developed i n B a s i l Bernstein's paper 'The C l a s s i f i c a t i o n and 
Framing of Educational Knowledge' (see Bernstein, 1971). I t would 
indeed be i n t e r e s t i n g t o formulate the 'pedagogy' of the 
i n s t i t u t i o n of schizophrenia i n these terms. 
10. To give c r e d i t where i t i s due, Roth i n an i l l u m i n a t i n g passage 
casti g a t e s Szasz f o r h i s procrustean conception of ' i l l n e s s ' : 
Of course i f i l l n e s s i s a matter of lumps, 
lesions and germs most schizophrenics are 
p e r f e c t l y h e a l t h y . But such d e f i n i t i o n s of 
disease would be repudiated even by 
physicians as too a r i d and r e s t r i c t i v e f o r 
general medicine. For p s y c h i a t r y which i s 
p r i m a r i l y concerned w i t h mental s u f f e r i n g 
i t s m i t i g a t i o n and prevention i r r e s p e c t i v e 
of cause, they are even more i r r e l e v a n t . 
I t i s w i t h the t r i b u l a t i o n s of people t h a t 
the analysis of the scope and l i m i t a t i o n s 
of p s y c h i a t r y has t o begin. 'Disease' i s 
a h i g h l y complicated concept and t o impose 
upon the word the concreteness of hard f i x e d 
objects of one's personal choice i s something 
d i f f e r e n t from understanding (1976, p.319). 
The scope and l i m i t a t i o n of responses to a p a r t i c u l a r form of 
t r i b u l a t i o n : t h a t i s indeed our concern. 
11. Thus f o r example Professor Henry M i l l e r of Newcastle-upon-Tyne t e l l s 
us t h a t the evidence presented i n Mayer-Gross, S l a t e r and Roth 
(1969): " w i l l probably convince most readers uncommitted to a 
metaphysical approach t o p s y c h i a t r y t h a t genetic f a c t o r s predominate 
i n the causation of schizophrenic i l l n e s s " ( l e t t e r , 'The L i s t e n e r ' , 
22 J u l y , 1971). Between these two options we are not l e f t much 
choice. 
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See also 'Anti-Psychiatry: A Debate' (The New Review, o f f - p r i n t , 
1977), f e a t u r i n g Szasz, Clare and others. 'The Observer' comments: 
" I n i t s way the acrimonious a t t a c k on the unorthodox views of 
R.D. Laing by h i s f e l l o w p s y c h i a t r i s t , the American Dr. Thomas 
Szasz, i s as important to p s y c h i a t r y as the famous Leavis-Snow 
debate of the 1960's was t o l i t e r a t u r e " (10 A p r i l , 1977). This, 
i t h a r d l y needs saying, i s nonsense. 
A f i n e d e s c r i p t i o n o f a w o r l d l y man's v i s i t to the h e a r t l a n d of the 
i n s t i t u t i o n of schizophrenia i s given to us by Professor Roger 
Brown of Harvard U n i v e r s i t y (1973), known to us f o r h i s c o g n i t i v e 
studies of young c h i l d r e n . Brown t e l l s us t h a t he had been reading 
the works of authors such as Szasz and Laing, even "an occasional 
l e a f l e t of the Insane L i b e r a t i o n Movement - which i s j u s t t h a t " : 
A l l these things together suggested t h a t the 
ideas about psychoses e s p e c i a l l y schizophrenia, 
which I had absorbed i n graduate school some 
20 years ago and which had not seemed to be 
challenged i n any fundamental way by the 
p r o f e s s i o n a l reading I had done since,were 
nevertheless no longer considered beyond 
dispute ( i b i d . p.395). 
Responsible u n i v e r s i t y teacher t h a t he i s he decided t h a t he had 
b e t t e r explore these things f o r h i m s e l f . "The f a l l - t e r m reading 
p e r i o d gave me jmst three f r e e weeks i n which to get out of my 
o f f i c e and arrange something l i k e a p e r i o d of t o t a l immersion i n 
schizophrenia" ( i b i d . ) . What he d i d , among other t h i n g s , was to 
have p r i v a t e conversations w i t h a wide v a r i e t y of schizophrenics 
i n a l o c a l h o s p i t a l . "The experience i n general was sad, sometimes 
p s y c h o l o g i c a l l y s t r e s s f u l , but above a l l f a s c i n a t i n g to a 
psychologist whose experience had been l i m i t e d to the l a b o r a t o r y 
and classroom" ( i b i d . p.396). What comes a f t e r t h i s i s r e v e a l i n g : 
Twenty years of reading experimental studies 
t h a t c o n t r a s t performance on some l a b o r a t o r y task 
of normals and schizophrenics had, w i t h o u t my 
r e a l i z i n g i t , i n the case of the l a t t e r group, 
though not the former, b u i l t up a preconception 
of a homogeneous p o p u l a t i o n , a monolith bearing 
the mark of ' s c h i z o p h r e n i c i t y ' . What I discovered 
a f t e r a few conversations... i s t h a t persons 
c a l l e d schizophrenic are as diverse as persons 
c a l l e d normal. But one thinks they must have 
some common q u a l i t y or q u a l i t i e s , or else why 
are they labeled w i t h one term, and I kept 
t r y i n g to f i n d i t as I t a l k e d w i t h one person 
a f t e r another. I n the f i r s t few days I found 
my mind was doing something t h a t my reason 
c e r t a i n l y r e j e c t e d . I t was t r y i n g to f i n d 
some perceptual p r o p e r t y common to schizophrenics, 
some s p e c i a l look or sound t h a t the distance 
receptors, the eye and ear, could make use of 
i n the f u t u r e . I n time a l l hypotheses f a i l e d -
there seemed to be no r e l i a b l e stigma. Indeed, 
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when t h a t f a c t f i r s t came home to me i t was w i t h 
a c e r t a i n shock because one then recognizes t h a t 
anyone, however he looks or t a l k s i n o r d i n a r y 
s i t u a t i o n s , may have u t t e r e d thoughts t h a t 
could q u a l i f y him as schizophrenic ( i b i d . ) . 
He then found himself disabused i n another way: 
Throughout my three weeks I kept ray ears cocked f o r 
what has been c a l l e d schizophrenic speech, a k i n d 
of speech s t i l l o f t e n c a l l e d regressed, which 
suggests c h i l d l i k e , though not everyone who uses the 
term intends t h a t sense. While I f a i r l y o f t e n 
heard p a t i e n t s spoken to w i t h what I c a l l 
nursery school i n t o n a t i o n , a k i n d of exaggerated 
prosody t h a t most adults use w i t h small c h i l d r e n , 
I have to r e p o r t t h a t i n my three weeks I never 
heard anything c h i l d l i k e from a p a t i e n t nor 
indeed anything t h a t I would want to set apart 
as schizophrenic speech. As f a r as my experience 
goes and w i t h i n the l i m i t s o f a p a r t i c u l a r 
d e f i n i t i o n o f speech, I would have t o conclude 
t h a t there i s no such t h i n g as schizophrenic 
speech. I hasten to add t h a t I encountered 
p l e n t y of schizophrenic thought but t h a t i s 
another matter ( i b i d . p.397, emphasis i n the 
o r i g i n a l ) . 
His experience l e d him to f e e l t h a t the vast q u a n t i t y of research 
t h a t has t r i e d to e s t a b l i s h the basic d e v i a t i o n i n schizophrenia 
( o v e r i n c l u s i o n , a s s o c i a t i v e i n t r u s i o n s i n language, p a r a l o g i c i n 
t h i n k i n g e t c . ) i s d i s a p p o i n t i n g : 
A f t e r reading q u i t e a l o t of t h i s work I cannot 
help wondering i f there i s not a more fundamental 
d i f f i c u l t y . The tasks used have t y p i c a l l y been 
w e l l established l a b o r a t o r y tasks having s l i g h t 
and very occasional personal i n t e r e s t t o any 
subject. I t i s as i f the assumption were t h a t 
schizophrenia r e s u l t e d from an across-the-board, 
content-free impairment of a basic f u n c t i o n l i k e 
p e rception, l e a r n i n g , concept formation, or a t t e n t i o n . 
I f t h a t were indeed the case, then i t would make 
no d i f f e r e n c e what task was used t o t e s t the 
f u n c t i o n and convenience might as w e l l d i c t a t e 
the s e l e c t i o n . But i s t h i s the case?...In my 
conversations w i t h schizophrenics i t was not my 
impression t h a t some p a r t i c u l a r f u n c t i o n had 
become impaired i n a content-free way. Quite 
the c o n t r a r y i t seemed t h a t when one h i t upon 
or even approached the di s t u r b e d content area, 
any or a l l f u n c t i o n s might s u f f e r d i s r u p t i o n . 
And the d i f f e r e n c e s from normals were not 
s l i g h t ( i b i d . p.402). 
He i s , he t e l l s us, i n c l i n e d to the view t h a t "people studying f a m i l y 
i n t e r a c t i o n are on the r i g h t t r a c k " (he instances the work of 
Theodore L i d z , see, e.g., L i d z , 1975). 
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At the end of the day he i s . l e f t w i t h the f e e l i n g " t h a t I have been 
able to do n o t h i n g i n r e t u r n f o r the kindness of the persons 
c a l l e d schizophrenic whom I met during my three weeks out of the 
o f f i c e . And I deeply r e g r e t t h a t , because I found myself 
sympathetic to a l l of them, and pained by the s u f f e r i n g many 
endure each day". 
From our p o i n t of view Professor Brown provides a f a s c i n a t i n g 
account of what i t i s t o approach the schizophrenic as through 
the ' c l u t t e r ' t h a t l i t t e r s the space around him. On one p o i n t 
though we must f a u l t him: he i s much too modest and s e l f -
deprecating. " I do not expect", he w r i t e s , " t h a t experienced 
c l i n i c a l psychologists can l e a r n anything from my observations." 
His discovery t h a t people c a l l e d schizophrenic are as diverse 
as people c a l l e d normal must, he b e l i e v e s , be obvious to the 
i n i t i a t e d . What he f a i l s t o r e a l i s e i s t h a t though from one 
p o i n t of view i t may w e l l be obvious, the whole t h r u s t of the 
s c i e n t i f i c endeavour i s to repudiate such a r e c o g n i t i o n ; and 
hence the misapprehensions t h a t he brought w i t h him from h i s 
reading of the l i t e r a t u r e i n the f i r s t place. I t i s a p i t y 
t h a t he does not esteem h i s own 'naivety' more, f o r a good many 
'experts' have a great deal to l e a r n from him. 
His i n s i s t e n c e t h a t there i s no such ' t h i n g ' as schizophrenic 
language and t h a t whatever i s wrong w i t h schizophrenics i s to be 
located i n the "domain of meaning" ( i b i d . p.399) i s also i n the 
r i g h t d i r e c t i o n , as we s h a l l see from our l a t e r discussion. 
13. I n h i s remarkable study 'Against Method' the American philosopher 
of science Paul Feyerabend puts the whole matter of ' s c i e n t i f i c 
education' and of the loss of what i s one's own very w e l l : 
I t s i m p l i f i e s 'science' by s i m p l i f y i n g i t s 
p a r t i c i p a n t s : f i r s t a domain of research i s 
defined. The domain i s separated from the 
r e s t of h i s t o r y . . . a n d given a ' l o g i c ' of i t s 
own. A thorough t r a i n i n g i n such a l o g i c then 
con d i t i o n s those working i n the domain: i t 
makes t h e i r actions more uniform and i t 
freezes large p a r t s of the h i s t o r i c a l process 
as w e l l . 'Stable' f a c t s a r i s e and persevere 
despite the v i c i s s i t u d e s of h i s t o r y . An e s s e n t i a l 
p a r t of the t r a i n i n g t h a t makes such f a c t s 
appear consists i n the attempt t o i n h i b i t 
i n t u i t i o n s t h a t might lead t o a b l u r r i n g of 
boundaries. A person's r e l i g i o n , f o r example, 
or h i s metaphysics, or h i s sense of humour 
(h i s n a t u r a l sense of humour and not the i n b r e d 
and always r a t h e r nasty k i n d of j o c u l a r i t y one 
f i n d s i n s p e c i a l i z e d professions) must not have 
the s l i g h t e s t connection w i t h h i s s c i e n t i f i c 
a c t i v i t y . His imagination i s r e s t r a i n e d and 
even h i s language ceases to be h i s own. This 
i s again r e f l e c t e d i n the nature of s c i e n t i f i c 
' f a c t s ' which are experienced as being 
independent of o p i n i o n , b e l i e f and c u l t u r a l 
background (1975, p.19, emphasis i n the o r i g i n a l ) . 
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14. Habermas w r i t e s of the psychoanalyst t h a t he "makes himse l f the 
instrument of knowledge; n o t , however, by b r a c k e t i n g h i s 
s u b j e c t i v i t y but p r e c i s e l y by i t s c o n t r o l l e d employment" 
(1972, p.237). 
15. With some of t h i s a c t i v i t y there i s a l i m i t to argument; once one 
has demonstrated what i s going on, i t i s best t o walk away. 
16. See Sedgwick (1972, 1973) f o r the argument t h a t the s p e c i a l i s e d 
medical model of i l l n e s s i s not the only one. As Sedgwick r i g h t l y 
p o i n t s out the r e a l argument i n r e l a t i o n to mental i l l n e s s i s not 
over i l l n e s s as such but over the conversion of i l l n e s s i n t o the 
terms and procedures of technology. 
For a d i f f e r e n t argument see Sie g l e r and Osmond (1966). For these 
w r i t e r s s o c i a l explanations of schizophrenia are incompatible w i t h 
an i l l n e s s model and hence must be j e t t i s o n e d . 
17. Mental i l l n e s s , l i k e mental h e a l t h , i s a 
fundamentally c r i t i c a l concept: or can be 
made i n t o one provided t h a t those who use i t 
are prepared to place demands and pressures 
on the e x i s t i n g o r g a n i z a t i o n o f s o c i e t y . I n 
t r y i n g to remove and reduce the concept of 
mental i l l n e s s , the r e v i s i o n i s t t h e o r i s t s . . . 
have brought themselves and t h e i r p u b l i c i n t o 
a s t a t e of complete i n e r t i a : they can expose 
the h y p o c r i s i e s and annotate the tragedies 
of o f f i c i a l p s y c h i a t r y , but the concepts 
which they have developed enable them to 
engage i n no p u b l i c a c t i o n which i s grander 
than t h a t of wringing t h e i r hands (Peter Sedgwick, 
'Mental I l l n e s s is_ I l l n e s s ' , p.27; paper d e l i v e r e d 
to the Nati o n a l Deviancy Conference's Tenth Deviancy 
Symposium, U n i v e r s i t y of York, A p r i l 1972). 
See also Sedgwick (1973). 
18. See also, the posture t h a t has been adopted by proponents of the 
new vogue i n deviancy theory i n recent years. Just as, by Foucault's 
(1954) account, the 'great internment' of the l a t e seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries brought together w i t h i n the confines of a 
s i n g l e space the whole range of s o c i a l transgressors so, a f t e r long 
years of s o l i t a r y confinement, the schizophrenic has been r e - u n i t e d 
w i t h h i s f e l l o w transgressors i n the imaginative space of deviancy 
theory. T aylor, Walton and Young, authors of 'The New Criminology' 
w r i t e : 
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For us, as f o r Marx and other new c r i m i n o l o g i s t s , 
deviance i s normal, i n the sense t h a t men are now 
consciously i n v o l v e d ( i n the prisons t h a t are 
contemporary s o c i e t y and i n the r e a l p r i s o n s ) i n 
a s s e r t i n g t h e i r human di v e r s i t y . . The task i s not 
merely t o 'penetrate' these problems, nor merely 
to question the stereotypes, or to act as c a r r i e r s 
of ' a l t e r n a t i v e phenomenological r e a l i t i e s ' . 
The task i s t o create a s o c i e t y i n which the 
f a c t s o f human d i v e r s i t y whether personal, 
organic, or s o c i a l , are not subject t o the 
power to c r i m i n a l i z e (1973, p.282), 
Lest there be any doubt about the schizophrenic's i n c l u s i o n i n 
t h i s gathering, see p.270 i n the same book. Strong r h e t o r i c , 
but we should know b e t t e r than to r i d e w i t h t h i s , f o r j u s t as 
much as the t r a d i t i o n a l s c i e n t i f i c observers whom the authors 
berate so severely, 'The New Criminology' celebrates the d i v e r s i t y 
of the human scene as an a d u l t l o o k i n g over a w a l l views c h i l d r e n 
i n a playground. 
19. Raymond Williams, i n the context of a discussion of the responses 
of the n o v e l i s t t o s o c i a l change, w r i t e s of a s c e p t i c i s m and 
d i s b e l i e f t h a t came about i n the n i n e t e e n t h century " i n the 
p o s s i b i l i t y of understanding s o c i e t y " . "An important s p l i t takes 
place between knowable r e l a t i o n s h i p s , and an unknown, unknowable, 
overwhelming s o c i e t y " . Furthermore: 
...what i s knowable i s not only a f u n c t i o n of 
objects - of what i s there t o be known. I t i s 
also a f u n c t i o n of s u b j e c t s , of observers - of 
what i s d e s i r e d , and what needs to be known. 
A knowable community, t h a t i s to say, i s a 
matter o f consciousness as w e l l as of evident 
f a c t . . . I t i s t o j u s t t h i s problem of knowing 
a community - o f f i n d i n g a p o s i t i o n , a p o s i t i o n 
c onvincingly experienced, from which community 
can begin to be known - t h a t one of the major 
phases i n the development of the novel must be 
r e l a t e d (1970, p.17). 
20. The Ph.D. researcher i s something of a one-man band, and my 
schizophrenic instrument was several enough f o r my meagre musical 
t a l e n t s w i t h o u t a t t a c h i n g i t s r e l a t i v e s to my person. 
21. This i s p a r t i c u l a r l y t r u e of Laing and Esterson (1964). Even i f we 
allow t h a t the f a m i l i a l frame i s d i s t u r b e d , m y s t i f y i n g e t c . the l i n e 
of connection between the p a t i e n t ' s behaviour and the reported 
p a t t e r n of communication i n the f a m i l y i s s t i l l a d i f f i c u l t one. 
A demonstration of the m y s t i f i c a t i o n w i t h i n the f a m i l y cannot take 
away from the experience of what i t i s l i k e t o r e l a t e t o the 
p a t i e n t i n the absence of the f a m i l y . The i m p l i c a t i o n i n Laing 
and Esterson i s t h a t a l l these confusions o f relatedness e t c . w i l l 
disappear once the i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y of the p a t i e n t ' s behaviour i n 
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r e l a t i o n to the f a m i l y context i s demonstrated and accepted. 
T h i s i s to confuse an i n t e l l e c t u a l acceptance a t a somewhat a b s t r a c t 
l e v e l w i t h the s t u f f of what takes p l a c e i n i n t i m a t e r e l a t i o n s 
between people. 
22. Even those committed to the e d i f i c e of c l a s s i f i c a t i o n i n a l l i t s 
d e t a i l have sometimes eschewed th e s e d e f i n i t i o n a l n i c e t i e s . See 
f o r example the c r i t i c i s m s of R.W. Payne and h i s a s s o c i a t e s made 
by Foulds e t . a l . (1967). 
23. I t i s as w e l l to mention a t t h i s p oint another a s p e c t of what I 
have excluded. I n the next s e c t i o n I t a l k about t h e ' p a t i e n t ^ 
m a t e r i a l t h a t I have found i t n e c e s s a r y to exclude. I n a d d i t i o n 
I have a l s o j e t t i s o n e d some t h e o r e t i c a l m a t e r i a l : thus f o r 
example a s e c t i o n on p s y c h o a n a l y t i c p e r s p e c t i v e s on s c h i z o p h r e n i a , 
p a r t i c u l a r l y as these bear on problems of language and thought. 
But somehow one has to b r i n g things to a c l o s e . 
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I I . 1 . I n t r o d u c t i o n to the Fieldwork 
L e t me begin by s e t t i n g the scene. Most of the work was undertaken 
i n a l a r g e p r o v i n c i a l mental h o s p i t a l some e i g h t m i l e s from the n e a r e s t 
town.''' A daunting e d i f i c e , s e t on a r i s e , Enoch Powell must have had i t 
i n mind when i n h i s legendary address of 1961 he d e s c r i b e d the mental 
h o s p i t a l s : "There they stand, i s o l a t e d , m a j e s t i c , imperious, brooded 
over by the g i g a n t i c water-tower and chimney combined, r i s i n g 
unmistakable...out of the c o u n t r y s i d e " . 
I f we stand o u t s i d e the admission wards and look over to our r i g h t 
we can see over i n the f a r d i s t a n c e the environmental upheaval of a 
c o l l i e r y ; and a l l around us f i e l d s , some of i t a r a b l e , some of i t 
pasture w i t h cows g r a z i n g . And behind us, and f u r t h e r back, beyond the 
main h o s p i t a l b u i l d i n g s , the gardens: some of i t ornamental w i t h v a s t 
sweeps of lawn, much of i t given over to v e g e t a b l e s . And i f we should 
wonder how i n t h i s e r a of s t r i n g e n c y the h o s p i t a l can muster the r e s o u r c e s 
to s u s t a i n such a presence, we s h a l l not have to look f a r to f i n d the 
answer: rows of cloth-capped p a t i e n t s , t r a i l i n g long o v e r c o a t s , some of 
them heaving a c a r t , the r e s t armed w i t h spades and r a k e s , a uniformed 
attendant not f a r behind. 
Over the two and a h a l f y e ars t h a t I worked t h e r e I t r i e d , as f a r 
as I could t o l e r a t e , to steep myself i n the l i f e of the i n s t i t u t i o n : I 
attended case conferences and c l i n i c a l meetings, I lunched w i t h 
p s y c h i a t r i s t s and p s y c h o l o g i s t s , accompanied the s o c i a l workers on 
d o m i c i l i a r y v i s i t s , drank t e a wi t h the n u r s e s , gave a number of l e c t u r e s 
both i n the h o s p i t a l and a t l o c a l p s y c h i a t r i c departments, spent a number 
of days s i t t i n g i n a locked ward t a l k i n g and l i s t e n i n g to p a t i e n t s (much, 
I may add, to the d i s p l e a s u r e of the nurses f o r whom i t was untoward 
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t h a t a p r o f e s s i o n a l worker should s i t w i t h the p a t i e n t s i n t h e i r own 
space r a t h e r than i n the nurses s t a t i o n , the more e s p e c i a l l y s i n c e there 
was nothing about my c l o t h i n g t h a t d i s t i n g u i s h e d my s t a t u s ) and attended 
s o c i a l events. I t r i e d , i n other words, to i n v o l v e myself i n the 
i n s t i t u t i o n of s c h i z o p h r e n i a as i t went about i t s b u s i n e s s i n the 
h o s p i t a l and around: not j u s t the l i t e r a t u r e and the formal d i s c u s s i o n s , 
but the i n f o r m a l t r a f f i c k i n g t h a t goes on around p a t i e n t s . 
U n l i k e mental h o s p i t a l s i n l a r g e c i t i e s , the h o s p i t a l had no 
t r a d i t i o n of r e s e a r c h . The presence of a r o v i n g r e s e a r c h worker was 
t h e r e f o r e unusual and I was accorded a s i g n i f i c a n c e t h a t i n other s e t t i n g s 
I would not have had. The h o s p i t a l c o n s u l t a n t s were g e n e r a l l y extremely 
h e l p f u l i n p r o v i d i n g the c o n d i t i o n s w i t h i n which f o r me to work. I was 
given f r e e r e i n to see as many p a t i e n t s f o r as o f t e n , or as long, as I 
l i k e d . I n the words of one c o n s u l t a n t , I could do whatever I l i k e d as. 
long as i t was reasonable. The h o s p i t a l provided me w i t h the use of a 
room a t the corner of the female admission block, and i t was here t h a t I 
d i d most of the work t h a t I r e p o r t on i n t h i s t h e s i s . The l o c a t i o n of the 
room was important: away from the main p a r t of the h o s p i t a l where most 
of my p a t i e n t s l i v e d , i t provided me w i t h a space t h a t was r e l a t i v e l y 
s e p a r a t e from the dominant c a t e g o r i e s of everyday l i f e i n the h o s p i t a l . 
For the p a t i e n t s , too, I had c l e a r l y had a ' s p e c i a l ' r o l e t h a t 
marked me o f f from o t h e r s . To begin w i t h , i t was d i f f i c u l t , f o r the 
n u r s e s , e s p e c i a l l y , to s e p a r a t e my presence from t h a t of the h o s p i t a l 
p s y c h o l o g i s t , l a r g e l y because w i t h i n the h o s p i t a l I was designated as a 
' r e s e a r c h p s y c h o l o g i s t ' . Some of my p a t i e n t s , f o r example, were on 
o c c a s i o n s mistakenly d i r e c t e d to the 'treatment c e n t r e ' which housed -
along w i t h E.C.T. and other forms of apparatus - the c l i n i c a l psychology 
u n i t . However w i t h i n the p a t i e n t s u b c u l t u r e i t q u i c k l y became c l e a r t h a t 
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I belonged i n a category of my own, and t h a t my a s s o c i a t i o n s w i t h the 
medical and para-medical f r a t e r n i t i e s need not be taken too s e r i o u s l y . 
T h i s was p a r t l y a matter of i n f e r e n c e on my p a r t , but i t was a l s o s a i d 
to me e x p l i c i t l y on a number of o c c a s i o n s . Age and appearance were, 
a f t e r a l l , i n my favour, and i n a number of i n s t a n c e s , I was a c t u a l l y 
mistaken f o r a p a t i e n t . 
Those p a t i e n t s who were allowed freedom of movement most o f t e n 
made t h e i r own way over to see me. S e v e r a l of the p a t i e n t s w i t h whom 
I worked, however, were locked ward p a t i e n t s . When I began my work 
these p a t i e n t s were e s c o r t e d to my room by n u r s e s . I q u i c k l y came to 
f e e l that t h i s procedure d i d not enhance my r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h the 
p a t i e n t s , and armed as I now was, w i t h my own s e t of master-keys to 
the h o s p i t a l , I decided to c o l l e c t the p a t i e n t s themselves and r e t u r n 
them to the wards a f t e r the s e s s i o n . The arrangement produced i t s own 
discomforts i n t h a t I was now i n the r o l e of ' j a i l e r ' and t h i s a s p e c t 
was on occasions not l o s t on some of the p a t i e n t s . N e v e r t h e l e s s the 
conv e r s a t i o n s t h a t we sometimes had on the walk back to the wards from 
the admission b l o c k - the admission block was separated from the main 
p a r t of the h o s p i t a l by a wide acreage of lawn - were o f t e n extremely 
i l l u m i n a t i n g . 
For the p a t i e n t s 1 was marked o f f from the h o s p i t a l personnel i n 
another way too. As we have a l r e a d y seen a long-stay p a t i e n t i n an 
average mental h o s p i t a l i s l i k e l y to see a doctor f o r only ten minutes 
or so every three months. My im p r e s s i o n from the c h r o n i c p a t i e n t s w i t h 
whom I worked i s t h a t i n many cases c o n t a c t was even l e s s frequent. 
F o r the r e s t c o ntact i s e i t h e r between each other or w i t h n u r s e s . And 
the n u r s e s , e f f i c i e n t though they may have been a t managing the 
s i t u a t i o n s i n the wards, d i d not engage i n any depth w i t h the p a t i e n t s 
under t h e i r charge. The simple f a c t , then, of being able to have an 
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extended c o n v e r s a t i o n w i t h someone l e n t a ' s p e c i a l ' c h a r a c t e r to what I 
was doing. 
And we may wonder, i n t h i s connection, what the d e s i g n a t i o n of 
r e s e a r c h a c t u a l l y meant to these p a t i e n t s . My im p r e s s i o n was th a t 
though on f i r s t meeting i t may have t r i g g e r e d s u s p i c i o n s , i n the event 
i t came to count f o r r a t h e r l i t t l e . Treatment, i n the context of t h i s 
h o s p i t a l , meant e i t h e r t a b l e t s or E.C.T. I admi n i s t e r e d none of these, 
hence I must have been doing something d i f f e r e n t . There was, however, 
no meaningful a l t e r n a t i v e category i n which to put me. I suspect t h a t 
f o r many of the p a t i e n t s I was something of an anomaly, an unexpected 
b e n e f i t that t h e i r experience of the e s t a b l i s h e d c u r r e n c i e s of h o s p i t a l 
e x i s t e n c e could not have helped them to f o r e s e e . 
What I t o l d a l l the p a t i e n t s I worked w i t h was t h a t I was t r y i n g to 
l e a r n something about how they f e l t about themselves, about each o t h e r , 
and about t h e i r s i t u a t i o n . I made i t c l e a r i n every case t h a t a n y t h i n g 
they s a i d to me would not pass beyond us, unl e s s they s p e c i f i c a l l y asked 
me to do so. T h i s was a c o n t r a c t to which I r i g i d l y adhered. 
I have so f a r s e t the scene i n a general way. Most of my time, 
however, was spent i n a room alone w i t h p a t i e n t s , and i t i s to the 
m a t e r i a l that I c o l l e c t e d t h a t we must now turn. Over the p e r i o d of 
my r e s e a r c h I worked w i t h upward of f i f t y s c h i z o p h r e n i c p a t i e n t s . A 
few of these I saw only once, others f o r v a r y i n g d u r a t i o n s . Some of 
these p a t i e n t s were acute, f i r s t admission s c h i z o p h r e n i c s ; most of them 
were long-stay p a t i e n t s . A l l of them had r e c e i v e d a f i r m d i a g n o s i s of 
s c h i z o p h r e n i a by a c o n s u l t a n t p s y c h i a t r i s t . Each of the p a t i e n t s whom I 
saw completed the B a n n i s t e r & F r a n s e l l a G r i d T e s t of S c h i z o p h r e n i c 
Thought Di s o r d e r (1966), and s e v e r a l of them other g r i d s b e s i d e s . The 
bulk of my m a t e r i a l , however, d e r i v e s from d i s c u s s i o n s that I had w i t h 
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p a t i e n t s . For some of these I took w r i t t e n n o t e s , and s e v e r a l of 
them were taped. 
From the o u t s e t my aim was to work c l o s e l y w i t h a s m a l l number of 
chr o n i c s c h i z o p h r e n i c p a t i e n t s , and to use the m a t e r i a l taken from these 
p a t i e n t s as a means to i l l u m i n a t e some of the p e r p l e x i t i e s t h a t they 
pr e s e n t f o r us. But j u s t as I thought i t important to explore the wider 
parameters of the h o s p i t a l environment, so too i t seemed to me e s s e n t i a l 
to i n v e s t i g a t e the outer reaches of the l a r g e r group to which the 
sub-group of p a t i e n t s w i t h whom I worked c l o s e l y belonged. For one 
th i n g I wanted to be c l e a r i n my own mind t h a t the c o n s i d e r a t i o n s t h a t 
emerged f o r me from my own work w i t h the sub-group were to some ex t e n t 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e . For another, as a matter of p r a c t i c a l procedure, I needed 
to see a wide range of p a t i e n t s i n order to determine those w i t h whom I 
f e l t I could p r o f i t a b l y work more i n t i m a t e l y . 
For a r e s e a r c h endeavour such as t h i s my p r a c t i c e was I think the 
r i g h t one. However i t does c r e a t e d i f f i c u l t i e s f o r the p r e s e n t a t i o n of 
the m a t e r i a l . Very simply, I have too much m a t e r i a l . A l l t o l d , I have 
some s i x t y hours of tape-recorded m a t e r i a l , together w i t h s e v e r a l 
notebooks of hand-written notes. The main problem, then, has been one 
of e x c l u s i o n . The f i r s t p r i n c i p l e of e x c l u s i o n I have adopted i s only 
to present m a t e r i a l from p a t i e n t s w i t h whom I have worked a t a l l c l o s e l y . 
My i n c u r s i o n i n t o the wider h o s p i t a l environment, and my work w i t h other 
p a t i e n t s , do not appear e x p l i c i t l y ; n e v e r t h e l e s s they are the r e as an 
informing background, and what f o l l o w s could not have been w r i t t e n without 
t h a t work. 
Even w i t h i n the s m a l l sub-group of some ten p a t i e n t s , however, the 
m a t e r i a l i s s t i l l daunting. T h i s i s only p a r t l y a r e f l e c t i o n of i t s 
ex t e n t ; i t r e f l e c t s a l s o the c o m p l e x i t i e s w i t h i n the m a t e r i a l i t s e l f . 
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As R.D. L a i n g puts i t : "Each i n v e s t i g a t i o n i n t o the l i f e of any 
s i n g l e s c h i z o p h r e n i c p a t i e n t i s a l a b o r i o u s p i e c e of o r i g i n a l r e s e a r c h " 
(1960, p. 179). I have t h e r e f o r e chosen to b u i l d a c o n s i d e r a b l e p a r t of 
t h i s p r e s e n t a t i o n around the m a t e r i a l taken from one p a t i e n t , and even 
f o r t h i s p a t i e n t I have used only a f r a c t i o n of the twenty hours of 
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tape-recording on which he f e a t u r e s . P r e s e n t l y I s h a l l say something 
about the b a s i s f o r my choice of t h i s p a t i e n t , and the p r i n c i p l e s of 
s e l e c t i o n I have adopted i n p r e s e n t i n g h i s m a t e r i a l . A l l of the 
p a t i e n t s have been given f i c t i t i o u s names, though as f a r as p o s s i b l e I 
have chosen names th a t seem to me to capture something of the 
i n d i v i d u a l i t y of the p a t i e n t concerned. Where ap p r o p r i a t e I have a l t e r e d 
i d e n t i f y i n g d e t a i l s , such as p l a c e names. Otherwise e v e r y t h i n g i s as 
i t was given to me. Joseph, as I have chosen to c a l l him, i s my 
p r i n c i p a l a c t o r ; seven other p a t i e n t s make appearances of v a r y i n g 
l e n g t h as a supporting c a s t , and to s i x of these I pay p a r t i c u l a r 
a t t e n t i o n i n my d i s c u s s i o n of the personal c o n s t r u c t theory approach to 
the study of s c h i z o p h r e n i c thought d i s o r d e r i n S e c t i o n I I I . A l l of 
these p a t i e n t s had a d i a g n o s i s of c h r o n i c s c h i z o p h r e n i a , and a l l of 
them were regarded as being thought-disordered on the b a s i s of c l i n i c a l 
e vidence.^ 
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I I . 2 . P r e l i m i n a r i e s 
S h o r t l y I s h a l l i n t r o d u c e Joseph. Before I do so, however, some 
p r e l i m i n a r i e s . I n the i n t r o d u c t i o n I quoted from Michel F o u c a u l t ' s 
observations to the e f f e c t t h a t Western C i v i l i z a t i o n has t h r u s t the 
language of madness i n t o s i l e n c e . I n h i s i n a u g u r a l l e c t u r e to the 
College de France F o u c a u l t takes the matter f u r t h e r . He poses the 
q u e s t i o n : "...qu'y a - t - i l done de s i p e r i l l e u x dans l e f a i t que l e s 
gens p a r l e n t , e t que l e u r s d i s c o u r s i n d e f i n i m e n t p r o l i f e r e n t ? Ou done 
e s t l e danger?" And he c o n t i n u e s : "Je suppose que dans toute s o c i e t e 
l a production du d i s c o u r s e s t a l a f o i s c o n t r o l e e , s e l e c t i o n n e e , 
organisee e t r e d i s t r i b u t e par un c e r t a i n nombre de procedures qui ont 
pour r o l e d'en c o n j u r e r l e s pouvoirs e t l e s dangers, d'en m a i t r i s e r 
l'evenement a l e a t o i r e , d'en e s q u i v e r l a lourde, l a redoutable m a t e r i a l i t e " 
(1971, p.10-11). He i n s t a n c e s three procedures of e x c l u s i o n ; one of 
these i s the o p p o s i t i o n between reason and madness. "Jamais, avant l a 
f i n du x v i i i e s i e c l e , un medicin n ' a v a i t eu l ' i d e e de s a v o i r ce qui 
e t a i t d i t (comment e ' e t a i t d i t , pourquoi e ' e t a i t d i t ) dans c e t t e p a r o l e 
qui pourtant f a i s a i t l a d i f f e r e n c e " ( i b i d . pp.13-14). We are tempted 
to b e l i e v e t h a t i n our time things are d i f f e r e n t ; t h a t " l a p a r o l e du 
fou n ' e s t p l u s de l ' a u t r e c 6 t e du partage; q u ' e l l e n ' e s t p l u s n u l l e 
e t non avenue; q u ' e l l e nous met aux aguets au c o n t r a i r e ; que nous y 
cherchons un sens, ou l ' e s q u i s s e ou l e s r u i n e s d'une oeuvre; e t que nous 
sommes parvenus a l a surprendre, c e t t e p a r o l e du fou dans ce que nous 
a r t i c u l o n s nous-m£mes, dans c e t a c c r o c minuscule par oil ce que nous 
disons nous £chappe" ( i b i d . ) . Yet we have only to look a t " t o u t 
1'armature de s a v o i r a t r a v e r s l a q u e l l e nous d e c h i f f r o n s c e t t e p a r o l e ; 
i l s u f f i t de songer a tout l e r e s e a u d ' i n s t i t u t i o n s qui permet a 
quelqu'un - medicin, p s y c h a n a l y s t e - d'ecouter c e t t e p a r o l e e t q u i 
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permet en meme temps au p a t i e n t de v e m r apporter, ou desesperement 
r e t e n i r , ces pauvres mots; i l s u f f i t de songer a tout c e l a pour 
soupconner que l e partage, l o i n d'etre e f f a c e , joue autrement, s e l o n 
des l i g n e s d i f f e r e n t e s , a t r a v e r s des i n s t i t u t i o n s n o u v e l l e s e t avec 
des e f f e t s q ui ne sont point l e s memes" ( i b i d . p.15). 
And i t i s not d i f f i c u l t to see what F o u c a u l t i s g e t t i n g a t . A l l 
along the tendency has been to a s s i m i l a t e or absorb the s c h i z o p h r e n i c ' s 
speech - the d e t a i l of an a c t i v e s t a t e of a f f a i r s as i t i s rendered over 
time, what gets s a i d , and how i t a f f e c t s us - i n t o another d i s c o u r s e 
t h a t i s not the s c h i z o p h r e n i c ' s own but i s a d i s c o u r s e about him. I t i s 
most unusual i n the v a s t l i t e r a t u r e on s c h i z o p h r e n i a to be permitted to 
l i s t e n to a s c h i z o p h r e n i c speak i n any depth. The evidence f o r the 
tendency we f i n d s c a t t e r e d a c r o s s a range of responses that belong to 
very d i f f e r e n t t h e o r e t i c a l frameworks: i t i s as t r u e , f o r example, of 
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p s y c h o a n a l y t i c p r e s e n t a t i o n s as i t i s of r e p e r t o r y g r i d s t u d i e s . And 
the text-book p r e s e n t a t i o n s of s c h i z o p h r e n i c speech a r e , from B l e u l e r 
(1911) on, l e g i o n ; a small item - o f t e n the most ob v i o u s l y incomprehensible -
of s c h i z o p h r e n i c speech i s f i x e d to the page; i t s s e l f - e v i d e n t s t u p i d i t y 
then comes to s e r v e as a j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r another k i n d of approach t h a t 
pays no f u r t h e r a t t e n t i o n to the d e t a i l of what the p a t i e n t says."* As 
Raymond Williams remarks i n another context, "the l i v i n g speech of human 
beings i n t h e i r s p e c i f i c s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s i n the world" comes to be 
"reduced to i n s t a n c e s and examples of a system" which l i e s beyond them 
(1977, p.27). Mary Douglas d i s c o v e r s a s i m i l a r tendency among those 
a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s who r e j e c t the d e t a i l of s o c i a l l i f e as i t i s l i v e d i n 
favour of i s o l a t e d c a t e g o r i e s of thought: 
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...a p r e d i l e c t i o n f o r c o n c r e t i s i n g w r i t t e n words 
and t r e a t i n g them as the only hard and s o l i d o b j e c t s 
of study. The a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s t a r t s by s a y i n g t h a t 
the only a c c e s s i b l e r e a l i t y l i e s i n the words of 
c l a s s i f i c a t o r y systems. He goes on to w r i t e as i f 
t h i s e x t e r n a l l y v i s i b l e and audible r e a l i t y r e p r e s e n t s 
another more r e a l but hidden one, the c a t e g o r i e s 
i n s i d e the heads of the informants. The system 
of c l a s s i f i c a t i o n i s c r e d i t e d w i t h autonomy and 
f i x i t y , n e i t h e r of which i t p l a u s i b l y has. According 
to t h i s p r e s e n t a t i o n the r e s t of human behaviour 
i s a b l o o d l e s s a f f a i r , without s t r i f e or f e e l i n g . 
These a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s s p i r i t u a l i s e s o c i a l l i f e . . . 
On t h e i r r e c o r d an awful l o t of human behaviour 
i s d i s c a r d e d as unworthy of a s c h o l a r ' s time. T h i s 
view has something of the a t t r a c t i o n of p l a s t i c 
f l o w e r s . The verb to express a l l o w s the t r a n s i e n t 
to be f i x e d . L i f e moves too f a s t f o r easy a n a l y s i s . 
E x c l u s i v e f o c u s i n g upon e x p r e s s i o n and i t s l o g i c a l 
c a t e g o r i e s detaches from the f l u x of l i v i n g 
something t h a t w i l l s t a y s t i l l long enough to be 
contemplated (1975, p.120). 
I n a very obvious way, then, one of our t a s k s , i f we a r e not to 
undermine our endeavour before i t i s even p r o p e r l y under way, must be to 
c l o s e t o u r s e l v e s away w i t h the s c h i z o p h r e n i c p a t i e n t f o r a c o n s i d e r a b l e 
p e r i o d of time. We have to r e s i s t the temptation to extrude the 
d i f f i c u l t i e s and the d i s t u r b a n c e s t h a t such a confine may impose on us 
i n t o congenial formalisms, of which the i n s t i t u t i o n of s c h i z o p h r e n i a 
has a ready supply. Only from w i t h i n such a space can we begin to 
understand something of the way i n which the s c h i z o p h r e n i c i n t r u d e s 
i n t o , or p u l l s a t the margins of, those forms of order, r e l e v a n c e , and 
r e l a t i o n to which we most s t r o n g l y adhere; to grasp, i n F o u c a u l t ' s 
f o r m u l a t i o n , the 'dangers' of the p s y c h o t i c ' s d i s c o u r s e . E r v i n g Goffman 
puts the same q u e s t i o n i n h i s own terms when he concerns h i m s e l f w i t h 
the k i n d of ' s o c i a l d e l i c t ' t h a t p s y c h o s i s c o n s t i t u t e s . " P s y c h i a t r i s t s " 
he w r i t e s , "have f a i l e d to provide us w i t h a s y s t e m a t i c framework f o r 
i d e n t i f y i n g and d e s c r i b i n g the type of d e l i c t r e p r e s e n t e d by p s y c h o t i c 
behaviour." And he c o n t i n u e s : 
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P s y c h o s i s i s something t h a t can manifest i t s e l f 
i n the p a t i e n t ' s work p l a c e , i n h i s neighborhood, 
i n h i s household, and must be seen, i n i t i a l l y a t 
l e a s t , as an i n f r a c t i o n of the s o c i a l order t h a t 
obtains i n these places...Common c r i m i n a l s , we say, 
offend the property order; homosexuals the s e x - r o l e 
order; drug a d d i c t s perhaps the moral order; and so 
f o r t h . We must ask, then, what type of s o c i a l order 
i s s p e c i f i c a l l y r e l a t e d to p s y c h o t i c behaviour? 
(1964, p.139, p.141). 
The questions he asks a r e , I t h i n k , the r i g h t ones, a l b e i t t h a t 
the answers he provides, as we s h a l l see l a t e r , a r e unable to do the 
work t h a t i s r e q u i r e d of them. 
We are now almost ready to meet Joseph, but not q u i t e . S t i l l 
r e q u i r e d of us i s to say something a l i t t l e more e x a c t i n g about how we 
approach a p a t i e n t such as Joseph. To s e t about t h i s we s h a l l borrow 
from the German s o c i a l philosopher Jllrgen Habermas. Habermas, by v i r t u e 
of h i s concerns w i t h the human i n t e r e s t s t h a t d i r e c t and underpin 
s c i e n t i f i c endeavours, i s i n any case of i n t e r e s t to us. More 
s p e c i f i c a l l y he has i n r e c e n t y e a r s developed an i n t e r e s t i n problems 
of meaning and understanding as these bear on the models of language 
a c t i v i t y t h a t we hold t o , t h a t i s d i r e c t l y r e l e v a n t to our purposes. 
Habermas, i t need h a r d l y be s a i d , i s not easy r e a d i n g and i n these next 
few pages I s h a l l t r y to show as s u c c i n c t l y as I can t h a t h i s r e c e n t 
treatment of these matters p o i n t s us i n a d i r e c t i o n , and a t the same 
time g r a v e l y d i s t o r t s the p o s s i b i l i t i e s t h a t the approach appears to 
suggest. Hopefully the e x e r c i s e , a p a r t from any i n t r i n s i c i n t e r e s t i t 
might have, w i l l s e r ve to t i g h t e n our e x p l i c a t i o n of our own endeavour. 
Habermas, i n the context of a d i s c u s s i o n of the hermeneutics of 
D i l t h e y , remarks on the " p r a c t i c a l " c h a r a c t e r of the " k n o w l e d g e - c o n s t i t u t i v e 
i n t e r e s t of the c u l t u r a l s c i e n c e s " . " I t i s " he w r i t e s , " d i s t i n g u i s h e d 
from the t e c h n i c a l c o g n i t i v e i n t e r e s t i n t h a t i t aims not at the 
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comprehension of an o b j e c t i f i e d r e a l i t y , but at the maintenance of 
the i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y of mutual understanding, w i t h i n whose h o r i z o n 
r e a l i t y can f i r s t appear as something" (1972, p.176). I t aims a t 
comprehension c e r t a i n l y , but the comprehension i s ach i e v e d through 
dialogue w i t h i n the speech s i t u a t i o n , through communicative, as opposed 
to i n s t r u m e n t a l , a c t i o n . We can say t h a t Habermas puts forward a model 
tha t stands i n c o n t r a s t to the "monologue of reason about madness" t h a t 
F o u c a u l t a l l u d e s to. Elsewhere, i n an a r t i c l e i n which he d i s c u s s e s 
s t r a t e g i e s of comprehension i n r e l a t i o n to communication, he w r i t e s : 
"Any attempt to l o c a t e misunderstanding i n communication i s i t s e l f 
p a r t of a f u r t h e r (or p o s s i b l y the same) process of r e c i p r o c a l 
communication, and t h e r e f o r e not the r e s u l t of 'observing' such 
p r o c e s s e s . The c r i t i c a l vantage-point can never be b e t t e r than t h a t of 
a p a r t n e r i n the communication" (1970a, p.206). He then l e a d s on to say 
t h a t : "...we have no v a l i d c r i t e r i o n a t our d i s p o s a l f o r determining 
i n g e neral whether we are l a b o u r i n g under the mistaken c o n v i c t i o n of 
normal understanding, and thus wrongly c o n s i d e r i n g d i f f i c u l t i e s to be 
h e r m e n e u t i c a l l y e x p l i c a b l e , when they a c t u a l l y r e q u i r e s y s t e m a t i c 
a n a l y s i s " ( i b i d . ) . 
Hermeneutic understanding i s ab l e to help us where " d i f f i c u l t i e s 
of comprehension are the r e s u l t of c u l t u r a l , temporal, or s o c i a l 
d i s t a n c e " ; we are ab l e to say i n p r i n c i p l e "what f u r t h e r information 
we would need i n order to achieve understanding"; we are a b l e , t h a t i s , 
"to r e c o g n i s e , w i t h i n the l i m i t s of normal communication, what i t i s t h a t 
we do not - y e t - know" ( i b i d . p.205). However i n those c a s e s where 
" i n c o m p r e h e n s i b i l i t y r e s u l t s from a f a u l t y o r g a n i z a t i o n of speech 
i t s e l f " that Habermas terms " s y s t e m a t i c a l l y d i s t o r t e d communication" -
and h e r e he i n s t a n c e s "the c l e a r l y p a t h o l o g i c a l speech d i s t u r b a n c e s to 
be observed...among p s y c h o t i c s " - a d i f f e r e n t form of understanding i s 
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r e q u i r e d , which he c a l l s s c e n i c understanding. S c e n i c understanding 
determines the a n a l y t i c a l c o n v e r s a t i o n between p a t i e n t and a n a l y s t and 
i s "based on the d i s c o v e r y t h a t the p a t i e n t behaves i n the same way i n 
h i s symptomatic scenes as he does i n c e r t a i n t r a n s f e r e n c e s i t u a t i o n s ; 
such understanding aims at the r e c o n s t r u c t i o n , confirmed by the p a t i e n t 
i n an a c t of s e l f - r e f l e c t i o n , of the o r i g i n a l scene" ( i b i d . p.208). S c e n i c 
understanding, " i n c o n t r a s t to hermeneutic understanding or o r d i n a r y 
semantic a n a l y s i s , cannot be conceived as a mere a p p l i c a t i o n of 
communicative competence, f r e e from t h e o r e t i c a l guidance" ( i b i d . p.209). 
What i t does, i n e f f e c t , i s to undertake a s y s t e m a t i c a n a l y s i s of the 
d i s t o r t e d forms of communication. 
The i m p l i c a t i o n of these p r o p o s i t i o n s i s , I t h i n k , q u i t e c l e a r . 
P s y c h o t i c communications, viewed as from w i t h i n the framework of normal 
communication and normal modes of understanding, are n e c e s s a r i l y 
u n i n t e l l i g i b l e . The normal framework has then to be d i s c a r d e d i n 
favour of an a l t e r n a t i v e model of understanding. Only i f we f o l l o w 
t h i s procedure can we a t t r i b u t e any sense a t a l l to these forms of 
communication. Habermas then proceeds to s e t out a number of 
p r o p o s i t i o n s r e g a r d i n g the s t r u c t u r a l c o n d i t i o n s which must be met f o r 
normal communication to o b t a i n . Thus f o r example: 
I n the c a s e of normal speech the speakers a re aware 
of the c a t e g o r i c a l d i f f e r e n c e between s u b j e c t and 
o b j e c t . They d i f f e r e n t i a t e between outer and 
i n n e r speech and separate the p r i v a t e from the 
p u b l i c world...The speaking s u b j e c t w i l l master 
the d i s t i n c t i o n between r e a l i t y and appearance to 
the same extent as speech a t t a i n s a d i s t i n c t r e a l i t y 
f o r him, d i s t i n c t t h a t i s , from the denoted o b j e c t s 
and t h e i r meanings as w e l l as from p r i v a t e experience. 
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Furthermore: 
I n normal communication an i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y of 
mutual understanding, guaranteeing e g o - i d e n t i t y , 
develops and i s maintained i n the r e l a t i o n 
between i n d i v i d u a l s who acknowledge one another. 
On the one hand, the a n a l y t i c use of language 
al l o w s the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of o b j e c t s (thus 
the c a t e g o r i z a t i o n of p a r t i c u l a r items, the 
s u b o r d i n a t i o n of elements under c l a s s e s , and 
the i n c l u s i o n of s e t s ) . On the other hand, 
the r e f l e x i v e use of language a s s u r e s a 
r e l a t i o n s h i p between the speaking s u b j e c t and 
the language community which cannot be s u f f i c i e n t l y 
p r esented by the a n a l y t i c operations mentioned. 
For a world on the l e v e l of which s u b j e c t s 
m a i n t a i n mutual e x i s t e n c e and understanding 
s o l e l y by v i r t u e of t h e i r o r d i n a r y communication, 
i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y i s not a u n i v e r s a l according 
to which the i n d i v i d u a l s could be c l a s s i f i e d i n 
the same way as elements are subordinated to 
t h e i r c l a s s e s . On the c o n t r a r y , the r e l a t i o n 
between I (ego), you ( a l t e r - e g o ) and we (ego 
and a l t e r - e g o ) i s e s t a b l i s h e d only by an 
a n a l y t i c a l l y p a r a d o x i c a l achievement: the 
speaking persons i d e n t i f y themselves a t the 
same time w i t h two incompatible dialogue r o l e s 
and thereby ensure the i d e n t i t y of the I (ego) 
as w e l l as of the group. The one being (ego) 
a s s e r t s h i s absolute n o n - i d e n t i t y i n r e l a t i o n 
to the other being ( a l t e r - e g o ) ; a t the same 
time, however, both recognize t h e i r i d e n t i t y 
inasmuch as each acknowledges the other as being 
an ego, t h a t i s , a non-replaceable i n d i v i d u a l 
who can r e f e r to h i m s e l f as * I ' . 
And f i n a l l y : 
...normal speech i s d i s t i n g u i s h e d by the f a c t t h a t 
the sense of substance and c a u s a l i t y , of space and 
time, i s d i f f e r e n t i a t e d a c c o r d i n g to whether these 
c a t e g o r i e s are a p p l i e d to the o b j e c t s w i t h i n a world 
or to the l i n g u i s t i c a l l y c o n s t i t u t e d world i t s e l f , 
which a l l o w s f o r the m u t u a l i t y of speaking s u b j e c t s . 
The i n t e r p r e t a t i o n a l schema, 'substance', has a 
d i f f e r e n t meaning f o r the i d e n t i t y of items which 
can be c l e a r l y c a t e g o r i z e d a n a l y t i c a l l y from t h a t 
which i t has f o r speaking and i n t e r - a c t i n g s u b j e c t s 
themselves, whose e g o - i d e n t i t y , as has been shown, 
j u s t cannot be grasped by a n a l y t i c a l l y c l e a r - c u t 
operations...'Space' and 'time' undergo a d i f f e r e n t 
schematism when viewed i n regard to p h y s i c a l l y 
measurable p r o p e r t i e s of observable events from 
t h a t which they undergo when viewed according to 
experienced i n t e r a c t i o n s . I n the f i r s t p l a c e the 
c a t e g o r i e s s e r v e as a system of c o - o r d i n a t e s f o r 
o b s e r v a t i o n c o n t r o l l e d by the s u c c e s s of 
i n s t r u m e n t a l a c t i o n : i n the l a t t e r case the 
c a t e g o r i e s serve as a frame of r e f e r e n c e f o r the 
e x p e r i e n c e of s o c i a l space and h i s t o r i c a l time from 
a s u b j e c t i v e p o i n t of view ( i b i d . pp.210-212). 
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Habermas s e t s out very s k i l f u l l y the s t r u c t u r a l requirements f o r 
normal communication, and i t w i l l be apparent l a t e r t h a t the 
communications of p s y c h o t i c p a t i e n t s i n v o l v e a breach of some or a l l 
of these. I t i s something e l s e , however, to mount an argument about 
the l i m i t s of understanding and of comprehension on the b a s i s of these 
same requirements. The s t r e s s on the r e f l e x i v e notwithstanding, 
Habermas, without acknowledging as much, s e t s a l i m i t as to the 
p o s s i b i l i t i e s of the r e f l e x i v e from w i t h i n the normal speech s i t u a t i o n 
f o r the normal speaker. I t i s as though the speech s i t u a t i o n , once 
e s t a b l i s h e d , becomes a n a l y t i c a l l y hardened and f i x e d , i n c a p a b l e of 
understanding the terms and procedures of i t s own o r d e r i n g . Now q u i t e 
c l e a r l y t h i s may be the case as a p o i n t of e m p i r i c a l f a c t under 
s p e c i f i c s o c i a l c o n d i t i o n s , but t h i s i s a poor b a s i s on which to b u i l d 
what i s , i n e f f e c t , a u n i v e r s a l t h e o r e t i c a l case about normal communication. 
I n s h o r t the 'normal speaker' i n Habermas's p r e s e n t a t i o n i s an 
impoverished a f f a i r . Moreover between t h i s and the s p e c i a l i s e d mode of 
communication and understanding of p s y c h o a n a l y s i s we are given no other 
option. Without f u r t h e r ado to d i s p a t c h the p s y c h o t i c f o r s c e n i c 
understanding seems to me hasty; i t i s , i m p l i c i t l y , to a s s e r t t h a t f o r 
ordinary mortals the communications of p s y c h o t i c s are nonsense. Only 
an expert can d e t e c t any sense i n them. And i t i s a l s o , as a consequence, 
to disparage our c a p a c i t i e s as normal speakers and l i s t e n e r s . 
Given then, the enforced choice between the normal and the s p e c i a l i s e d 
we s h a l l , i n our p r e s e n t a t i o n of Joseph, opt f i r m l y f o r the normal. L i k e 
Habermas we take the view t h a t "the c r i t i c a l vantage p o i n t can never be 
b e t t e r than a p a r t n e r i n the communication". We s h a l l not, however, 
s u b j e c t Joseph to a s y s t e m a t i c a n a l y s i s , as d e s c r i b e d by Habermas, under 
the c o n d i t i o n s of s c e n i c understanding. Normal communication, Habermas 
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i n s i s t s , i s " f r e e from t h e o r e t i c a l guidance". We can t u r n Habermas's 
argument about and say t h a t the very d e l i n e a t i o n s he provides of the 
way i n which e g o - i d e n t i t y i s developed and maintained, and of the 
r e f l e x i v e s t i p u l a t i o n s which are necessary f o r s t r u c t u r e s of 
communication to be sustained, provide us w i t h j u s t the t h e o r e t i c a l 
guidance we need to approach a s i t u a t i o n i n which these same s t r u c t u r e s 
appear to be under t h r e a t . Thus i n my r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h Joseph and 
other p a t i e n t s I never made s p e c i a l i s e d i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s but operated 
on the p r i n c i p l e - and as we s h a l l see on occasions expressed my 
understanding t o t h i s e f f e c t - t h a t the p a t i e n t ' s communications could 
be r e f e r r e d t o the d i f f i c u l t i e s of m a i n t a i n i n g an i d e n t i t y , t h a t i s to 
d i f f i c u l t i e s i n r e l a t i o n t o t h a t a n a l y t i c a l l y p a r a d o x i c a l , r e f l e x i v e 
achievement t h a t Habermas describes. Andre Green t e l l s us t h a t demanded 
of the other person i n the r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h a psychotic or a b o r d e r l i n e 
p a t i e n t i s "more than h i s a f f e c t i v e capacity and empathy. I t i s h i s 
mental f u n c t i o n s which are demanded f o r the p a t i e n t ' s s t r u c t u r e s of 
meaning have been put out of a c t i o n " (1975, p.6). Turning now to 
Joseph, our mental f u n c t i o n s , our r e f l e x i v e c a p a c i t i e s t h a t i s , w i l l 
indeed be under pressure. But what I hope the exercise w i l l , among 
other t h i n g s , uncover are not the 'systematic d i s t o r t i o n s ' of a 
psychotic speaker but the tenuous and precarious devices by which we 
maintain our selfhood, devices t h a t i f we are to disparage n e i t h e r our 
own r e f l e x i v e c a p a c i t i e s as normal speakers nor our a b i l i t y to put those 
c a p a c i t i e s to work i n communicating w i t h psychotics, we must regard as 
r e l a t i v e and i n s e c u r e l y anchored. 
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I I . 3 . Joseph 
So Joseph went a f t e r h i s brothers and found them 
at Dothan. They saw him af a r o f f , and before he 
came near to them they conspired against him to 
k i l l him. They sa i d to one another, 'Here comes 
t h i s dreamer. Come now, l e t us k i l l him and 
throw him i n t o one of the p i t s ; then we s h a l l 
say t h a t a w i l d beast has devoured him, and we 
s h a l l see what w i l l become of h i s dreams'. 
...So when Joseph came to h i s b r o t h e r s , they 
s t r i p p e d him o f h i s robe, the long robe w i t h 
sleeves t h a t he wore; and they took him and 
cast him i n t o a p i t . The p i t was empty, 
there was no water i n i t . 
Joseph i s a f r u i t f u l bough, 
a f r u i t f u l bough by a s p r i n g ; 
h i s branches run over the w a l l . 
(Genesis, 37: 17-20, 23-24; 
49: 22) 
I now t u r n to Joseph. The m a t e r i a l i s i n three p a r t s . F i r s t , I 
introduce Joseph and the m a t e r i a l t h a t I have c o l l e c t e d about him; 
second, I provide examples of a number of u n i t s of i n t e r a c t i o n 
i n v o l v i n g Joseph and myself, and Joseph and ot h e r s ; and f i n a l l y , i n a 
commentary, I set out some of the movements and f l u c t u a t i o n s i n h i s 
thought, and i n h i s way of t a l k i n g about himself and h i s s i t u a t i o n , 
over the p e r i o d t h a t I knew him. 
Joseph, when I met him, was 33. A gaunt-looking man w i t h a pock-
marked face, and p i e r c i n g blue eyes, he was f i r s t admitted t o h o s p i t a l 
at the age of 26. He had been i n and out on a number of occasions and 
when I came t o know him had been a permanent i n - p a t i e n t f o r three years. 
According to the consultant's r e p o r t at the time of f i r s t admission, 
Joseph was "up most of the n i g h t , l i g h t i n g f i r e s , running water taps, 
d u r i n g the day shooting arrows t i p p e d w i t h n a i l s from a home-made bow 
i n t o a busy thoroughfare". On one occasion he sat on the roof of h i s 
fat h e r ' s bungalow h o l d i n g a shot-gun and f i r e d a t h i s f a t h e r as he was 
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t r y i n g to get him down. (His f a t h e r was not h i t ! ) The r e p o r t 
continues: "Often t a l k i n g as i f he were l e c t u r i n g , and says t h a t i f 
i t were not f o r the l e c t u r i n g he would go mad. He believes t h a t there 
are ghosts i n the house, and stays awake a l l n i g h t r a t t l i n g doors and 
f l u s h i n g t o i l e t s . Pre-morbid p e r s o n a l i t y s o l i t a r y , shy, p e s s i m i s t i c 
and h e a l t h conscious. He i s grossly deluded and thought disordered. 
He says, f o r example, t h a t 'though people t h i n k t h a t a s a i l d r ives a 
ship i t doesn't; i t ' s p u l l e d round the w o r l d by cables and capstans, 
and blocks and t a c k l e s ' ; 'What use are aeroplanes? There are cables 
underneath the sea to p u l l the ships'; and t h a t there are two Edward 
Heath's: one who's gone to l i v e i n I r e l a n d and one who's come back". 
The diagnosis i s chronic schizophrenia. 
Joseph comes from a working class f a m i l y . He was brought up i n a 
p i t v i l l a g e i n County Durham where h i s parents s t i l l l i v e . The p i t has 
long closed down and the v i l l a g e i s now h a l f deserted. Joseph's f a t h e r 
i s a b u i l d e r . Joseph was successful a t school and went on to grammar 
school. He obtained a t e c h n i c a l c e r t i f i c a t e i n carpentry and j o i n e r y 
and taught f o r a time i n a t e c h n i c a l c o l l e g e . He has one s i s t e r . 
From a common-sense p o i n t of view many o f the items of Joseph's 
thought are very odd indeed. Not only do we have ships p u l l e d by cables 
under the sea, but t r a c t o r s b u r i e d i n tanks of water under the e a r t h , 
cats g i v i n g b i r t h t o cave-men, men e a t i n g stones, the atmosphere f i l l e d 
w i t h fragments of aeroplanes, cows dying i n the f i e l d s roundabout, 
h o s p i t a l s t h a t t u r n i n t o farms and then i n t o c o l l e g e s , and much else 
besides. He t o l d me once, apparently apropos of n o t h i n g , t h a t he.had 
j u s t h i t upon a s t a r t l i n g theory of r e l i g i o n : "That we are i n f a c t 
l i v i n g i n a heap of stones at the bottom of Durham River...our world i s 
a stone hollowed out at the bottom of Durham River...and when we shoot 
f o r the moon we are shooting through water to another stone". 
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I worked w i t h Joseph over a pe r i o d of 16 months. A l l t o l d we 
spent about 50 hours together. Sometimes I saw him alone, and sometimes 
i n a group. Over the pe r i o d I ran two series of group sessions f o r the 
sub-group o f chronic schizophrenics I worked w i t h c l o s e l y , and Joseph 
was a member of both of these. A l l of the group meetings and some of 
the i n d i v i d u a l sessions were tape-recorded; f o r the remaining sessions 
I took notes. Throughout the pe r i o d t h a t I knew him he was on a locked 
ward, Male 15's, t h a t i n the p a t i e n t sub-culture was gene r a l l y reckoned 
to be the most 'crazy' ward i n the h o s p i t a l , under a compulsory 
d e t e n t i o n order. 
Among those p a t i e n t s I worked w i t h i n t e n s i v e l y , I chose to 
concentrate more energy on Joseph than on the others. Why? One reason 
i s t h a t he was f o r much of the time extremely d i f f i c u l t to understand, 
and manifested very s t a r k l y a l l those features of language and thought 
t h a t are taken to be most c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f the schizophrenic c o n d i t i o n . 
Another i s t h a t we l i k e d each oth e r : Joseph was keen t o meet w i t h me, 
and I w i t h him. He c e r t a i n l y had a great deal to teach me, and f o r my 
p a r t , I was, I t h i n k , perhaps more w i l l i n g and able to engage w i t h him 
than anyone else i n the h o s p i t a l w i t h whom he came i n t o contact. Without 
t h i s base i n f r i e n d s h i p and respect I do not t h i n k t h a t we would have 
been able t o work together as i n t e n s i v e l y as we d i d . 
1 now provide some examples of a number of u n i t s of i n t e r a c t i o n 
i n v o l v i n g Joseph. A l l of them are taken from group discussions; Units 
I t o XVI from the f i r s t s e r i e s of group meetings t h a t I ran, and Un i t 
XVII from the second series which began two months a f t e r the t e r m i n a t i o n 
of the f i r s t . A l l the examples are given i n the order i n which they 
occurred; between the f i r s t and the l a s t there i s a gap of four and a 
h a l f months. Along the way we s h a l l meet other p a t i e n t s : E r i c , 
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A r t h u r , Terence and Henry. E r i c and A r t h u r , l i k e Joseph, p a r t i c i p a t e d 
i n both series of group meetings, Henry and Terence i n the f i r s t and 
second series r e s p e c t i v e l y . E r i c , Arthur and Terence we s h a l l have 
occasion t o meet i n greater depth i n a subsequent s e c t i o n . A l l of the 
p a t i e n t s i n the group were chronic schizophrenics, although Joseph was 
w i t h o u t question the most obviously d i s t u r b e d . 
I chose to organise the group discussions f o r two reasons. F i r s t , 
I wanted to l e a r n something about what took place when the p a t i e n t s 
whom I saw i n d i v i d u a l l y met together. Second, and more important, the 
group meetings provided f o r a space i n which there was less pressure on 
me t o adopt the formal r o l e o f i n t e r v i e w i n g p s y c h o l o g i s t . As f a r as 
possible I t r i e d to s t r u c t u r e the groups such t h a t we discussed t o p i c s 
t h a t were of i n t e r e s t t o everyone present, such as, f o r example, 
t o p i c s t h a t bore on d i f f e r e n t aspects of h o s p i t a l l i f e . (On one occasion 
Joseph proposed t o me p r i v a t e l y t h a t we discuss ' r e a l i t y and u n r e a l i t y ' 
a t our next meeting'.) Needless t o say members of the group - myself 
included - d i d not always s t i c k to the t o p i c s t h a t had been agreed 
and they were i n any case intended only as rough gui d e l i n e s and not as 
f i r m boundaries. Despite the obvious status d i s t i n c t i o n between myself 
and these p a t i e n t s I d i d , I t h i n k , manage to create a s e t t i n g i n which i t 
was p o s s i b l e f o r p a r t i c i p a n t s t o v e n t i l a t e t h e i r thoughts and f e e l i n g s 
i n a way t h a t , by t h e i r own account, they would not normally have f e l t 
able to do w i t h a p r o f e s s i o n a l worker present. Although I d i d sometimes 
give expression t o my understanding along the l i n e s I o u t l i n e d e a r l i e r , 
as f a r as possible I t r i e d to p a r t i c i p a t e i n the group i n as d i r e c t and 
ordinary a way as p o s s i b l e . Thus f o r example i n the session when we 
shared some of our dreams w i t h the group, I chose t o share a dream of my 
own. 
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With the exception of U n i t XVII a l l the examples given are 
c u l l e d from a much longer interchange. I have not chosen them randomly 
nor have I selected them to i l l u s t r a t e p a r t i c u l a r t h e o r e t i c a l p o i n t s . 
As f a r as possible I have wanted to i l l u s t r a t e the v a r i e t y of responses 
of which Joseph was capable over t h i s p e r i o d . I n the commentary t h a t 
f o l l o w s I draw on these examples, and introduce other m a t e r i a l where 
ap p r o p r i a t e , to set out some of the movements and f l u c t u a t i o n s i n 
Joseph's thought, and i n h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p s . 
The commentary, though i t does I hope i l l u m i n a t e and c l a r i f y i n 
c e r t a i n respects, i s not t o be read as a ' f i n i s h e d ' piece of work. And 
t h i s , I hasten t o add, i s not due to some procedural i r r e g u l a r i t y of my 
own. To make the p o i n t more c o n c r e t e l y , i n preparing my p r e s e n t a t i o n of 
Joseph although I have used t r a n s c r i p t s of sessions or p a r t s of sessions 
I have found myself r e t u r n i n g time and again to the o r i g i n a l recordings. 
Rather as w i t h l i t e r a r y c r i t i c i s m one does, I t h i n k , have to keep 
r e t u r n i n g t o the o r i g i n a l ' t e x t 1 . The c r i t i c a l rendering can never 
supplant the t e x t , and the o r i e n t a t i o n t h a t one establishes to i t i s 
ne c e s s a r i l y p r o v i s i o n a l , must always be capable, i f the t e x t i s not to 
be supplanted, of being re-worked. 
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I I . 4 . Processual Units 
UNIT I 
Early on i n the very f i r s t session Joseph i n i t i a t e s a discussion about 
aeroplanes: 
"Eh, eh...I t h i n k about the hardest t h i n g i n the world to 
get r i g h t i s an aeroplane...every a i r c r a f t i s d i f f e r e n t . . . " 
He then enumerates various a i r c r a f t - Vulcans, Concordes, Deltas, Boeing 
707's - and continues: 
" I mean a p e r f e c t Delta and a p e r f e c t 707, they're j u s t 
e x a c t l y the same aren't they? Even though the design i s 
d i f f e r e n t , they're doing the same job j u s t as w e l l " . 
I then t r y to say something - perhaps a b i t long-winded - about the aims 
of the group. Joseph cuts across me to say: 
"Why, eh, they've t o l d me to keep very q u i t e , because a l l what 
I've been designing i s top secret". 
Me: "Keep very quiet? Who's t o l d you to keep very q u i e t ? " 
Joseph: "Keep very q u i e t . . . t h a t ' s one o f the reasons why I'm on a 
locked ward...because I know too much..." 
And a few seconds l a t e r : 
" I mean i f everybody found out about the Vulcans we'd have a 
n a t i o n of Vulcans wouldn't we?" 
Me: " I f everybody?" 
Joseph: " I f everybody found out how the Vulcan or the Concorde works... 
I mean eh...the a i r would be f u l l of them...I mean eh...that's 
something people have got to work out f o r themselves... t h a t ' s 
one of the t e s t s i n p s y c h i a t r y . . . to f i n d out how the Delta 
works..." 
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UNIT I I 
E r i c has been t a l k i n g about the c o n t r a s t between home and h o s p i t a l . 
" H o s p i t a l i s a backwater...nothing t o do." Home, i n c o n t r a s t , " i s 
mixed i n w i t h o r d i n a r y l i f e " . I ask Joseph what he t h i n k s : 
"Well, I don't know...I t h i n k you s t a r t o f f when you're p r e t t y 
young on the b u i l d i n g s i t e s . . . t h e n you work up t o heavy 
engineering...then you graduate to farming". 
He underscores the c o n t r a s t between the h o s p i t a l and the w o r l d outside 
i n t h i s way: 
"A d i f f e r e n t way of l i f e e n t i r e l y . . . t h i s h o s p i t a l teaches you 
farming doesn't i t ? . . . F o r anybody i n t e r e s t e d i n farming i t ' s 
the i d e a l place t o be". 
Me: "Why?" 
Joseph: "Well, because they're a c t u a l l y producing t h e i r own food. I t ' s 
got to be processed of course l i k e I t o l d you the other day. 
I mean you can't l i v e on chemicals a l l your l i f e . Y o u ' l l d i e " . 
We then discuss where we would l i k e t o be l i v i n g . Joseph asks E r i c : 
"Would you r a t h e r l i v e i n the town or the country?" and continues himself 
"You see the p o i n t i s , . . i f you're l i v i n g i n the town you depend 
on the country a l l the t i m e . . . i t ' s the country t h a t keeps the 
towns a l i v e . B e c a u s e Scotland which has always kept England 
alive.o.because t h a t ' s where a l l the power comes from...you see 
i t has to be b u i l t i n Scotland because otherwise the machinery 
would be red hot i n no time...as metal gets colder i t gets 
harder...so you're dependent on somewhere very, very remote. 
I mean you c a l l t h i s a commune...communism and a l l t h a t . . . a 
town's j u s t the same". 
I ask him again where he would l i k e to l i v e : 
"Well, I l i k e my f r i e n d s , what I c a l l my f rietids . .. l i k e o l d 
B i l l y R. I l i k e l i v i n g i n a commune". 
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A r t h u r : "Where there's a l o t of people l i v i n g ? " 
Joseph: " I f I was l i v i n g i n a house by myself which I would have t o do 
because I have nobody except f o r two o l d people, I ' d go 
crac k e r s . . . I ' d have nobody t o t a l k t o a l l day...Well, I l i k e to 
see the two o l d people, what I c a l l my mother and my f a t h e r , on 
a weekend, but the place I've moved i n t o i t ' s impossible". 
Henry says t h a t i f he had money he would be "able to do things...move 
around...live i n h o t e l s by myself... t h i s i s what I ' d do". 
Joseph then o f f e r s h i s view: 
"Well you see i t ' s l i k e t h i s . You were born i n a c e r t a i n place. 
Wherever you were born you always r e t u r n t o . I t ' s very d i f f i c u l t 
to leave the country and go to an e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t country and 
s e t t l e down there...very d i f f i c u l t indeed...managing a job I mean". 
The conversation then turns t o the pressures at home i n co n t r a s t to those 
i n the h o s p i t a l . Joseph says: 
" I found t h a t when I was l i v i n g a t home I was s t i l l working a l l 
the weekend t y p i n g notes out f o r somebody... doing some c l e r k i n g 
f o r somebody... i n f a c t when I got home on a weekend I d i d more 
work than when I came back here...That 1s what I found...I was 
glad t o get back on a Sunday n i g h t . . . J u s t t o simply go to bed 
and go t o sleep,,.because I never got any sleep a t a l l a l l the 
weekend...I was up a l l n i g h t w r i t i n g things out f o r people". 
A r t h u r : "You weren't forced t o , were you?" 
Joseph: "No, I wasn't forced t o . . . I suppose I decided I had a job to 
do and had to do i t " . 
58 
UNIT I I I 
I introduce the question of t a b l e t s : "What do people f e e l about having 
to take them? And what do they do t o you?" 
Joseph s t a r t s o f f the discussion: 
"You get i n t o t h i s r o u t i n e of t a k i n g t a b l e t s . . . r e l y i n g on 
t a b l e t s f o r everything...1 mean i f you take sleeping p i l l s 
a l l your l i f e you get to a p o i n t where you can't sleep a t a l l " . 
A r t h u r says t h a t he f e e l s t h a t t a b l e t s i n t e r f e r e w i t h 'human nature': 
"They i n t e r f e r e w i t h your own system". Both Ar t h u r and E r i c f e e l t h a t 
t a b l e t s deprive them of something: Arthur of h i s sexual d e s i r e s , and 
E r i c of the r i g h t t o make decisions f o r oneself. I ask Joseph what he 
f e e l s about i t : 
" I don't know l i k e . . . I just...more or les s . . . t h e people who 
look a f t e r us i n our ward...well, l i k e . . . they've been working 
a t t h e i r job f o r so long t h a t they know e x a c t l y what they're 
doing...we r e l y on the nurses you see...we r e l y on them a l l 
the time t o decide what we have got t o do". 
E r i c continues to disagree and says t h a t "we should have a w i l l of our own". 
At t h i s p o i n t the time i s up, and I say t h a t we w i l l have to f i n i s h . 
Joseph then says: 
" I t e l l you what's occurred t o me. Somewhere i n the world 
there's a group of people who t e l l everybody else what to do". 
Me: "You t h i n k t h a t ' s good?" 
Joseph: " I t i s i n a way l i k e . . . i t i s f o r me l i k e . For some people i t 
i s n ' t . Somewhere i n the wor l d there's a genius who knows 
everything and he t e l l s everybody else what to do. He must be 
very very o l d " . 
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UNIT IV 
Joseph begins the session by saying t h a t l i f e i s t e r r i b l e on the ward; 
everybody i s g e t t i n g on each other's nerves. 
"Worse t h i s l a s t week then e v e r . . . I suppose we've been i n 
t h i s h o s p i t a l too long...everybody's wanting to go home... 
everybody's fed up and we're g e t t i n g on each other's nerves... 
we're s i c k of the place and we j u s t want t o go home". 
Me: "And y e t l a s t week you were t e l l i n g me..." (The previous week 
he had sai d the h o s p i t a l was the i d e a l place to be f o r those who 
wanted to l e a r n about farming.) 
Joseph: " I know, I've changed my mind now...I j u s t want to go home... 
I don't want to be i n t h a t place f o r another week...I've 
changed my mind...I've been i n there too long...I'm going 
round the bend...I'm g e t t i n g headaches now...It j u s t confuses 
you somehow i n there...they're marching around t h a t much...the 
ra c k e t , the marching". 
E r i c comments i n agreement: 
"You j u s t s i t about u n t i l you can bear i t no longer, and then 
you s t a r t w a l k i n g up and down". 
Joseph goes on: 
"There's nowhere to go you see; you're i n the ward, you can 
never go out; the only exercise you get i s wal k i n g up and 
down on the ward". 
He claims t h a t he has not been out since he l a s t saw me; there i s , a t 
the moment, no garden group because of the weather and he has been 
working on ' b o t t l e tops' on the ward. 
Henry complains t h a t someone else takes a l l the decisions i n the 
h o s p i t a l . Joseph s t a r t s to laugh and says: 
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" I f you can work out how a two-way switch works you've signed 
your l i f e away...You put the l i g h t on a t one end of the room and 
go t o the other end o f the room and put i t o f f . . . I f you can work 
t h a t out you've signed your l i f e away..." 
E r i c : "You mean you must be r a v i n g mad to work t h a t out?" 
Me: " I s i t the same person who turns i t o f f as turns i t on?" 
Joseph: "Of course not...There's three wires and one bulb and two 
switches... i f you can work t h a t out you can work anything out". 
UNIT V 
Joseph s t a r t s the session by t a l k i n g about the ' A t l a n t i c S h e l f : 
"Slowly b i t by b i t the A t l a n t i c Shelf i s disappearing...so 
you're going to have no B r i t a i n . . . b i t by b i t i t ' s been eaten 
away...you see B r i t a i n was p a r t o f Europe a t one time". 
Some h a l f an hour l a t e r the discussion turns t o l i f e i n the h o s p i t a l . 
Joseph says: 
"Ward 15's are the l a s t people l e f t i n the h o s p i t a l . . . y o u see 
gradu a l l y b i t by b i t we were moved from ward to ward you see... 
and then we a l l f i n i s h e d locked up i n Male 15's. Most people 
have l e f t the h o s p i t a l . I t was p r a c t i c a l l y empty. I t was 
f a l l i n g down". 
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UNIT VI 
Arthur t a l k s about the 'unimportant thoughts' t h a t he f e e l s he has to 
c o n t r o l . I t becomes q u i c k l y apparent t h a t these are about v i o l e n c e . 
E r i c says t h a t i n the h o s p i t a l the tension can e a s i l y get out of hand. 
He recounts how he has seen Joseph punch a nurse: "A l o v e l y punch, 
r i g h t on the nose". Joseph comments: 
" I t h i n k r e a l l y the most important t h i n g i n l i f e i s comedy... 
making good comic p i c t u r e s . . . good q u a l i t y you know...that's 
the most important t h i n g . . . t h a t people can go out and enjoy... 
comedy you know..." 
The t a l k then turns t o t e l e v i s i o n . Joseph says: 
" I don't see any p o i n t i n Westerns...you can't r i d e a horse 
l i k e those they r i d e . . . t h o s e horses i s a wash out..." 
And he continues: 
"There's only one way you can handle a horse...what they use i s 
wooden horses...by p u t t i n g i t i n a s p e c i a l cart...you can r i d e 
a horse but i t ' s got to be encased i n metal...the whole of the 
armour i s the gear box...and you change gear w i t h the sword". 
I n the meantime other members of the group are discussing Coronation 
S t r e e t . Joseph then says: 
"That's i t . . . I ' v e got eh some horses to put right...know what 
I mean...thirty years time...take about t h i r t y years to put 
them r i g h t . . . t h e y shouldn't have bought them". 
A r t h u r : "Horses don't l i v e t h a t long do they?" 
Joseph: " I ' l l have to keep them i n the s t a b l e . . . f e e d them on cabbages... 
I f I feed them on anything else but cabbages t h e y ' l l be dead 
i n a f o r t n i g h t . . . I n other words you've got t o starve them down 
to the bones...I k i l l e d a b u l l once...chained i t up i n the back 
garden and starved i t down to the bones... they're animals you 
see...that's the treatment f o r animals...people i s d i f f e r e n t " . 
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A l l t h i s i s c l e a r l y too d i f f e r e n t f o r A r t h u r : 
" I t h i n k a l o t of people are d i f f e r e n t b ut I t h i n k you're a 
l o t d i f f e r e n t than anybody else here myself..." 
Me: " I n what way?" 
Art h u r : "Well h i s opinions about t h i n g s . . . about what's going to happen.. 
His t h i n k i n g about dangers happening and t h a t you know...I don't 
b e l i e v e some of the things he says". 
There i s a long pause; then Joseph says: 
"Well, you see e h . . . l i k e I say. . . I want something to eh... 
where the milkmen work you know...and I had t h i r t e e n l o v e l y 
white horses...and I've worked them t o death...I bought those 
horses cheap...I got them put r i g h t . . . i n t o the stable...they 
had t a i l s on t h a t l o n g . . . I s t a r t e d when I was fourteen years 
o l d p u t t i n g them r i g h t . . . A s soon as they were put r i g h t 
somebody bred o f f them...I've got i t a l l to do again now". 
Arthur s t a r t s to t a l k about h i s sexual problems; a l i t t l e l a t e r Joseph 
returns t o h i s e a r l i e r theme: 
" I was fo u r t e e n years old...up t i l l I came i n t o h e r e . . . i t took 
us a l l t h a t time t o get t h i r t e e n w h i t e horses I bought from the 
M i l k Marketing Board put r i g h t . . . A s soon as I got them put 
right...somebody came along and bred horses from them...See, 
i t was a waste of time...Occupied myself, got myself i n t o debt.. 
I mean they were going to slaughter those horses...I stopped 
them and bought them..." 
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UNIT V I I 
I suggest t h a t over the coming sessions we perhaps share some of our 
dreams i n the group. Henry says t h a t he had a wet dream the other 
n i g h t ; E r i c says t h a t he too sometimes has wet dreams. Joseph says: 
"I'v e also had s i x w h i t e cats". 
Henry: "Did you? They're r a r e , w h i te c a t s " . 
Joseph: " I don't know where they are now but I f i n d t h a t people take 
things from us you know...you've got to s i g n forms a l l the 
bloody time and I don't want t o " . 
Me: "Do you f e e l t h a t w e ' l l be t a k i n g something from you i n 
t a l k i n g about your dreams?" 
Joseph: "Well, I f e e l t e r r i b l e enough w i t h o u t any t a b l e t s . . . I mean 
they don't make t a b l e t s now, I f e e l t e r r i b l e " . 
UNIT V I I I 
This i s the session i n which we have agreed t o discuss our dreams. 
Joseph s t a r t s to t a l k : 
" I can't dream. . . i t ' s j u s t l i k e being i n the a r c t i c . . . I can go 
to bed and I don't know a thing...sometimes i t ' s a week or a 
f o r t n i g h t . . . A l l I can remember i s a room i n a h o s p i t a l " . 
Me: "Remember of what?" 
Joseph: "Of me l i f e . . . a room w i t h beds i n . . . I was i n t h i s room t h a t was 
a l l p ainted white and there was yel l o w beds and there was a l i t t l e 
lass t h e r e . . . I was i n the room l i k e . . . j u s t s o r t of standing s t i l l , 
and there was a l i t t l e g i r l there...she was a nurse or something.. 
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Me: " I s t h i s a dream?" 
Joseph: "Sort of l i k e . . . i t was s o r t of a d i f f e r e n t world you know..." 
Henry: "And i t ' s as i f you're dreaming i s i t ? " 
Joseph: " I never s l e p t . . . I was awake a l l the time". 
Me: "When?" 
Joseph: "When I was i n t h i s room...I don't even know where i t was". 
Me: "You weren't able to sleep?" 
Joseph: "No...I don't know...I j u s t s o r t o f come...I don't know what 
happened. I j u s t woke...I j u s t dreamt" (said very q u i c k l y 
and almost i n a u d i b l y ) " I was i n t h i s room w i t h w h i t e w a l l s . . . 
That's a l l I can remember". 
Me: "Of what?" 
Joseph: "Of my whole l i f e . . . I t ' s as i f I've l i v e d t w i c e . . . I f e e l as i f 
I've l i v e d on t h i s e a r t h twice...One p a r t of i t I remember was 
a l l b l a c k , and then a l l of the sudden I f i n i s h e d up i n t h i s 
l i t t l e room w i t h white w a l l s . . . Somebody was l i v i n g a t e r r i b l e 
l i f e and I don't know what k i n d of l i f e i t was". 
Me: "And what happened?" 
Joseph: "He drowned". 
Me: "What's the l i t t l e room got t o do w i t h t h a t ? " 
Joseph: " I don't know...I was happy i n t h i s l i t t l e room w i t h w h i te w a l l s " . 
Me: "The l i t t l e room i s one of your l i v e s ? " 
Joseph: "The other of my l i v e s i s a l l b l a c k . . . t h a t ' s the t e r r i b l e l i f e " . 
" I t stuck i n my memory...all t h i s h o r r o r , t h a t was my f a t h e r ' s 
l i f e " . 
Me: " I thought you said i t was your l i f e ? " 
Joseph: " I t was somebody's l i f e . . . I don't remember who...somebody was 
leading a persecuted l i f e " . 
" I j u s t remember coming round and I was i n t h i s w h i t e room w i t h 
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y e l l o w beds and t h a t person had died...And t h a t person had 
died...he was l i v i n g i n j a i l " . 
Me: "Who was?" 
Joseph: "Me dad...I regard him as me dad...a very o l d man...he died". 
Me: "Your dad?" 
Joseph: "Somebody d i e d . . . I don't know who". 
"Why, i t was l i k e an old-fashioned b u i l d i n g . . . a n old-fashioned 
j a i l he was l i v i n g i n " . 
Me: "But you weren't locked i n the room, t h a t wasn't the j a i l ? " 
Joseph: "No". 
He then goes on to say t h a t the g i r l i n the room w i t h him was 
" l i k e a s i s t e r . She was no r e l a t i o n to us...she seemed to be 
l o o k i n g a f t e r me...she had l i k e golden coloured h a i r . . . somebody 
was l i v i n g a t e r r i b l e l i f e i n t h i s j a i l . They couldn't get 
out; they weren't allowed home; a l l they d i d was work. 
Even t u a l l y they worked themselves to death and j u s t d ied... 
This person worked r i g h t u n t i l he was s i x t y f i v e years o l d . . . 
and died...he d i e d i n h i s sleep". 
Arthur s t a r t s t o describe h i s dream; Joseph presses to enlarge on what 
he's j u s t been recounting: 
"This person who died was l i v i n g not i n a h o s p i t a l but i n a 
prison...he got h a r d l y anything to eat...a very o l d man...as 
soon as he r e t i r e d he died..." 
Joseph, i n c o n t r a s t , i s i n a room i n the "most fabulous h o s p i t a l " . The 
nurse i s the daughter of the o l d man. 
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UNIT IX 
Arthur describes a dream: i t i s about an animal t h a t has been skinned 
i n the slaughter house but t h a t i s s t i l l a l i v e . Joseph asks: 
"Could you draw i t ? . . . i t s h e i g h t and breadth? Could you not 
get something to measure the size o f i t , t h i s beast?" 
I then recount a dream of my own about a headless, cardboard c u t - o u t , 
f i g u r e of a woman t h a t seems to move away as I approach i t . 
Joseph: "Why t o me i t ' s a dream of h o r r o r . . . w e l l , I f e e l , a r e j e c t i o n 
t o the whole t h i n g " . 
Me: "How do you mean?" 
Joseph: " I f e e l a r e j e c t i o n o f the whole idea: i n other words i t ' s 
as i f you'd been i n the slaughter house", 
(pause) 
"Was i t s t i l l a l i v e ? " 
Me: "What?" 
Joseph: "The headless f i g u r e " . 
Then a few seconds l a t e r : 
" I was f e e l i n g t h a t i t was a woman; a r e a l woman w i t h no head 
and no arms". 
Me: "Do you f e e l I k i l l e d her?" 
Joseph: " I don't know...it was probably a l i v e , probably a woman..." 
(pause) 
"What happened to i t ? I t doesn't make sense t o me". 
Joseph: "Was i t a dream or d i d you a c t u a l l y see i t ? " 
Me: "No, t h i s was a dream". 
Joseph: "A headless woman? Made of cardboard? I don't understand. 
How d i d she lose her head? I t was a woman? Was there a man 
there as we l l ? And she died?" 
Me: "No, she wasn't dead". 
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Joseph: "Did she get her head back then?" (everyone laughs) "They 
used t o chop t h e i r heads o f f i n the middle ages". 
UNIT X 
Joseph s t a r t s t o t a l k about c a t s ; the theme appears t o have been suggested 
by a dream of Henry's i n which a cat walks i n t o a f i r e and out again w i t h o u t 
g e t t i n g b u r n t . 
" I t ' s a f a c t t h a t what a cat does breeds cave men...it roams a l l 
the countryside t a k i n g semen from animals, c a r r i e s them i n t o 
houses, hypnotises women and before you know where you're a t a 
cave man i s born...demon from h e l l " . 
Then suddenly he says, w h i l e others are discussing something e l s e : 
"There's a cat j u s t a r r i v e d i n h e r e . . . I can smell i t . . . i t may 
be i n the k i t c h e n . . . I know what colour i t i s as w e l l . . . b l a c k . . . 
the worst kind...cats s t i n k " . 
And then: 
"You can shoot at b i r d s a t p o i n t blank range and t h e y ' l l 
s t i l l l i v e . . . t h e y ' r e i n d e s t r u c t i b l e , cats and b i r d s . . . " 
"While you're awake you have h a l l u c i n a t i o n s , w h i l e you're asleep 
you have dreams...Know what causes the dreams? The bad dreams? 
A cat comes i n t o the room and digs i t s claws i n t o you". 
Somebody suggests t h a t Joseph i s j u s t imagining the c a t . Joseph r e p l i e s : 
" I ' v e moved away, I've prisoned myself up, I've done a l l s o r t s -
there's a black cat followed me a l l my l i f e . . . I t was somebody who 
di e d , somebody had a cat...they d i e d , and ever since - i t was a 
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black torn cat - they died...as soon as I die t h a t cat came to 
my house...it's been f o l l o w i n g us ever s i n c e . . . i t ' s p i t c h black". 
And l a t e r : 
" I f you k i l l a cat y o u ' l l have h a l f a dozen cats...Some cats are 
more i n t e l l i g e n t than people f o r the simple reason they're only 
p a r t l y human...They cross a l l s o r t s as w e l l ; a cat can make an 
ape-man...the worst form of animals there i s . . . r u n s a l l over 
the country...at n i g h t time...before you know where you are 
you've got an explosion of cave men crossed w i t h b u l l s , 
elephants and a l l s o r t s " . 
UNIT XI 
On the way over from the ward I t e l l Joseph t h a t A r t h u r won't be there 
today because he has had to go t o h i s brother-in-law's f u n e r a l . He 
laughs and says: 
" I ' v e got t r o u b l e w i t h my e a r s . . . I t h i n k I'm going deaf". 
E a r l y on i n the session he says: 
" I f e e l as i f people are saying things to me and I can't hear 
what they're saying...somebody else i s t e l l i n g us what t o say". 
(laughing) 
"...the f a c i a l expression doesn't f i t up w i t h what they say^you 
know". 
Me: "How do you mean?" 
Joseph: "When someone's t a l k i n g t o us, you know when they dub these 
f i l m s you know...like p u t t i n g the t i t l e s i n the bottom...that's 
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what I f e e l l i k e I'm watching now...a f i l m where people are 
s o r t of speaking i n a f o r e i g n language..." (laughs) 
Me: "...the words unrelated to the f a c i a l expressions?" 
Joseph: " I mean now i f you wanted t o say anything to us you would have 
t o w r i t e i t out f o r us t o understand...Everything I do now I 
w r i t e . . . I w r i t e everything...because I'm not sure whether what 
people say I h e a r . . . i t ' s l i k e watching a s i l e n t movie...people 
seem t o be p r e t t y anxious when they're t a l k i n g t o us". 
Me: "Why?" 
Joseph: " I t h i n k i t ' s because of the s t a t e of my h e a l t h . . . I can't take 
a hot climate any longer". 
UNIT X I I 
The members of the group are discussing the s t i g m a t i s a t i o n of the mental 
p a t i e n t ; everybody f e e l s s t r o n g l y t h a t i t happens; E r i c says of people 
outside: "They know j u s t by l o o k i n g a t you". Joseph s t a r t s t o speak: 
he says t h a t h i s t r o u b l e i s t h a t he went t o see too many science f i c t i o n 
p i c t u r e s - 'The Forbidden Planet', 'The T w i l i g h t Zone' et c . - when he was 
young, and s t a r t e d developing s t u p i d ideas. He went t o see a p s y c h i a t r i s t ; 
the p s y c h i a t r i s t t o l d him not t o go and see any more science f i c t i o n f i l m s : 
"He s a i d I was t u r n i n g the whole t h i n g towards science...and 
ev e r y t h i n g t h a t I drew out was r e a l l y a design...you know... 
t h a t could be made...instead of doing something l i k e poetry or 
something l i k e t h a t . . . i n other words I was l o s i n g me emotions". 
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And he continues: 
" I was becoming too s e l f - c e n t r e d . . . t o o much sc i e n c e . . . I f e e l 
t h a t now. I'm too much on the s c i e n t i f i c side...Everything I 
draw out i s made of metal or wood...It f i r s t s t a r t e d when I 
drew a model a i r c r a f t plan...somebody pinched the plan and 
b u i l t a model a i r c r a f t t o the plan...and i t worked". 
Then a f t e r a pause: 
" I was g e t t i n g away from the modern idea of a r t which i s more 
or less s p i r a l s . . . l i k e w a l l paper designs...I was completely 
away from t h a t a l t o g e t h e r . . . I got to a p o i n t where I was 
le a v i n g a r t behind". 
The t a l k i n the group then moves on t o p s y c h i a t r i s t s : how much do you 
t e l l them, and how much do you hold back? I ask Joseph about h i s 
r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h Dr. Y. 
"Dr. Y.? He's r e t i r e d now i s n ' t he? How o l d would he be now?" 
He then says t h a t he was about to get a j o b as a bus conductor, had 
passed h i s " t e s t and e v e r y t h i n g " , when Dr. Y. s a i d , "Would you l i k e t o 
come i n t o my h o s p i t a l ? " 
" I ' v e been here ever since". 
The session ends s h o r t l y afterwards; Joseph comments t h a t he f e e l s l i k e 
going down to the pub and g e t t i n g drunk. On the way back t o the ward he 
says to me sadly: 
" I used to dance, go to dances...not any more: i t ' s a l l 
science now..." 
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UNIT X I I I 
Joseph says t h a t he has a comedy to t e l l us about.. He dreamt t h a t he had 
died and had been b u r i e d i n a c o f f i n t e n f e e t under; then he woke up - t h i s 
i s s t i l l p a r t of the dream - t o f i n d t h a t the grave had been dug up, and 
t h a t he was l y i n g i n the c o f f i n i n h o s p i t a l w i t h a plaque on the c o f f i n 
saying, 'Here l i e s the body of Joseph K.'. (everybody laughs) He t h i n k s 
i t was h i s s i s t e r who made the c o f f i n and put him i n i t and b u r i e d him -
" w i t h only the worms f o r company" - i t was d e f i n i t e l y a woman, but he i s 
not sure. A r t h u r t a l k s about the flowers on h i s brother-in-law's grave: 
how b e a u t i f u l they were. There i s a long s i l e n c e . No one else can 
remember any dreams. "Don't t h i n k I've dreamt at a l l " , says Henry. Then 
someone s t a r t s t o t a l k about the 'space business'. Joseph says i t ' s a l l 
comedy: 
"They slam the door and say that's such and-such a p a r t of 
the space-ship and you see i t a l l on the T.V.". 
I n r e a l i t y a space-ship has never gone t o the moon: what we have seen i s 
j u s t a f i l m t h a t ' s been made f o r t e l e v i s i o n , complete w i t h background 
e f f e c t s of doors slamming e t c . The f i l m was made i n a huge tank of water. 
Joseph then says t h a t he would l i k e t o get back t o the "standard of 
designing a good engine". The l a s t one he made: 
"They t o l d me i t went a hundred yards and dropped to b i t s . 
I couldn't b e l i e v e i t " . 
I say t h a t I f e e l the others are j u s t l e t t i n g Joseph t a l k to f i l l up the 
vacuum. Arthur i s tense and s i l e n t , c l e a r l y very angry. Joseph says 
t h a t a l l the k i d s are g e t t i n g fed up w i t h t h e i r mothers and f a t h e r s ; 
they can't look a f t e r them p r o p e r l y . Arthur says t h a t he f e e l s angry 
w i t h himself and w i t h everybody else. He wishes t h a t "everybody would be 
a b i t b r i g h t e r " . Joseph asks: "Feel depressed do you?" 
Arthur says t h a t the ward i s so depressing: everybody s i t t i n g around; no 
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communication: " I read a book; someone else t a l k s t o hims e l f " . Henry 
says t h a t he does not understand what Art h u r i s g e t t i n g a t . Arthur says: 
"I'm angry w i t h myself f o r not g e t t i n g on i n the world". Joseph comments: 
"Nothing you can do about i t a t a l l " . 
A rthur continues: 
"When I'm a t home I t h i n k about the f r o n t g a r d e n . . . f u l l of 
weeds...and the more I t h i n k about i t the more I put i t o f f . . . 
f u l l o f weeds and the dahlias need standing up w i t h canes...I 
haven't made much progress; I haven't got a j o b ; the only 
entertainment I have i s going t o a n i g h t c l u b . . . I ' m by myself 
most of the time". 
Joseph makes a suggestion: 
"The best t h i n g t o do i s to get some wood and make something... 
improvement b i t by b i t . . . s t a r t a p r o j e c t o r something...start 
o f f w i t h something simple..." 
Arthur says t h a t he doesn't f e e l t h a t he has anything to say t h a t would 
i n t e r e s t anybody. He has t o s t r u g g l e q u i t e hard t o stay i n contact; 
otherwise he would s t a r t daydreaming, about f o r example, l i f e on the moon. 
There i s a sense of emptiness and fragmentation i n the group. Joseph t r i e s 
another remedy: 
" I mean, I suppose the best t h i n g we can do i s t o . . . f o r everybody 
here l i k e i s t o s o r t of f i n d somebody who's your own type...who 
t h i n k s the same way as y o u r s e l f . . . get together...and l i k e s t a r t 
a bu s i n e s s . . . f i n d something to do l i k e . . . " 
Me: " S t a r t a business?" 
Joseph: "Why e h . . . s t a r t a car f a c t o r y or something l i k e t h a t . . . I t h i n k 
we're e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t , t h a t ' s what's wrong w i t h us, we can't 
get on together...because we're a l l i n a d i f f e r e n t mood..." 
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And a l i t t l e l a t e r : 
" I t h i n k people should be f r e e to go wherever they want to i n 
the w o r l d and see what they want to see...whatever they're 
i n t e r e s t e d i n . . . b u t to do t h a t you need a car...and you need 
to b u i l d good roads...and t o b u i l d the roads you need t r a c t o r s " . 
UNIT XIV 
E r i c recounts a dream he has had about going round the h o s p i t a l from room 
to room t r y i n g to f i n d somewhere to stay, and being r e j e c t e d a t every 
p o i n t : "Not g e t t i n g anywhere to s t a y . . . t h a t was the po i n t . . . g o i n g a l l 
over the place and not g e t t i n g anywhere t o stay..." And he adds: " I n 
r e a l l i f e , I ' d p r e f e r somewhere l i k e a f l a t " . 
Joseph comments: 
"The best t h i n g t o do...what I used t o do. . . I used to l i v e i n 
t r a n s p o r t c a f e s . . . I used to go from one cafe t o another cafe... 
and then I ' d come back to where I s t a r t e d " . 
Arthur then asks: 
"How can we f i n d a place t h a t s a t i s f i e s us?" 
Joseph answers: 
"You see the p o i n t i s at the moment we're a l l dreaming... 
we're l i v i n g i n a constant s t a t e o f sleeping". 
I ask Joseph what he's dreaming about. "About t r a n s p o r t cafes", he r e p l i e s . 
And then: " I mean e v e n t u a l l y w e ' l l a l l s o r t of get back to work I suppose". 
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He continues: 
"Everything we're making i s from wood i s n ' t i t ? I mean th a t ' s 
no good...I mean you can't d r i v e a wooden t r a c t o r . . . i t ' s got to 
be a metal one...The poetry of the matter i s , w h i l e you're 
asleep you don't eat do you?" 
Then a f t e r a pause: 
" I mean I used t o dream a l o t . . . e v e n t u a l l y I came to me senses... 
1 got back to doing something...I got back to doing what I l i k e 
to do, which i s woodwork...woodwork and metal work...making a 
design f o r something...The metal was the n a i l s you see... 
d i f f e r e n t sized n a i l s . . . I used t o make something out of wood 
you see...with d i f f e r e n t sized n a i l s . . . i n c h and a h a l f , three 
i n c h e s . . . I used to hammer them i n and make a model ship or 
s omething". 
A f t e r a pause: 
" I was probably i l l when I d i d t h a t . . . I don't know...I mean eh... 
being asleep's a l l r i g h t . . . b u t . . . I mean...eh...I'm i n a constant 
s t a t e of sleep, I can't get out o f i t . . . I mean eh t h i s morning 
I r e a l i s e d t h a t a c a t e r p i l l a r t r a c t o r i s 90% easier to make 
than a good q u a l i t y car...This morning when I woke I r e a l i s e d , 
I came t o the r e a l i s a t i o n t h a t a t r a c t o r i s one of the ea s i e s t 
things i n the wor l d t o make...especially when i t ' s powered by 
p e t r o l . . . s o i f you s t a r t o f f on something simple, then g r a d u a l l y 
you work out something more complicated such as a good q u a l i t y 
c a r . . . I would recommend i f i t was po s s i b l e f o r us to remain i n 
the stage of t r a c t o r s . . . t h a t ' s what I say. . . I don't know...In 
other words we're r i g h t back t o square one...we s o r t of get to 
a p o i n t where we could make something good and we go backwards 
you know". 
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On the way back to the ward he says t o me: 
" I t h i n k the depression's l i f t i n g . . . J u s t at t h i s moment I'm 
stopping dreaming and coming back to r e a l i t y " . 
UNIT XV 
Joseph announces t h a t i t ' s a crazy w o r l d ; so crazy t h a t we can do not h i n g 
about i t . He goes on: 
"This i s what I'm going t o do, I'm going to get somebody to 
cut pieces out of the paper and s t i c k them i n a scrap book". 
Me: "What f o r ? " 
Joseph: "When I f i n d one sensible person I ' l l give him the scrap book 
and h e ' l l s o r t i t out". (laughs) 
He continues: 
" I t ' s what's i n the paper man, i t ' s crazy...the news and a l l 
t h a t . . . i t ' s r i d i c u l o u s . . . I ' m going t o get a b i g book, a b o t t l e 
of paste, cut the pieces t h a t I l i k e out of the paper and s t i c k 
them i n the book". 
Me: "That you l i k e ? " 
Joseph: "That I'm i n t e r e s t e d i n " . 
Me: "What s o r t of pieces?" 
Joseph: "Why, t r a c t o r s , cars, c l o t h e s . . . a l l the a r t i c l e s i s not worth 
reading". 
Me: "Well, what i s worth reading?" 
Joseph: "Why, design...I've read the paper today and there's nothing 
worth t a k i n g out of i t . . . n o t h i n g worth c u t t i n g out of the paper 
and p u t t i n g i n t o a scrap book". 
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He then has another idea: 
" . . . t o get a b i g piece of plywood, cut out pieces from the paper, 
paste them onto the plywood, and form a p a t t e r n . . . t h e n v a r n i s h 
i t . . . E v e n t u a l l y you come t o r e a l i z e how r i d i c u l o u s i t i s and 
throw i t away.because as I say at the moment i t i s n ' t worth 
reading...Eventually the chronic depression w i l l l i f t and y o u ' l l 
look at t h a t piece of paper, and y o u ' l l say, 'What was I t h i n k i n g 
about at the time?'...By doing t h a t you can help the doctors 
understand your case: they know how your mind works by what you 
cut out o f the paper". 
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UNIT XVI 
Joseph complains about the h o s p i t a l : people keep "coming and going"; 
people leave instead of " s t i c k i n g i t out and g e t t i n g i n t o a r o u t i n e " ; 
the h o s p i t a l i s almost empty: 
"Even R. wants to go home...I mean e h . . . i f he goes home...he 
depends on me...I mean i f R. goes home what's the good of me 
stopping h e r e . . . I mean eh they j u s t seem t o sign themselves 
out and go home...and we stop here a l l the time..." 
A r t h u r : "Are you i n f o r m a l l i k e ? " 
Joseph: (very s o f t l y ) "No". 
Art h u r : "Are you on a section?" 
Joseph: "Why, I was...I had a house l i k e which I l i v e d i n " . 
A r t h u r : " I mean could you get out of here i f you wanted?" 
Joseph: (very s o f t l y ) " I don't know...I s o r t o f . . . I ' v e s o r t of s e t t l e d 
down now l i k e but eh..." 
Ar t h u r : "Yes". 
Arthur then complains t h a t i t ' s so d i f f i c u l t t o f i n d things to t a l k about 
i n the group: 
" I mean a l l we can t a l k about i s the h o s p i t a l . . . the only l i f e 
we're p r a c t i s i n g i s t h i s h o s p i t a l , aren't we?...I mean some of 
us don't even go out of the ward t o be i n t e r e s t e d i n anything". 
Joseph: (very s o f t l y ) "At one time I used t o play the guitar...never 
bother now...I've re p a i r e d i t and r e p a i r e d i t . . . f i n a l l y i t ' s 
a l l f i n i s h e d now, a l l bust up...I used t o play the g u i t a r l i k e " . 
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UNIT XVII 
The sequence t h a t f o l l o w s i s taken from a group session w i t h , apart 
from Joseph and myself, three other people present, E r i c , Terence and 
Art h u r . Terence s t a r t s a conversation w i t h me about h i s desire to move 
to another ward. A l l the way through t h i s conversation Joseph i s t a l k i n g 
and laughing l o u d l y . At one p o i n t he r e f e r s to a man c a l l e d Jack who 
"keeps changing h i s name l i k e me". He says t h a t one day he had decided 
to c a l l h imself Jack Waterhouse. He then says: 
"Makes you i n a bad temper doesn't i t , t h i s place, puts you i n 
a bad temper". (laughs) 
Terence: "That's why we're having t o d r i n k tea a l l the time". 
Joseph: " . . . f i g h t i n g w i t h each other a l l the time". 
He laughs again, and continues: 
" I don't know...you get to a p o i n t where you say 'Have I h u r t 
h i s f e e l i n g s or has he h u r t mine?' " 
He then says t h a t people of the same weight seem to get on best: f o r 
example you're best o f f on a ward where everybody weighs s i x t e e n stone. 
Someone else then discusses h i s home s i t u a t i o n b r i e f l y . A few minutes 
l a t e r Joseph i n t e r j e c t s : 
"Have you been t o F. l a t e l y ? " (Joseph's home v i l l a g e ) "The 
o l d F. you know, used to be a f i s h and chip shop...it's i n a 
t e r r i b l e s t a t e , you couldn't l i v e there now...The v i l l a g e i s 
i n a t e r r i b l e s t a t e , nobody l i v e s there a t a l l now...it's 
a b s o l u t e l y deserted". 
Me: "Don'tyour parents l i v e there?" 
Joseph: "No, no". 
Me: "Where do they l i v e now then?" 
Joseph: " I don't know l i k e . . . I suppose they're l i v i n g a t home... they've 
moved...my mother came from eh...why I t h i n k they've gone to 
South Shields l i k e . . . " 
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He pauses and then continues: 
"Why, the o l d F...There was houses about the r e , bingo h a l l s and 
t h a t . . . a l l f i n i s h e d now...nobody l i v e s there...the b u i l d i n g s are 
s t i l l t h e r e , impossible to l i v e there now...you see you can't 
j u s t l i v e anywhere, you know, you've got to have the weather 
conditions to l i v e i n . . . I mean i f you buy a house and f i n d you 
can never go out of the house...If you buy a house on eh dry 
land l i k e you f i n d t h a t you're never out of the house". 
Me: "Why?" 
Joseph: "Because i f you go outside you get dust up your nose and down 
your t h r o a t " . 
Me: " I n F.?" 
Joseph: "Why, anywhere... What they do i s they get a pressure s u i t when 
you take s e r i o u s l y i l l , and you have to l i v e on t a b l e t s . . . and 
when you take s e r i o u s l y i l l they put you on a crash course i n 
a pressure s u i t and you go crazy a l t o g e t h e r , crackers a l t o g e t h e r , 
f o r about three weeks. There's one on M.15's. That's 
p s y c h i a t r y t h a t . You see the whole w o r l d i s eh...you see there's 
so much dust and d i r t and things l i k e t h a t , you can't l i v e . . . 
Most people l i v e i n communities under b i g domes. Now you don't 
know the dome i s there. They b u i l d a whole v i l l a g e , and then 
they b u i l d a dome over the top, and they p a i n t the dome and you 
see aeroplanes f l y i n g about i n s i d e " . 
Me: " I n s i d e the dome? And what i s there outside the dome?" 
Joseph: " C e r t a i n death...there's domes under the sea". 
Me: " I s there a dome over t h i s h o s p i t a l , or does the dome extend 
over the whole of England?" 
Joseph: "No, j u s t over t h i s area...for about f i v e miles around. You see 
aeroplanes only t h a t b i g " (demonstrates w i t h h i s hands) "they 
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put hypnotic gas i n and there's l i t t l e b i t s of aeroplanes 
f l y i n g about". 
Me: " I n s i d e the dome?" 
Joseph: " I n s i d e the dome...some of i t ' s p o s s i b l y i n me...it's the only 
way t o e x i s t on a worl d l i k e t h i s " . 
Me: "Why?" 
Joseph: "Because there's so much i m p u r i t i e s i n the outside atmosphere... 
You j u s t t u r n i n t o a cave man...if you went ou t s i d e , i f you went 
out of t h i s environment of the dome, you would die w i t h i n h a l f 
an h o u r . . . I t ' s l i k e being on another w o r l d or another p l a n e t " . 
Me: "But does each v i l l a g e have i t s dome, or how does i t work?" 
Joseph: "Of course^they're connected w i t h tunnels". 
Me: "Between one place and another?" 
Joseph: "No, between one dome and the other". 
Me: "Have you been outside the dome?" 
Joseph: "No...only i n a pressure suit...when I went to F. l i k e . . . A t one 
time people e x i s t e d outside t h i s world of...dome a g r i c u l t u r e 
and things l i k e t h a t . . . l i v i n g outside l i k e cave men you know 
and they died you see, and were b u r i e d you see, and then they 
l e a r n t t o make things...And so the f i r s t t h i n g they made was a.., 
I suppose they cut t h i s t r e e and a l l s o r t s growing outside you 
know. They made a b i g dome l i k e . And t o s o r t of give them a 
sense of s e c u r i t y against the breakage of the dome they b u i l t 
b r i c k houses... i n s i d e the v i l l a g e , i n s i d e the dome. And there's 
another dome which manufactures gases and things l i k e t h a t , and 
we are l i v i n g i n what's c a l l e d an environment which i s s u i t a b l e 
to ourselves". 
He goes on to say t h a t the dome could collapse a t any time, and has to 
be kept i n a constant s t a t e of r e p a i r . I t i s impossible t o l i v e i n the 
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outside w o r l d f o r the "simple reason t h a t there i s too much dust". 
"You might get h i t by a meteorite coming down from space or something 
l i k e t h a t . " I then ask him how i t i s t h a t he seems to be more aware of 
these dangers than the r e s t of us: 
" I don't know r e a l l y . . . I suppose eh...at times you r e a l i s e 
where you're at through your, through l i v i n g i n an a r t i f i c i a l , 
i n t h i s environment you see". 
Me: "And what's brought t h i s r e a l i s a t i o n to you?" 
Joseph: " I don't know r e a l l y . . . y o u take so many t a b l e t s to get you f i t 
you see, and you r e a l i s e what you're l i v i n g in...you're seeing 
aeroplanes...and you .realise i t ' s only t h a t " (he points towards 
the c e i l i n g ) "high above your head and i t ' s only t h a t b i g . . . 
then you r e a l i s e t h a t you're l i v i n g i n t h i s a r t i f i c i a l 
environment". 
Me: " I don't r e a l l y understand about the aeroplane". 
Joseph: "Why, s i z e you see, size...You r e a l i s e t h a t the aeroplane going 
overhead i s only j u s t above your head and i s t h a t b i g " . 
Me: "But i n f a c t the a i r c r a f t looks t o be t h a t b i g because i t ' s 
such a long way o f f ? " 
Joseph: "But i t ' s not. They put hypnotic gas i n t o the eh dome". 
Me: "So the aeroplane looks to be only t h a t b i g and i s i n f a c t 
only t h a t big?" 
Joseph: "Yes, the gas a f f e c t s your eyes you see...in the dome, and so 
you t h i n k t h a t there's a b i g a i r c r a f t miles up". 
Me: "But not so?" 
Joseph: "Not so. I n f a c t there's l i t t l e a i r c r a f t f l y i n g j u s t above 
your head". (then almost i n a u d i b l y ) " I t ' s l i k e a nightmare". 
Me: "You said e a r l i e r on t h a t there were b i t s of aeroplanes". 
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Joseph: "Well, there i s at times. At times you see there's one crashed 
you know. ..so you maybe j u s t d r i v e down the motorway...like t h a t . , 
t h a t i s a dome about t h a t big...and make probably a f u l l - s i z e 
a i r c r a f t and j u s t s t i c k i t somewhere". 
He then goes on to repeat h i s f e e l i n g t h a t i f we l i v e d outside the dome 
we would d i e . People may c a l l t h i s an a r t i f i c i a l environment but i n 
f a c t i t ' s our r e a l environment. He then r e t u r n s to the t o p i c of 
aeroplanes: 
" I mean an a i r c r a f t eh i s a form of t r a n s p o r t , they t e l l you 
a l l s o r t s , but i t doesn't work you see...nothing can f l y . . . A l l 
these b i r d s you see f l y i n g around are f l y i n g food parcels or 
clockwork. You see an animal i s p a r t of the human body. People 
t a l k about breeding c a t t l e . A b u l l i s how you f e e l . There's 
d i f f e r e n t kinds of b u l l s . A b u l l i s your mind. People say 
why a b u l l you know...breeding c a t t l e and things l i k e t h a t 
you know...well t h a t i s p a r t of your mind you know, you see 
b u l l s " . 
"Now every animal t h a t has ever been designed or e x i s t e d i s 
p a r t of your body. You design your own animals". 
Me: "What about the b i r d s then? Which p a r t of the body are they?" 
Joseph: "Why, I suppose they are your f i n g e r s aren't they?" 
I then ask him about a horse; he r e f l e c t s f o r a moment and says t h a t he 
doesn't know about a horse r e a l l y . Snakes, however, are "your i n t e s t i n e s , 
your i n s i d e s " . "Every animal t h a t has ever been designed, t h a t p a r t 
e x i s t s i n you." (laughs) I then ask him why a b i r d i s a f l y i n g food 
p a r c e l : 
"Well, a b i r d i s something to do w i t h your stomach you see, 
the hands you see, you eat w i t h your hands, t h a t ' s the b i r d ' s 
wings, and when i t goes down i n t o here..." 
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A r t h u r : "You mean t h a t when we eat these things they become p a r t of 
us? You have t o eat them to make them p a r t of us?" 
Joseph: "You see animals are p a r t of the human body. You X-ray a 
human body and i t ' s made up of parts i s n ' t i t , l i k e a car you 
know...It's against the law t o X-ray anybody l i k e , you couldn't 
do i t i n any case, but you know t h i s p a r t here t h a t would be 
the head of a snake, and t h a t would be a b i r d f l y i n g . . . a c t i v i t y . . 
You see animals are nothi n g . That's where l i f e would have 
s t a r t e d . . . I suppose i t ' l l probably have s t a r t e d w i t h a b i r d , 
some people say t h a t you see, and then they would s o r t of 
have i n t e r - b r e d , i n t e r - b r e d , and i n t e r - b r e d t i l l you got a 
cave-man l i k e a g o r i l l a you know. But t h a t d i d n ' t happen. 
That was impossible". 
Me: "Why?" 
Joseph: "Why i t worked the opposite way you see. I t would work the 
opposite way you see i f you went outside t h i s dome". 
Me: "What would happen?" 
Joseph: "Why there would be animals producing our body". 
Me: "But instead we're produced from animals' bodies?" 
Joseph: "No, no, i t ' s the opposite way round. People t h i n k t h a t we're 
produced from animals but we're not. I f we went outside the 
dome animals would produce themselves from us". 
Me: "Well, what happens i n s i d e the dome?" 
Joseph: " I n s i d e the dome?...I don't know l i k e . . . w e l l i n s i d e the dome 
the most important t h i n g i s your medicines i s n ' t i t " . 
Me: "You're saying animals don't e x i s t , they're j u s t p a r t of us?" 
Joseph: "They probably do outside the dome l i k e , what's l e f t o f somebody 
who went out". 
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I then ask Joseph why the b u l l i s the mind: 
" I don't know lik e . . . p e o p l e t a l k , they say 'He's a b u l l i n a 
china shop', and things l i k e t h a t " . 
I s t i l l don't understand and ask him t o e x p l a i n f u r t h e r : 
"Something to do w i t h the b r a i n probably. You see, you l i v e 
i n t h i s environment where your medicines i s changed, and 
things l i k e t h a t you know...and your s t a t e of mind changes 
and e v e r y t h i n g doesn't i t . . . Y o u see we're l i v i n g under the 
in f l u e n c e of hypnotic gases...and i f anybody i s showing too 
much a c t i v i t y they give them some work to do so they don't 
go out s i d e " . 
I t e l l Joseph t h a t i t puzzles me t h a t over a l l these months he has never 
t a l k e d about domes before: 
" I don't know like...we also l i v e i n s p e c i a l s u i t s don't we, 
l i k e w i t h diving? Everybody has been i n a pressure s u i t you 
see and we a l l t a l k about deep sea d i v i n g now. Now we don't 
t a l k about domes we t a l k about d i v i n g and submarines and things 
l i k e t h a t . . . i t ' s under 15's you see, under ward 15's...Why, we 
are t a l k i n g about submarines i s simply t h a t we're i n a dome 
which i s under the sea. For the simple reason t h a t the sea 
pro t e c t s us from any f l y i n g p a r t i c l e s and dissolves them 
before i t h i t s the dome". 
Terence then says t h a t he th i n k s Joseph i s t a l k i n g s c i e n t i f i c a l l y about 
l i f e on Mars. I disagree and say t h a t i n my view Joseph i s t a l k i n g about 
l i v i n g i n the h o s p i t a l , about l i f e on t h i s p l a n e t . There i s a long 
s i l e n c e and then Joseph says: 
"No, what I'm beginning to t h i n k now...I r e a l i s e now t h a t I 
can't e x i s t i n the outside w o r l d . . . I must stay here...and I'm 
f e e l i n g a k i n d of r e v o l t against t h a t . . . o f s t a y i n g i n a, of 
l i v i n g i n an a r t , i n an environment l i k e t h i s " . 
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Me: "Revolt against i t ? " 
Joseph: "Ay, where you have t o l i v e w i t h people...you see you can't go 
outside a t a l l . . . I t ' s a p i t y you couldn't have your own p r i v a t e 
dome. But you can't you see". 
A l i t t l e l a t e r he returns to h i s f e e l i n g of r e v o l t : 
"Some times you f e e l a r e v o l t towards t h i s eh...idea of l i v i n g 
under t h i s environment but you r e a l i s e l i k e t h a t you'd be dead 
i f you d i d n ' t , t h a t there'd be not h i n g l e f t of y o u . . . i f you 
went outside". 
Me: "Outside of where?" 
Joseph: "Outside the environment of the h o s p i t a l and the place i n the 
atmosphere i n which you live...We're stuck here aren't we... 
We can't...I'm not you know...We must work here...We must clean 
the place up and keep i t tidy...Otherwise any dust accumulating 
gets i n t o us". 
Arthur c l e a r l y f e e l s a l o t of sympathy f o r what Joseph i s saying and 
comments: 
" I f e e l t h a t nowadays i t ' s the only t h i n g I can do...to come 
here l i k e . . . I could perhaps get an outside job but I ' d probably 
not be f i t enough to keep up the pace". 
Then Joseph says: 
"That's i t you see. This i s where people come f o r treatment 
who are working i n another environment. They come here f o r 
treatment. They come here f u l l o f muck and dust you know and 
things l i k e that...They come here dead you know...they come 
here dead...they come here dead man". 
Arthu r then enlarges on what Joseph's thoughts about domes s t i r up i n him 
He needs a protected environment l i k e the h o s p i t a l because he can only 
t h i n k of one t h i n g a t a time. Outside, i n c o n t r a s t , you have to t h i n k 
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of several things at a time. I comment tha t there's a sense i n which 
we a l l need our domes: "We need to have a dome", I say, "but i t ' s also 
a l i m i t a t i o n " . Joseph r e p l i e s : " Exactly, people want to get out of i t . , 
and go f o r a long walk...and k i l l i n g something" ( t h i s l a s t phrase obscure 
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I I . 5 . Commentary 
...There i s , i t seems to us, 
At best, only a l i m i t e d value 
I n the knowledge derived from experience. 
The knowledge imposes a p a t t e r n , and f a l s i f i e s , 
For the p a t t e r n i s new i n every moment 
And every moment i s a new and shocking 
Valuation of a l l we have been. We are only undeceived 
Of t h a t which, deceiving, could no longer harm. 
I n the middle, not only i n the middle o f the way 
But a l l the way, i n a dark wood, i n a bramble, 
On the edge of a grimpen, where i s no secure f o o t h o l d , 
And menaced by monsters, fancy l i g h t s , 
R isking enchantment. 
(T.S. E l i o t , 'East Coker', 81-93) 
People come t o the h o s p i t a l , Joseph t e l l s us at the end of the 
'dome' sequence i n U n i t X V I I , " f o r treatment". "They come here f u l l of 
muck and dust you know and things l i k e that...They come here dead you 
know...They come here dead man". Joseph experiences himself most of the 
time as dead, as having to f i g h t f o r l i f e . Much of what he says about 
hi m s e l f , and about the world i n which he l i v e s , depicts a s t r u g g l e 
between the forces of l i f e and the forces of death. I t i s n o t , however, 
a s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d t u s s l e between Eros and Thanatos: the d i f f e r e n c e i s 
t h a t Joseph does not always know which to choose; sometimes he favours 
l i f e , and sometimes death. More than t h i s , l i s t e n i n g t o him we can 
never be sure - because he i s himself so unsure - of the d i f f e r e n c e between 
l i f e and death; the s t r u g g l e i s not only between l i f e and death, but a 
s t r u g g l e w i t h i n l i f e - or w i t h i n a death i n l i f e - between c o n f l i c t i n g 
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ideas about l i f e , about what i t i s to be a l i v e and t o l i v e a l i f e . 
For Joseph ever y t h i n g i s t u r b u l e n t ; nothing w i l l s e t t l e f o r very 
long. An o p p o s i t i o n of meaning t h a t i s e s t a b l i s h e d i n one instance i s 
turned i n a d i f f e r e n t d i r e c t i o n a t the next. I t i s easy to be daunted 
by a l l of t h i s ; the m a t e r i a l i s i n every respect too laden w i t h contra-
d i c t i o n and resonance f o r any k i n d of comfortable response t o be 
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po s s i b l e . The temptation i s e i t h e r to disregard i t a l l as meaningless 
'noise' or to search i n desperation f o r a 'key' or hidden code t h a t w i l l 
d i s c l o s e a r a t i o n a l i t y beneath the turbulence of the surface. I n the 
idiom of Andre Green t h a t we quoted e a r l i e r we have, I t h i n k , to t r y to 
create a 'space' t h a t i s n e i t h e r an empty space - a space emptied of a l l 
s i g n i f i c a n c e - nor a space f i l l e d to o v e r f l o w i n g w i t h o u t l i m i t t h a t can 
leave us only confused and amazed; we have, i n s t e a d , to t r y to s i t u a t e 
what Joseph gives us " i n a v e n t i l a t e d space, a space which i s n e i t h e r 
t h a t of ' t h i s i s meaningless' nor t h a t of ' t h i s means t h a t ' " (1975, p.8) 
Some of what he says i s c l e a r l y f i l i b u s t e r i n g . Take f o r example 
the sequence about aeroplanes i n Unit I . At the time of the meeting 
from which t h i s excerpt i s taken I had already met Joseph on a number 
of occasions b u t I i n no sense knew him w e l l . His long and rambling 
monologue - of which I reproduce only a few items - has on the face of 
i t no apparent sense to i t ; not only the person behind the language 
but even the language i t s e l f seem to be obscured by the presence of 
hard-edged objects and fragments of objects t h a t w i l l not resolve i n t o 
a u n i t y of meaning. Only when he s t a r t s t o t a l k about 't e s t s i n 
p s y c h i a t r y ' am I given a clue. He was c l e a r l y anxious i n t h i s meeting; 
and h i s a n x i e t y was not diminished by my own nervous and stumbling 
i n t r o d u c t i o n t o t h i s f i r s t group session. I am reminded of Laing's 
remark t h a t " i r r e d u c i b l e d i f f i c u l t i e s are p r a c t i c a l l y c e r t a i n to be 
increased, at l e a s t i n one's f i r s t encounters w i t h the p a t i e n t , by h i s 
or her d e l i b e r a t e use of o b s c u r i t y and complexity as a smoke screen to 
hide behind" (1960, p.163). 
For the most p a r t , however, the o b s c u r i t i e s and p e r p l e x i t i e s of 
h i s t a l k were not contrivances produced f o r the immediate occasion but 
had a more pervasive f u n c t i o n i n h i s o r d e r i n g of himself and of h i s 
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r e l a t i o n to the world. I t i s t o the d e t a i l of the tensions and 
oppositions t h a t are a t work i n h i s discourse t h a t we must now t u r n . 
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These are several and they move m a number of d i r e c t i o n s . There 
i s no s i n g l e core n o t i o n around which everything else can be seen t o 
t u r n . A u s e f u l beginning i s w i t h the op p o s i t i o n between a r t and 
science t o which Joseph r e t u r n s on a number of occasions. 
I n U n i t X I I the d i s t i n c t i o n between a r t and science i s made 
e x p l i c i t ; Joseph con t r a s t s science - woodwork, m e t a l c r a f t , and 
designing model a i r c r a f t - w i t h the modern idea of a r t : s p i r a l s , 
l i k e wall-paper designs. He had, he t e l l s us, reached a p o i n t where 
he was leaving a r t behind, and "instead of doing poetry or something 
l i k e t h a t " was concentrating h i s energies on things t h a t could be 
made. " I n other words", he t e l l s us, " I was l o s i n g me emotions". 
And walking oyer t o the ward a f t e r t h i s session he says i n a despairing 
v o i c e : " I used t o dance, go t o dances...not any more: i t ' s a l l science 
now". The f o l l o w i n g day he returned to the theme and asked i f he 
could draw me a d i a g r a m . ^ This i s what he drew: 
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In the diagram then, a r t i s r e l a t e d t o peace and home, and 
science to h o r r o r , machinery, and the h o s p i t a l . Later i n the same 
session he asks i f he can draw me another diagram to depi c t a h o r r i b l e 
dream he has had: 
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The meanings here are not easy t o disentangle. He mourns the 
loss of a r t and of h i s emotions, yet i n t h i s second diagram he appears 
to encourage an a l i e n growth t h a t v i o l a t e s the l i f e of the roses. A r t 
i s seen to be good and the rubbish-heap bad; the roses, l i k e the room 
i n the h o s p i t a l w i t h i t s white w a l l s i n U n i t V I I I , and the image of 
'peace' associated w i t h F- and home, i n the e a r l i e r diagram, suggests 
a romantic i d e a l of p u r i t y t h a t i s i n c o n t r a s t to the dangers and 
contaminations of the ' t r a p ' . Yet the t r a p , w i t h i t s pipes, and the 
bones, and p h a l l i c - l i k e growths i s s t r o n g l y suggestive of Joseph's 
body. And the rubbish-heap i s also the h o s p i t a l ; the h o s p i t a l , he 
t e l l s me on another occasion, i s a " t i p : a d i r t y , s c r u f f y , r o t t e n hole". 
A few months l a t e r he t e l l s me t h a t he wishes t h a t he could spend 
more time l o o k i n g a t p i c t u r e s . He mentions Cezanne; Cezanne, he says, 
s t a r t e d by p a i n t i n g trees and then moved on to sculptures. When he 
was on a course i n Edinburgh he used t o look a t l a r g e books - opening 
hi s arms wide - of i l l u s t r a t i o n s . But here, he says, there i s n o t h i n g , 
only the b u i l d i n g s : 
"So you have to create your own a r t . When there's no a r t 
provided you have to create your own. Current a f f a i r s i s a l l photo-
graphs, j u s t a copy of something. A r t i s much more i m p o r t a n t . . . i t 
shows you what you t h i n k . 
He does indeed atte n d the h o s p i t a l a r t classes, but i n the l a r g e r 
sense to create h i s own a r t i s c l e a r l y very d i f f i c u l t f o r him. Moreover 
i t c a r r i e s w i t h i t i t s own dangers. The rubbish-heap i s 'bad' but i t 
i s surrounded by an e l e c t r i c fence t o e s t a b l i s h the boundary between i t 
and the outside world. The a r t i s t , by c o n t r a s t , r i s k s the loss of a l l 
hi s boundaries. Thus he t e l l s me t h a t when he came i n t o h o s p i t a l he 
threw h i s pen away. There was too much poaching going on: people 
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transforming someone else's ideas i n t o t h e i r own s t y l e . Many of the 
p a t i e n t s on Male 15's have w r i t t e n books and they are now half^dead: 
"Take the back three pages of everything they have w r i t t e n - the 
worst s t u f f - put i t a l l together, and p u b l i s h i t under t h e i r name, 
as the authors of these novels. I t ' l l show you what a s t a t e they're 
in...We used to say the Lord's Prayer backwards". 
Most n o v e l i s t s , he goes on to say, are i n p s y c h i a t r i c h o s p i t a l s "on 
these therapeutic drugs...they're wanting new ideas from people a l l 
12 
the time". 
I n Figure I i t i s a car d r i v e n by himself t h a t e s tablished the 
l i n k between home and h o s p i t a l , between a r t and science. However, a 
few months a f t e r he drew the diagram he t e l l s me t h a t he has l o s t h i s 
sense of pleasure. The car t h a t used t o carry him from home t o 
h o s p i t a l was once a source of pleasure; now, he says, i t i s simply a 
form of t r a n s p o r t . Thus, f o r example, he could, l i k e me, go t o Durham 
i f he f e l t l i k e i t . But i f he d i d go there he wouldn't know what t o 
do. And i f he went home there'd only be t r o u b l e . I ask him of what 
k i n d . "Well", he r e p l i e s , "I've been here f o u r years and 1 don't 
even know i f the house i s there anymore. On the ward they say ' t h i s 
i s your home' but I say i t i s n ' t . I know I should go home...A married man 
i s separated from h i s w i f e i n h o s p i t a l , and an unmarried man i s separated 
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from h i s f u t u r e w i f e " . 
I n U n i t IV he declares roundly - i n co n t r a s t to the previous session 
where he has celebrated the h o s p i t a l as the best place to l e a r n farming -
t h a t he wants t o go home: "everybody's wanting t o go home...We're s i c k of 
the place". And i n the graphic image of the two-way switch he describes 
the d e p l e t i o n of autonomy t h a t h o s p i t a l existence i n f l i c t s on him. 
I n the f o l l o w i n g session - Unit V - 1 am f o r a long time at sea - from 
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the A t l a n t i c Shelf we t r a v e l to the Azores - but g r a d u a l l y i t dawns 
on me th a t Joseph i s t a l k i n g about the erosion of h i s own i d e n t i t y i n 
the h o s p i t a l . The collapse of h i s own s e l f and the collapse of the 
h o s p i t a l are t i e d together; 
"Ward 15's are the l a s t people l e f t i n the h o s p i t a l . . . y o u see 
gradually b i t by b i t we were moved from ward t o ward you see...and 
then we a l l f i n i s h e d locked up i n Male 15's. Most people have l e f t the 
h o s p i t a l . I t was p r a c t i c a l l y empty. I t was f a l l i n g down". He 
survives, but only j u s t . 
The h o s p i t a l here i s associated w i t h death and decay; the 
p o s s i b i l i t i e s of l i f e and c r e a t i o n are somewhere else. Over the time 
t h a t I knew him, however, the road between home and h o s p i t a l seems to 
be invested w i t h l e s s and less hope. Roads c a r r y a great deal of 
meaning f o r him. I n U n i t X I I I i n answer t o A r t h u r ' s d e j e c t i o n about 
h i s wasted l i f e he says: 
" I t h i n k people should be f r e e t o go wherever they want t o i n the 
world and see what they want t o see...whatever they're i n t e r e s t e d i n . . . 
but t o do t h a t you need a car...and you need to b u i l d good roads...and 
to b u i l d the roads you need t r a c t o r s " . 
Ten months l a t e r - almost the l a s t session I had w i t h him i n f a c t -
he t e l l s me t h a t the roads are bad f o r the cars. "Any type of p r a c t i c a l 
work has t o be stopped apart from s i t t i n g on benches; you can't b u i l d 
a car because to put a v e h i c l e on these roads would crack the roads and 
completely s p o i l them...Now the roads have gone and we a l l seem to be 
stuck on t h i s desert i s l a n d here". Roads, he goes on t o say "are the 
l i f e - l i n e of the country. I f you ever lose your roads you can manage 
l i k e , but i t ' s d i f f i c u l t . " 1 4 
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And he i s indeed i n danger of l o s i n g h i s l i f e - l i n e . The p o s s i b i l 
t i e s of r e t u r n i n g home are s l i m ; i n any case the peaceful haven of the 
diagram i s not the r e a l home t h a t he knew. His r e a l home - and h i s 
r e a l r e l a t i o n s w i t h h i s parents - as the quotations i n Unit I I seem to 
suggest - evoke i n him a turbulence t h a t i s unbearable. 1 was never 
able t o b u i l d up a clea r p i c t u r e of h i s r e l a t i o n s w i t h h i s f a m i l y , and 
of h i s f e e l i n g s about them - o f t e n he would t a l k about imaginary 
f a m i l i e s i n which he had e i t h e r the r o l e of parent or i n f a n t ; sometimes 
i t seemed as though he experienced himself as a parent t o h i s own parent 
and on occasions he t a l k e d about h i s a c t u a l parents as h i s step-parents. 
Something, however, of the tumult i n h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h h i s mother i s 
evident i n the f o l l o w i n g . A propos a v i s i t t h a t I was t o pay to h i s 
parents'*'"' he t o l d me t h a t an undertaker had once said t o him: 
'"Take no n o t i c e of p s y c h i a t r i s t s and psych o l o g i s t s : there's many 
a man been k i l l e d by h i s mother'. So as soon as he said t h a t I bought 
a gun. He said there's not a woman on e a r t h d i d n ' t want her son born 
the opposite sex. He said the r i g h t t h i n g t o do was t o look a f t e r 
your mother and make sure she's p h y s i c a l l y and mentally happy: but 
the danger i s t h a t when she gets too w e l l s h e ' l l want to look a f t e r you 
and k i l l you. You mustn't put her i n a p r i s o n because when she gets 
out and you haven't v i s i t e d her s h e ' l l k i l l you." He goes on to say 
th a t h i s mother " l i v e d i n a house, but she had a large r i n g which 
wouldn't come o f f , t i e d to a m i l e of g u i t a r s t r i n g , so she could only 
walk a short way."''"'' 
And on another occasion he said t o me: 
"Some people as soon as they s t a r t t a l k i n g on the s t r e e t corner 
s t a r t doing d a f t t h i n g s , s t u f f i n g things down t h e i r t h r o a t s : because 
they wish they hadn't been born men r a t h e r than women". 
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Home, then, although i t may be an imaginary haven of peace and 
a r t i s associated w i t h f e a r f u l complications of sexual i d e n t i t y . 
Between home and h o s p i t a l , he can envisage no other r e a l p o s s i b i l i t y . 
As he says to me on one occasion, even i f he d i d leave the h o s p i t a l he 
wouldn't be able t o a f f o r d t o buy any land. And not being a f a m i l y 
man, he would walk the roads, working i n showgrounds and sleeping i n 
cars. I n Un i t XVI he complains t h a t people keep coming and going: 
the h o s p i t a l i s p r a c t i c a l l y empty; even h i s f r i e n d R- wants t o go 
home. But he i s no longer i n c l i n e d t o leave himself. A r t h u r , i n 
a poignant t u r n of phrase, remarks on the dreariness and emptiness 
of the " l i f e we're p r a c t i s i n g i n t h i s h o s p i t a l " . Joseph, i n a statement 
t h a t echoes h i s e a r l i e r remark about how he used t o go to dances but 
" i t ' s a l l science now", comments sadly: 
"At one time I used t o play the guitar...never bother now... 
I've r e p a i r e d i t and r e p a i r e d i t . . . f i n a l l y i t ' s a l l f i n i s h e d now 
a l l bust u p . . . I used t o play the g u i t a r l i k e " . 
The h o s p i t a l depletes h i s i d e n t i t y ; i t separates him from h i s 
f u t u r e w i f e and i t undermines h i s work i d e n t i t y . A man who does not 
work, as he t e l l s me, i s not a proper man. Moreover the h o s p i t a l has 
no a r t , only b u i l d i n g s . One s o l u t i o n open t o him i s i m a g i n a t i v e l y t o 
devote h i s energy to b u i l d i n g . A l l u d i n g to b u i l d i n g work t h a t i s 
t a k i n g place i n the h o s p i t a l , he says t h a t Male 15's i s not i n need 
of a l t e r a t i o n s . A new ward couldn't be as good as 15's because of a l l 
the work t h a t he and the other p a t i e n t s have put i n t o i t . "We've put 
a l o t of work i n t o the i n s i d e s " he t e l l s me "we don't want any roads 
digging up or any lawns d i g g i n g up. We're j u s t going to keep on working 
on the ins i d e s a l l the time. We're working on the roo f a t the moment... 
to make i t w a t e r - t i g h t . " The w a l l s are i n need of papering: "The 
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t r o u b l e i s there's 40 on the ward; we might have t o t r a n s f e r them 
over here w h i l s t we paper the w a l l s " . Male 15's he says, i s home: "I've 
got i t the way 1 want it . . . T h e work I've put i n t o the place, I wouldn't 
l i k e to lea v e . . . I ' d have t o s t a r t from s c r a t c h again on a new b u i l d i n g . . . 
I t takes 40 men t o look a f t e r a h o s p i t a l t h i s s i z e and they a l l come 
from 15's". 1 7 
I m a g i n a t i v e l y , then, he has been able to b u i l d f o r himself a work 
i d e n t i t y and a home t h a t he can c a l l h i s own. However the vocabulary 
of b u i l d i n g on occasions serves him w i t h a more fundamental f u n c t i o n than 
t h i s ; i t provides him w i t h a means t o t a l k about, and f i n d a temporary 
s o l u t i o n t o , v i o l a t i o n s t o the carapace of h i s s e l f . The most extreme 
v e r s i o n of t h i s i s the e x t r a o r d i n a r y sequence about domes i n U n i t X V I I , 
which f o l l o w s , we w i l l note, a statement t h a t he makes about h i s 
experience on the ward to the e f f e c t t h a t "you get t o a p o i n t where you 
say 'Have I h u r t h i s f e e l i n g s or has he h u r t mine?'". I n the 'dome' 
sequence even to b u i l d a strong house i s not enough; the house or the 
v i l l a g e i s placed i n s i d e the dome, and the dome i t s e l f i s located under 
the sea " f o r the simple reason t h a t the sea p r o t e c t s us from any f l y i n g 
p a r t i c l e s and dissolves them before i t h i t s the dome". 
He develops h i s ideas about b u i l d i n g s i n h i s responses t o some 
of the p i c t u r e s i n the Object Relations Test which he gave three weeks 
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a f t e r the 'dome' sequence. I n response to one p i c t u r e he says: 
"...There's shadows i n i t , t h a t ' s the funny p a r t , t h a t ' s a l l 
wrong and there's no shadow f o r t h a t w a l l . . . c o u l d be a t n i g h t then... 
a l i g h t or something shining through a p a r t l y demolished b u i l d i n g . . . a 
farmhouse or something a f t e r i t ' s been blown up...there's a place l i k e 
t h a t near F-, a farmhouse t h a t ' s f a l l e n down,,.a l o t of people meet 
there...there's a path a l l the way round...and a path j u s t over here... 
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and b i t s of farmhouse a l l round". 
The v i l l a g e of F- recurs i n the next p i c t u r e too: 
"That looks t o me l i k e , . . o h I recognise the place...looks l i k e 
Black House,..! used to l i v e there o n c e , . . i t ' s s t i l l here l i k e . . . I 
always wanted a b e t t e r house but never got one...Windows are boarded 
up...Looks as i f he's saying 'do we have t o s t a r t w i t h the house r i g h t 
from the beginning again?' Looks l i k e o l d F- p i t heap to me. Them 
houses no good. Probably the stones and b r i c k s are made from F- p i t 
heap. They have t o be a l l f i t t e d out l i k e a ship. The basic s t r u c t u r e 
p r e t t y sound, but i t wants f i t t i n g on the insides of the w a l l s . . . I t would 
cost a hundred times as much t o b u i l d a place t h i s s i z e p r o p e r l y . . . t o 
house t h i s number of people...with u l t r a v i o l e t lamps and round absorb-
ing w a l l s , and pipes in- the walls...and e l e c t r i c c e n t r a l heating and 
that...and then i t would cost a f o r t u n e to run wouldn't i t . . . B a s i c 
s t r u c t u r e ' s sound but no good really...Won't l a s t very long I don't 
suppose...Two years and then i t ' l l f a l l down...Black houses: we t r i e d 
t o r e p a i r them but couldn't...we couldn't demolish them. So we j u s t 
boarded up the windows t o stop people g e t t i n g i n . . . V i l l a g e s and v i l l a g e s 
of them...And so many people wanting houses. And a l l these houses 
going to rack and r u i n . Impossible t o b u i l d houses f o r a l l the people 
who wanted them. Housing, food and medicines are the three biggest 
problems i n the country..." 
People come t o the h o s p i t a l , Joseph t e l l s us i n the 'dome' sequence 
' f u l l of muck'; i n the h o s p i t a l there i s no a r t , and the b u i l d i n g s 
themselves are i n a sorry s t a t e of collapse u n t i l Joseph s t a r t s to 'work' 
on them h i m s e l f ; and the whole place i s i n any case hopelessly over-
crowded. An a l t e r n a t i v e i s t o be found i n the f o l l o w i n g : 
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"That p i c t u r e t o me i s a place worth l i v i n g i n . A l o t of 
timber i n i t . Good v e n t i l a t i o n . A l l r i g h t . One of the s t a t e l y 
homes of England. You see r e a l l y a place t h i s s i z e . . . i t takes a place 
t h i s size t o support not 40 t o a ward but j u s t one man and h i s w i f e . 
So they can l i v e comfortably f o r ever.,,They were b u i l t l a r g e so the 
person could walk around them, lo o k i n g at p a i n t i n g s . So he d i d n ' t 
have to go out among a l l t h a t muck and t h a t . He could get out of h i s 
car and i n t o the house with o u t ever going outside. He l i v e d a 
comfortable l i f e i n a very b i g house - not l i k e 15's, 40 to a ward... 
and t h a t ' s the way i t should be. And the houses were good houses". 
The s t a t e l y home provides f o r a peaceful existence, not u n l i k e 
the haven of peace i n Figure I . I n the next example he takes us back 
to the muck and chaos, and i n t i m a t i o n s of a t e r r o r around h i s own 
b i r t h - he was born i n 1937 - and u p b r i n g i n g , i n which i d e n t i t i e s are 
hopelessly muddled. The RVI i s the Royal V i c t o r i a I n f i r m a r y i n 
Newcastle-upon-Tyne where Joseph was f i r s t admitted some years back 
before h i s t r a n s f e r to the present h o s p i t a l : 
"Looks l i k e a London fog . He's s o r t of wandering around l o o k i n g 
f o r h i s house i n a f o g . . . I mean they got themselves i n t o t h i s mess, 
we can't get them out." "They?" "Our p a r e n t s . . . I mean t h e y ' l l have 
to l e a r n how t o b u i l d a proper house and produce m a t e r i a l s and every-
t h i n g . I mean they produced b u i l d i n g s l i k e t h i s which are useless. 
Most of t h e i r time they spent i n the RVI which i s a good b u i l d i n g . 
The houses they had are a l l no good - they kept coming i n t i l l they 
were shipped i n t o the RVI...1937 i n the R V I . . . t e r r i b l e . . . I was born 
i n 1 9 2 6 . . . f u l l of babies and t h a t . . . t h e doctors couldn't cope w i t h 
the chaos i n th e r e , they hadn't the medicines, and a l o t of the babies 
died...That's where I f i r s t met my doctor. She said ' I ' l l take your 
appendix out' but d i d n ' t . , . J u s t put a couple of scars, t a t t o o marks... 
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At about 11 I was shipped i n t o the RVI to work i n there but I couldn't 
do no u g h t . . . I t was r e a l l y bad i n t h e r e . . . I t was a l l due t o t h e i r 
houses: they were no good...The place was jampacked. So a l l they're 
doing now i s t o push them i n t o places l i k e t h i s , hoping t h e y ' l l come 
round t o studying b u i l d i n g and that...They're doing what they d i d i n 
1937 when the RVI was f u l l up...Otherwise they're going to spend the 
r e s t of time i n a place l i k e t h i s . . . u n t i l they l e a r n a b i t about 
building...and get i n t o a decent hospital...Now when you t r y t o teach 
them something - such as j o i n e r y - they can't do i t , they won't have 
i t , what t o o l s you need t o buy t o b u i l d a house, a p r e f a b r i c a t e d house." 
Michael Long, i n a powerful study of Shakespeare's t r a g e d i e s , 
shows how c e n t r a l i s the image of the house i n both the comedies and 
the t ragedies. I n the comedies we f i n d a house, surrounded by woods 
and f i e l d s , "which can open i t s doors and al l o w f r e e movement back 
and f o r t h between the s o c i e t y indoors and the w i l d world w i t h o u t " 
(1976 p.7). I n the t r a g e d i e s , i n c o n t r a s t , we "have houses which do 
not open t h e i r doors, except t o cast out the e r r a n t t o t h e i r f a t e . 
They keep t h e i r doors f i r m l y shut and t h e i r bulwarks impregnable, 
f e a r f u l of v o l a t i l i t y and t h e r e f o r e p r e v e n t a t i v e of release" ( i b i d . ) . 
Thus i n 'King Lear' "we begin w i t h i n a great house where a l l the panoply 
of a c u l t u r e i s assembled...This house of Law i s surrounded by the w i l d 
w orld, i n t o which the e r r a n t are d r i v e n or where the Law's v i c t i m s 
seek sanctuary; and those who adventure i n t o i t experience a l l the 
tumult of the k i n e t i c which, i n the s o c i a l w o r l d , was tamed or ignored 
or repressed," (ibid,pp.162-3). And Cordelia and Kent are indeed 
expelled; expelled " t o i n h a b i t an outer, e x t r a - c u l t u r a l and non-human 
world of dumb animal v i o l e n c e ; an area of l i f e not on the map, and 
hence not p a r t of the King's 'nature', i n h a b i t e d by the sub-man or 
beast ' t h a t makes h i s generation messes/To gorge h i s a p p e t i t e ' " 
( i b i d . p.166). 
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For Joseph 'housing t a l k ' i s f a m i l i a r ; h i s f a t h e r .is a b u i l d e r 
and Joseph himself a j o i n e r . Some years back, f o r example, Joseph 
had - as h i s f a t h e r proudly showed me - designed and b u i l t the roof 
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of h i s parents' bungalow. There i s a sense i n which houses con-
s t i t u t e the b r i c k s and mortar of h i s work i d e n t i t y i n t h a t l a r g e r 
house - the house of so c i e t y - from which he i s now e x i l e d . There 
i s an obvious sense, too, i n which t a l k about houses and about b u i l d i n g 
provides him w i t h a means t o give expression t o forms of experience 
t h a t are a l i e n , and f o r which he has no s e t t l e d vocabulary. The 
d i f f i c u l t y f o r him i s t h a t the language of housing t r e a t s of the f i x e d 
and e x t e r n a l whereas the meanings t h a t Joseph i s s t r u g g l i n g w i t h are 
both i n t e r n a l and e x t e r n a l ; they s h i f t and leap about. The house 
f o r which he has b u i l t the roof does a f t e r a l l include h i s mother; and 
t h e r e i n a meaning t h a t the s t r u c t u r e cannot co n t a i n . 
Joseph, l i k e Cordelia and Kent, has been expelled from the house 
i n which most of us l i v e . He has v i o l a t e d the h a b i t s and assumptions -
the frameworks of meaning - t h a t hold the house i n place, and f o r t h i s 
he has been banished. Unlike Lear, however, Joseph i s not cast out 
wit h o u t s h e l t e r onto the heath. His enforced place of residence, 
although i n one sense i t belongs w i t h i n the s o c i a l w o r l d , speaks l o u d l y 
of h i s e x i l e from i t . I n Units I I and I I I he wonders where he should 
l i v e ; home or h o s p i t a l ; between these, as we have seen, there i s no 
other o p t i o n . The question t h a t he asks i s i n one sense r e a l ; but 
i t i s not j u s t the p h y s i c a l i t i e s of place t h a t concern him: more pressing 
i s h i s abode i n the vast d r i f t of meaning.. I n a celebrated phrase of 
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W i n n i c o t t ' s , i t i s a question of the "place where we l i v e " . The 
message t h a t i s given t o him by the s o c i a l world i s t h a t he and the r e s t 
of us do not l i v e i n the same place. He i s i n t h a t sense, t h r u s t i n t o 
an "area of l i f e not on the map". One t a c t i c , as we have seen, i s t o 
re s t o r e the h o s p i t a l and h i s a c t i v i t y i n i t , t o a place i n a meaningful 
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s o c i a l world t h a t includes the world of work. And more than t h i s , 
the h o s p i t a l i s r e s t o r e d not only t o the s o c i a l world but also t o 
c u l t u r e and t o nature; from being a rubbish-heap, "a d i r t y , s c r u f f y 
r o t t e n h o l e " , a r e p o s i t o r y of the unwanted and the d e r e l i c t , i t becomes 
a farm and a c o l l e g e : 
"...we thought i t was a college when we f i r s t got here...next 
we thought i t was a farm...then we thought i t was a h o s p i t a l . . . t h e n we 
thought i t was a farm...so eh". 
"What do you t h i n k i t i s now?" 
" I f i t i s a c o l l e g e , . , i t looks more l i k e a co l l e g e to me than 
anything... the 0T and the group-work and t h a t . . . i t looks more l i k e a 
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college than anything t o me...a very old-fashioned c o l l e g e l i k e " . 
Yet. to b u i l d himself an abode, and t o keep i t i n t a c t , i s not easy. 
He has been t h r u s t from the house of named and i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d others 
i n which most of us l i v e . What he does not renounce - what cannot be 
taken from him - i s h i s tenancy i n the i n s t i t u t i o n of language; he 
uses the resources t h a t i t o f f e r s , w i t h energy and i n g e n u i t y , t o b u i l d 
f o r himself an abode t h a t w i l l p r o t e c t him from the storm. For Joseph 
i n h i s own way a l l t h a t i s outside the house i s dangerous. Thus i n the 
'dome' sequence he t e l l s us: 
"...you see you can't j u s t l i v e anywhere, you know, you've got to 
have the weather co n d i t i o n s t o l i v e i n . . . I mean i f you buy a house and 
f i n d you can never go out of the house...If you buy a house on eh dry 
land l i k e you f i n d t h a t you're never out of the house." 
"Why?" 
"Because i f you go outside you get dust up your nose and down 
103 
your t h r o a t " . 
The only way t o go o u t s i d e , he goes on t o say, i s i n a pressure 
s u i t ; t o leave unprotected i s t o r i s k c e r t a i n death or to t u r n i n t o 
a cave-man. 
C l e a r l y i t i s not simply a matter of ho l d i n g the door shut: the 
whole s t r u c t u r e threatens to collapse. The abode i s always temporary: 
f l y i n g p a r t i c l e s and b i t s of aeroplanes, the fear of fragmentation and 
devastation i s never f a r away. For the most p a r t h i s language holds 
together; o c c a s i o n a l l y the molecular s p l i t t i n g puts i t i n jeopardy as 
here: 
" . . . I n f a c t there's l i t t l e a i r c r a f t f l y i n g j u s t above your head", 
(then almost i n a u d i b l y ) " I t ' s l i k e a nightmare". 
"You said e a r l i e r on t h a t there were b i t s of aeroplanes?" 
"Well, there i s at times. At times you see there's one crashed 
you know...so you maybe j u s t d r i v e down the motorway...like t h a t . . . 
t h a t i s a dome about t h a t big...and make probably a f u l l - s i z e d a i r c r a f t 
and j u s t s t i c k i t somewhere". 
At h i s most extreme, he wants t o b u i l d f o r himself an abode t h a t 
i s u t t e r l y unpeopled: " I t ' s a p i t y you couldn't have your own p r i v a t e 
dome, but you can't you see". At times i t seems as though there l i e s 
nothing i n between the e x t r e m i t i e s of the v i l l a g e s upon v i l l a g e s of 
empty houses, t h e i r windows boarded up, standing desolate and i r r e p a r a b l e , 
and the t e r r i b l e chaos and confusion of the teeming l i f e i n the RV1. 
Some months l a t e r , a t the time when he has s t a r t e d to i n v e s t the h o s p i t a l 
w i t h s i g n i f i c a n c e as a place where he i s doing u s e f u l work, and t h a t he 
can c a l l home, he adopts a b e t t e r s o l u t i o n . Speaking of the h o s p i t a l 
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he says t o me: 
" I t h i n k I ' l l be here f o r q u i t e a w h i l e . . . I l i k e these remote 
areas...My mother says t h a t there's nothing here l i k e : she's i n the 
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women's ward. But the work's here l i k e . . . " 
A month l a t e r I ask him how things are on the ward. "Why eh... 
they're p r e t t y bad l i k e . . . a f t e r working a l l w i n t e r l i k e . . . t h e y ' r e 
p r e t t y bad l i k e . . . W e l l , we're p r e t t y eh...mentally f i t l i k e . . . l wouldn't 
say t h a t we're p h y s i c a l l y f i t l i k e , but we're mentally f i t l i k e , our 
mothers are f i t you know" "Your?" "Our mothers, we've got our mothers 
and s i s t e r s i n t o h o s p i t a l l i k e . . . y o u know...ay because of the weather 
l i k e " "How's t h a t ? " " I t ' s too hot l i k e " . 1 remind him t h a t I 
r e c e n t l y met h i s parents a t t h e i r home i n F-. He t e l l s me t h a t the 
two o l d people 1 met were only h i s step-parents. He goes on to say 
t h a t h i s mother makes tea and does a b i t of s e c r e t a r i a l work, "not 
much, mostly making tea a l l the time f o r the doctors and things l i k e 
t h a t . . . " "My mother's a l l r i g h t " , he says, "she used to go t o the a r t 
classes w i t h me". And he continues: "While I'm outside she can't go 
out...she stops i n on the ward...to make sure I don't wander o f f . . . 
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Wherever I work she i s " . 
By a f i n e imaginative s t r o k e , then, Joseph has found a s o l u t i o n 
to h i s problem of abode; l i k e Joseph himself h i s mother takes refuge 
i n the h o s p i t a l from the 'weather c o n d i t i o n s ' ; one of her f u n c t i o n s i s to 
make sure he doesn't wander o f f ; i n short t o p r o t e c t him from the 
ravages of the storm. And the mother t h a t he brings t o l i v e i n the 
h o s p i t a l , we can be sure, i s from Joseph's own account very u n l i k e h i s 
own mother who wanted her son born the opposite sex, a mother who 
f i g u r e s prominently i n the storm from which he would have h i s imaginary 
mother p r o t e c t him. 
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I n 'King Lear' the spurious and corr u p t 'nature' of the house 
contrasts w i t h the n a t u r a l world of the storm on the heath. The storm 
may be harsh but i n i t s raw a c t u a l i t y brings w i t h i t a sense of l i f e 
t h a t i s i n v i g o r a t i n g . And as Michael Long p o i n t s o u t , the storm i n 
'King Lear', u n l i k e the n a t u r a l world of 'Macbeth', i s " q u i t e f r e e from 
witches and mousing owls and crows making wing t o rooky woods and 
horses eating one another" Cop. c i t . p.188). For Joseph, however, 
nature holds no consolations. Time and again he presents us w i t h 
images t h a t d e p i c t an a c u t e l y p a i n f u l h i a t u s of growth and development; 
i t i s as though nothing can be allowed to f o l l o w i t s n a t u r a l course 
from beginning t o end; everywhere there i s c o l l a p s e , d e p l e t i o n and 
r e v e r s a l . I n U n i t X I I I he says of the l a s t t r a c t o r t h a t he designed: 
"They t o l d me i t went a hundred yards and dropped t o b i t s . I couldn't 
b e l i e v e i t " . Of one of the p i c t u r e s i n the Object Relations Test he 
says: "Looks as i f he's saying 'do we have t o s t a r t w i t h the house 
r i g h t from the beginning again?'". I n Un i t V I I I Joseph i s i n a peaceful 
room i n a "most fabulous h o s p i t a l " but i t seems at the expense of 
another man - who appears t o be h i s f a t h e r - "who...was l i v i n g not i n 
a h o s p i t a l but i n a prison...he got ha r d l y anything t o eat...a very o l d 
man...as soon as he r e t i r e d he died". And of himself he says on another 
occasion; " I t ' s going t o take me u n t i l I'm s i x t y - f i v e t o have my own 
s e l f put r i g h t before I can have any f a m i l y a t a l l " . I n h i s response 
to the Object Relations Test p i c t u r e i n which he t a l k s about the RVI, 
the chaos of h i s own b i r t h and development, and of h i s parents' 
i d e n t i t i e s , seem t o be mingled together. Something of h i s agonising 
f e e l i n g s about growth and p r o c r e a t i o n i s evident i n a discussion t h a t 
we had towards the end of my work w i t h him: "They" - he d i d not make 
i t c l e a r who 'they' r e f e r s t o - "prepared i n 1937" ^  the year of 
Joseph's b i r t h - " t o breed t h i s new herd of c a t t l e . . . a n d eh i t ' s now 
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1974" - i t was i n f a c t 1972 - "and eh, so f a r they've got a young 
b u l l , a young cow,...and two o l d cows... t h a t ' s a l l they've got since 
1945." And the cows i n the f i e l d s roundabout, he t e l l s me, are 
"deaf, dumb, b l i n d , and s t u p i d . Their t a b l e t s wear o f f and they stop 
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e a t i n g . They s i t down m the meadows and they starve t o death". 
Nature f o r Joseph i s more l i k e the world of 'Macbeth' than t h a t 
of 'Lear'. I n U n i t X we have the rampant s e x u a l i t y of cats g i v i n g 
b i r t h t o an "explosion of cave-men crossed w i t h b u l l s , elephants and 
a l l s o r t s " . I n U n i t V I horses can only be r i d d e n i f "encased i n metal., 
the whole of the armour i s the gear box and you change gear w i t h the 
sword." 
Nature, as the l a s t example i n d i c a t e s , demands mastery and c o n t r o l . 
Union can only unleash d r e a d f u l hybrids. Mastery and c o n t r o l i s the 
idiom of science i n c o n t r a s t t o a r t ; science as we have already seen i s 
associated w i t h death and horror but the l i f e of a r t exposes the s e l f 
to the p o s s i b i l i t y of v i o l a t i o n s and t h e f t s t h a t may be u t t e r l y 
fragmenting. (Joseph t a l k s about the 'poaching' of ideas i n the 
h o s p i t a l ; images of s t e a l i n g recur i n U n i t s V I I , IX and X I I . ) Much 
of the time Joseph opts f o r science and punctuates h i s discourse w i t h 
statements about t r a c t o r s , cars, aeroplanes, wood-work and metal-work, 
as f o r example i n U n i t XVI. I n Unit XV he proposes to cut pieces out 
of the paper t h a t he l i k e s and s t i c k them i n a book. The pieces are 
of " t r a c t o r s , cars, c l o t h e s . . . a l l the a r t i c l e s i s not worth reading." 
Better the s t a b i l i t y of these frozen images than to be v i o l a t e d by 
meanings from "a crazy world". And i f words there must be, the w r i t t e n 
word i s p r e f e r a b l e to the spoken, as i n U n i t X I , 
But i n saying to me "everything I do now I w r i t e , , . I w r i t e 
e v e r y t h i n g " Joseph of course b e l i e s himself. The r e a l i t y i s t h a t he 
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t a l k s a great deal and w r i t e s only a l i t t l e . Just as we found t h a t 
'housing t a l k ' could not c o n t a i n the meanings t h a t dwelt i n the house, 
so w i t h the idiom of mechanical objects Joseph, t r y as he w i l l , cannot 
keep a r t out of i t . The idiom i s presented as an a l t e r n a t i v e t o 
animate, organic meanings and at the same time as a v e h i c l e f o r express-
ing these meanings w i t h o u t appearing t o do so. Thus i n U n i t XIV 
Joseph t e l l s us t h a t " t h i s morning when I woke up 1 r e a l i s e d . . . t h a t a 
t r a c t o r i s one of the easiest things i n the world t o make...so i f you 
s t a r t o f f on s.omething simple, then g r a d u a l l y you work out something 
more complicated such as a good q u a l i t y c a r . . . I would recommend i f i t 
was possible f o r us t o remain i n the stage of t r a c t o r s . . . t h a t ' s what I 
say...I don't know..„In other words we're r i g h t back to square one... 
we s o r t of get to a p o i n t where we could make something good and we go 
backwards you know". The t a l k i s o s t e n s i b l y about t r a c t o r s , but we 
can q u i c k l y sense the presence of those other meanings concerning 
growth and development t h a t we r e f e r r e d t o e a r l i e r . 
An important question a r i s e s here, i n r e l a t i o n to t h i s example 
and others t h a t we have discussed: how aware i s Joseph of these hidden, 
or not so hidden, meanings i n what he i s saying? Or to put the matter 
d i f f e r e n t l y , how aware i s he of the symbolic import of what he i s 
conveying i n , f o r example, the 'dome' sequence? Or are we to t r e a t 
examples such as t h i s , as the conventional wisdom would have us, as 
'delusions' of which Joseph i s a passive v i c t i m ? A c o n t r a s t i n g 
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f o r m u l a t i o n , favoured by some American t h e o r i s t s , i s t h a t the 
schizophrenic p a t i e n t i s p l a y i n g a 'game' of which he i s f u l l y conscious. 
Neither the conventional nor the r a d i c a l renderings of the problem 
seem to me adequate, A more accurate expression of the d i f f i c u l t y i s , 
I t h i n k , t o say t h a t Joseph i s both aware and unaware of the s i g n i f i c a n c e 
of what he i s saying and of the nature of the r e a l i t y t o which h i s 
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statements r e f e r . I t i s as though much of the time he c a r r i e s out 
mental operations on h i m s e l f , such t h a t he i s able to export a large 
p a r t of what i s troublesome and f r i g h t e n i n g i n h i s f e e l i n g s about 
h i m s e l f , and h i s r e l a t i o n s w i t h the w o r l d , i n t o objects t h a t are 
e x t e r n a l t o him. Nevertheless although these operations may be p a r t l y 
unconscious, he i s f o r the most p a r t s u f f i c i e n t l y i n charge of them as 
to be w i l l i n g , and able, t o make the connections between h i s immediate 
experience of h i m s e l f , and the meanings t h a t are being conveyed through 
objects and events e x t e r n a l to him, when c a l l e d upon t o do so. The 
c l e a r e s t expression of t h i s i s i n the 'dome' sequence where Joseph 
r e a d i l y accepts the c o n s t r u c t i o n t h a t I place upon what he has been 
saying as having t o do w i t h h i s f e e l i n g s about h i m s e l f , and more 
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p a r t i c u l a r l y w i t h what i t means f o r him t o be m h o s p i t a l . I n a 
subsequent s e c t i o n 1 s h a l l r e t u r n t o the d i f f i c u l t i e s t h a t are posed 
by these f o r m u l a t i o n s , and t o the expressions of them t h a t are c u r r e n t 
i n the l i t e r a t u r e . 
Joseph o s c i l l a t e s a great deal of the time between extremes of 
awareness and non-awareness, between s e n s i t i v i t y and o b l i t e r a t i o n . I n 
Unit X I when I t e l l him on the way over from the ward t h a t Arthur w i l l 
not be present a t the meeting because he has had t o atte n d h i s b r o t h e r -
in-law's f u n e r a l Joseph remarks: " I ' v e got t r o u b l e w i t h me e a r s . . . I 
t h i n k I'm going deaf". On another occasion when Henry recounts the 
t a l e of a p a t i e n t who thought t h a t he was going t o be discharged but 
found t h a t h i s p s y c h i a t r i s t had decided t o renew h i s s e c t i o n f o r another 
year Joseph comments: 
"I'm having t r o u b l e w i t h my ears and eyes now...I can't see 
p r o p e r l y . . . ! want a p a i r of glasses,,,My hearing's d u l l , I can't hear 
pro p e r l y " . I n the next session, however, when the i n c i d e n t over the 
p a t i e n t i s again discussed, Joseph i s able t o muster a more humorous 
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response: 
" I t ' s what they used, t o do e x a c t l y . t h e y used t o c a l l i t f o r e i g n 
l a b o u r . . . o f f e r i n g people holidays i n the country, and once you were i n 
the country you couldn't get out", 
The same o s c i l l a t i o n s are t o be found i n h i s perceptions of others. 
What he had to say about Henry, f o r example, made me wonder i f we were 
discussing the same person: "He's a born leader...a r e a l man...He 
seems to know what he's doing a l l the time...he's one of these persons 
who would get onto a s t r a i g h t course and stay there...He's what we c a l l 
a 'he-man'...he's a crack shot w i t h a shot-gun you know". I n my own 
case I o f t e n f e l t q u i t e l o s t w i t h him. Time and again I had t h a t 
f e e l i n g of deep f u t i l i t y t h a t Searles has described i n h i s work w i t h 
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chronic schizophrenics. I t seemed q u i t e impossible to penetrate 
beyond the f a b r i c of b i z a r r e d e s c r i p t i o n and speculation t o achieve some 
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sense of how he f e l t about meeting w i t h me. 
On one occasion, however, a f t e r a p a r t i c u l a r l y f u t i l e meeting i n 
which i t seemed to me t h a t everyone i n the room was become i n c r e a s i n g l y 
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remote from each o t h e r , Joseph asked i f he could w r i t e me a message. 
The other p a t i e n t s had a l l l e f t , and Joseph and I were alone i n the 
room together. He asks i f he can w r i t e me a message to "see what you 
make of i t " . This i s what he wrote: 
A DOZEMEZE 
COMMANDANT 
OUR A VOIR 
Espaniola 
VOUS ET LE MOIR 
J K-, 
I thank him, but say t h a t 1 f i n d i t d i f f i c u l t t o understand. He 
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r e a d i l y t r a n s l a t e s f o r me: "Where are you bound f o r Commandant? 
Where are you going? Good bye. You are s i c k of the j o b " . 
The r i t u a l was i n one sense comic: a message i n doggerel French 
and Spanish t h a t he then u n h e s i t a t i n g l y t r a n s l a t e s f o r me; the words 
t h a t he w r i t e s down bear only an oblique r e l a t i o n to the message t h a t 
he t r a n s l a t e s ; the posture i s d r o l l : i t suggests a p r o v i n c i a l g a r r i s o n 
i n a second-rate Western. But i n a sense we were actors i n j u s t such a 
drama: there he was a locked ward p a t i e n t i n a l a r g e , dreary, 
p r o v i n c i a l mental h o s p i t a l , and I , w i t h my keys at the ready, was soon to 
lock him up f o r the n i g h t . No doubt t h i s was the best t h a t he could 
summon to e n l i v e n t h i s sad, empty, r e a l i t y . And i t was also the clos e s t 
t h a t he could come to a d i r e c t l y personal statement t h a t recognized my 
own depression. I n h i s own way, he p o i n t s to something of t h i s himself 
when, walking back t o the ward w i t h me a few minutes l a t e r , he says t h a t 
there are "so many misunderstandings w i t h E n g l i s h " ; Spanish, by c o n t r a s t , 
" i s d e f i n i t e " . 3 1 
When the period of my research was drawing t o a cl o s e , I decided 
t h a t I would i n f o r m the p a t i e n t s I worked w i t h c l o s e l y of my departure 
a few months before I a c t u a l l y l e f t . Joseph was a t t h a t time very 
preoccupied w i t h s i c k animals. " I see t h i s place" he said "as working 
over time to look a f t e r animals, s i c k animals... the cows are the worst 
of the l o t " . And p a r t of Joseph's r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , so he t o l d me, was to 
look a f t e r these animals. He then sa i d to me: "Anything you'd l i k e me 
to do f o r you? You've done a l o t f o r me. I f you had a dog or a cat or 
something took s i c k you could b r i n g i t here". A week or so l a t e r I t o l d 
him t h a t I would be l e a v i n g i n a few months' time. The date was May 16th. 
There was a s i l e n c e , then he s a i d , l o o k i n g at me: "Yes...the t r o u b l e 
w i t h the meadows around here i s t h a t there's not enough grass. The cows 
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can't f i n d enough to f i l l t h e i r stomachs...They can't get by w i t h o u t 
supplementary sustenance". 
Some months l a t e r - on August 4th to be exact - Joseph ponders 
whether the h o s p i t a l i s a farm, a c o l l e g e , or a h o s p i t a l . He decides, 
as we noted e a r l i e r , t h a t i t i s probably a co l l e g e . He then says: 
" I t seems to me t h a t the f i r s t p a r t of the course i s over...We're now 
i n the second p a r t of the course, and the f i r s t p a r t of the course was 
a year. I t f i n i s h e d on the..." - and he t h i n k s f o r a minute, and says 
aloud - "15th?, 16th?, 15th of May l i k e . . . i f i t i s a college l i k e " . 
A stonishing though i t may seem, coming from someone who on occasions 
appears to be confused as to h i s own age, the dates of the Second World 
War, and the year i n which we are p r e s e n t l y l i v i n g , I can only assume 
t h a t Joseph i s a l l u d i n g here to the date on which I t o l d him t h a t I was 
going to be l e a v i n g . And i n May I had, i n f a c t , been working w i t h him 
f o r a l i t t l e over a year. 
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You take my house when you do take the prop 
That doth s u s t a i n my house; you take my l i f e 
When you do take the means whereby I l i v e 
('.Merchant of Venice', I V . i . 376-8). 
Joseph, w i t h a generosity t h a t i t i s not easy f o r us to complement, 
shows us the means whereby he l i v e s . To s u s t a i n h i s house i s d i f f i c u l t 
f o r him; he s u f f e r s b i t t e r tensions and c o n t r a d i c t i o n s : between a r t and 
science; between the l i f e of f e e l i n g and the a r t i f i c i a l ; between the 
rose-garden and the rubbish heap; between the complete d i s s o l u t i o n of a l l 
s t r u c t u r e s and a moribund order t h a t cramps the human s p i r i t . He f e e l s 
t e r r i b l e w i t h o u t t a b l e t s , and y e t when t o l d by someone t h a t p s y c h i a t r y i s 
dependency on t a b l e t s , "we d i d n ' t q u i t e understand t h i s , we thought 'Surely 
to God we weren't put on t h i s e a r t h to l i v e on t a b l e t s a l l the time' ". 
These tensions and c o n t r a d i c t i o n s are, taken together, more extreme than 
we would want - or could t o l e r a t e - f o r ourselves but we have, I t h i n k , 
as a necessary component of any act of personal and s o c i a l a f f i r m a t i o n , 
to recognise ourselves i n them. I n order to f i n d a p o s i t i o n c onvincingly 
experienced from w i t h i n which we can both allow Joseph h i s voice and 
ourselves be allowed our own, wi t h o u t the one seeming to repudiate the 
other, we have to stress the important sense i n which we do l i v e i n the 
same place. The strangeness and 'otherness' of much of what Joseph says 
does not t h e r e f o r e go away but the whole problem i s experienced from a 
d i f f e r e n t vantage p o i n t . Instead of t r y i n g t o reach across an i n a l i e n a b l e 
d i v i d e as from a safe and assured harbour of refuge i t becomes a matter 
of how t o forge a language of d e s c r i p t i o n and communication, a mode of 
response and r e l a t i o n , t h a t i s rooted i n a common - and t h e r e f o r e f e l t -
dynamic o f personal and s o c i a l l i f e . To provide Joseph w i t h the 
"supplementary sustenance" t h a t he asks f o r i s , to be l a c o n i c about i t , 
a problem of a r t as much as of science, and more p a r t i c u l a r l y of the 
tension between them; sustenance f o r an i s o l a t i o n t h a t i s only p a r t l y 
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of h i s own choosing; a house under the sea i n which he dances no more: 
The houses are a l l gone under the sea. 
The dancers are a l l gone under the h i l l . 
(T.S. E l i o t , 'East Coker', 99-100) 
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I I . Notes 
1. On occasions I saw discharged p a t i e n t s a t c l i n i c s and p s y c h i a t r i c 
departments elsewhere i n the area. 
2. I f i n d the extent of my own m a t e r i a l daunting, nevertheless I 
cannot claim to equal Searles (1972) who presents the case of 
a schizophrenic woman whom he has seen 4 hours per week ("apart 
from b r i e f vacations") over a p e r i o d of 18 years, a " t o t a l of 
some 3500 hours a t the time of w r i t i n g " . A l l the sessions f o r 
the l a s t 6 years were tape-recorded. 
3. A l l of the p a t i e n t s reported here were r e c e i v i n g a form of 
Phenothiazine treatment. None of them were administered E.C.T. 
or any other form of treatment d u r i n g the time t h a t I knew them. 
4. E x c e l l e n t presentations of schizophrenic p a t i e n t s i n recent years 
are Laing (1960), Milner (1969), and Searles (1972). Nevertheless 
even w i t h these w r i t e r s i t i s o f t e n d i f f i c u l t to d i s t i n g u i s h the 
voice of the p a t i e n t from the voice t h a t i s speaking about him. 
The accomplished understanding t h a t i s given to us at the l e v e l 
of the t e x t takes away from what happens i n the s o c i a l occasion 
of meeting; namely the s t r u g g l e to accommodate the discourse of 
the schizophrenic w i t h i n one's own discourse i n a way t h a t does 
not i n v o l v e a r e p u d i a t i o n of one or the other, or of both. To 
go from reading, say, Laing (1960) to meeting w i t h a d i s t u r b e d 
schizophrenic i s no easy matter. 
5. The f o l l o w i n g examples are c h a r a c t e r i s t i c . The f i r s t i s taken from 
Mayer-Gross, S l a t e r and Roth (1969, p.267): 
A young p a t i e n t s a i d ' I f e e l t h a t e v e r y t h i n g i s s o r t 
of r e l a t e d to everybody and t h a t some people are f a r 
more susceptible to t h i s theory of r e l a t i v i t y than 
others because of e i t h e r having previous ancestors 
connected i n some way or other w i t h places or t h i n g s , 
or because of b e l i e v i n g or of l e a v i n g a t r a i l behind 
might leave a d i f f e r e n t t r a i l and a l l s o r t s of things 
go l i k e t h a t ' . 
The example i s presented as an instance of 'thought b l o c k i n g ' to 
i n d i c a t e the gaps, the poverty, the i n d e f i n i t e n e s s , and the 
vagueness of the t h i n k i n g d i s o r d e r . 
I n F o r r e s t and A f f l e c k , eds. (1969, p.23) we f i n d the f o l l o w i n g as 
an i l l u s t r a t i o n of the disorder of the possession of thought: 
J.G. claimed t h a t he was h i g h l y s k i l l e d a t making up 
jokes. Unfortunately these were immediately removed 
from h i s mind and put i n t o the mouths o f comedians so 
t h a t when J.G. was watching the t e l e v i s i o n he would 
hear h i s own thoughts u t t e r e d as jokes by the 
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performers. He said he was going to w r i t e to the 
BBC about t h i s infringement of h i s p r i v a c y . 
The c r i t i c a l p o i n t i s , of course, not t h a t these v i g n e t t e s do not 
i l l u s t r a t e the tendencies t h a t the authors ascribe to them but t h a t 
the p r e s e n t a t i o n enfolds the p a t i e n t i n a terminology of i t s own 
such t h a t we are never p e r m i t t e d to hear more from the p a t i e n t than 
the occasional c u r t a i l e d utterance. 
6. Andre Green, a French psychoanalyst, i s u s e f u l i n another way too. 
The paper from which the q u o t a t i o n i s taken, 'The Analyst, 
Symbolization and Absence i n the A n a l y t i c S e t t i n g ' (1975), i s q u i t e 
the best d e s c r i p t i o n on a broad canvas t h a t I know o f , of the 
various d i r e c t i o n s t h a t psychoanalytic t h i n k i n g and p r a c t i c e have 
taken i n recent years. Habermas's n o t i o n of psychoanalysis as 
i n v o l v i n g an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the p a t i e n t ' s behaviour i n the 
transference as a " r e p e t i t i o n of e a r l y childhood experience", i n 
p a r t i c u l a r of an " o r i g i n a l scene experienced i n e a r l y childhood" 
(1970a, pp.207-8), i s c l e a r l y a p a r t i a l , i f not r e t r o g r a d e , view. 
Green sets out an opposing conception which concerns i t s e l f w i t h 
the v i c i s s i t u d e s of a d u l t i d e n t i t y . See also W i n n i c o t t (1971). 
I t i s worthwhile mentioning here, before we embark on our next stage, 
t h a t a l l the f i e l d w o r k reported here was undertaken before I had 
received any form of experience or t r a i n i n g i n psychoanalysis. 
7. The dates of the sessions from which the examples are taken are as 
f o l l o w s : 
U n i t I 1. 7. 71 
Unit I I 1. 7. 71 
Unit I I I 7. 7. 71 
Unit IV 11. 7. 71 
Unit V 14. 7. 71 
U n i t VI 19. 7. 71 
U n i t V I I 19. 7. 71 
U n i t V I I I 22. 7. 71 
U n i t IX 22. 7. 71 
Unit X 22. 7. 71 
Unit XI 28. 7. 71 
Unit X I I 28. 7. 71 
Unit X I I I 2. 8. 71 
U n i t XIV 5. 8.71 
U n i t XV 11. 8. 71 
U n i t XVI 12. 8. 71 
Unit XVII 16. 11 .71 
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8. Winnicott (1971) w r i t e s : 
S t a r t i n g as we:do from psychoneurotic i l l n e s s and 
w i t h ego defences r e l a t e d to anxiety t h a t arises 
out o f the i n s t i n c t u a l l i f e , we tend to t h i n k of 
h e a l t h i n terms of the s t a t e of ego defences. We 
say t h a t i t i s healthy when these defences are not 
r i g i d etc. But we can seldom reach the p o i n t at 
which we can s t a r t to describe what l i f e i s l i k e 
apart from i l l n e s s or absence of i l l n e s s . That 
i s to say, we have s t i l l to t a c k l e the problem of 
what l i f e i t s e l f i s about...Psychotic p a t i e n t s who 
are a l l the time hovering between l i v i n g and not 
l i v i n g force us to look at t h i s problem, one t h a t 
r e a l l y belongs...to a l l human beings ( i b i d . p.98, 
p.100, emphasis i n the o r i g i n a l ) . 
9. I t w i l l be obvious from what we have already s a i d , and from what 
f o l l o w s , t h a t our approach d i f f e r s from L a f f a l (1965) who might be 
thought to share w i t h us a concern w i t h the range of a schizophrenic's 
discourse. L a f f a l sets out to e s t a b l i s h the contexts i n which a 
p a t i e n t uses c e r t a i n c r i t i c a l 'key' words. A context he defines 
as " t h a t segment of the p a t i e n t ' s language which included one 
sentence immediately preceding the sentence i n which the key word 
was used, and one sentence immediately f o l l o w i n g the sentence 
w i t h the key word" ( i b i d . p.132). The catalogue of fragmented 
utterances t h a t we are given i s a minor triumph of the t e c h n i c a l 
i m a g i n a t i o n , but any sense of the p a t i e n t as an a c t i v e speaking 
subject occupying a s o c i a l space together w i t h the research worker 
i s q u i t e l o s t . 
10. 29.7.71 
11. 25.1.72 
12. 7.6.72 
13. 22.2.72 
14. 23.8.72 
15. For the reasons t h a t I give i n the i n t r o d u c t i o n I d i d not attempt 
to work w i t h the f a m i l i e s of p a t i e n t s . I d i d , however, v i s i t 
Joseph's parents on one occasion, i f only to a s c e r t a i n t h a t the 
b i o g r a p h i c a l f a c t s t h a t I had e s t a b l i s h e d about him were c o r r e c t . 
His parents t o l d me t h a t Joseph had always been a ' t a l k e r ' . U n t i l 
the age of 26 he was "a gentleman...every word p e r f e c t and sensible". 
Sensible t a l k , so h i s parents s a i d , included t o p i c s such as 
"education, shooting and motorbikes". Now, i n c o n t r a s t , e v e r y t h i n g 
t h a t he says i s nonsense. Mrs. K. said t h a t she had not been able 
to t a l k to Joseph f o r four years. His f a t h e r spoke a great deal 
117 
about Joseph's b u i l d i n g prowess: he showed me the work t h a t 
Joseph had done on the house, and t o l d me about the extensions 
he had designed f o r other people. " A l l I want", s a i d h i s f a t h e r 
" i s t o see Joseph married" (13.5.72). 
16. 26.4.72 
17. 12.7.72 
18. 8.12.71. Object Relations Technique, t e x t and t e s t m a t e r i a l s , 
P h i l l i p s o n (1955). 
The m a t e r i a l presented i s from Joseph's responses to the f o l l o w i n g 
p i c t u r e s : BG(10), B2(7), A3(8), C3(3). 
19. See Note 15 above. 
20. Winnicott (1971) examines "the place where we most of the time are 
when we experience l i f e " . Language, he suggests, t e s t i f i e s to 
our " n a t u r a l i n t e r e s t i n the matter": 
I may be i n a muddle, and then I e i t h e r crawl out of 
the muddle or else t r y t o put things i n order so t h a t 
I may, at l e a s t f o r a time, know where I am. Or I may 
f e e l I am at sea, and I take bearings so t h a t I may come 
to p o r t (any p o r t i n a storm) and then when I am on dry 
land I look f o r a house b u i l t on rock r a t h e r than 
sand; and i n my own home, which (as I am English) i s 
my c a s t l e , I am i n a seventh heaven ( i b i d . p.104, 
emphasis i n the o r i g i n a l ) . 
A l l these images echo, i n c e r t a i n ways, Joseph's pre-occupations. 
According t o Winni c o t t the s p e c i a l f e a t u r e of the place where we 
l i v e most of the time i s t h a t i t i s an "area of l i v i n g " t h a t i s 
" n e i t h e r i n s i d e the i n d i v i d u a l nor outside i n the wor l d of shared 
r e a l i t y " . He terms t h i s area of intermediate l i v i n g a ' p o t e n t i a l 
space' t h a t makes possible a separating out of the me from the 
not-me, and yet " a t the same time, however, i t can be s a i d t h a t 
separation i s avoided by the f i l l i n g i n of the p o t e n t i a l space 
w i t h c r e a t i v e p l a y i n g w i t h the use of symbols, and w i t h a l l t h a t 
e v e n t u a l l y adds up t o a c u l t u r a l l i f e " ( i b i d . p.109). We s h a l l 
r e t u r n t o some of these ideas l a t e r . 
21. 4.8.72 
22. 16.5.72 
23. 23.6.72 
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24. Rubinstein (1975) discusses the schizophrenic's experience of the 
" l a c k of human contact" i n the h o s p i t a l environment. "To avoid 
t h i s lack of human contact, t o f i l l the 'human gap'^ the p a t i e n t 
creates delusions and h a l l u c i n a t o r y experiences which supply a 
s u b s t i t u t e 'environment'. This s p e c i a l e c o l o g i c a l system i s made 
up of o l d memory fragments, wished-for daydreams, symbolic pieces 
of a puzzled existence, and d i s t o r t e d , nightmarish t e r r o r s " 
( i b i d . p.245). 
25. 4.8.72 
26. e.g., Watzlawick (1971). 
27. I t i s , I t h i n k , also worth remarking t h a t t h i s whole sequence has 
something about i t of the sorcerer's apprentice, w i t h Joseph i n the 
r o l e of sorcerer and myself as apprentice. Joseph was a f t e r a l l 
deprived of h i s status as a teacher i n the h o s p i t a l and he d i d , I 
t h i n k , receive some pleasure from being able to i n s t r u c t me i n 
something w i t h which I was t o t a l l y u n f a m i l i a r . Moreover i t must 
have been obvious t o him t h a t I was f a s c i n a t e d by what he was 
recounting; a number of my questions, I suspect, r a t h e r than 
drawing from him i n f o r m a t i o n about a pre-formulated system of ideas 
brought from him hasty improvisations to keep the t o p i c on the move. 
28. See Searles (1965), e s p e c i a l l y Chapters 8, 18, 21. Even a f t e r an 
i n t e r v a l of almost s i x years I s t i l l f i n d i t d i f f i c u l t to l i s t e n 
to the recording of the 'dome' sequence w i t h o u t having to s t r u g g l e 
w i t h f e e l i n g s of deadness and f u t i l i t y . 
29. A s t a r t l i n g instance o f Joseph's relatedness t o me i s U n i t IX where 
I r e p o r t a dream of my own. Joseph's a t t e n t i o n was r i v e t e d i n a way 
t h a t I had never experienced before, or indeed a f t e r . I am s t i l l 
puzzled as t o how to account f o r h i s r e a c t i o n ; at the time I was 
l e f t f e e l i n g t h a t he was astonished to discover t h a t some of the 
'horrors' t h a t he experienced w i t h i n h i m s e l f were to be found i n 
my inner w o r l d also. 
30. 11.8.71 
31. I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to note i n t h i s connection t h a t i t was r e c e n t l y 
reported ('Sunday Times', 13.3.77) t h a t p s y c h i a t r i s t s i n an 
American h o s p i t a l have been t r e a t i n g t h e i r chronic schizophrenic 
p a t i e n t s by teaching them German. Anatole M a t u l i s , who f i r s t 
s t a r t e d the experiment, comments: "Chronic schizophrenics want 
to t a l k but they are f r i g h t e n e d by r e a l i t y so they t a l k i n metaphors 
which may be incomprehensible t o another person. A f o r e i g n language 
i s more n e u t r a l and acts l i k e a t r a n q u i l l i s e r . I t opens a worl d 
which was closed and brings them back, making them accessible to 
psychotherapy". According t o the r e p o r t , " a t f i r s t the p a t i e n t s 
were unkempt, i n c o n t i n e n t and shrieked abuse or nonsense at each 
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other. A year l a t e r they were more l i k e a t t e n t i v e college 
students. The tr a n s f o r m a t i o n was slow but a f t e r s i x months 
the s t a f f began to n o t i c e t h a t the p a t i e n t s were calmer. 
During the seventh month 'Herr T' who had been mute since 1959 
spoke s o f t l y but au d i b l y i n German, and 'Herr R', mute since 
1961, stopped h i s incessant r o c k i n g back and f o r t h and j o i n e d 
the group". 
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I I I . APPROACHES TO THE LANGUAGE AND THOUGHT OF SCHIZOPHRENICS 
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I I I . Preface. 
We have now met Joseph and we have t r i e d t o f i n d a way of t a l k i n g 
about him i n human terms t h a t n e i t h e r abolishes the strangeness of much 
of what he says nor presents him, as Searles puts i t , as a man "set 
hopelessly apart from h i s f e l l o w beings" (1965, p.561). To achieve 
t h i s we have had t o t o l e r a t e a f l e x i b i l i t y of egress between the place 
where we most of us l i v e and the strange f i e l d s of meaning i n which 
Joseph f i n d s himself. I n a subsequent s e c t i o n we s h a l l want t o consider 
what such a l i c e n c e i m p l i e s f o r the s t r u c t u r e of our own house. For 
the most p a r t , however, responses to the behaviour of schizophrenics 
have fended away from i n c u r s i o n s such as these. Part of our purpose, 
as we declared a t the o u t s e t , i s t o look a t the c i t a d e l s of closure 
t h a t have been erected around schizophrenics, and i t i s t o some of these 
t h a t we must now t u r n . The p r e s e n t a t i o n i s i n two p a r t s . F i r s t , I 
examine some of the p r e v a i l i n g approaches to the study of language and 
thought i n schizophrenia. I have not i n s i s t e d unduly on a separation 
between studies of language and studies of thought d i s o r d e r ; t o do so 
would have been t o assume as 'given' the d i s c i p l i n a r y a r t i f a c t t h a t i s 
made of schizophrenics. Second, I consider i n some depth the personal 
construct theory approach t o the study of thought disorder as represented 
i n the work of Bannister i n p a r t i c u l a r , and present some m a t e r i a l of 
my own. 
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I I I . l . P r e v a i l i n g Approaches, Past and Present. 
B l e u l e r , i n h i s c l a s s i c monograph, regarded "a s p e c i f i c type of 
a l t e r a t i o n of t h i n k i n g " as the d e f i n i n g c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of schizophrenia 
(1911 p. 14). The " t h i n k i n g d i s o r d e r " , he argued, i s manifested by a 
"language di s o r d e r " . Of the schizophrenic's language he wrote t h a t : 
Blocking, poverty of ideas, incoherence, c l o u d i n g , 
delusions, and emotional anomalies are expressed i n 
the language of the p a t i e n t s . . . the abnormality does 
not l i e i n the language i t s e l f but r a t h e r i n i t s content 
( i b i d . p.15). 
The a l t e r a t i o n of t h i n k i n g Bleuler characterizes as a disorder of 
ass o c i a t i o n . This i n i t s t u r n leads t o an increase i n a u t i s t i c t h i n k i n g . 
Concepts come t o d i s p l a y a lack of c l a r i t y , and are f a l s e l y constructed 
by condensation, displacement, and symbolism, by which i s meant misuse 
of symbols. As Fish puts i t : 
Weakness i n a s s o c i a t i o n allows the a f f e c t s to dominate 
the t r a i n of thought and t h i s leads t o an increase i n 
a u t i s t i c ( d e r e i s t i c ) t h i n k i n g by which i s meant fantasy 
t h i n k i n g which i s not goal d i r e c t e d (1976 p.30). 
Taking t h e i r lead from B l e u l e r subsequent w r i t e r s have displayed 
considerable i n g e n u i t y i n t r y i n g to p i n down the s a l i e n t f e a t u r e s of 
schizophrenic speech. F i s h , i n a monograph on schizophrenia f i r s t 
published i n 1962 t h a t continues to be held i n h i g h esteem, pays 
p a r t i c u l a r a t t e n t i o n t o the w r i t i n g s of C. Schneider and K l e i s t . 
Schneider (1942) i d e n t i f i e d three d i s t i n c t sympton-complexes or syndromes 
i n schizophrenia which could occur e i t h e r i n pure form or i n combination, 
the thought withdrawal syndrome, the d e s u l t o r y syndrome, and the 
d r i v e l l i n g syndrome. F i s h enlarges on the d r i v e l l i n g syndrome as 
f o l l o w s : 
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Vague d r i v e l l i n g t h i n k i n g i s the outstanding f e a t u r e 
of the d r i v e l l i n g syndrome. There i s no gross 
grammatical disorder and although speech and t h i n k i n g 
are s u p e r f i c i a l l y i n t e g r a t e d the content i s d r i v e l 
(op. c i t . p.72). 
K l e i s t (1914) provides us w i t h a number of r a t h e r more s p e c i f i c 
c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n s , such as v e r b a l paraphrasis i n which p a t i e n t s make 
combinations of words i n i n c o r r e c t ways. Thus f o r example a p a t i e n t 
used the word 'vessel' f o r n e a r l y a l l o b j e c t s , and c a l l e d a watch a 
'time-vessel'; another p a t i e n t r e f e r r e d to a candle as a 'night 
i l l u m i n a t i o n o b j e c t ' ( F i s h , op. c i t . p.34). 
Two e a r l y w r i t e r s who have had considerable i n f l u e n c e on subsequent 
work are Cameron and Goldstein. Cameron argued t h a t the outstanding 
f e a t u r e of schizophrenic thought disorder i s the lack of genuine causal 
l i n k s and termed i t 'asyndetic t h i n k i n g ' . Asyndetic t h i n k i n g may be 
broken down i n t o three d i s o r d e r s : 'metonyms' i n which imprecise 
approximations are used instead of the more exact expressions, i n t e r -
p e n e t r a t i o n of themes, and o v e r - i n c l u s i o n . Cameron's expositions of 
the disorders of schizophrenic communication have provided the impetus 
f o r a whole range of studies of schizophrenic thought disorder w i t h i n 
what we may c a l l the o v e r - i n c l u s i o n paradigm. A l l of these s t u d i e s , 
most notably those by R. W. Payne and h i s associates,''' u t i l i z e a b a t t e r y 
of experimental t e s t s t h a t pay l i t t l e a t t e n t i o n t o the d e t a i l of the 
schizophrenic's communications other than t h a t which i s generated i n 
2 
response t o , f o r example, the Benjamin Proverbs Test. 
I t i s t h e r e f o r e u s e f u l t o t u r n back to Cameron's o r i g i n a l d e s c r i p t i o n s 
3 
of schizophrenic speech from which the l a t e r work derives. What 
happens i n schizophrenic d i s o r g a n i z a t i o n , Cameron w r i t e s , i s t h a t " s o c i a l 
communication i s gra d u a l l y crowded out by fantasy; and the fantasy 
i t s e l f , because of i t s n o n - p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n , and r e l a t i o n t o , a c t i o n , 
124 
becomes i n t u r n less and less influenced by s o c i a l p a t t e r n s . The 
r e s u l t i s a progressive loss of organised t h i n k i n g and u l t i m a t e l y an 
in c a p a c i t y f o r t a k i n g the r o l e of others when t h i s i s necessary to 
enable one t o share adequately i n t h e i r a t t i t u d e s and perspectives" 
(1944 pp.51-52). With i n t e r p e n e t r a t i o n of themes we have a s i t u a t i o n 
i n which "a p a t i e n t ' s a s o c i a l fantasy themes are able continuously t o 
subordinate a l l e x t e r n a l events i n the f i e l d of s o c i a l behaviour": 
the p a t i e n t i s thus l e f t " w i t h only a fragmented and d i s t o r t e d environ-
ment which cannot p o s s i b l y i n f l u e n c e h i s conduct i n a s o c i a l l y organised 
way" ( i b i d . p. 56). 
Of a p a t i e n t ' s performance on a s o r t i n g t e s t Cameron w r i t e s t h a t : 
Personal c o n f l i c t s i n t r u d e d themselves. A woman 
p a t i e n t could not b r i n g h e r s e l f t o d i v i d e the blocks 
because f o r her t h i s involved her separation from 
her husband and d i f f e r e n c e s over having c h i l d r e n ; 
n e i t h e r could she group them together because, she 
said 'They belong together only i f they are t r u e . ' 
Another woman t r i e d t o solve the t e s t as a means of 
' t r y i n g to f i g u r e some l i f e out of the c o n s t r u c t i o n ' 
etc. She got nowhere w i t h i t because she kept mixing 
i n t o her manipulations questions from her already 
tangled personal l i f e . These disorganised schizo-
phrenics could not manage the e s s e n t i a l f i r s t step 
i n problem s o l v i n g , t h a t of narrowing down one's 
operations t o something r e s t r i c t e d and u n i f i e d 
enough t o c a l l out organised a t t i t u d e s and s p e c i f i c 
responses ( i b i d . p.57). 
Experimental evidence suggests t h a t p a t i e n t s who i n Cameron's 
terms are ' o v e r i n c l u s i v e ' are also l i k e l y to demonstrate an i n a b i l i t y 
to m aintain an 'abstract' a t t i t u d e . The d i s t i n c t i o n between the 
abstra c t and the concrete a t t i t u d e i s set out i n Goldstein and Scheerer 
(1941) and i n Goldstein (1944). Once again i t i s , I t h i n k , u s e f u l to 
r e t u r n to the o r i g i n a l d e f i n i t i o n s . "The concrete a t t i t u d e " , the 
authors w r i t e : 
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i s r e a l i s t i c . I t does not imply conscious a c t i v i t y 
i n the sense of reasoning, awareness or a self-account 
of one's doing. We surrender t o experiences of an 
u n r e f l e c t i v e character: we are confined t o the immediate 
apprehension of the given t h i n g or s i t u a t i o n i n i t s 
p a r t i c u l a r uniqueness. This apprehension may be by 
sense or percept but i s never mediated by d i s c u r s i v e 
reasoning. Our t h i n k i n g and a c t i n g are d i r e c t e d by 
the immediate claims which one p a r t i c u l a r aspect of 
the o b j e c t or of the outerworld s i t u a t i o n makes. 
And they continue: 
Such a clai m may c o n s t i t u t e a bond between the respond-
ing i n d i v i d u a l and the o b j e c t etc. Because of the 
bondage the i n d i v i d u a l cannot e a s i l y detach himself 
from the demand exerted by t h a t experienced uniqueness 
of the o b j e c t . Therefore i t i s d i f f i c u l t , i f not 
impossible, f o r him t o r e a l i z e other p o t e n t i a l f u n c t i o n s 
of t h i s same o b j e c t , or even to conceive of i t as an 
example, a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e , or a case of a general class 
or category. This dependence upon immediate claims can 
take on the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of r i g i d i t y or 'lack of 
s h i f t i n g ' . . . B u t i t can also take on the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c 
of f l u i d i t y which manifests i t s e l f i n an extreme 
s u s c e p t i b i l i t y to the v a r y i n g s t i m u l i i n the surround-
ings. The s t i m u l i are f o l l o w e d as ever newly a r i s i n g ; 
the person i s d e l i v e r e d t o t h e i r momentary valences... 
t h e — i n d i v i d u a l i s being shunted passively from one 
stimulus t o the next (1941 p.2-3). 
The a b s t r a c t a t t i t u d e i n c o n t r a s t "embraces more than merely the 
' r e a l ' stimulus i n i t s scope. I t i m p l i e s conscious a c t i v i t y i n the 
sense of reasoning, awareness and self-account of one's doing. We 
transcend the immediately given s i t u a t i o n , the s p e c i f i c aspect or sense 
impression; we a b s t r a c t common from p a r t i c u l a r p r o p e r t i e s ; we are 
o r i e n t e d i n our a c t i o n by a r a t h e r conceptual v i e w p o i n t , be i t a category 
class or a general meaning under which the p a r t i c u l a r o b j e c t before us 
f a l l s . We detach ourselves from the given impression,and the i n d i v i d u a l 
t h i n g represents to us an a c c i d e n t a l example or r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of a 
category." Dominant among the modes of behaviour t h a t s u s t a i n the 
a b s t r a c t a t t i t u d e i s the detachment of the ego from the outerworld or 
from inner experiences ( i b i d . pp.3-4). 
The f o r m u l a t i o n s were o r i g i n a l l y developed i n the context of the 
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study of organic d i s o r d e r s . Addressing himself s p e c i f i c a l l y t o the 
problems presented by schizophrenics Goldstein w r i t e s : 
The world of the schizophrenic i s determined t o a 
p a t h o l o g i c a l extent by h i s own f e e l i n g s and t h i n k -
i n g , and by h i s capacity to r e a c t . The demarcation 
between the outer world and h i s ego i s more or less 
suspended or modified i n comparison w i t h the normal. 
Here i s one o r i g i n of i l l u s i o n s . The objects which 
impress the p a t i e n t are not the same as those which 
would impress the normal person i n the given s i t u a t i o n . 
He experiences only objects to which he can r e a c t i n 
the only way of which he i s capable, t h a t i s , i n the 
concrete way. He does not consider the o b j e c t as 
p a r t of an ordered outer world separated from h i m s e l f , 
as the normal person does (1944 p.23). 
Considering the d i f f i c u l t i e s i n understanding the schizophrenic's 
discourse he w r i t e s : 
I n schizophrenia i t i s r e a l l y very d i f f i c u l t t o f i n d 
out the p a r t i c u l a r concrete s i t u a t i o n t o which a 
word spoken by the p a t i e n t belongs. I f we succeed 
i n f i n d i n g o u t , much of the awkwardness i n the 
comprehension of the schizophrenic's language w i l l 
disappear; h i s language w i l l become understandable 
p a r t i c u l a r l y when we bear i n mind t h a t many of the 
experiences of the schizophrenic d i f f e r so widely 
from those of a normal i n d i v i d u a l t h a t the o r d i n a r y 
channels of v e r b a l expression are n e i t h e r s u f f i c i e n t 
nor s u i t a b l e f o r v e r b a l i z i n g these experiences. 
This i s a l l the more t r u e because language i n general 
i n our c i v i l i z a t i o n i s more stereotyped and not r i c h 
i n words to express the s p e c i f i c i t y of concrete 
s i t u a t i o n s . The p a t i e n t i s thus f o r c e d to b u i l d up 
a language which though i t may appear strange to the 
normal person i s adequate f o r h i s experiences ( i b i d , 
pp.28-9). 
What do these ideas suggest f o r us? Of one t h i n g we can be c l e a r : 
Joseph i s culpable on most of the counts t h a t are set out i n the f o r e -
going pages. His discussion of aeroplanes, f o r example, i n U n i t I i s 
i n Schneider's terms " d r i v e l " . I n U n i t XVII h i s c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n of a 
b i r d as a " f l y i n g food p a r c e l " i s an instance of K l e i s t ' s v e r b a l 
paraphrasia. Nor w i l l we have to look very f a r t o f i n d examples of 
Cameron's i n t e r p e n e t r a t i o n of themes: see, f o r example, Units I I , 
V I and X. Without doubt he i s also o v e r - i n c l u s i v e : thus when 
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presented w i t h the photographs f o r the Bannister & F r a n s e l l a Grid 
Test of Thought Disorder (1966), although i t i s cl e a r t h a t he has 
understood the requirements of the task, he begins to organise the 
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photographs i n terms of f a m i l y groups and likenesses. Moreover 
he i s also i n the sense defined by Goldstein "concrete": he does not 
consider objects as p a r t of an ordered outer world separate from 
himself; h i s perceptions are infused w i t h h i s own f e e l i n g s and 
imaginings as, f o r example, i n h i s d e s c r i p t i o n of cows. Most of the 
r e p e r t o i r e of terms t h a t the p s y c h i a t r i c pathognomy has so c a r e f u l l y 
developed are a p p l i c a b l e i n h i s case: incoherence, p a r a l o g i a , f u s i o n , 
derailment e t c . ; only neologisms are l a c k i n g . 
Considered from w i t h i n t h e i r own p o i n t of view, then, these are 
accurate d e l i n e a t i o n s . We may wish t o add a d e t a i l here and there 
but taken as a whole there i s not much t h a t we can f a u l t . But what 
i s the p o i n t of view from w i t h i n which these c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n s are 
established? The quotations from Cameron and Goldstein provide us, I 
t h i n k , w i t h some clues. Both Cameron and Goldstein make a great play 
of p u t t i n g the study of schizophrenic language and thought on an 
experimental f o o t i n g . Taken i n i t s e l f t h i s i s an exemplary aim. But 
something else i s a t work here. We may n o t i c e t o begin w i t h t h a t 
nowhere i n any of the studies c i t e d i n the foregoing pages i s there any 
i n d i c a t i o n of a r e l a t i o n s h i p between the research worker and the p a t i e n t . 
Where the p a t i e n t i s unable to "consider the obj e c t as p a r t of an 
ordered outer world separated from h i m s e l f " the experimenter does 
e x a c t l y t h a t ; where the p a t i e n t i s entrapped w i t h i n the bondage of 
the concrete the experimenter detaches h i s ego from the "outerworld 
or from inner experiences" i n order t o "transcend the immediately given 
s i t u a t i o n ' ; where the p a t i e n t i s the slave of h i s own s u b j e c t i v i t y 
the experimenter views the world as i t r e a l l y i s . What we have here, i n 
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s h o r t , are a set of m i r r o r opposites: r a t i o n a l i t y celebrates i t s e l f , 
i t s order and i t s accomplishments, by e s t a b l i s h i n g a distance from the 
muddle and confusion t h a t surrounds i t . 
A u s e f u l review of subsequent work i n the t r a d i t i o n of Cameron and 
Goldstein i s given by Payne (1970). I f , however, the p r e v a i l i n g 
approaches w i t h i n the o v e r - i n c l u s i o n paradigm, have, among the other 
s t r i c t u r e s t h a t we have l a i d on i t , by and large tended to ignore the 
language of the schizophrenic p a t i e n t , language studies of schizophrenics 
have not f a r e d much b e t t e r . Reviews of the l i t e r a t u r e are given by 
Pavy (1968), Maher (1972) and Borst (1976). 
We can d i s t i n g u i s h a number of approaches: a s s o c i a t i o n studies i n 
the Kent and Rosanoff (1910) t r a d i t i o n ; measurements of redundancy 
using the Cloze analysis technique; measures of s t a t i s t i c a l r e g u l a r i t y 
t h a t evaluate the nature of the Type-Token r a t i o s i n schizophrenic 
utterances; studies using generative grammar to unravel the problems 
of grammatical d e v i a t i o n s i n schizophrenic language; studies of 
meaning responses to words and phrases; studies of c o n t e x t u a l c o n s t r a i n t 
on speech perception; and studies of concrete and a b s t r a c t modes of 
thought and language among schizophrenics. 
Some of these - the redundancy s t u d i e s , and the i n v e s t i g a t i o n s 
of the s t a t i s t i c a l p r o p e r t i e s of schizophrenic language - are f o r m a l : 
t h a t i s they are able t o s p e c i f y a d e v i a t i o n from the norm, but they 
are unable t o say anything about the nature of the processes t h a t 
produce the d e v i a t i o n ; others - the studies of c o n t e x t u a l c o n s t r a i n t 
and of meaning response i n p a r t i c u l a r - are more ambitious: they attempt 
to develop a model t o account f o r the observed i r r e g u l a r i t i e s . 
Even considered i n t h e i r own terms the p i c t u r e t h a t emerges from 
these endeavours i s not a happy one. Pavy (1968) reviews a s s o c i a t i o n 
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studies and remarks t h a t " w h i l e . . . s t u d i e s have been co n s i s t e n t i n t h e i r 
f i n d i n g s of d i f f e r e n c e between schizophrenics and normals w i t h commonness 
of response as the c r i t e r i o n of ' d i f f e r e n c e s ' there has been l i t t l e 
a t t e n t i o n paid to r e f i n i n g o r e l a b o r a t i n g Kent and Rosanoff's c l a s s i f i c a t i o n 
of p a t h o l o g i c a l r e a c t i o n s " ( i b i d . pp.164-5). One of the l a r g e s t categories 
i n the c l a s s i f i c a t i o n i s l a b e l l e d ' u n c l a s s i f i e d ' . 
Rutter e t . a l . (1975) review recent studies using the Cloze 
technique and r e p o r t an i n v e s t i g a t i o n of t h e i r own: the r e s u l t s of 
d i f f e r e n t studies are by no means consistent and i t i s not cle a r t h a t 
schizophrenic speech i s less p r e d i c t a b l e than normal speech. I n a 
more recent paper Rutter (1977), contrary to what other studies of the 
formal c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of schizophrenic speech have t r i e d t o suggest, 
i s l e d to the view t h a t there are no general c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of 
schizophrenic speech and t h a t i t may " w e l l be t h a t schizophrenic 
p a t i e n t s , l i k e the general p o p u l a t i o n , respond q u i t e d i f f e r e n t l y to 
d i f f e r e n t s i t u a t i o n s " ( i b i d . p.54). 
Sommer e t . a l . (1960) i n i t i a t e d a l i n e of i n q u i r y t h a t s t i l l endures 
e n t i t l e d ' I s there a schizophrenic language?' Chaika (1974) attempts 
to define 'schizophrenic language' by s i x c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , and contends 
t h a t the psychological or mental aberrations are p a r a l l e l e d by "a 
disturbance i n those areas of the b r a i n concerned w i t h l i n g u i s t i c 
production". Fromkin (1975) i n a sharp r i p o s t e demonstrates t h a t the 
l i n g u i s t i c d e v i a t i o n s t h a t Chaika s i n g l e s out as c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of 
schizophrenic speech occur i n , f o r example, the speech productions of 
u n i v e r s i t y professors and concludes: " I f the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c features 
s i n g l e d out by Chaika are unique, then they are unique to the class of 
human speakers" ( i b i d . p.503). 
The studies of contextual c o n s t r a i n t and of meaning response 
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p r o p e r l y speaking belong t o the domains both of language and of thought. 
A c r i t i c a l review i s given by Chapman and Chapman (1973). This might 
appear to recommend them t o our i n t e r e s t , however the whole t h r u s t of 
these studies - whether the emphasis i s on the i n a b i l i t y to d i s a t t e n d 
from strong aspects of meaning, as i n Chapman et a l . (1976), or on the 
i n a b i l i t y t o i n h i b i t a s s o c i a t i v e i n t r u s i o n s - i s towards an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n 
of schizophrenic p a t t e r n s of response i n terms of an a t t e n t i o n a l d e f i c i t 
i n the f i l t e r mechanism. Chapman and Chapman conclude t h e i r study of 
thought disorder w i t h a cascade of questions: 
Do some schizophrenics, or a l l of them have a sp e c i a l 
defect i n a b i l i t y t o f i l t e r out and ignore i r r e l e v a n t 
s t i m u l i ? Do they have a sp e c i a l defect i n a b i l i t y 
t o process i n f o r m a t i o n from more than one channel 
simultaneously? Do they have a d e f i c i t a t some one 
p a r t i c u l a r stage of i n f o r m a t i o n processing, but not 
another? I f so, a t what stage? Do some schizo-
phrenics narrow the range of s t i m u l i t o which they 
attend? I f so, what kinds of s t i m u l i do they ignore? 
(1973, p.345). 
The problem i s not t h a t these questions, or the theory of the 
f i l t e r mechanism as developed by Broadbent (1958) t h a t underpins them, 
are i n any obvious sense wrong: indeed from a cursory i n s p e c t i o n of 
Joseph's m a t e r i a l we can see t h a t much of i t could be t r a n s l a t e d i n t o 
these terms. We reach here, I t h i n k , the s o r t of impasse described 
by Kuhn when he w r i t e s t h a t "the competition between paradigms i s not 
the s o r t of b a t t l e t h a t can be resolved by p r o o f s " (1962, p.153-4). 
We can only weigh the consequences i n e i t h e r d i r e c t i o n : on the one 
hand the t r a n s l a t i o n of the complication of c e r t a i n human states of 
a f f a i r s i n t o a p h y s i c a l i s t i c and b i o l o g i c a l language w i t h the promise 
of "an o b j e c t i v e study of schizophrenic thought d i s o r d e r " i n what i s 
s t i l l "almost a v i r g i n f i e l d " t h a t w i l l lead us to a s o l u t i o n to the 
"enigma of schizophrenic t h i n k i n g " (Chapman and Chapman, op. c i t . 
p.345, p.347); on the other the d e n i g r a t i o n of a language of d e s c r i p t i o n 
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and response t h a t grounds both the schizophrenic p a t i e n t and those who 
work w i t h him i n the l i v e d world of a c t i v e s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s . As Pavy 
remarks, i n a l l the studies w i t h i n t h i s paradigm "language i s viewed 
as epiphenomenal to a t t e n t i o n " (op. c i t . p . 1 7 1 ) . C h a p m a n and Chapman 
(1973) preface t h e i r t e x t w i t h an item of schizophrenic discourse and 
discuss the competing i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s t h a t may be brought to bear on i t ; 
the stance t h a t i s taken i s c o n s i s t e n t l y t h a t of the " s c i e n t i f i c 
observer", and the m a t e r i a l i s i n any case s w i f t l y l e f t behind on the 
grounds t h a t i t i s too f l u i d and "may be described or explained i n many 
ways depending on the bias of the observer" ( i b i d . p.6). The nature of 
the data t h a t i s c o l l e c t e d must, i t i s argued, " f i t the o r i e n t a t i o n of 
the s c i e n t i s t , who, s t a r t i n g w i t h the assumption t h a t a l l phenomena 
of nature are o r d e r l y , i s concerned p r i m a r i l y w i t h f i n d i n g p r i n c i p l e s 
t h a t describe the nature of the order" ( i b i d . p.4). 
As i n our discussion of Cameron and Goldstein we can see here the 
pressure towards a model of r a t i o n a l i t y and coherence t h a t stands i n 
d i r e c t o p p o s i t i o n to the r e a l i t y of the schizophrenic. Consider, f o r 
example, the f o l l o w i n g statement from a well-known paper by McGhie and 
Chapman (1961) i n which they discuss the " s e l e c t i v e and i n h i b i t o r y 
f u n c t i o n of a t t e n t i o n " : 
Perception i s thus f i n a l l y s t a b i l i z e d by our capacity 
to modify the incoming p a t t e r n of s t i m u l a t i o n t o 
provide a degree of perceptual constancy...By such processes 
we reduce, organize, and i n t e r p r e t the otherwise 
chaotic f l o w of i n f o r m a t i o n reaching consciousness 
to a l i m i t e d number of d i f f e r e n t i a t e d s t a b l e and 
meaningful percepts from which our r e a l i t y i s con-
s t r u c t e d ( i b i d . p.114). 
And Maher (1972) t e l l s us how "the utterance of normal, coherent speech 
may be seen as the r e s u l t of the successful and instantaneous i n h i b i t i o n 
of a ssociations t o elements i n the u t t e r a n c e " ( i b i d . p.12). Normal 
speech i s characterized by i t s distance from schizophrenic speech but the 
d e t a i l of a c t u a l speech - f o r d i f f e r e n t people, under d i f f e r e n t c o n d i t i o n s 
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i s nowhere discussed, 
F o r r e s t et a l . (1969) reach the conclusion t h a t "schizophrenic 
speech disturbance i s psychogenic i n o r i g i n , and not evidence of organic 
d e t e r i o r a t i o n " and base t h e i r "view l a r g e l y on the observation t h a t i t 
can, t o some ex t e n t , be switched on or o f f , depending on the questions 
and the context" ( i b i d . p,840). Suggestive though the conclusion i s , 
however, the authors' approach i s unable t o do much w i t h i t . Thus they 
begin by t r a n s c r i b i n g the responses of a number of schizophrenic p a t i e n t s 
to questions such as 'What i s w i n t e r ? ' and 'What does one do w i t h a 
c i g a r e t t e ? ' . The responses given are c e r t a i n l y b i z a r r e and the authors 
comment: "The j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r p u b l i s h i n g these t r a n s c r i p t s i s perhaps 
to convince the sceptics about the ' r e a l i t y ' of schizophrenic speech 
d i s o r d e r " ( i b i d . p.835), ' R e a l i t y ' i s placed i n i n v e r t e d commas, 
but i t q u i c k l y becomes r e a l i t y and we pass on. F o r r e s t and h i s colleagues 
do not discuss the ' r e a l i t y ' of the s i t u a t i o n i n which the speech samples 
are assembled, or the kinds of assumptions and understandings t h a t the 
research worker brings t o the s i t u a t i o n . I n Habermas's terms we are 
t r e a t e d here to an already " o b j e c t i f i e d r e a l i t y " ; absent i s "the 
maintenance of the i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y of mutual understanding w i t h i n 
6 
whose horizon r e a l i t y can f i r s t appear as something" (1972, p.176). 
Michel Foucault, i n the context of a discussion of madness i n the 
c l a s s i c a l p e r i o d , argues t h a t the c e n t r a l issue concerns "not the 
r e l a t i o n s between madness and i l l n e s s , but the r e l a t i o n s between s o c i e t y 
and i t s e l f , between so c i e t y and what i t recognized and d i d not recognize, 
i n the behaviour of i n d i v i d u a l s " (1954, p.68). From our b r i e f i n c u r s i o n 
i n t o these experimental byways we can, I t h i n k , see t h a t the whole 
t h r u s t i s away from any form of ' s e l f - r e c o g n i t i o n ' i n the behaviour of 
schizophrenics towards an a s s e r t i o n of absolute d i f f e r e n c e . Technical 
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reason seeks to muster a l l the resources i t has a t i t s disposal to p i n i o n 
the complication of schizophrenic behaviour and thereby to declare 
something about the image of man t h a t i s i m p l i c i t i n i t s image of 
i t s e l f . 
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I I I . 2 . The Personal Construct Theory Paradigm 
Preface 
I now t u r n t o another paradigm t h a t has a t t r a c t e d a l a r g e number of 
devotees i n recent years; t h a t developed by Bannister and h i s co-workers, 
f o l l o w i n g i n the l i n e of i n q u i r y established by K e l l y (1955). Personal 
construct theory, and i t s e x e m p l i f i c a t i o n i n r e p e r t o r y g r i d s , i s a 
powerful tendency i n contemporary psychology. The case f o r the theory, 
and i t s p o s s i b i l i t i e s as an a c t i v e approach, are set out i n Bannister 
and Mair (1968), Bannister and F r a n s e l l a (1971), and Bannister ed. (1970b). 
The theory i s not t o be viewed as merely one among s e v e r a l ; i t s 
r e p u t a t i o n - and the f a s c i n a t i o n i t appears to engender - r e s t s h e a v i l y 
on an avowedly polemical cast. Bannister ranges himself very 
d e l i b e r a t e l y against what he takes t o be the orthodoxies of psychological 
study. He exhorts us t o attend t o the person as an a c t i v e agent i n the 
business of l i v i n g , away from the " b i l l i a r d - b a l l " view of man. 
The most s u b s t a n t i a l body of work t o have emerged from the theory 
are the studies of thought d i s o r d e r . ^ I t i s these t h a t recommend the 
approach t o our i n t e r e s t . Our aim i n t h i s s e c t i o n w i l l be t o consider 
the v i r t u e s and l i m i t a t i o n s of the approach as a means t o understanding 
the p e r p l e x i t i e s t h a t schizophrenics present f o r us. We s h a l l look 
at the d e t a i l of some of the work w i t h i n t h i s paradigm, but we s h a l l 
not concern ourselves w i t h a l l the items of the i n t e r n a l debate over 
t h i s or t h a t p a r t i c u l a r t h a t continues t o hold sway i n the j o u r n a l s . 
The paradigm has developed i t s own i n t e r n a l language, and i t i s easy to 
become l o s t i n i t i n a way t h a t obscures an a p p r e c i a t i o n of the working 
of the approach t r e a t e d as a whole. 
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F i r s t , by way of o r i e n t a t i o n , I look, b r i e f l y a t some of the ideas 
and assumptions i n Bannister's e a r l y work and set out some of the 
d i r e c t i o n s t h a t subsequent studies have taken. Second, I r e p o r t on 
some m a t e r i a l of my own t h a t h o p e f u l l y both uncovers some of the 
l i m i t a t i o n s of the approach and brings more sharply i n t o focus the 
complexities of schizophrenic behaviour. And f i n a l l y I consider 
what our m a t e r i a l suggests both f o r items of dispute t h a t are i n t e r n a l 
to the paradigm, and f o r the paradigm taken as a whole. 
I I I . 2 . i . O r i e n t a t i o n 
Bannister (1960, 1962) gives short s h r i f t t o the other approaches 
we have been dis c u s s i n g , such as 'concretism' and ' o v e r - i n c l u s i o n ' . His 
most fundamental c r i t i c i s m of these approaches i s t h a t they are "'ad hoc' 
i n t h a t they seek t o provide an explanation of disordered t h i n k i n g 
w i t h o u t p r o v i d i n g any general theory of normal ordered t h i n k i n g . Thus 
they describe the schizophrenic c o n d i t i o n w i t h o u t i n v e s t i g a t i n g the 
schizophrenic process" (1962, p.825. Emphasis i n the o r i g i n a l ) . I n 
hi s a p p l i c a t i o n of the theory of personal constructs to schizophrenic 
thought disorder Bannister sets out t o remedy the omission. To construe 
a s i t u a t i o n or element, he argues, i s t o p r e d i c t f u t u r e events; i t 
fo l l o w s t h a t the event w i l l e i t h e r v a l i d a t e , i n v a l i d a t e , or render 
' i r r e l e v a n t ' the p r e d i c t i o n . Schizophrenics, i t i s suggested, 
construe l o o s e l y : " l o o s e l y t o construe a person as l o v i n g i s not 
au t o m a t i c a l l y t o a n t i c i p a t e from him 'sincere', 'good', 'kind' behaviour 
since the r e l a t i o n s h i p between these and other constructs normally 
l i n k e d w i t h ' l o v i n g ' have been weakened" ( i b i d . p . 8 4 0 ) . Bannister 
suggests t h a t : 
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The c o n d i t i o n of schizophrenic thought disorder i s the 
end product of the repeated experience of i n v a l i d a t i o n 
of construing.,.Construct r e l a t i o n s h i p s have been 
p r o g r e s s i v e l y loosened u n t i l the constructs can no longer 
generate ' b r i t t l e ' ( i . e . t e s t a b l e ) p r e d i c t i o n s but only 
vague and m u l t i - d i r e c t i o n a l p r e d i c t i o n s . These have 
the v i c e of being n o n - r e a l i t y t e s t i n g but the v i r t u e 
of serving as a b i o l o g i c a l defence system i n t h a t they 
cannot l o g i c a l l y speaking be i n v a l i d a t e d by events. 
The loosening of construct r e l a t i o n s h i p s has thus brought 
to an end the era of repeated i n v a l i d a t i o n which preceded 
thought disorder (1962 p.841). 
" I t f o l l o w s from t h i s " he continues: 
t h a t schizophrenic thought disorder i s experienced 
s u b j e c t i v e l y as l i v i n g i n a f l u i d , unfocussed and 
u n d i f f e r e n t i a t e d world i n which a n x i e t y i s not f e l t 
t o any marked degree since only the vaguest and l e a s t 
d e s t r u c t i b l e a n t i c i p a t i o n s a r i s e i n the mind of the 
subject. To the outside observer i t presents as a 
c o n d i t i o n i n which the subject's behaviour i s r e l a t i v e l y 
random, purposeless and unpre d i c t a b l e . His t a l k has 
low communication value since i t consists of constructs 
l i n k e d l o o s e l y by what appear to be vague associations 
and assonantal 'echo' e f f e c t s i n which sound has almost 
as much relevance as meaning" ( i b i d ) . 
I quote these passages at l e n g t h because they e x h i b i t so s t a r k l y the 
assumptions on which subsequent work undertaken by Bannister and h i s 
associates r e s t s . Bannister, l i k e B l e u l e r , p o s i t s a disorder of 
t h i n k i n g t o account f o r the language disorder i n which the a l t e r a t i o n 
of t h i n k i n g i s manifested. The disor d e r of t h i n k i n g i s thus i n v i s i b l e , 
and depends f o r i t s r e c o g n i t i o n on the p a t i e n t ' s v e r b a l behaviour. I t 
i s indeed only of i n t e r e s t as a means t o account f o r the d e v i a t i o n s 
t h a t appear i n the p a t i e n t ' s speech. Bannister himself allows t h a t the 
g r i d t e s t of thought disorder which he has developed w i t h F r a n s e l l a 
(1966) must, i n order to be c r e d i b l e , c o r r e l a t e w i t h judgements t h a t are 
made of the p a t i e n t ' s v e r b a l behaviour i n c l i n i c a l p r a c t i c e (Bannister, 
g 
F r a n s e l l a , and Agnew, 1971). The d e l i n e a t i o n i n t h i s e a r l y paper, 
however, i s the clos e s t we s h a l l ever get t o hearing a schizophrenic 
speak; i n Bannister and F r a n s e l l a (1971) we are t r e a t e d t o an instance 
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of schizophrenic prose but as an o b j e c t of r i d i c u l e (p.161). More-
over f o r a l l the t a l k about l a c k of a t t e n t i o n to process i n the work of 
other researchers, thought d i s o r d e r , as we see from these q u o t a t i o n s , 
i s q u i c k l y converted i n t o a c o n d i t i o n . Right from the outset then, 
we are l i f t e d away from the d e t a i l of how an i n d i v i d u a l engages w i t h 
h i s world, w i t h d i f f e r e n t people, i n d i f f e r e n t s e t t i n g s , over time, and 
the responses of which he i s capable, i n t o a universe of abstracted 
meanings. Already t h i s may s t r i k e us as odd coming from one who 
appears to espouse an approach t o psychology t h a t i s grounded i n an 
e x p l o r a t i o n of ' r e l a t i o n s h i p ' and 'conversation' (1970a). 
Perhaps the most i n t e r e s t i n g l i n e of studies to have emerged from 
w i t h i n t h i s paradigm are those t h a t have set out t o i n v e s t i g a t e the 
hypothesis t h a t thought disorder i s not a generalized d e f i c i t , but i s 
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more severe m some areas of t h i n k i n g than m others. McPherson e t a l . 
(1975), i n a r e p l i c a t i o n and extension of e a r l i e r s t u d i e s , found t h a t 
schizophrenics have more d i f f i c u l t y i n 'construing' people on a 
p s y c h o l o g i c a l , than on a p h y s i c a l , dimension. Thus when asked t o 
construe a set of people on the dimensions 'sociable', 'carefree', 
'kind' and 'honest' they show much more disorder - r e l a t i v e to c o n t r o l s -
than they do when asked t o construe the same people on the dimensions 
' p h y s i c a l l y s t r o n g ' , ' w e l l - b u i l t ' , ' p h y s i c a l l y healthy' and ' t a l l ' . The 
authors are led t o the view t h a t "thought d i s o r d e r does not e n t a i l a 
generalized breakdown across a l l areas of t h i n k i n g but r a t h e r i s maximal 
i n the areas of psychological construing". And by psychological 
construing i s meant " t o describe, d i s c r i m i n a t e among, and make p r e d i c t i o n s 
about the p e r s o n a l i t y and emotional s t a t e of other people or of the 
p a t i e n t h i m s e l f " ( i b i d . p.313, p.303), 
Heather (1976) provides a d d i t i o n a l support f o r the f i n d i n g s of 
McPherson et a l . and shows furthermore t h a t the s p e c i f i c i t y of schizo-
phrenic thought disorder as a t t a c h i n g to 'psychological' construing can 
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be "extended from g r i d s employing photographs of strangers t o g r i d s 
employing known people". "The use of known people as elements 
appears" he w r i t e s , " t o make very l i t t l e d i f f e r e n c e t o mean i n t e n s i t y 
s c o r e s . ^ Although there may be high i n d i v i d u a l v a r i a t i o n s i n scores 
between photograph and people element g r i d s , the present r e s u l t s 
confirm those of Bannister (1962) and McFadyen and Foulds (1972) t h a t 
both techniques are capable of demonstrating loosened construing i n 
thought disordered schizophrenics. F i n a l l y , the s p e c i f i c i t y of 
schizophrenic thought disorder presents great d i f f i c u l t i e s f o r any 
hypothesis...which sees thought disorder as a generalized c o g n i t i v e 
d e f i c i t " (1976, pp.136-7). 
Williams (1971), i n c o n t r a s t , suggests t h a t there are important 
d i f f e r e n c e s i n i n t e n s i t y and consistency scores according t o whether 
photographs or people known t o the subjects are taken as elements. 
He argues t h a t i t i s "not immediately c l e a r whether personal construct 
theory would p r e d i c t t h i s e f f e c t " and t h a t i n any case w i t h i n the 
terms of the theory i t s e l f "the exact nature of the elements used i n 
the g r i d t e s t would be r e l a t i v e l y unimportant as long as they were 
people, since the d e f i c i t i s looseness i n linkage between c o n s t r u c t s " 
( i b i d . p.207). A b e t t e r e x p l a n a t i o n , he suggests, i s i n terms of 'cue-
i n s e n s i t i v i t y ' theory. "The more r e l e v a n t cues t h a t a domain presents 
to a subject", he w r i t e s , "the more adept he w i l l be a t const r u i n g i n 
t h a t domain. One would thus expect t h a t a r i c h e r source of r e l e v a n t 
cues, such as known persons, would lead t o more r e l i a b l e construing 
than would a poorer source of cues, such as a photo of an unknown person 
( i . e . consistency would be higher; i n t e n s i t y might or might not be, 
since c o g n i t i v e complexity i s the reverse of i n t e n s i t y ) " ( i b i d . p.208). 
And the explanation f o r the d e f i c i t of thought disordered schizophrenics, 
he argues, i s t h a t they are i n s e n s i t i v e to cues of p e r s o n a l i t y . Williams 
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used three v a r i a n t s of the Bannister and F r a n s e l l a t e s t ; a l l three 
v a r i a n t s had the same constructs as f o r the g r i d t e s t , but had e i t h e r 
f i c t i t i o u s names and addresses, the usual t e s t photos, or e l i c i t e d 
people, as elements & He found t h a t the d i f f e r e n c e i n scores between 
the normal and schizophrenic groups was greatest f o r the g r i d photo-
graphs. This f i n d i n g can, he argues, "be t e n t a t i v e l y explained by 
the i n s e n s i t i v i t y theory. Presumably i f the elements were very poor 
i n r e l e v a n t cues, or had none a t a l l , no amount of s e n s i t i v i t y t o the 
cues would give one enough t o make judgements upon" ( i b i d . p.210). 
And t h i s , he suggests, i s what happens i n the case of the addresses. 
For people known t o the subject he found t h a t 3 of the 12 'thought-
disordered' schizophrenics obtained scores on the people g r i d s above 
Bannister and Fransella's c u t - o f f s f o r i n t e n s i t y and consistency, and 
3 more scored above the c u t - o f f on consistency alone. Bannister (1962) 
had suggested t h a t the d i f f e r e n c e s found between people known to the 
subject as elements, and photographs, was due t o the f a c t t h a t schizo-
phrenics were " o f t e n g i v i n g remembered judgements of people made before 
the disease process was i n being, thereby achieving s p u r i o u s l y high 
matching scores" ( i b i d . p.837). Williams demonstrates t h a t Bannister's 
explanation i s inadequate. His 'people' g r i d s included people known t o 
the subject both before and a f t e r the onset of the i l l n e s s , and, co n t r a r y 
to Bannister's p r e d i c t i o n , he found no p o s i t i v e c o r r e l a t i o n between 
the number of people known before the i l l n e s s who were used i n the g r i d 
and the scores f o r i n t e n s i t y and consistency. He concludes t h a t on the 
basis of these r e s u l t s i t i s q u i t e misleading t o generalize from the 
scores obtained from the standard g r i d s to statements about the subject's 
c a p a c i t i e s f o r construing i n r e l a t i o n t o r e a l people. The f i n d i n g s of 
Bannister and Salmon (1966), he suggests, are b e t t e r accommodated i n a 
' c u e - i n s e n s i t i v i t y ' theory than i n a 'people-object' framework. 
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I have given t h i s r a t h e r laboured account of Williams's study 
because f o r a l l the obvious i n f e l i c i t i e s of i t s argument i t does, I 
t h i n k , b r i n g t o the f o r e some of the p e r p l e x i t i e s inherent i n t h i s 
whole approach t o the study of thought d i s o r d e r . There are, t o s t a r t 
w i t h , e m p i r i c a l conundrums: f o r example, whether the use of known 
people as elements as against photographs of strangers, w i t h the same 
con s t r u c t s , give appreciably d i f f e r e n t scores. And behind the l o c a l 
p e r p l e x i t i e s there are the l a r g e r questions of how we i n t e r p r e t the 
patterns t h a t emerge. Personal c o n s t r u c t theory argues i t s case i n 
terms of the linkage between c o n s t r u c t s ; i t i s the r e l a t i o n s h i p s 
between constructs t h a t are important, i r r e s p e c t i v e of the elements t o 
which they are app l i e d . A competing theory i s put forward by Williams 
t h a t emphasises the s t r u c t u r e of the elements and l i f t s the g r i d 
m a t e r i a l away from the framework of 'psychological construing' t o which 
Bannister arid h i s associates would t i e i t . From another p o i n t of view 
there i s the question of the r e l a t i o n s h i p between performance on 
measures such as these, and the way i n which the p a t i e n t presents 
h i m s e l f , and engages w i t h the w o r l d , through language. 
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I X I . 2 . i i . Repertory Grid M a t e r i a l 
Our opening remarks have already given us grounds f o r suspicion 
as t o the v i r t u e s of t h i s approach. Before v e n t u r i n g a more d e t a i l e d 
c r i t i c a l commentary 1 s h a l l now look a t what the approach throws up 
when ap p l i e d t o some of our own p a t i e n t s . Hopefully the treatment 
t h a t f o l l o w s w i l l add f l e s h and bone t o our discussion and provide f o r 
c l a r i f i c a t i o n of d i f f i c u l t i e s t h a t are i n t e r n a l to the paradigm; as 
we s h a l l see, we can also use i t as a springboard to introduce wider 
r a m i f i c a t i o n s t h a t the theory i t s e l f cannot accommodate; and something 
more besides: the exercise provides us w i t h a means t o compare Joseph 
to others. 
The m a t e r i a l consists of two sets of g r i d s : Bannister and Fr a n s e l l a 
g r i d t e s t p r o f i l e s , ^ and a series of g r i d s using as elements people 
known t o the i n d i v i d u a l p a t i e n t and the g r i d t e s t c o n s t r u c t s . Our aim 
i s not so much t o develop a general l i n e of argument about schizophrenia, 
or about schizophrenic thought d i s o r d e r , as to p o i n t up some of the 
di f f e r e n c e s w i t h i n a group of p a t i e n t s a l l of whom are deemed, on the 
basis of both c l i n i c a l judgement and t h e i r scores on the Bannister and 
Fra n s e l l a g r i d t e s t , t o be thought-disordered, and t o examine what these 
d i f f e r e n c e s may mean. We s h a l l look i n p a r t i c u l a r a t the performance 
of i n d i v i d u a l p a t i e n t s on the 'people' g r i d s , as I have termed them; 
we s h a l l inspect the i n t e r n a l s t r u c t u r e of the g r i d m a t e r i a l and r e l a t e 
i t t o other evidence t h a t the p a t i e n t provides; t o h i s comments on the 
exercise, to the way i n which he speaks and t h i n k s , and to the way i n 
which he engages w i t h the world more ge n e r a l l y . 
I n a l l we s h a l l be concerned here w i t h 6 p a t i e n t s , Joseph, V i c t o r , 
E r i c , Terence, Tom and A r t h u r , a l l of them p a t i e n t s w i t h whom I worked 
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c l o s e l y . The raw scores f o r these p a t i e n t s on the two sets of g r i d s 
are as f o l l o w s : ^ 
A. Joseph 
i . Bannister & F r a n s e l l a : 
I n t e n s i t y I 164 
I I 283 = 447 
Consistency = +.24 
i i . People Grids: 
I n t e n s i t y I 153 
I I 190 = 343 
Consistency = -.26 
B. V i c t o r 
i . Bannister & F r a n s e l l a : 
I n t e n s i t y I 406 
I I 257 = 663 
Consistency = +.28 
i i . People Grids: 
I n t e n s i t y I 564 
I I 372 = 936 
Consistency = -.2 
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C E r i c 
i . Bannister & F r a n s e l l a : 
I n t e n s i t y I 146 
I I 248 = 394 
Consistency = +.34 
i i . People Grids: 
I n t e n s i t y I 273 
I I 332 = 605 
Consistency = +.05 
D. Terence 
i . Bannister & F r a n s e l l a : 
I n t e n s i t y I 235 
I I 171 = 406 
Consistency = +.1 
i i . People Grids: 
I n t e n s i t y I 608 
I I 519 = 1127 
Cons i s tency = +.05 
E. Tom 
i . Bannister & F r a n s e l l a : 
I n t e n s i t y 1 459 
I I 201 = 660 
Consistency = +.01 
i i . People Grids: 
I n t e n s i t y I 160 
I I 178 = 338 
Consistency = -.12 
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F. Arthur 
i . Bannister & F r a n s e l l a : 
I n t e n s i t y I 162 
494 I I 656 
Consistency -.26 
i i . People Grids: 
I n t e n s i t y I 330 
678 I I 1008 
Consistency + .89 
Before we look a t the d e t a i l some p r e l i m i n a r y remarks. I n each 
case the Bannister & F r a n s e l l a g r i d s were administered before the 'people 
Grids. With the Bannister & F r a n s e l l a Grids I adhered to the t e s t 
p r o t o c o l t h a t has been used by others: between t e s t and r e t e s t an 
i n t e r v a l of -up t o - h a l f an hour. I n the ease of the 'people' Grids, 
however, I used a d i f f e r e n t procedure. The elements here are people 
known t o the su b j e c t , and thus more e a s i l y d i s t i n g u i s h e d from each 
other: r e c a l l of a previous ranking i s less d i f f i c u l t than w i t h the 
anonymous-seeming g r i d t e s t photographs. This, coupled w i t h the st r e s s 
t h a t the exercise c l e a r l y engendered i n some of the p a t i e n t s , i n c l i n e d 
me t o leave a sizeable i n t e r v a l between t e s t and r e t e s t . I n a l l cases 
the i n t e r v a l was between a week and t e n days. The d e c i s i o n was, I 
t h i n k , the r i g h t one, but i t does mean t h a t on the basis of the raw 
scores alone we should not make too much of the d i s p a r i t y between the 
increase i n i n t e n s i t y scores f o r 4 of the 6 p a t i e n t s on the 'people' 
g r i d s as against the Bannister & F r a n s e l l a g r i d s , and the decrease i n 
consistency scores f o r 3 of these 4. A r t h u r , we w i l l note, does much 
b e t t e r on both i n t e n s i t y and consistency i n the 'people' g r i d s . Joseph 
and Tom, i n c o n t r a s t , do a good deal worse. 
Without f u r t h e r ado l e t us now t u r n t o the m a t e r i a l i t s e l f , 
Joseph we have already encountered i n some depth, and we have caught 
an occasional glimpse of some of the others. I s h a l l preface each 
of these 5 p a t i e n t s w i t h a short statement s e t t i n g out something of 
how, t y p i c a l l y , they spoke and thought i n our work together. 
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A. Joseph. 
I , Kind 
1 
Stupid 
2 
S e l f i s h 
3 
Sincere 
4 
Mean 
5 
Honest 
6 
Self A 8 3 6 8 1 2 
Mother B 7 7 7 2 8 4 
Father C 3 4 5 5 7 3 
S i s t e r D 1 8 4 3 3 8 
Pat E 2 1 8 1 2 1 
C o l i n F 6 2 3 6 4 7 
R. G 5 6 1 7 6 6 
Dr. F. H 4 5 2 4 5 5 
I I . Kind 
1 
Stupid 
2 
S e l f i s h 
3 
Sincere 
4 
Mean 
5 
Honest 
6 
Self A 5 2 1 3 8 8 
Mother B 3 6 5 5 5 1 
Father C 1 5 8 2 6 7 
S i s t e r D 2 4 4 4 3 5 
Pat E 6 8 3 1 2 4 
C o l i n F 6 1 2 8 7 3 
R. G 4 7 7 6 4 2 
Dr. F. H 8 3 6 7 1 6 
The f i r s t f our persons i n the l i s t are s e l f - e x p l a n a t o r y ; Pat i s 
a long-standing f r i e n d whom Joseph has not seen f o r a number of years; 
C o l i n and R. are both p a t i e n t s : R. we w i l l have heard r e f e r r e d t o on a 
number of occasions i n Joseph's discourse; and Dr. F. i s a p s y c h i a t r i s t . 
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We a r r i v e d a t t h i s l i s t only w i t h d i f f i c u l t y . At my suggestion 
Joseph l i s t e d himself f i r s t , f o l l o w ed by h i s mother and f a t h e r . His 
f a t h e r , however, he said was not h i s r e a l f a t h e r : "He might be my 
dad, but I don't look l i k e him...I take a f t e r my mother's side: my 
grandfather was 6'6"." He t r i e d to persuade me to l i s t both h i s 
f a t h e r and h i s s t e p - f a t h e r - (from our previous discussion we w i l l 
r e c a l l t h a t he does not i n f a c t have a s t e p - f a t h e r ) - but since on 
t h i s occasion, a t l e a s t , I was wearing an experimenter's hat I refused. 
We then proceed t o h i s s i s t e r ; from previous discussion and from 
other sources I know t h a t she i s c a l l e d S a l l y . Joseph however i s 
less c e r t a i n : " I s she c a l l e d S a l l y ? " I n any case, so he says, he 
has not seen her f o r three years, and she now l i v e s i n Blackpool. 
"My r e a l s i s t e r l i k e , but a l o t of lasses I was a t school w i t h come to 
the house...My f a m i l y ' s a l l s p l i t up now...sister m a r r i e d . . . a l l w i t h 
f a m i l i e s of t h e i r own. There's two ways of working i t l i k e , e i t h e r you 
get married or you work." The u n c e r t a i n t y over h i s s i s t e r ' s name s t i l l 
unresolved, we then move on to t a l k about other f r i e n d s . He mentions 
two; one i s c a l l e d Pat and the other S a l l y . Both, he says, are 
nurses. S a l l y , moreover, was taught woodwork a t school by Joseph. He 
then r e t u r n s t o the discussion of h i s f a t h e r . His f a t h e r , he says, i s 
a gardener. " F i r s t there was only two of us i n the house, my s i s t e r 
and me, and my mother and f a t h e r , t h e n . . . " ( w i t h a laugh) "...no c e n t r a l 
heating i n the house...very c o l d during the w i n t e r . " He and h i s 
f a t h e r , he t e l l s me, f i g h t l i k e cat and dog. " F i r s t of a l l he wanted 
us out to get a j o b - I couldn't get one so I had to come i n here. 
Next t h i n g i s he's wanting us home again." I then ask him about 
p a t i e n t s i n the h o s p i t a l . He mentions C o l i n and R. C o l i n , he says, 
i s a " l a d who borrows money o f f us and pays i t back." Both C o l i n and 
R. are, he t h i n k s , Arabian. And f i n a l l y we i n c l u d e , w i t h o u t comment, 
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Dr. F. Joseph says sadly; "That's why I never go home. A l l my 
f r i e n d s have gone away and got married". 
12 
Let us begin w i t h the f i r s t g r i d . For the f i r s t c o n s t r u c t , 
k i n d , he puts h i s s i s t e r f i r s t , f o l l o w e d by Pat. He then comments: 
" D i f f i c u l t to say w i t h the r e s t . . . t h e r e are d i f f e r e n t kinds of kindness: 
money from my f a t h e r , a f f e c t i o n from my mother...my mother d r i v e s us 
l i k e a s l a v e . . . C e r t a i n l y not myself, I'm e v i l " . He c l e a r l y has no 
d i f f i c u l t y i n assigning meaning t o the con s t r u c t s : s t u p i d , he says, 
means "low IQ", and then comments, " I don't know, crime comes i n t o 
t h i s . . . s t u p i d people aren't c r i m i n a l s " . S e l f i s h he defines as " f o r 
themselves a l l the time"; sincere as " t h i n k i n g of someone else besides 
y o u r s e l f " ; mean he defines by h i s choice of himself as the most mean: 
" I have to be mean because 1 never have nought". Of honesty he says: 
"Staying away from the p o l i c e ; keeping t o the law, the w r i t t e n law 
l i k e . . . t h e y change the law o c c a s i o n a l l y . I s e l l c i g a r e t t e s , 3p each -
I don't know whether t h a t ' s honest, but I b e l i e v e i t i s - I b e l i e v e i n 
f r e e trade l i k e the l i b e r a l s . " 
He puts himself at the bottom of the l i s t f o r k i n d and f o r sincere: 
" I t e l l l i e s l i k e a trooper"; f o r honest, however, the other p o s i t i v e 
c o n s t r u c t , he i s i n second place. For mean he puts himself i n f i r s t 
place; f o r s t u p i d i n t h i r d place and f o r s e l f i s h i n s i x t h place. His 
mother holds to a seventh p o s i t i o n f o r k i n d , s t u p i d and s e l f i s h , moves 
up t o second place f o r sincere, down again t o the bottom of the l i s t f o r 
mean and up to f o u r t h p o s i t i o n f o r honest. His f a t h e r holds the middle 
ground - between 3 and 5 - a l l the way through except f o r mean where he 
i s i n seventh place. He seems to t h i n k w e l l of h i s s i s t e r f o r the most 
p a r t , but she does badly on honest. The same holds f o r Pat, except t h a t 
he r a t e s her as the most s t u p i d and the second most mean. His f r i e n d R. 
he appears t o hold i n poor esteem; C o l i n does s l i g h t l y b e t t e r . Dr. F. i s 
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f o r the most p a r t placed i n the middle ground, not f a r d i s t a n t from 
Joseph's f a t h e r . A l l i n a l l a complicated p i c t u r e , where no one i s 
e i t h e r one t h i n g or the other. 
Turning t o the second g r i d we f i n d some remarkable s h i f t s . I 
administered the second g r i d e x a c t l y one week a f t e r the f i r s t . Joseph 
made no comments about h i s s e l e c t i o n f o r k i n d . He puts himself second 
on s t u p i d because " I can't s o r t A from B a t the moment". His s i s t e r 
he puts f o u r t h because "she won't leave home". Of h i s f r i e n d R. he 
says: " I t ' s funny how R. can s e t t l e b e t t e r than anyone else. Wonder 
what i t i s . I f R. goes home then I go home...I'll go t o court i f R. 
goes home because 1 r e l y on him." His f r i e n d Pat he puts l a s t and 
says:"I haven't seen her f o r years l i k e . . . d o n ' t know what she's l i k e . . . 
you can disclude her like...The Pat I d i d know i s very wise...but she 
has t o be l i v i n g a t home before she could s o r t things out...She used 
to pinch my t a b l e t s when she went t o a new area...Put h e r s e l f to sleep 
a l l day t i l l she got used t o i t . . . D i d n ' t get much sleep n i g h t or day 
t i l l she got used to i t . " 
For sincere he places Pat f i r s t and comments: "The Pat I went t o 
school w i t h , but l i k e I say she's g e t t i n g o l d " ; he puts himself t h i r d : 
"When I'm i n the r i g h t mood, but I never am...I'm g e t t i n g too o l d f o r 
the j o b " . For mean, discussing C o l i n , he says: " I t h i n k C o l i n should 
go home...Well he once wrote a l e t t e r from the h o s p i t a l asking h i s 
s i s t e r i f he could stop w i t h her, she said he must stop where he i s , 
and h i s f a t h e r won't have him...he (Colin) i s an o l d man, he's f o r t y 
now". He puts himself as the l e a s t mean and comments: " I spend every 
penny I can get my hands on...I'm always i n debt." 
The bare f a c t s are these: f o r k i n d Joseph moves from e i g h t h 
place t o f i f t h on the second g r i d ; f o r s t u p i d from second t o t h i r d ; 
150 
f o r s e l f i s h from s i x t h t o f i r s t ; f o r sincere from e i g h t h to f i r s t ; 
f o r mean from f i r s t t o l a s t ; f o r honest from second to l a s t . I n a l l 
he moves 26 places between one g r i d and the next. The c o n t r a s t w i t h 
the others i s s t r i k i n g : h i s mother moves 16 places, h i s f a t h e r 14, h i s 
s i s t e r only 9, Pat 15, C o l i n 12, R. 15, and Dr. F. 18. 
The f l u c t u a t i o n i n h i s own case i s i n t e r e s t i n g and we s h a l l have 
reason t o r e t u r n t o i t l a t e r . For the moment we may only remark t h a t 
the most extreme s h i f t - from f i r s t to e i g h t h place - i s f o r mean and 
i t i s clear t h a t i n the two instances Joseph i s responding to d i f f e r e n t 
d e f i n i t i o n s of mean: i n the f i r s t case hs i s the most mean because he 
has nothing t o g i v e , and i n the second the l e a s t mean because what 
l i t t l e he has he gets r i d of q u i c k l y . For the r e s t , we should, I 
t h i n k , be wary of making too much of the surface data; d i s l o c a t i n g the 
p i c t u r e seems t o be, but a l l the i n d i c a t i o n s are t h a t there i s a t u r -
bulence underneath the surface t h a t an examination of the surface p i c t u r e 
cannot d i s c l o s e . I n Bannister's terms Joseph's g r i d s demonstrate 
d i s o r g a n i z a t i o n ; p r e s e n t l y we s h a l l want t o consider what t h i s may mean. 
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B. V i c t o r 
When I f i r s t met V i c t o r he was 44, He was f i r s t admitted t o 
h o s p i t a l a t the age of 26 and had been i n h o s p i t a l permanently f o r the 
past f i f t e e n years. His f a t h e r died ten years ago, and he has not 
had a v i s i t o r since. He had two brothers and two s i s t e r s but according 
to V i c t o r they are also deceased. I n any case they have never v i s i t e d . 
The diagnosis i s chronic schizophrenia. 
Of a l l the p a t i e n t s 1 worked w i t h V i c t o r was one of the most 
d i f f i c u l t t o understand. I n appearance and manner he f u l f i l l e d a l l 
the requirements f o r the r o l e of career schizophrenic: w i t h stooped 
posture and h i s clothes o f t e n i n d i s a r r a y , he s h u f f l e d h i s way around 
the h o s p i t a l , mumbling t o h i m s e l f , a c i g a r e t t e never f a r from h i s l i p s . 
The nurses on h i s ward t o l d me t h a t I was wasting my time t r y i n g to 
get some sense out of him. And i t was not hard to see why they f e l t 
t h i s way: he t a l k e d i n short c l i p p e d sentences, h i s statements never 
seemed t o hold together, conversations w i t h him e a s i l y seemed t o come 
f u l l c i r c l e so t h a t one was l e f t u t t e r l y a t a lo s s . U n like Joseph, 
V i c t o r was not a locked ward p a t i e n t ; he was "too f a r gone" to need 
sp e c i a l s u r v e i l l a n c e . Behind a l l the obvious mannerisms and vagueries, 
however, one could sense i n him something of the robus t : the broad 
shoulders and the p i e r c i n g brown eyes spoke c l e a r l y of h i s mining 
background. 
I worked w i t h him r e g u l a r l y over a perio d of almost a year. For a 
short time he was a member of one of my groups. He attended the group 
because he asked t o , having heard about i t from other p a t i e n t s . For the 
most p a r t he sat i n a corner of the room gazing a t me and t a l k i n g t o 
himself. I persevered w i t h him l a r g e l y because he so c l e a r l y wanted 
to continue meeting w i t h me. I s h a l l now t r y t o give some i n d i c a t i o n 
of our discussions together. I n reading t h i s i t i s , I think>important 
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to remember t h a t i t i s extremely u n l i k e l y t h a t V i c t o r had ever himself 
engaged, or been engaged by another person, i n a conversation of any 
length f o r a p e r i o d of a t l e a s t ten years, and p o s s i b l y a great deal 
longer. 
Almost a l l my discussions w i t h V i c t o r turned round d i f f e r e n t aspects 
of h i s 'case'. The predominant sense t h a t I had was t h a t e verything 
about him was condensed i n t o h i s 'case', and yet a t the same time the 
'case' was dispersed and fragmented over a wide area of space and time 
such t h a t any experience of u n i t y of meaning t h a t I had was q u i c k l y 
s p l i n t e r e d . I t would, I t h i n k , be misleading t o say t h a t t h i s i s at 
every p o i n t the record of a conversation. A more accurate rendering 
of my experience i s t o say t h a t items of language were t h r u s t i n t o the 
space between us f o r me to c o l l e c t and give shape to as best I might. 
"My own case", he t e l l s me e a r l y oh i n our r e l a t i o n s h i p i s " w e l l 
worth going i n t o " . " Y o u ' l l f i n d i t worthwhile to go i n t o , Mr. Barham, 
i f you have the time, and i f you can't do anything f o r me...Help me to 
get a new case, everything cleaned up." He i s himself a 'case', 
"an instance of a disease" (O.E.D.), a nutcase. He i s h i s own case; 
but e q u a l l y h i s case i s outside him; as a d e f i n i t i o n imposed from 
w i t h o u t , f o r example, and l i t e r a l l y as a ' t h i n g ' i n the form of h i s 
'case-notes'. He has, he t e l l s me on one occasion, got many cases 
and names: a l l of these are w i t h the r e c e p t i o n i s t : "she has every-
t h i n g , everything I have". On another occasion he says t h a t a l l t h a t 
he possesses t h a t i s not i n the case are h i s spectacles, h i s t e e t h , 
h i s money and h i s c l o t h e s . He has also another name, the case-name, 
which I w i l l f i n d i n the case. He has i n a d d i t i o n yet another case-
name, which i s i n the possession of the Medical Superintendent. 
V i c t o r is'encased' i n the h o s p i t a l (OED., case: ' s h e l l or carcass of 
a b u i l d i n g ' ) and i n h i s body; but the body i n which he i s p r e s e n t l y 
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encased i s a 'bad' body. His case, moreover, i s i n a muddle; he 
t e l l s me one day t h a t he would l i k e h i s discharge: "the conclusion 
of my case...back t o my own people, i n my own case". When I have 
attended to h i s case, he says, he w i l l be able to t r a v e l " t o my own 
people, t o my own country": "To be changed from those cases I had 
when 1 came here...that they had so much t r o u b l e about when 1 came 
here...The :times I've been i n and back and forward...They've had so 
much t r o u b l e w i t h cases, Doctor". 
He wants me t o attend t o h i s case " w i t h a view to c o r r e c t i n g my 
case w i t h my own from my own". The dates i n the case are wrong: 
"T h e y ' l l have t o be attended t o when I'm here t h i s time Doctor... 
staying w i t h you...then I ' l l be f r e e t o go...the people I was sta y i n g w i t h 
hadn't brought the book up t o date...The case-name I'm i n hasn't been 
attended to...Not my own case-name of course has been, wants, att e n d i n g 
t o " . 
V i c t o r , then, both i s , and i s n o t , h i s own case; he i s h i s own 
case i n t h a t t h a t i s a l l - apart from t e e t h , money, spectacles and the 
l i k e - t h a t he has. Equally he does not possess h i s own case- i t i s 
d i s t r i b u t e d elsewhere: i n the muddle of a past t h a t he cannot fathom, 
i n the c a s e - f i l e , and i n the whole symbolic domain of the h o s p i t a l . 
The confusion between i n s i d e and o u t s i d e , and between the grammar of 
r e l a t i o n - ' i n my case' - and objects i n the world i s evident i n the 
f o l l o w i n g : 
"They have my case...my i d e n t i t y . . . i t s i d e n t i t i e s you want i n my 
case". ' I n the case of V i c t o r you want i d e n t i t i e s ' ; or 'there are 
at the moment no i d e n t i t i e s i n my case'; or ' I want you, i n my case, 
to r i d me of my case so 1 can have an i d e n t i t y ' . The case i s both 
i n s i d e and outside; thus of himself and the case-notes: 
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"They're separate of course Doctor, because I have other cases... 
i n s i d e me i s the case...yes, i n s i d e the case". 
And h i s own case i s not j u s t a h o s p i t a l case; i t i s also a money 
case, a law case, and an i n s u l i n case. To go i n t o i t 1 w i l l have to 
get permission from the p o l i c e and the army. And the case, as we 
have seen, m u l t i p l i e s ; 
"I've a few good cases, they were l e f t t o the s o l i c i t o r s " . 
At the same time one of the nurses has "the gold i n my case". 
His r e a l name, he says, i s Smith and Saunders: Smith i s " t h i s 
e s t a t e , the f a m i l y I'm sta y i n g w i t h " ; Saunders i s the p o l i c e . He 
says t h a t he i s not V i c t o r Saunders: "but of course he wants h i s a t t e n d -
ing t o too, V i c t o r Saunders". V i c t o r F r e d e r i c k Saunders i s h i s case-
name. Smith and Saunders has been taken away by the p o l i c e , and 
V i c t o r hasn't seen him since. He then says of V i c t o r Saunders "he's 
not my case, he's got h i s own...V.F. Saunders, he's not my case e i t h e r . . . 
I t ' s j u s t the place I was st a y i n g i n during the war." He i s not sure 
where h i s own case i s . He t h i n k s the p o l i c e have h i s i d e n t i t y . He 
t e l l s me t h a t he w i l l have t o come back again and c o l l e c t h i s i d e n t i t y 
from me, and go back t o h i s own. Yet a l l these other people " w i l l 
be i n the case as w e l l to get my own, t o get my own i d e n t i t y . . . a l l the 
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people I have known": 
"They said they'd send me back to my own, and get everything there 
back out and see t o i t from t h e r e . " 
During the war he used t o l i v e w i t h Margaret Saunders and George 
Saunders, "sleep w i t h them, nothing more, nothing l e s s , eat w i t h them, 
and get my pocket allowance". He allows t h a t h i s present case-name 
i s V i c t o r Frederick Saunders but i n s i s t s t h a t t h i s i s not h i s r e a l case: 
155 
"Wasn't me...I j u s t took h i s place when he departed...There's some 
of t h a t f a m i l y whose name and place I t o o k . . . I steered cl e a r of everyone, 
j u s t awaiting my own case, to take i t back t o my own people." 
Most people thought t h a t he was V. F. Saunders but he knew t h a t 
he wasn't. The p o l i c e t o l d him to adopt the i d e n t i t y of t h i s case. 
As t o what became of h i s own i d e n t i t y he has no idea. " I f you attend 
to my i d e n t i t y , " he t e l l s me, "then I ' l l be able t o t a l k to you b e t t e r , 
have b e t t e r understanding...It's another young man's case, Doctor, a 
p o l i c e case." 
For the most p a r t V i c t o r t r e a t e d me w i t h great deference, c a l l i n g 
me 'Doctor' although he knew t h a t I was not. On occasions, however, 
something more personal took place between us. One day a f t e r a long 
si l e n c e I asked him what he was t h i n k i n g about. "About the cases," 
he s a i d , "your friends...my f r i e n d s . . . v e r y n i c e f o l k " . He then alluded 
to h i s f r i e n d s h i p w i t h me. Sho r t l y afterwards i t was time t o f i n i s h , and 
he sa i d : " i t ' s f e e l i n g s yes...love yes...case." 
On another occasion my b a l l - p o i n t pen, w i t h which I had, I suppose, 
been f i d d l i n g , sprang from i t s holder t o the other side of the room. 
I muttered something about " t h a t f u c k i n g pen". The s i g n i f i c a n c e of 
t h i s was not l o s t on V i c t o r who a t once asked me: 
"Fuck i n your pants d i d you Doctor?" 
I t o l d him t h a t t h i s was not what had happened, and he then sa i d : 
" I could do w i t h a good fuck and a woman Doctor. Can you get me 
one?" 
Then a f t e r a pause: 
"Which are you, Doctor, a man or a woman?" 
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"Which do you t h i n k ? " 
"A man , but are you a woman as w e l l ? " 
I . Kind 
1 
Stupid 
2 
S e l f i s h 
3 
Sincere 
4 
Mean 
5 
Honest 
6 
Self A 8 8 2 8 6 4 
Dr. S. B 7 7 1 7 5 3 
Mr. Y. C 2 5 7 2 7 2 
John D 5 4 4 5 4 5 
George E 6 1 3 6 2 7 
Gordon F 4 3 6 3 3 6 
Morris G 3 2 5 4 1 8 
Chris H 1 6 8 1 8 1 
I I . Kind 
1 
Stupid 
2 
S e l f i s h 
3 
Sincere 
4 
Mean 
5 
Honest 
6 
Self 8 8 1 1 1 1 
Dr. S. 4 7 2 5 2 2 
Mr. Y. 1 4 5 4 6 8 
John 6 6 6 6 5 4 
George 5 2 8 8 4 3 
Gordon 3 3 4 2 8 7 
Morris 7 1 3 3 3 6 
Chris 2 5 7 7 7 5 
Dr. S. i s a p s y c h i a t r i s t , Mr. Y. i s a charge nurse, John, George, 
Gordon, Morris and Chris are a l l p a t i e n t s . V i c t o r provided me w i t h the 
l i s t of people known t o him very w i l l i n g l y . I ask him i f he has l e f t 
out anybody important. He says he doesn't t h i n k so but i f he has 
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"Chris W. w i l l know them a l l " . He completes the task on both s i t t i n g s 
much more h u r r i e d l y than Joseph, and u n l i k e Joseph makes no comments 
about what he i s doing. His i n t e n s i t y scores are much higher than 
Joseph's: indeed even h i s poorer showing on the second g r i d i s above 
what Joseph scores o v e r a l l . On consistency, however, he does badly. 
The most s t r i k i n g f e a t u r e of V i c t o r ' s performance i s the co n t r a s t 
between the f i r s t g r i d and the f i r s t three ranks of the second g r i d , 
and the remaining ranks of the second g r i d . The s h i f t s i n p o s i t i o n 
between the f i r s t and second g r i d s are q u i t e considerable: V i c t o r 
himself moves 16 places, Dr. S. 10, Mr. Y. 13, John 8, George 15, 
Gordon 10, Morris 12, and Chris 14. Yet even from these f i g u r e s we 
can note the co n t r a s t w i t h Joseph's g r i d s : a l l the people here, 
V i c t o r included, are very much bunched together. Joseph, we w i l l 
r e c a l l , was set apart from the others on a s o l i t a r y and t u r b u l e n t 
t r a j e c t o r y . I f however we examine the s h i f t s i n p o s i t i o n between the 
f i r s t three ranks of the f i r s t g r i d and the comparable ranks i n the 
second g r i d , and repeat the procedure f o r the remaining three ranks, 
we f i n d t h a t most of the variance i s accounted f o r by the p a t t e r n i n g 
i n the l a s t three ranks of the second g r i d . V i c t o r , f o r example, 
s h i f t s only one place as between the f i r s t h a l f of the two g r i d s ; y et 
o v e r a l l he moves 16 places. For Dr. S. the comparable f i g u r e s are 4 
as against 10, f o r Mr. Y. 4 as against 13, f o r John 5 as against 8, 
f o r George 7 as against 15, f o r Gordon 3 as against 10, f o r Morris 7 
as against 12, and f o r Chris 3 as against 14. The explanation i s 
I f e a r r a t h e r simple. I noted at the time t h a t V i c t o r completed 
the l a s t three ranks w i t h more than usual haste: q u i t e simply, he had 
had enough of my games. 
The conclusion we are l e d t o from these g r i d s , then, i s t h a t 
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contrary t o a l l appearances V i c t o r i s able t o organise h i s judgements 
of those around him q u i t e e f f e c t i v e l y . The o v e r a l l p i c t u r e i s of 
order and consistency, a l b e i t a r a t h e r simple one. We may, f o r 
example, note t h a t a t l e a s t two sets of people are q u i t e c l e a r l y 
p a i r e d up: thus V i c t o r and Dr. S., and Mr. Y. and Chris. 
We s h a l l r e t u r n l a t e r t o the question of what t h i s evidence 
suggests. 
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C. E r i c 
E r i c when I knew him was 29 and had been i n h o s p i t a l permanently 
f o r the past 10 years. The diagnosis was chronic schizophrenia. His 
f a t h e r died when he was an i n f a n t and he was brought up by h i s "mother 
and the N a t i o n a l Assistance". He has one s i s t e r , twenty years older 
than h i m s e l f , whom he sometimes v i s i t s . His mother died three years 
ago. Of a l l the p a t i e n t s reported here E r i c was the most obviously 
'normal', indeed s e l f - c o n s c i o u s l y so. A boyish, r a t h e r effeminate 
l o o k i n g man he endeavoured to present himself as a model of the 
'sensible' and the 'proper' t h a t would not have been out of place a t 
grandma's tea-party. (The same could hardly be said f o r V i c t o r and 
Joseph). Thus he t o l d me once t h a t the group i n order to be a 'good' 
group must avoid ' d i r t y ' discussions; we may a l l be men and have 
' d i r t y ' thoughts but i t would be wrong to give expression t o these. 
U n t i l h i s mother's death, he s a i d , he h a r d l y spoke at a l l : " I was 
very dependent on h e r . . . I couldn't put things together t h e n . . . I 
wasn't dumb, but I wasn't a r t i c u l a t e " . 
He was not incapable of being a r t i c u l a t e but f o r the most p a r t 
he c a r r i e d himself i n the r o l e of the well-adapted, 'career' mental-
p a t i e n t ; someone who had r e t i r e d from l i f e e a r l y , f e a r f u l of ' d i r t ' 
and turbulence. Even a f t e r several months of group sessions 1 was 
given no more than a h i n t of the d i s r u p t i v e underneath the pleasant 
and co-operative surface. Most of what he said was p l a t i t u d i n o u s ; 
o c c a s i o n a l l y he was i n c i s i v e , as i n h i s remarks about the h o s p i t a l . 
The nurses, he t o l d me, make up jokes about people: " I t ' s p a r t of 
the t r e a t m e n t . . . I t i s n ' t very nice f o r the person they're laughing at 
i f he has any i n t e l l i g e n c e l e f t a t a l l " . And: "I'm nearer now t o 
being a paranoid than I was two years ago. I f you t r e a t a man l i k e 
an animal h e ' l l behave l i k e one". 
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I Kind Stupid S e l f i s h Sincere Mean Honest 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Cousin A 4 7 2 2 6 3 
Self B 3 6 1 5 2 6 
Si s t e r C 6 3 6 3 5 5 
Bob D 7 1 4 8 1 7 
Douglas E 1 4 3 7 3 8 
Francis F 2 5 5 1 4 2 
Tom G 5 2 7 6 8 1 
Dr. D. H 8 8 8 4 7 4 
I I Kind 
1 
Stupic 
2 
S e l f i s h 
3 
Sincere 
4 
Mean 
5 
Honest 
6 
Cousin A 3 7 7 3 4 2 
Self B 4 6 2 2 5 4 
Si s t e r C 6 4 4 5 2 5 
Bob D 8 1 1 4 1 8 
Douglas E 2 2 6 7 8 7 
Francis F 1 5 5 8 6 1 
Tom G 7 3 3 6 7 6 
Dr. D. H 5 8 8 1 3 3 
Bob, Douglas, Francis , and Tom are p a t i e n t s and Dr . D. i s 
p s y c h i a t r i s t . E r i c pays regular v i s i t s t o h i s cousin and t o b 
s i s t e r , both of whom l i v e not f a r away. 
He completes the f i r s t g r i d q u i e t l y and p r o f i c i e n t l y and comments 
only t h a t "people have d i f f e r e n t values today". "My s i s t e r " , he says, 
"has got modern values, d i f f e r e n t t o what I was taught". About the 
second g r i d he says t h a t he i s g i v i n g me d i f f e r e n t answers t h i s time: 
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"sometimes people appear k i n d , and sometimes n o t . " "They can be angry 
w i t h you one moment, and k i n d the next". I n h i s q u i e t l y humourous 
way he also remarks t h a t i t i s a "common delusion t h a t doctors are the 
most u n s e l f i s h , " 
C l e a r l y there i s a l o t of turbulence here. The o v e r a l l i n t e n s i t y 
score (605) i s very low; much lower than V i c t o r ' s , f o r example. The 
consistency score i s r a t h e r b e t t e r : +.05. The p a t t e r n of movement 
from one g r i d t o the next i s f a i r l y even: E r i c moves ten places, 
h i s cousin 10, h i s s i s t e r 8, Bob 9, Douglas 12, Francis 10, Tom 13, 
and Dr. D. 11. Of i n t e r e s t here i s not so much the co n t r a s t between 
the g r i d s as the h i a t u s w i t h i n each of them. I f we take the f i r s t 
g r i d , f o r example, E r i c seems t o preserve a f a i r l y c o n s i s t e n t p a t t e r n 
across the range of constructs and so too do Bob and h i s s i s t e r . But 
something r a t h e r odd happens around h i s cousin and Douglas. Douglas, 
f o r example, i s ranked as the most k i n d ; but he i s also one of the 
l e a s t sincere and the l e a s t honest. What seems t o be happening i s 
t h a t at c e r t a i n p o i n t s a turbulence of f e e l i n g i n t e r f e r e s w i t h the 
p a t t e r n of r e l a t i o n s h i p s between constructs t h a t common-sense semantics 
would lead us t o expect. The f e e l i n g s are, of course, expressed 
through the ranking of p a r t i c u l a r people but they are c l e a r l y not 
attached only t o these people: i n the second g r i d i t i s Francis who 
from being the most sincere and the second most honest becomes the 
l e a s t sincere and the most honest. Despite the low scores then, i t 
would be misleading t o say about these g r i d s t h a t they lack o r g a n i z a t i o n ; 
b e t t e r t o say t h a t what we f i n d are moments of s t r u c t u r e f o l l o w e d by 
moments of h i a t u s . 
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D. Terence 
When I f i r s t met Terence he was 28. He had spent most of the 
past 10 years i n h o s p i t a l . The diagnosis was chronic schizophrenia. 
His parents v i s i t e d him once a week b r i n g i n g him c l o t h e s , c i g a r e t t e s 
e t c . and sometimes he went home f o r the weekend. Terence was a 
puz z l i n g person to make out. What str u c k one most f o r c i b l y was h i s 
a i r of innocence and n a i v e t y ; i t was as though he had never grown 
up, or been allowed t o grow up. Indeed he o f t e n complained t h a t 
h i s parents t r e a t e d him l i k e a two year o l d when he went home: "behave 
yo u r s e l f Terence, l i e down on the s e t t e e , have a r e s t , have a sleep". 
A good deal of the time he presented himself as confused and m y s t i f i e d ; 
an innocent i n a world of c o r r u p t i o n and e x p l o i t a t i o n . 
He i s not however with o u t humour, and h i s i n s i g h t s are o f t e n 
a s t u t e . One of h i s favoured devices was to rehearse f o r me remarks 
t h a t h i s parents had made about him: '"Am 1 balmy?' I say t o my dad. 
'Yes', he says 'you're balmy, you've been balmy f o r years and y o u ' l l 
never be any d i f f e r e n t . Only your dad and mum know you're balmy, 
no one else knows' he says". According t o Terence h i s parents say 
about him t h a t he's cunning, c r a f t y , and a l l he t h i n k s about i s 
c i g a r e t t e s : "yet my f a t h e r p i l e s c i g a r e t t e s on us; c o n t r a d i c t i o n 
i s n ' t i t Mr. Barham?" Terence t e l l s me t h a t he fancies one of the 
female p a t i e n t s i n the h o s p i t a l but t h a t h i s f a t h e r discourages him: 
"My dad says i f I got married I ' d d i e . He says 'don't give money t o 
women; t h e y ' l l j u s t take i t o f f you. I've got t o work f o r t h a t 
money' he says, ' a l l I'm concerned about i s your h e a l t h ' " . 
For a perio d Terence was a p a t i e n t on an open ward but was 
t r a n s f e r r e d back t o a locked ward a f t e r he had walked home e i g h t 
miles w i t h o u t permission. "The charge nurse said I might have been 
k i l l e d . . . I said t o me dad 'Aren't you going t o give me a cup of tea 
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before you take me back to the h o s p i t a l ? ' 'Come on Terence, Dr. Y 
has been on the phone..,You mustn't upset Dr. Y, keep i n w i t h Dr. Y 
and everything w i l l be a l l right'...My dad says the doctor says my 
nervous system's not f u n c t i o n i n g p r o p e r l y . . . i t ' s stopped working". 
Terence t e l l s me t h a t he walked home because " I thought...well I've 
had enough of the re g u l a r r o u t i n e . , . g o i n g out every morning a f t e r 
b r e a k f a s t . . . I ' 1 1 go home." He found himself asking questions such 
as: "Am I wasting my l i f e here? I s my dad wasting my l i f e here? 
I s Dr. Y hel p i n g me? Why does my dad put a l l the burden on Dr. Y? 
Does my dad want me home or not?" He gives me an analogy: " I f 
you were s i t t i n g there w r i t i n g and got s i c k of i t you'd say 'OK 
Terence, you can go now'...Same w i t h me...Sudden impulse t o down t o o l s 
and go home". But then he f e e l s g u i l t y : " I f e e l I'm not co-operating 
s u f f i c i e n t l y w i t h d i f f e r e n t people...As long as you s u i t other people, 
play the game, you're a l l r i g h t . . , " . Thus f o r example, i n r e l a t i o n 
to going home: " I f everyone took i t i n t o t h e i r heads t o do t h a t ! 
I f Dr. Y l e f t he might leave me here!" 
I Kind 
1 
Stupid 
2 
S e l f i s h 
3 
Sincere 
4 
Mean 
5 
Honest 
6 
Self A 3 6 6 5 7 4 
Father B 4 7 5 2 6 1 
Mother C 1 1 7 3 5 5 
Peter D 6 2 2 7 1 6 
Joyce E 5 5 1 4 4 7 
Dr. S. F 2 8 8 1 8 2 
Uncle G 7 3 4 6 2 3 
Brother H 8 4 3 8 3 8 
I I Kind 
1 
Stupid 
2 
S e l f i s h 
3 
Sincere 
4 
Mean 
5 
Honest 
6 
Self A 4 7 5 8 3 2 
Father B 5 4 6 7 1 3 
Mother C 2 6 7 5 2 1 
Peter D 7 2 3 3 8 8 
Joyce E 3 5 1 1 6 4 
Dr. S. F 1 8 8 4 4 5 
Uncle G 6 1 2 6 5 6 
Brother H 8 3 4 2 7 7 
Peter and Joyce are both p a t i e n t s ; Dr. S. i s a p s y c h i a t r i s t 
and h i s uncle i s h i s Uncle A., h i s f a t h e r ' s b r o t h e r . Terence t e l l s 
me t h a t Joyce has asked him t o marry her. The t r o u b l e i s t h a t h i s 
parents have t o l d him t h a t she's j u s t a f t e r h i s money and c i g a r e t t e s 
" G i r l s t h a t read books", he t e l l s me, "are wicked and f o o l i s h . . . a 
v i c e . . . I don't know why r e a l l y , but I was reading i t i n a good book. 
You've got t o have s o b r i e t y haven't you, Mr. Barham?" He then t e l l s 
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me th a t h i s f a t h e r says t h a t he i s harmless: 
"...innocent, a k i n d n i c e l a d , but he gets on to us, you know, 
as soon as he gets out of bed, s a y s , 'Why should you do th a t to us 
Terence? I'm only t r y i n g to keep you r i g h t . ' He says ' Y o u ' l l never 
be a b e t t e r man than me Terence...What would you do without me and your 
mum?' I say 'How do you do i t dad?' He says ' I don't know, i t ' s i n 
the head.' He says 'You're always t h i e v i n g Terence when you're i n 
the house'. I pin c h c i g a r e t t e s , mother's c i g a r e t t e s , not r e a l l y 
t h i e v i n g . ' L i e down and go to s l e e p Terence,' he s a y s , 'do something, 
l i e down on the couch and have a r e s t , go to s l e e p ' . " 
On the f i r s t g r i d he says v e r y q u i c k l y "Knock my brother out, 
he's not kind...My u n c l e ' s not ki n d e i t h e r " . He i n s i s t s on g i v i n g 
a long d e f i n i t i o n of a s t u p i d person: "a person t h a t ' s s i l l y and 
ignorant, a l a c k a d a i s i c a l person, always f i g h t i n g and being i g n o r a n t 
of the ways of l i f e , he doesn't know how to work p r o p e r l y , he doesn't 
know how to d r e s s p r o p e r l y , to shave p r o p e r l y , doesn't know how to 
keep h i m s e l f c l e a n , not c o - o p e r a t i v e . . . " T h i s i s only a summary of 
what he s a i d ! He then p o i n t s to the card w i t h 'mother' w r i t t e n on 
i t without mentioning i t by name. A s e l f i s h person, he s a y s , i s 
someone who i s "mean, always wants f o r h i m s e l f , never t h i n k s of anybody 
e l s e but h i m s e l f , never takes anybody e l s e i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n - i n 
money matt e r s , i n f a m i l y r e l a t i o n s h i p s , . . . always wanting f o r h i m s e l f 
i n b i g thi n g s and l i t t l e t h i n g s , always wanting to shout h i s own 
d e s i r a b i l i t i e s , always on the want f o r h i s own needs". S i n c e r e : "A 
person who's f a i t h f u l , honest, w e l l - l i k e d by your compatriots, v e r y 
t r u e to h i s word". Mean: "A corrupt d i s h o n e s t person you can't t r u s t , 
t h i n k s only of h i s own needs,...a wanton person. Soon gets annoyed 
and up the pole and shouts, Quiet but untrustworthy. Takes what 
he wants from you and g i v e s nothing back." He says of h i s mother t h a t 
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"she's a b i t mean i n a way...She's k i n d but mean...Mother never comes 
through t o see us." An honest person, f i n a l l y , "works f o r a l i v i n g , 
i s u p r i g h t i n word, act and deed, t r u s t w o r t h y , never t e l l s l i e s " . 
Terence's o v e r a l l i n t e n s i t y score i s 1127, and h i s consistency 
score +.05: r a t h e r b e t t e r than V i c t o r on i n t e n s i t y and much b e t t e r 
on consistency. What i s s u r p r i s i n g , however, i s t h a t the same p a t t e r n 
as we found i n V i c t o r ' s g r i d s i s repeated here. Terence's performance 
i n the f i r s t g r i d i s unexceptional: a l l the constructs seem to c a r r y 
a f a i r amount of i m p l i c a t i o n f o r each other. And the same tren d 
c a r r i e s over i n t o the f i r s t three ranks of the second g r i d : Terence 
s h i f t s only 3 places, h i s mother 6, h i s f a t h e r 5, Peter 2, Joyce 5, 
Dr. S. 1, Uncle A. 5, and Terence's brother 2. I f we include the 
l a s t three ranks, however, a l l the s h i f t s are more extreme: Terence 12, 
hi s mother 15, h i s f a t h e r 17, Peter 15, Joyce 10, Dr. S. 11, h i s 
Uncle 11 and h i s brother 13. And we can r e a d i l y see why: columns 
2 and 5 i n the second g r i d bear h a r d l y any r e l a t i o n to each o t h e r , 
whereas i n the f i r s t g r i d they are c l o s e l y r e l a t e d . Terence, l i k e 
V i c t o r , has had enough before the f i n a l w h i s t l e has blown. 
Terence, i t seems, when c a l l e d upon t o do so, i s able t o muster 
a passably ordered p r e s e n t a t i o n of h i s perceptions of himself and 
h i s immediate others. 
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E. Tom 
Tom, when I came t o know him, was 21 and had been a p a t i e n t i n a 
mental h o s p i t a l f o r 5 years. He was diagnosed as a chronic schizophrenic, 
and was a p a t i e n t on the same ward as Joseph. His parents v i s i t e d him 
r e g u l a r l y and oc c a s i o n a l l y took him out f o r the day. He had one 
br o t h e r , three years older than himself. 
Most of what Tom had t o say was on f i r s t hearing incomprehensible. 
For one t h i n g he said very l i t t l e . A question from me would o f t e n be 
followed by a silence of up to f i f t e e n minutes before he answered. 
Moreover when he d i d speak h i s voice was o f t e n i n a u d i b l e , and a request 
from me to repeat what he had said was g e n e r a l l y t r e a t e d as an admonish-
ment. I t was d i f f i c u l t t o know what h i s statements r e f e r r e d t o . 
For example he would t e l l me t h a t he had been dreaming about 'green 
p a i n t ' and then i n the next breath t h a t he had l o s t the screw from a 
c y l i n d e r . 
Tom had b a s i c a l l y f o u r pre-occupations: the h o s p i t a l , h i s parents, 
women, and e l e c t r i c a l devices. E a r l y on i n our r e l a t i o n s h i p he t o l d 
me t h a t he was "hypnotised i n the i n f a n t school": 
"How do you mean?" 
" I t must have been something l i k e t h a t or I wouldn't have gone t o 
school. I wouldn't have got through i t otherwise" 
"Hypnotised? Who by?" 
"Lots of k i d s were: by t h e i r parents. I wouldn't have got 
through the rough and tumble otherwise" 
"And what would have happened?" 
" I would have got wrong" 
"Got wrong?" 
"Well when we were bad we were sent t o the headmaster. I used 
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to see pink elephants and t h a t s o r t of t h i n g . I n one case 1 d i d get 
wrong and they sent me to h o s p i t a l , I got wrong i n the playground, 
I must have been doing something dangerous," 
"What happened t o you?" 
"They gave me a good h i d i n g " 
" I thought you said they sent you to h o s p i t a l ? " 
"No, 1 said they were going t o send me t o h o s p i t a l but they 
didn't...Most of the t r o u b l e i n t h i s world i s caused by a d u l t s . Kids 
don't get any say i n what happens. They might t r y s u i c i d e but t h a t ' s 
a l l . Adults cause most of the t r o u b l e l i k e f i r e s and t h a t s o r t of 
t h i n g . " 
"And you? Are you a c h i l d or an a d u l t ? " 
"I'm a b i t c h i l d i s h a t t i m e s . . . I t h i n k I'm an a d u l t , yes." 
Just before t h i s we had been loo k i n g a t a p i c t u r e which he said 
reminded him of Adam and Eve i n the year 200. 1 now ask him: 
"Why Adam and Eve?" 
"Well because i t was l i k e something I saw i n the beginning 
when I was young...There must have been i n d u s t r y then or they wouldn't 
have had anywhere t o t u r n when they l e f t the garden. There must 
have been home and i n d u s t r y then or else how could you now have a 
line - u p w i t h a recei v e r set?" 
Occasionally he gives d i r e c t expression t o h i s f e e l i n g s : "My 
f a t h e r keeps condemning me t o these kinds of places...They're t i r e d 
of coming f o r me now" A long s i l e n c e , and then almost i n a u d i b l y : 
"You'd b e t t e r take me home." Most o f t e n he seems t o be the v i c t i m 
of a t e r r i b l e confusion. The f o l l o w i n g i s t y p i c a l : 
" I was s i t t i n g down f o r a meal e a r l i e r on and o l d Smith was 
t a l k i n g about women. I f e l t l i k e asking who h i t me...and going and 
h i t t i n g the nurse...I don't get any peace" 
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And he continues; 
"And Smith was t a l k i n g about women. About what t h i s was l i k e 
i n a woman," p o i n t i n g t o h i s penis. 
" I t d i s t u r b e d you what Smith said about women?" 
"Yes, I was too sm a l l " 
"What worries you about what Smith said?" 
"Well t h a t means I ' l l have t o get married or something doesn't 
i t . . . 1 f e l t g u i l t y " 
"About?" 
"About what Smith said t o Johnson...I'm e n t i t l e d t o a house 
aren't I ? " 
"What made you f e e l g u i l t y ? " 
" I saw Johnson l y i n g on the f l o o r a l l bleeding and everything,... 
Last n i g h t I was i n bed and I put my f i n g e r up my nose and i t was a l l 
bleeding and ever y t h i n g . " 
He then says about Smith and Johnson: 
" I thought I was b i g enough to t r y i t a t f i r s t " (long s i l e n c e ) 
"They've got a woman i n - Smith and Johnson - i n the ward somewhere..." 
A r e c u r r i n g f e a t u r e of our work together i s Tom's pre-occupation 
w i t h e l e c t r i c a l devices. For example he t e l l s me t h a t Male 15's i s 
where the power i s t h a t c o n t r o l s the whole of the h o s p i t a l . "Two 
boxes, and the b i g one's got nine fuses i n i t . " He wants t o go to 
a ward on another block t o get away from i t . He t e l l s me t h a t he 
couldn't c o n t r o l himself and had a go at the boxes. "I'm too greedy" 
he t e l l s me "my mum wanted t o know why I was so greedy...the only way 1 
manage t o keep f i t i s over a decent meal." He then t e l l s me t h a t he 
had a go at the boxes i n order to get something t h a t he couldn't have: 
"Ever since I've been i n here there have been things l i k e sex which I 
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couldn't have." 
On another occasion he t e l l s me t h a t he would l i k e me t o make him 
a 'set'. The set would have " c o t t o n i n s u l a t e d w i r e s " w i t h a "speaker 
and a power pack a t the back of some s o r t " . His parents, he says, 
have a "bad o l d s e t . . . j u s t t i e d together w i t h hardboard and o l d 
screws". Perhaps I could make them another one: "the type you 
t o l d me about; i t could heat my depression". He would be 
p a r t i c u l a r l y pleased t o have such a set, he says, because he would be 
able t o get s t a t i o n s on i t from d i f f e r e n t places. 
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I . Kind 
1 
Stupid 
2 
S e l f i s h 
3 
Sincere 
4 
Mean 
5 
Honest 
6 
Father A 1 5 2 4 7 5 
Mother B 4 3 7 1 1 2 
Self C 7 8 8 7 8 6 
Brother D 6 4 6 3 4 8 
B i l l E 8 2 5 6 5 7 
Percy F 3 6 4 2 6 1 
Mr. S. G 5 1 1 5 3 4 
Dr. D. H 2 7 3 8 2 3 
I I . Kind 
1 
Stupid 
2 
S e l f i s h 
3 
Sincere 
4 
Mean 
5 
Honest 
6 
Father A 6 4 5 3 1 7 
Mother B 2 6 7 4 7 5 
Self C 7 3 8 1 8 1 
Brother D 8 8 1 2 6 4 
B i l l E 5 7 2 8 3 3 
Percy F 1 1 4 5 5 8 
Mr. S. G 4 5 6 7 2 2 
Dr. D. H 3 2 3 6 4 6 
B i l l and Percy are p a t i e n t s ; Mr. S. i s a nurse; and Dr. D. i s 
a p s y c h i a t r i s t . Tom claims t h a t he has not had a v i s i t f o r s i x months. 
He then says: " I used t o have ideas t h a t someone was t r y i n g to t u r n me 
i n t o a p s y c h i a t r i s t , and I said t h a t I d i d n ' t want t o , t h a t I wanted 
to see my parents again". "Yesterday they asked me i f I ' d l i k e t o be 
a p s y c h i a t r i s t . . . " I ask him about h i s b r o t h e r ; Tom says he hasn't 
seen him f o r a w h i l e and comments: "He's got a whole room f u l l of 
172 
rubbish". He also recounts t h a t another p a t i e n t t o l d him where the 
fuse-box was. He says he f e e l s he should fuse the whole place "so 
we'd get some more money, and we're g e t t i n g low on food". 
On the f i r s t g r i d , f o r k i n d , there i s a long s i l e n c e before he 
begins, and he then says, " w e l l , my dad". A s t u p i d person he defines 
as someone who doesn't t h i n k before he opens h i s mouth; s e l f i s h 
means "keeping y o u r s e l f back from people"; sincere means " t o do a 
job p r o p e r l y and c o n f i d e n t l y " ; a mean person i s somebody who "won't 
l e t anybody get on w i t h what they're doing or who won't help them"; 
and an honest man i s someone "who does what he's t o l d and pays f o r 
what he gets". 
A f t e r completing the ranking f o r s e l f i s h he t e l l s me t h a t he 
wanted to sow some seeds to open up the ground, but then along came 
an e l e c t r o n i c gardener and Tom f e l t outdone. When we come to mean, 
he pushes the 'dad' and ' s e l f cards to the f a r side of the t a b l e . 
I ask him to choose between them which i s the most mean and he says: 
" I used t o get an ice-cream when I was at home e a r l i e r " . 
On the second g r i d he seems somewhat confused by h i s previous 
d e f i n i t i o n of s e l f i s h when I read i t out t o him: "Oh you mean not 
mixing w i t h people". He picks up the card f o r Dr. D. and says 
almost i n a u d i b l y : "He keeps away from me...he used t o , yes". "Does 
he s t i l l ? " There i s a long s i l e n c e and Tom says "yes". 
The o v e r a l l i n t e n s i t y score (338) i s very low; lower even than 
Joseph's, though the consistency score i s m a r g i n a l l y b e t t e r : -.12 as 
against -.26. The s h i f t s i n p o s i t i o n are l a r g e but even: Tom 
moves 16 places i n a l l from one g r i d t o the next; h i s f a t h e r 18 
places; h i s mother 17; h i s brother 18; B i l l 19; Percy 18; the 
nurse 15; and Dr. D. 13. I t i s , though, d i f f i c u l t t o f i n d any 
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sense of p a t t e r n e i t h e r i n the f l u c t u a t i o n s , or i n the r e l a t i o n s h i p s 
w i t h i n the i n d i v i d u a l g r i d s . Occasionally there are glimmers: 
where i n the f i r s t g r i d he ranks h i s f a t h e r and himself as the two 
l e a s t mean, and h i s mother as the most mean, i n the second g r i d 
h i s mother and f a t h e r are intern-changed. Where w i t h E r i c we could 
say t h a t there were moments of h i a t u s and moments of s t r u c t u r e 
w i t h Tom hi a t u s dominates; we have t o look very hard t o f i n d items 
of s t r u c t u r e . 
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F. Arthur 
A r t h u r , when I f i r s t met him, was 26, He was f i r s t admitted 
to the h o s p i t a l at the age of 18. Since then he had been i n and 
out of h o s p i t a l seven times, most of the admissions f o l l o w i n g 
r a p i d l y on each other. At the time 1 knew him, he was a day p a t i e n t , 
sleeping at home w i t h h i s parents and spending the best p a r t of 
hi s days a t the h o s p i t a l . A t a l l , bespectacled, lanky man, w i t h a 
shambling g a i t , he spoke i n a s o f t and gentle voice t h a t seemed to 
express an inconsolable sadness. He was a member of the group f o r 
almost a year; he always attended r e g u l a r l y and seemed t o value 
the occasions. I never saw anything extreme i n him: he was 
never outwardly angry, or exuberant, or badly depressed; always 
a t t e n t i v e , but s l i g h t l y bemused and q u i e t l y d e s p a i r i n g , h i s voice 
conveying the sense of the a r r e s t e d l i f e t h a t he now l i v e d . He 
once t o l d me the p a t t e r n of h i s normal day: get up a t 7; a t 8 
br e a k f a s t , w i t h perhaps a few words shared w i t h the f a m i l y about 
"food, and what we're doing l i k e " . At 8.50 he goes to work i n the 
h o s p i t a l . He works i n the gardens t i l l 11, then he r e t u r n s to the 
ward. At 12 he has dinner and a t 1 he ret u r n s to the gardens. He 
has no sp e c i a l f r i e n d s among the p a t i e n t s and we have already heard 
him (Unit X I I I ) express h i s f e e l i n g s about l i f e on the ward. He 
works u n t i l 4p.m.; then he r e t u r n s t o the ward, changes out of h i s 
o v e r a l l s , and has tea on the ward. A f t e r tea he may perhaps walk 
over t o the h o s p i t a l tea-rooms; most days he j u s t goes home. At 
7.30 he has supper a t home. A f t e r supper he perhaps goes f o r a 
walk on h i s own; otherwise he watches t e l e v i s i o n . At 10 he goes t o 
bed. On an ord i n a r y day he w i l l exchange no more than a few words 
w i t h anyone. 
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His thoughts d u r i n g the day, he t e l l s me, are mostly about 
r e l i g i o n : " t h i n g s t h a t I've read i n the B i b l e , things out of the 
New Testament". "1 t h i n k about whether I'm doing any good and 
t h a t , doing God's w i l l . . . " He t e l l s me t h a t i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o 
understand what i s meant by r e l i g i o n : "knowing what the words stand 
f o r , what they mean, knowing the d i f f e r e n c e between good and bad... 
I f a person's clean, then h e ' l l go t o heaven, 'Clean i n s i d e ' , 
t h a t ' s what's meant by the Holy Ghost i n the B i b l e : not drabness a t 
a l l . I o f t e n worry about me i n case I'm going drab, i n case I 
aren't healthy enough." 
He t e l l s me t h a t he i s f r i g h t e n e d of temptation; there are a 
l o t of bad influences about, l i k e t e l e v i s i o n : "1 can't get i n t e r e s t e d 
i n t h a t because there are things I don't l i k e , f o r example crime, 
making f u n out of t h a t l i k e cartoons". On a number of occasions 
he has f e l t a s p i r i t coming up i n h i s body and has been f r i g h t e n e d 
of l o s i n g c o n t r o l ; f o r example a t one time the word ' k i l l ' would 
come i n t o h i s mind - " i t used t o happen every day I could t h i n k of 
nothing to stop i t " - and a f e e l i n g run up h i s spine, f o l l o w e d by 
the phrase " I s h a l l not k i l l " . The only way to deal w i t h i t was to 
say to himself " I am strong". 
He i s not very happy at home, and f e e l s unable t o t a l k t o anyone 
i n the f a m i l y about what concerns him. His f a t h e r , he says, i s a 
b i t of a b u l l y and shouts a t Arthur f o r no reason. " I d r i n k a l o t 
of tea and he plays up about t h a t " . He says t h a t he sometimes th i n k s 
t h a t he would have "more s e l f - r e l i a n c e " i f he found board and lodging 
f o r h i m s e l f : "only i t ' s my mother, I don't want t o upset her". About 
once a f o r t n i g h t he goes to bed at 7 o'clock and then gets up again 
because he can't sleep: "and then my dad plays h e l l w i t h me and I go 
to bed again a t the usual time". He has never had a g i r l - f r i e n d i n 
h i s l i f e : "I've fancied a few but I've found nothing t o say t o 
them". "Before 1 have a g i r l - f r i e n d I must be able t o chat them 
up and a t t r a c t them, and then I t h i n k , what have I got to a t t r a c t 
them?... Sometimes I f e e l f r i g h t e n e d t o stand very close to a g i r l 
anyway." 
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I . Kind Stupid S e l f i s h Sincere Mean Honest 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Mother A 2 8 8 1 8 6 
Brother B 3 2 2 7 3 7 
Si s t e r C 5 7 1 6 1 3 
Self D 1 3 6 4 6 1 
E r i c E 7 4 5 5 2 2 
A l f F 8 1 3 8 5 8 
S i s t e r C. G 4 5 7 2 7 5 
Dr. T. H 6 6 4 3 4 4 
I I . Kind 
1 
Stupid 
2 
S e l f i s h 
3 
Sincere 
4 
Mean 
5 
Honest 
6 
Mother A 2 7 8 3 7 7 
Bro ther B 5 6 1 6 3 5 
Si s t e r C 6 2 2 7 1 4 
Self D 1 4 6 1 8 1 
E r i c E 4 3 5 4 5 3 
A l f F 8 1 3 8 2 8 
Si s t e r C. G 3 8 7 2 6 2 
Dr. T. H 7 5 4 5 4 6 
E r i c and A l f are p a t i e n t s ; S i s t e r C. i s a nurse; and Dr. T. i s 
a p s y c h i a t r i s t . 
Taken as a whole Arthur's scores, both on i n t e n s i t y and consistency, 
are higher than any we have seen so f a r . The s h i f t s between one g r i d 
and the next are r e l a t i v e l y small; h i s mother moves 5 places, h i s 
brother 10, h i s s i s t e r 9, Arthur himself 6, E r i c 9, A l f 3, S i s t e r C. 8, 
and Dr. T. 6. One f e a t u r e of these g r i d s i s p a r t i c u l a r l y worthy of 
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note: despite the very high, consistency score (+.87) the i n t e n s i t y 
score f o r the f i r s t g r i d i s s u r p r i s i n g l y low. We can r e a d i l y see 
why: compare, f o r example, the f i r s t two ranks of g r i d I . Mother 
i s the second most k i n d and the l e a s t s t u p i d ; brother i s j u s t behind 
mother i n kindness, but the second most s t u p i d ; Arthur himself i s 
the most k i n d , but only j u s t behind h i s brother i n s t u p i d i t y , and so 
on. On the face of i t , the p a t t e r n of i n t e r - c o r r e l a t i o n between 
the constructs i s low. I f we look a t the f a t e of i n d i v i d u a l s , however, 
we become q u i c k l y wary of making too much of t h i s : on common-sense 
grounds alone i t i s p e r f e c t l y tenable f o r a son t o perceive h i s 
mother as being as k i n d as him but much more i n t e l l i g e n t . We can 
detect something s i m i l a r i f we look a t the i n t e r - c o r r e l a t i o n s between 
ranks 3 and 6, s e l f i s h and honest, i n the two g r i d s . I n both cases 
they are very low: mother i n each instance i s the l e a s t s e l f i s h 
and one of the most dishonest; A l f , i n c o n t r a s t , i s one of the most 
s e l f i s h and the most dishonest. 
I n general terms we can say t h a t Arthur's estimations of himself 
and others appear t o be reasonably s e t t l e d ; there i s none of the 
turbulence or sudden h i a t u s t h a t we have met before. 
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I I I . 2 . i i i . C r i t i q u e . 
What then does our reading of the m a t e r i a l suggest f o r the 
personal c o n s t r u c t theory approach to the p e r p l e x i t i e s o f schizophrenia? 
I f we f o l l o w the h i e r a r c h y t h a t i s est a b l i s h e d by the raw scores, then 
Joseph and Tom are a t the bottom, w i t h Terence and Arth u r at the top. 
The mean scores f o r our 6 p a t i e n t s on the two sets of gr i d s are: 
I n t e n s i t y Consistency 
range mean range mean 
Photos 394 to 663 538 -.26 t o +.34 +.12 
People 338 t o 1127 726 -.26 to +.89 +.07 
For 4 of the 6 p a t i e n t s the o v e r a l l i n t e n s i t y score was higher on 
the 'people' grids than on the photograph g r i d s ; f o r consistency the 
trend was i n the opposite d i r e c t i o n : only Arthur scores higher on 
consistency on the 'people' g r i d s . Heather (1976), we w i l l r e c a l l , 
found t h a t the use of known people as elements made very l i t t l e 
d i f f e r e n c e to mean i n t e n s i t y scores. (There were no r e - t e s t s i n h i s 
study, and hence no c a l c u l a t i o n s f o r consistency.) Williams (1971), by 
co n t r a s t , found t h a t 7 of h i s 12 subjects d i d b e t t e r on both consistency 
and i n t e n s i t y i n the 'people' g r i d s as compared t o the photo g r i d s . 
However he gives us no i n d i c a t i o n i n h i s paper o f the lapse of time 
between the f i r s t a d m i n i s t r a t i o n and the second, and i t may t h e r e f o r e 
be t h a t the consistency scores i n h i s 'people' g r i d s were boosted by a 
' memory f a c t o r ' . 
Even i f we allow t h i s k i n d of t h e o r e t i c a l c o n s t r u c t i o n some 
c r e d i b i l i t y then, i t i s c l e a r t h a t Williams's 'cue i n s e n s i t i v i t y ' 
explanation receives no e m p i r i c a l support from our data. As I s h a l l 
show s h o r t l y , i t i s only able t o make an appearance at a l l a t the 
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expense of expunging a good deal of complication. From another d i r e c t i o n , 
however, the argument i s on Williams's s i d e : we w i l l do w e l l to question 
the tendency to subsume g r i d t e s t p r o f i l e s and 'people' g r i d s i n t o the 
c a t c h - a l l of the p a t i e n t ' s c a p a c i t i e s f o r construing i n r e l a t i o n to r e a l 
people. From Bannister's p o i n t of view a change i n the elements should 
make l i t t l e d i f f e r e n c e ; i t i s the linkage between constructs t h a t i s 
important. That t h i s view i s p a t e n t l y f a l s e can be seen from the 
f o l l o w i n g example. I t involves the case of a middle-aged s p i n s t e r 
who had spent many years i n h o s p i t a l as a chronic schizophrenic, and we 
can, I t h i n k , use i t to throw l i g h t on our e a r l i e r m a t e r i a l . 
Discussion w i t h t h i s lady, whom I s h a l l c a l l A l i c e , revealed t h a t 
she was p a r t i c u l a r l y preoccupied w i t h people who were e i t h e r dead or 
had only an imaginary r e l a t i o n s h i p to her. These people included her 
parents, the Duke of Windsor, Teddy her son, two husbands, and James Munro 
"daddy's godson, up i n England, up i n heaven". Joseph, we w i l l r e c a l l , 
wanted t o include both h i s s t e p - f a t h e r and h i s r e a l f a t h e r i n the l i s t 
of elements f o r the people g r i d , and I refused. With A l i c e I h i t 
upon the idea of de v i s i n g two g r i d s , one to include persons l a r g e l y 
dead or imaginary, and the other to co n s i s t of persons known to her i n 
the h o s p i t a l . There were not enough dead and imaginary f i g u r e s to 
complete the l i s t however, and A l i c e and Dr. T. t h e r e f o r e f e a t u r e i n 
both sets of g r i d s . When we came to the second s i t t i n g o f the g r i d 
i n v o l v i n g people i n the h o s p i t a l she r e s i s t e d ; the whole exercise was 
c l e a r l y d i s t r e s s i n g f o r her, and I d i d not press i t any f u r t h e r . 
Nevertheless the data as i t stands i s , I t h i n k , r e v e a l i n g : 
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l . Bannister & F r a n s e l l a Grids: 
i n t e n s i t y I 306 
I I 763 1069 
consistency + .33 
n. Mostly dead and imaginary people: 
i n t e n s i t y I 918 
I I 928 1846 
consistency + .59 
i n . People known to her i n the h o s p i t a l : 
i n t e n s i t y I 259 
As can be seen from the scores, she presents a remarkably ordered 
p i c t u r e of her perceptions of the dead and imaginary f i g u r e s ; the more 
s u r p r i s i n g , perhaps, when we note t h a t Teddy, her son, was "only born 
l a s t year - o v e r n i g h t , I d i d n ' t know I was having him". Even A l i c e 
h e r s e l f and Dr. T. do w e l l i n t h i s company: Dr. T. s h i f t s only 4 places 
between one g r i d and the next, and A l i c e 6. With the g r i d f o r the people 
known p r e s e n t l y , i n c o n t r a s t , things are very d i f f e r e n t ; e v e r y t h i n g i s 
t u r b u l e n t and confusing: of S i s t e r H.: "I'm s o r r y , S i s t e r H. i s muddling 
me today, I can't take her a t a l l , I can't work i t out f o r her"; of 
Betty B., a p a t i e n t * "There's a few Betty B's, they keep jumping and so 
you don't know where you are w i t h them"; and of Doris, another p a t i e n t : 
"Sometimes she goes away, and sometimes she comes back, so I don't know 
where we are w i t h her". 
Quite c l e a r l y , then, the choice of elements does make a good deal 
of d i f f e r e n c e , even w i t h i n the range of people elements. Nor i s 
Bannister's argument t h a t the schizophrenic does b e t t e r when he i s able 
to trade upon remembered judgements of any use here: A l i c e h e r s e l f and 
Dr. T. are a c t i v e f i g u r e s i n the present, and one o f her husbands she 
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had only married a short w h i l e ago. From t a l k i n g to her i t was c l e a r 
t h a t a l l these f i g u r e s were very much a l i v e and moving i n her imagination. 
The d i f f e r e n c e between her c a p a c i t i e s i n t h i s respect, and the t u r m o i l of 
the more obviously contemporary g r i d , resides I suspect i n t h i s : t h a t 
here she i s able to muster her perceptions a t her repose, whereas i n 
dealing w i t h the f i g u r e s on the ward she i s faced w i t h a turbulence 
from which she can r e t r e a t only by r e f u s i n g to complete the exercise. 
And hence, too, perhaps, why she does considerably b e t t e r on the g r i d 
t e s t , even though her o v e r a l l performance f a l l s w i t h i n the thought-
disordered range. Her 'disorder' then, l i e s not i n the linkage between 
c o n s t r u c t s , but i n the d i f f i c u l t y f o r her i n p u t t i n g these constructs 
to work to describe a very s p e c i f i c s t a t e of a f f a i r s . (One might note, 
though, i n passing, t h a t having met Betty B., A l i c e ' s comment about 
her i s e x a c t l y r i g h t : there were indeed several Betty B.'s and I f o r 
one would have found i t w e l l nigh impossible to t i e her down to a set 
of constructs i n t h i s way, l e t alone do so i n a context where I was 
forced t o l i v e w i t h her!) 
And we can l e a r n something else from t h i s example t h a t i s germane 
to our e a r l i e r m a t e r i a l , and t o our discussion of the c o n s t r u c t theory 
approach as a whole: the danger o f b u i l d i n g a t h e o r e t i c a l case about 
schizophrenia, or about schizophrenic thought d i s o r d e r , on the basis of 
a group score. And t h a t indeed i s what a l l the studies to date have 
done. This i s a serious complaint about work undertaken i n t h i s 
t r a d i t i o n : t h a t much of t h i s t h e o r e t i c a l e d i f i c e can only s u s t a i n 
i t s e l f by a disregard f o r the complication t h a t i s a c t u a l l y present i n 
i t s own data. An instance of t h a t complication we have seen i n our 
discussion of A l i c e ; i t i s present i n our e a r l i e r m a t e r i a l i n another 
way: from the grids of Terence and V i c t o r i t i s c l e a r t h a t some p a t i e n t s 
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when subjected to t h i s k i n d of exercise q u i c k l y become bored. One 
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can only speculate as to the unacknowledged e f f e c t of responses of 
t h i s k i n d on the studies reported i n the l i t e r a t u r e . And complication 
presents i n another way too; from our discussions of Joseph and A l i c e 
i n p a r t i c u l a r , i t i s apparent t h a t the comments t h a t the p a t i e n t makes 
about what he i s doing, h i s f e e l i n g s about the exercise, and h i s 
responses to i t , are an important source of data. From a t r a d i t i o n a l 
p o i n t of view, discussion of t h i s k i n d i s 'waste'; the r e a l data shows 
i t s e l f i n the i n t e r n a l l o g i c of the t e s t m a t e r i a l i t s e l f , abstracted 
from the p a t i e n t ' s thoughts and f e e l i n g s about the whole business, and 
from the r e l a t i o n s h i p between p a t i e n t and research worker. And what i s 
then undercut, i n e f f e c t , i s our capacity to grasp how the i n d i v i d u a l 
p a t i e n t i s engaging w i t h the world. We can see t h i s c l e a r l y when we 
examine the meaning of the d i s o r g a n i z a t i o n t h a t the grids t h a t we have 
discussed d e p i c t . 
Bannister, i n a r e p l y t o W i l l i a m s , argues t h a t Williams's assertions 
to the contrary n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g , i t i s apparent from Williams's own 
m a t e r i a l t h a t " e i t h e r photographs or people broadly i d e n t i f y thought 
disorder" (1971, p.470). And no doubt he might make the same r e t o r t to 
us. However we w i l l do w e l l t o catch ourselves on t h a t word ' i d e n t i f y ' . 
For what does i t mean, f o r Bannister, t o ' i d e n t i f y ' thought disorder? 
Really r a t h e r l i t t l e ; only t h a t we have found evidence, w i t h i n the scope 
provided by the g r i d framework, of a p a t t e r n o f response t h a t i s 
normatively u n c h a r a c t e r i s t i c . Bannister t a l k s i n terms of d i s o r g a n i z a t i o n , 
and he would account f o r the d i s o r g a n i z a t i o n i n terms of a loosening of 
the r e l a t i o n s h i p s between constructs. "The thought disordered 
schizophrenic," Bannister and F r a n s e l l a w r i t e , "has been d r i v e n t o loosen 
beyond the p o i n t at which there are enough workable l i n e s of i m p l i c a t i o n 
between h i s constructs f o r him to r e - t i g h t e n h i s system" (1971, p. 165). 
Bannister does not ask any f u r t h e r questions about the meaning of the 
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d i s o r g a n i z a t i o n t h a t he i d e n t i f i e s ; he does not need to because w i t h i n 
h i s own scheme of i n t e r - p e r s o n a l f u n c t i o n i n g i t speaks f o r i t s e l f : i t 
i s at the opposite extreme from h e a l t h y , normal, organised f u n c t i o n i n g . ^ 
However we can, I t h i n k , begin t o see the pertinence of the question. 
I t i s already i m p l i c i t i n the remarks t h a t we have made about A l i c e . 
Compare f o r example, Joseph and A r t h u r . Arthur presents a p a t t e r n of 
response t h a t i s considerably more organized than t h a t of Joseph. From 
one p o i n t t o view then, A r t h u r i s closer along the road to recovery. 
Yet i t seems to me t h a t we can only adopt such a view i f we extrude 
e v e r y t h i n g t h a t i s not given us by the i n t e r n a l s t r u c t u r e of the g r i d s 
themselves. Joseph and A r t h u r , as we have seen, are markedly d i f f e r e n t 
people: where Joseph i s vocal and energetic, a t times, f o r a l l h i s 
despair, exuberant, Arthur i s q u i e t and withdrawn. The d i s t i n c t i o n 
can be put thus: Joseph i s at times q u i t e mad but there i s about him 
a v i t a l i t y and sense of l i f e ; A r t h u r , by c o n t r a s t , i s w e l l adapted to 
the w o r l d but the sense one has of him i s of u t t e r loss and r e s i g n a t i o n . 
The c o n t r a s t between these two i s c r u c i a l ; i t takes us t o the core 
of what i s demeaning about t h i s whole approach to the p e r p l e x i t i e s of 
schizophrenia. Freud, we w i l l r e c a l l , described Schreber's d e l u s i o n a l 
system as an attempt at recovery, as a process of r e c o n s t r u c t i o n by 
which e x t e r n a l r e a l i t y , from which cathexis had been withdrawn, became 
rein v e s t e d w i t h s i g n i f i c a n c e so t h a t i t again became a place i n which he 
could l i v e (1911). And something l i k e t h i s i s happening i n Joseph's 
case. Far from withdrawing from the w o r l d , Joseph i s too much i n the 
w o r l d ; the carapace of h i s s e l f i s q u i c k l y penetrated; the boundaries 
between i n s i d e and o u t s i d e , between hims e l f and o t h e r s , between language 
and the w o r l d , are never resolved f o r him: they have always to be 
discovered anew. The complication of the world, and of h i s r e l a t i o n 
to i t , w i l l not s e t t l e i n t o the p a t t e r n of judgement r e q u i r e d by the 
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r e p e r t o r y g r i d exercise. I n the second of the two g r i d s , as we have 
seen, Joseph makes f o u r references i n r e l a t i o n to four d i f f e r e n t 
people, about e i t h e r 'going home' or ' l i v i n g at home'. I n the terms of 
our e a r l i e r d i s c u s s i o n , something i s a c t i v e w i t h i n him about h i s 'abode' 
i n the w o r l d t h a t the dimensions of the exercise cannot contain. 
For A r t h u r there i s complication too, as we have seen from our 
discussion of h i s i n t e n s i t y scores. But compared to what we have found 
w i t h Joseph i t i s minimal: where Joseph s h i f t s 26 places between one 
g r i d and the next, A r t h u r moves only 6. Arthur i s able to maintain a 
semblance of a bounded s e l f but only by detaching himself from anything 
t h a t i s l i k e l y to d i s r u p t : from h i s own f e e l i n g s and impulses, f o r 
example, and from the resonances of meaning t h a t are inherent i n 
language. Ar t h u r sustains h i m s e l f , but only at the expense of r e p u d i a t i n g 
both p a r t of himself and p a r t of the w o r l d . We can detect something of 
t h i s i f we look at the way i n which he engages w i t h the g r i d t e s t of 
thought d i s o r d e r . As we can see from the scores he does r a t h e r badly: 
only 656 on i n t e n s i t y , and -.26 on consistency. On the face of i t , a 
disorganized p a t t e r n of response. From my observation of the way i n which 
he set about the exercise, however, i t was apparent to me t h a t A r t h u r 
was not so much confused about what was r e q u i r e d of him as d i s i n t e r e s t e d ; 
these blank faces d i d not mean anything t o him, he could not a t t a c h enough 
s i g n i f i c a n c e t o them t o make meaningful a t t r i b u t i o n s about them. For 
Joseph, by c o n t r a s t , they meant too much. Whereas Arthur has d i f f i c u l t y 
c onverting the photographs i n t o people, f o r Joseph they cease to be 
photographs. Let us look at how he proceeds w i t h the exercise. 
We begin w i t h the construct k i n d . Joseph comments: " a y . . . I don't 
know...they a l l look k i n d t o me...you mean g i v i n g things away and t h a t 
l i k e ? . . . depends r e a l l y . . . a r t i c l e s I would say her...money her. . . t h i n g s 
l i k e motor cars and a r t i c l e s f o r him...I would say such things as houses 
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and things f o r him...". "How do you mean?" "Well, I should say he's 
t y p i c a l . . . h e looks l i k e a t y p i c a l b u i l d e r to me." Of the next card he 
ways: "He looks l i k e an accountant, something to do w i t h money...he 
looks k i n d but I t h i n k he would want a p r o f i t out of whatever he gave... 
he'd give you the money, but he'd want money back". And the l a s t place 
i n the l i s t he gives to a woman: " 'With my body I thee endow'. She 
looks l i k e a t y p i c a l member of women's l i b , I would say sex her". And 
so i t continues. Thus when he comes to rank the photos on s t u p i d he says 
of one woman: "She's s t u p i d i n a way...in a way she i s , i n a way she 
i s n ' t . She's a s i s t e r . She's got a br o t h e r . . . and she's not s t u p i d due 
to the f a c t t h a t she's got a b r o t h e r " . For s e l f i s h he t r i e s t o organize 
the photos i n t o f a m i l y p a t t e r n s : C i s the mother of B and H; E i s the 
mother of F and G; A and D are s i s t e r s ; then he changes i t to say t h a t 
D i s the mother of A, and the s i s t e r of E. He juggles the cards to piece 
out the r e l a t i o n s h i p s f o r a long time: "I'm t r y i n g t o get the f a m i l y 
t r e e r i g h t . . . t h e y ' r e a l l r e l a t e d . . . t h e biggest f a m i l y of the l o t i s 
bound to be the most s e l f i s h " . 
I t i s , I t h i n k , easy-enough t o see what i s happening here. Rather 
than rank a l l the photographs on a s i n g l e c r i t e r i o n of kindness, which 
i s what the t e s t requires of him, Joseph begins by s p l i t t i n g the 
c r i t e r i o n : i t can mean d i f f e r e n t things and shape up i n d i f f e r e n t ways. 
And the constru c t then very e a s i l y gets l o s t i n favour of an enumeration 
of a t t r i b u t e s of the person. I had the impression, watching him, t h a t he 
was not f o r the most p a r t concerned to compare the photographs w i t h each 
other; he pai d close a t t e n t i o n but i t was not a comparative a t t e n t i o n : 
what the construct seems to t r i g g e r i n him i s a means t o i l l u m i n a t e 
something about the biography of each i n d i v i d u a l person. Another way 
of making the p o i n t i s t o say t h a t the photographs evoke f o r him a 
complexity of meaning t h a t cannot p r o p e r l y be resolved i n t o simple 
a t t r i b u t i o n s . 
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We have opened out complexities where Bannister thought there were 
none. I t would be misleading of us, however, to suggest t h a t we can now 
d e f t l y t i d y them away i n an opposing set of formulae. A r t h u r , as we 
have seen, i s able t o order h i s perceptions of h i s immediate others 
r e l a t i v e l y cogently; on the g r i d t e s t , i n c o n t r a s t , he does much less 
w e l l . For A l i c e the opposite holds: she i s able t o muster her judgements 
of the photographs e f f e c t i v e l y ; i n r e l a t i o n to those w i t h whom she l i v e s 
e v erything i s t u r b u l e n t . Consider Tom, f o r example. Between h i s scores 
on the 'people' grids and those o f Joseph there i s l i t t l e d i f f e r e n c e ; 
i t seems t h a t they are both as chaotic as each oth e r . Yet we have only 
to look a t the way i n which Tom gen e r a l l y speaks and responds to see 
t h a t a d i s c r i m i n a t i o n needs to be made. For Joseph the meanings and 
resonances seem to be too many; y e t he continues to s t r u g g l e w i t h them 
w i t h energy. Good carpenter t h a t he i s , he never loses the a b i l i t y to 
use h i s t o o l s . Tom, i n c o n t r a s t , i s a d r i f t ; a passive, helpless v i c t i m 
i n a sea of confusing and t u r b u l e n t meanings. From V i c t o r , j udging by 
h i s v e r b a l performance, we might have expected something r a t h e r s i m i l a r . 
I n the event he p u l l s together something t h a t i s reasonably ordered. 
One might pose the d i f f e r e n c e between Joseph and V i c t o r i n t h i s way; 
where i n Joseph the psychotic and the non-psychotic p a r t s of h i s p e r s o n a l i 
operate together, each pressing on the other, i n V i c t o r they are e n t i r e l y 
sundered: he i s e i t h e r u t t e r l y , and incomprehensibly, f o r the most p a r t , 
psychotic, or a r a t h e r pale i m i t a t i o n of a n o r m a l l y - f u n c t i o n i n g i n d i v i d u a l 
With E r i c the same argument holds but i n reverse; behind the benign and 
se l f - c o n s c i o u s l y 'normal' e x t e r i o r there i s a h i a t u s t h a t upsets h i s 
capacity t o order h i s judgements i n the way t h a t i s r e q u i r e d of him. 
The burden of our argument should now be apparent: the ways i n 
which these people go about t h e i r l i v e s , the ways i n which they t h i n k 
and f e e l , the responses of which they are capable, and the c r u c i a l 
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d i f f e r e n c e s between them i n t h i s regard, cannot be accommodated w i t h i n 
the terms and procedures of construct theory.''"'' I t must also be obvious 
t h a t Williams (1971), together w i t h h i s c u e - i n s e n s i t i v i t y e x p l a n a t i o n , 
can serve no u s e f u l purpose here. Our discussion has enabled us to 
spec i f y the p o i n t s a t which, considered even i n i t s own terms, 
Bannister's paradigm i s l a c k i n g . To mount our case we have had to edge 
over the boundary of the approach as i t i s u s u a l l y given to us to 
include other s o r t s of data. A l l along we have had t o s t r u g g l e against 
the current t o r e s t o r e to the approach what i s excluded by i t ; most 
important of a l l i t i s the language of the schizophrenic t h a t i s 
excluded. 
Michel Foucault describes how dur i n g the n i n e t e e n t h century madness 
entered a "phase of s i l e n c e from which i t was not to emerge f o r a long 
time; i t was deprived o f i t s language and although one continued to 
speak of i t , i t became impossible f o r i t to speak of i t s e l f " . Impossible 
u n t i l Freud "who was the f i r s t to open up once again the p o s s i b i l i t y f o r 
reason and unreason t o communicate i n the danger of a common language, 
ever ready t o break down and d i s i n t e g r a t e i n t o the i n a c c e s s i b l e " 
(1976, p.69). I n personal construct theory there can be no meeting -
and hence no danger - between the schizophrenic and ourselves because 
the r i c h and d i f f i c u l t middle ground where selves are made and l o s t , 
and the w o r l d and consciousness i n t e r p e n e t r a t e , and from w i t h i n which 
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men e s t a b l i s h t h e i r l i n k s to the world, i s emptied of s i g n i f i c a n c e . 
Simple i d e a l i s m cannot understand t h a t man " n e i t h e r merely makes nor 
19 
merely encounters the w o r l d he l i v e s i n " . As Foulds put i t , w i t h 
personal c o n s t r u c t theory "the normal person and the schizophrenic are 
equally withdrawn from r e a l i t y , locked i n an egocentric s o l i p s i s t i c 
20 
co n s t r u c t system" (1973, p.225). 
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We are p u l l e d out of the world i n which we l i v e i n t o an imaginary 
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space of d e l i c a t e mental framing. The space i n t o which we are 
d e l i v e r e d i s a space of complacent r a t i o n a l i t y ; here there are no 
b o d i l y presences, no s t r u g g l e s t o f i n d expression f o r the p e r p l e x i t i e s 
of experience, no separations and comings together, no unconscious; i n 
short no engagement. Bannister exhorts us to a t t e n d to the person, but 
the person i n c o n s t r u c t theory i s a complex mental machine; d i s c r e t e 
bounded selves, sets of more or less accomplished const r u c t systems. 
Selves come ready made; there i s no more work of 'boundary maintenance' 
to be done. The whole idiom f a l s i f i e s ourselves as much as the 
schizophrenic. Norman 0. Brown, to conclude on a c o n t r a s t , provides us 
w i t h an opposing idiom t o which we s h a l l s h o r t l y r e t u r n . He asserts the 
r e l a t i v e and conventional character of the s e l f - o t h e r boundary and 
continues: 
The existence of the ' l e t ' s pretend boundary' does 
not prevent the continuance of the r e a l t r a f f i c 
across i t . P r o j e c t i o n and i n t r o j e c t i o n , the process 
whereby the s e l f as d i s t i n c t from the other i s 
c o n s t i t u t e d , i s not past h i s t o r y , an event i n c h i l d -
hood, but a present process of continuous c r e a t i o n . 
The dualism of s e l f and e x t e r n a l w o r l d i s b u i l t up 
by a constant process of r e c i p r o c a l exchange between 
the two. The s e l f as a s t a b l e substance enduring 
through time, an i d e n t i t y , i s maintained by c o n s t a n t l y 
absorbing good p a r t s (or people) from the outside 
world and e x p e l l i n g bad p a r t s from the inner world. 
'There i s a c o n t i n u a l unconscious wandering of other 
p e r s o n a l i t i e s i n t o ourselves' (1966, pp.146-7). 
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I I I . Notes 
1. See, f o r review of recent s t u d i e s , Payne (1970). 
2. See Benjamin (1944).. 
3. I n a d d i t i o n to reference c i t e d see also Cameron (1938). 
4. For more d e t a i l e d i l l u s t r a t i o n see the discussion of r e p e r t o r y 
g r i d m a t e r i a l t h a t f o l l o w s . 
5. The tendency i s c a r r i e d f u r t h e r i n , f o r example, the studies of 
c o g n i t i v e abnormalities i n schizophrenia by Hemsley (1976, 1977). 
6. The study by F o r r e s t , e t . a l . , i t i s worth saying, i s a more benign 
v e r s i o n o f a tendency t h a t i s taken to an extreme by Salzinger, 
e t . a l . (1964) i n one of a series of studies d e a l i n g w i t h the e f f e c t 
of reinforcement on the v e r b a l behaviour o f schizophrenics. The 
p a t i e n t was seated i n the "experimental room. . . i n such a way t h a t 
the experimenter was able t o observe the o u t l i n e of the p a t i e n t , 
w h i l s t the p a t i e n t was unable t o see the experimenter". The 
p a t i e n t was then given the f o l l o w i n g i n s t r u c t i o n s : 
When I t e l l you t o s t a r t t a l k i n g I would l i k e you 
to begin t a l k i n g and continue t a l k i n g u n t i l I ask 
you to stop. You've probably n o t i c e d the l i g h t i n 
f r o n t of you. Whenever you are saying something of 
importance the l i g h t w i l l f l a s h on and o f f . By 
importance I mean i n f o r m a t i o n which w i l l help us get 
a p i c t u r e of what's wrong and put us i n a b e t t e r 
p o s i t i o n to help you. You w i l l f i n d t h a t speaking 
of these important things w i l l make you f e e l b e t t e r . 
Now I ' d l i k e you to t a l k f r a n k l y about your f a m i l y , 
about your schooling, your work, how you spend your 
f r e e time, about any problems you have, and anything 
else about y o u r s e l f t h a t i s r e l a t e d to your being 
here i n t h i s h o s p i t a l . 
So why don't you s t a r t by t e l l i n g me why you came 
here to the h o s p i t a l and then go on t a l k i n g u n t i l 
I t e l l you to stop ( i b i d . pp.509-10) . 
This i s about as 'monologic' as we can get. 
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7. E x t r a o r d i n a r y though i t may appear, Chapman and Chapman (1973) i n 
t h e i r copious and s o l i d review of studies o f thought disorder make 
only one reference to the work of Bannister and h i s associates, 
and t h a t i n passing. 
8. And the most recent research, f o r example H i l l (1976) and Poole 
(1976), suggests t h a t the c o r r e l a t i o n between the t e s t diagnosis 
of thought d i s o r d e r , and c l i n i c a l diagnosis, i s poor. As long 
ago as 1970 Poole argued t h a t "since a d i a g n o s t i c t e s t of t h i s 
type can only be shown to be as good as the c r i t e r i o n , and since 
p s y c h i a t r i c assessment of thought process diso r d e r i s probably of 
low r e l i a b i l i t y , fundamental research i n t o the behavioural 
m a n i f e s t a t i o n of thought d i s o r d e r i s of prime importance". Seven 
years l a t e r , and we are s t i l l w a i t i n g f o r i t . H i l l (1976) concludes 
h i s piece: " I t may be t h a t the i n f o r m a t i o n i t generates i s capable 
of being used i n a d i f f e r e n t way and t o b e t t e r advantage. Further 
research may w e l l reveal t h a t when a p p r o p r i a t e l y combined w i t h 
other s o r t s of i n f o r m a t i o n , perhaps even simple b i o g r a p h i c a l 
f a c t o r s , g r i d data can be d i a g n o s t i c a l l y u s e f u l " . As we s h a l l see 
our own m a t e r i a l suggests t h a t 'other s o r t s of i n f o r m a t i o n ' are 
indeed needed, though we would p a r t company w i t h H i l l i n upholding 
the 'usefulness' of the g r i d exercise. 
9. See Bannister & Salmon (1966), and McPherson & Buckley (1970). 
10. The g r i d t e s t consists of 8 passport-type photographs, 4 men and 
4 women, which are l a i d before the subject. The subject i s then 
asked by the researcher t o say which of these appears t o him to 
be the most k i n d , and then, when he has chosen, to s e l e c t the 
next most k i n d , and so on, down through the l i s t . The procedure 
i s then repeated f o r the remaining f i v e c o n s t r u c t s , s t u p i d , s e l f i s h , 
s i n c e r e , mean and honest. From the two g r i d s - the t e s t and the 
r e - t e s t - two measures are obtained, i n t e n s i t y and consistency. 
I n t e n s i t y i s a measure o f the s t r e n g t h of r e l a t i o n s h i p between 
c o n s t r u c t s , and the f i n a l score i s p r o p o r t i o n a l t o the sum of the 
c o r r e l a t i o n s between p a i r s of c o n s t r u c t s , regardless of whether 
the c o r r e l a t i o n i s p o s i t i v e or negative. Spearman rank order 
c o r r e l a t i o n s between a l l the construct p a i r s on the two g r i d s 
are worked out, g i v i n g 30 rhos i n a l l , which are then squared 
and m u l t i p l i e d by 100 t o give 'percentage variance i n common 
scores'. The sum of these scores ( d i s r e g a r d i n g sign) i s the 
i n t e n s i t y score f o r the subject. Consistency i s a measure of the 
extent to which the subject has maintained the p a t t e r n of 
r e l a t i o n s h i p between constructs from g r i d one to g r i d two. The 15 
r e l a t i o n s h i p scores - i . e . , the scores obtained from the procedure 
c a r r i e d out on the rhos, as described above - f o r the f i r s t g r i d 
are ranked from the highest p o s i t i v e down t o the highest negative 
and the operation i s repeated f o r the second g r i d . The Spearman 
rank order c o r r e l a t i o n c o e f f i c i e n t f o r these two sets of rankings 
gives the consistency score. F u l l d e t a i l s of the s c o r i n g procedure 
are set out i n Bannister & F r a n s e l l a (196 6, 196 7 ) . 
The c u t - o f f p o i n t s given by Bannister & F r a n s e l l a are 1,000 on 
i n t e n s i t y , and +.49 on consistency. Below these scores l i e 80% of 
the thought-disordered schizophrenics i n the s t a n d a r d i z a t i o n data 
reported. 
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11. For the 'people' g r i d s I have used the same s c o r i n g procedure as f o r 
the Bannister & F r a n s e l l a g r i d s , as set out i n the t e s t manual (1967). 
12. The f i n a l l i s t , i t w i l l be seen, i s a much t i d i e r v e r s i o n of what 
we s t a r t e d out w i t h . And the order, we need to be c l e a r , was 
imposed by me; i t was I who marshalled these fragmenting and 
d u p l i c a t i n g f i g u r e s i n t o l i n e . I mention t h i s because nowhere 
i n the l i t e r a t u r e on the use of g r i d techniques w i t h schizophrenic 
p a t i e n t s do we f i n d any discussion of the interchange between 
p a t i e n t and research worker i n t r y i n g t o a r r i v e at an arrangement 
t h a t meets the demands of the design. The f a i l u r e of the 
schizophrenic p a t i e n t to accommodate i s no doubt, from a c e r t a i n 
p o i n t of view, i t s e l f an i n d i c a t i o n but I am not convinced t h a t by 
f o r c i n g the p a t i e n t to swim i n our pool we s h a l l l e a r n t o understand 
him b e t t e r than by r i s k i n g ourselves on the more u n c e r t a i n waters 
t h a t are h i s own. 
13. I am reminded of the voice i n Samuel Beckett's 'The Unnamable' 
who t h i n k s of h i m s e l f as "made of words" t h a t are "others' words" 
as w e l l as h i s own: " i n s i d e me, outside me" (1966, p.390). 
14. I t might be argued t h a t since the second g r i d was completed i n 
i s o l a t i o n a week, or ten days, a f t e r the f i r s t , the 'boredom' 
argument cannot h o l d . I can only record my impression t h a t some 
p a t i e n t s , a f t e r having had t o submit t o the Bannister & F r a n s e l l a 
g r i d t e s t e x e r c i s e , and the f i r s t round of the 'people' g r i d , were 
i r k e d t h a t I should s p r i n g the whole business on them y e t again. 
15. Bannister, F r a n s e l l a and Agnew suggest t h a t " a l l the p a t i e n t s who 
have very low scores on a g r i d t e s t might have a dubious prognosis 
i n t h a t thought d i s o r d e r i s deemed to represent a major breakdown 
i n the i n t e g r a t i o n of the person" (1971, p.147). 
16. The coexistence o f , and the i n t e r a c t i o n between, the psychotic and 
the non-psychotic, parts o f the p e r s o n a l i t y i s discussed i n Bion 
(1957), and Kernberg (1972). 
17. Thus f o r example the people-object d i s t i n c t i o n t h a t has been made 
so much of (e.g., McPherson, e t . a l . 1975; Heather 1976) has an 
obvious r i n g o f t r u t h t o i t . But the epistemology t h a t underpins 
the f o r m u l a t i o n trunchates; people are converted i n t o a form of 
objects i n a given e x t e r n a l w o r l d , w i t h the d i f f e r e n c e t h a t they 
are a more complex v a r i e t y than the inanimate s o r t . I t i s assumed 
w i t h i n the paradigm t h a t the same mode of understanding i s brought 
to the understanding or comprehension of people as i s brought t o 
the contemplation of o b j e c t s : they are both to be a s s i m i l a t e d 
w i t h i n the scope o f what Haberman terms i n s t r u m e n t a l (as opposed to 
communicative) a c t i o n . An opposing f o r m u l a t i o n i s t h a t i t i s the 
s o c i a l world-people themselves i n t h e i r s p e c i f i c s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s -
t h a t i s c o n s t i t u t i v e : a n a l y t i c d i s t i n c t i o n s between animate and 
inanimate e t c . only have meaning, only come about, from w i t h i n such 
an i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e o r i e n t a t i o n . The a t t e n t i o n i s then d i r e c t e d not 
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to s p e c i f i c items i n the world without - a person or an o b j e c t -
but to the c o d i f i c a t i o n s through which d i f f e r e n t forms of s o c i a l 
r e a l i t y - s e t s of r e l a t i o n s i n c l u d i n g people and o b j e c t s - are 
rendered. The problem f o r the s c h i z o p h r e n i c i s not that he has 
trou b l e w i t h people as a g a i n s t o b j e c t s , but t h a t c e r t a i n k i n d s 
of conventional c o d i f i c a t i o n s - f o r example those t h a t trade i n 
people/object d i s t i n c t i o n s - do not work f o r him: h i s experience 
overwhelms them. As Kuhn puts i t , questions about "the 
consequences of p a r t i c u l a r l a b o r a t o r y manipulations presuppose a 
world a l r e a d y p e r c e p t u a l l y and c o n c e p t u a l l y subdivided i n a 
c e r t a i n way" (1962, p.129). What i s then overlooked, to borrow 
from W i t t g e n s t e i n , a r e the procedures by which men e s t a b l i s h l i n k s 
between language and the world ( v i z . Toulmin, 1969, p.67). 
18. As wi t h the other approaches t h a t we d i s c u s s e d , of s e v e r a l of 
which B a n n i s t e r has h i m s e l f been a s t e r n c r i t i c , we are not 
allowed to re c o g n i s e anything of o u r s e l v e s i n the s c h i z o p h r e n i c . 
19. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, quoted by Passmore (1968, p.502). 
20. J.S. Bruner understands something of t h i s : "One s u b j e c t of 
c a t e g o r i z i n g the world i n terms of a c o n s t r u c t system i s to 
minimize the d i s r u p t i v e s u r p r i s e s i t can wreak on us" (1956, p.356). 
21. I n h i s w r i t i n g B a n n i s t e r conveys an enthusiasm and n a i v e t y t h a t i s 
suggest i v e of the i n v e n t i v e school-boy. Taken o u t s i d e the l a b o r a t o r y , 
however, and put to work i n the world, the school-boy's c o n t r a p t i o n s 
may seem somewhat l e s s benign. R e c e n t l y B a n n i s t e r , Adams-Webber, 
Perm and Radley (1975) r e p o r t an attempt to r e v e r s e the proc e s s of 
thought d i s o r d e r i n c h r o n i c s c h i z o p h r e n i c s . T h e i r aim was to 
strengthen and e l a b o r a t e the p a t i e n t ' s ' c o n s t r u c t system' which 
was p r e s e n t l y deemed to be i n a s t a t e of poor r e p a i r . To e f f e c t 
such improvements they s e t about ' v a l i d a t i n g ' d i f f e r e n t a s p e c t s 
of the p a t i e n t ' s c o n s t r u c t system. Thus the authors t e l l us t h a t 
i n the case of a p a t i e n t c a l l e d Daphne over a period of two y e a r s 
and two months " p s y c h o l o g i s t s and nurses would p r e s e n t themselves 
to Daphne as e i t h e r loud-voiced, c i g a r e t t e r e f u s i n g , pro-mother and 
so f o r t h , or s o f t - v o i c e d , c i g a r e t t e g i v i n g , anti-mother and so 
f o r t h " ( i b i d . p.173). The whole t h r u s t i s to convert a f f e c t i n t o 
i n t e l l e c t ; what the p a t i e n t says about h i s ex p e r i e n c e , or what he 
does w i t h h i s experience v e r b a l l y - what he makes of i t - i s t r e a t e d 
as i f i t were p a r t of an i n t e l l e c t u a l system. B a n n i s t e r attends to 
the 'world' i n s i d e the p a t i e n t ' s head: the ' c o n s t r u s t system'. 
V a l i d a t i o n , from t h i s p o i n t of view, i s a technique whereby the 
immediate environment i s made to accommodate to the ' l o g i c ' of such 
a 'system'. But t h i s i s epistemology c u r t a i l e d and something worse. 
The p a t i e n t ' s d i f f i c u l t y i s not w i t h a 'something' i n s i d e h i s head 
but w i t h the whole b u s i n e s s of f i n d i n g a t o l e r a b l e mode of response 
from w i t h i n h i m s e l f to meanings, resonances, c o n s t r u c t i o n s t h a t 
are a t work i n the world without. As R u b i n s t e i n puts i t more 
p r o s a i c a l l y we need to be a b l e to "help the p a t i e n t to i n t e r p r e t 
the s t i m u l i from the environment" (1976, p.246). B a n n i s t e r takes 
the p a t i e n t ' s muddled e x p r e s s i o n s of h i s a c t i v e r e l a t e d n e s s to the 
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world and r e i f i e s these i n t o a system t h a t can only i s o l a t e the 
p a t i e n t s t i l l f u r t h e r . We need not be s u r p r i s e d to f i n d t h a t 
B a n n i s t e r and h i s a s s o c i a t e s were unable to keep the world out of 
i t : " S e v e r a l p a t i e n t s gained ground to the point where they l e f t 
the h o s p i t a l on t h e i r own i n i t i a t i v e f o r a few days or weeks. T h e i r 
i n t e r a c t i o n w i t h people i n the world o u t s i d e seems to have been 
anything but v a l i d a t i n g f o r they r e t u r n e d i n a s o r r y s t a t e " 
( o p . c i t . , p.178). 
A l l i n a l l the e x e r c i s e bore markedly l i t t l e f r u i t . The authors 
provide t h e i r own c o n c l u s i o n : "...the i d e o l o g i c a l i m p l i c a t i o n s 
of being ' s c i e n t i s t s ' conducting an 'experiment' may have caused 
us to p r e s e n t (and sometimes to p r a c t i c e ) s e r i a l v a l i d a t i o n as a 
ma n i p u l a t i v e undertaking - we the a c t i v e agents c o n t r o l l i n g the 
p a s s i v e p a t i e n t s " ( o p . c i t . , p.179). 
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IV. A HOUSE IN A FIELD 
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IV. P r e f a c e 
...Do not l e t me hear 
Of the wisdom of o l d men, but r a t h e r of t h e i r f o l l y , 
T h e i r f e a r of f e a r and f r e n z y , t h e i r f e a r of p o s s e s s i o n , 
Of belonging to another, or to o t h e r s , or to God. 
(T.S. E l i o t , ' E a s t Coker', 93-6) 
We have heard Joseph speak and we have looked at some of the terms 
i n which Joseph and others l i k e him are g e n e r a l l y spoken about. As 
Thomas Kuhn phrases i t , we have been introduced to the "vocabulary and 
syntax of a contemporary s c i e n t i f i c language" (1962, p.137). From a 
formal p o i n t of view such a s p e c t s of the language as we have considered 
provide only a poor c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n of the s c h i z o p h r e n i c ' s predicament. 
The i n t r i c a c y of h i s experience i s r e p u d i a t e d i n favour of a formalism 
th a t can only e s t a b l i s h the d i f f e r e n c e between the s c h i z o p h r e n i c and 
o u r s e l v e s ; ^ h i s behaviour i s hedged around w i t h procedures by which he 
2 3 
i s converted i n t o a p i e c e of d i s c i p l i n a r y hardware. ' For our immediate 
purposes we need to enquire more deeply i n t o the human i n t e r e s t s t h a t are 
at work i n these procedures. From our d i s c u s s i o n i n the l a s t s e c t i o n i t 
i s apparent t h a t the r e a l i s t i c , or ' t h i n g i s h ' as Gregory Bateson terms 
i t , epistemology which underpins these procedures s e r v i c e s c e r t a i n kinds 
of c u l t u r a l and i d e o l o g i c a l requirements. I s h a l l now t u r n to a range 
of m a t e r i a l that w i l l h elp us look more d i r e c t l y a t what i s d i s r u p t i v e 
about the behaviour of the s c h i z o p h r e n i c , and thus a t the f u n c t i o n s of 
the kinds of responses t h a t t y p i c a l l y we have brought to bear on i t . 
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IV.1. I n s e c u r e Tenancy 
A u s e f u l beginning i n t h i s r e s p e c t i s w i t h the r e s e a r c h and d i s c u s s i o n 
that has followed the o r i g i n a l e x p o s i t i o n of the theory of the double-bind 
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by Gregory Bateson and h i s co-workers i n 1956. The example should be of 
i n t e r e s t to us on two counts. F i r s t , i t draws our a t t e n t i o n to a number 
of p e r p l e x i t i e s both i n r e l a t i o n to s c h i z o p h r e n i c s themselves, and i n 
r e l a t i o n to our ways of t h i n k i n g about them, th a t c onventional renderings 
obscure. Second, the s u c c e s s i v e m o d i f i c a t i o n s of the theory i t s e l f , and 
the misapprehensions of o t h e r s as to i t s s t a t u s , are testimony to the 
o b s t a c l e s - o b s t a c l e s t h a t are c u l t u r a l as much as they are s c i e n t i f i c -
t h a t must be overcome i n order to frame an a l t e r n a t i v e form of response 
and r e l a t i o n to the t r i b u l a t i o n s of s c h i z o p h r e n i c s . 
The theory as i t was f i r s t p resented appeared to l i c e n s e the 
assumption t h a t there was such a ' t h i n g ' as the double-bind, and t h a t 
these things could be counted. And t h a t , indeed, i s what droves of 
r e s e a r c h workers have s e t about d o i n g . N o t , however, w i t h very much 
s u c c e s s . As H i r s c h and L e f f comment i n a review of experimental s t u d i e s 
w i t h i n the double-bind t r a d i t i o n : " I t i s p o s s i b l e t h a t a l l these 
experimenters are chasing shadows, because even the e x p e r t s on the 
double-bind hypothesis were unable to reach even a modicum of agreement 
on what c o n s t i t u t e d double-bind statements" (1975, p.92). 
From the p o s i t i v i s t standpoint of H i r s c h and L e f f such a c r i t i c i s m 
s e r i o u s l y undermines the c r e d i b i l i t y of the theory. From subsequent 
e x p o s i t i o n , however, i t seems c l e a r t h a t the o r i g i n a l theory f a t a l l y 
m i srepresented i t s e l f . Bateson confesses t h a t he was "bored and 
d i s g u s t e d by the Augean muddle of conventional p s y c h i a t r i c t h i n k i n g " ; 
n e v e r t h e l e s s " i t was from p s y c h i a t r y t h a t we got our money, and we l e t 
o u r s e l v e s be s t r o n g l y and d i s a s t r o u s l y i n f l u e n c e d by the need to apply 
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our s c i e n c e i n t h a t f i e l d " (1976, p . x i i ) . W r i t i n g i n the mid-seventies 
he puts the matter thus: 
I can say today t h a t what we were doing i n 1955-60 
was the beginning of a formal s c i e n c e which would 
study the forms of i n t e r a c t i o n among e x p l i c i t , 
i m p l i c i t , and embodied i d e a s . But a t t h a t time 
our work was c a l l e d - seemed to us to be - the 
study of 'family o r g a n i z a t i o n ' and of 'double-binds'... 
We were i n f l u e n c e d a l s o by the o l d e r , r e a l i s t i c 
or ' t h i n g i s h ' epistemology from which we were 
d i v e r g i n g ( i b i d . p . x i ) . 
Elsewhere he i n v e i g h s more h e a v i l y a g a i n s t the tendency towards r e i f i c a t i o n : 
We t a l k i n the o r i g i n a l paper as though a double-bind 
were a something and as though such somethings could 
be counted. Of course t h a t ' s a l l nonsense. You 
cannot count the bats i n an i n k b l o t because t h e r e 
are none. And y e t a man - i f he be bat-minded -
may see s e v e r a l (1969, p.238). 
I n the same paper he s e t s out to r e f i n e the d e s c r i p t i o n of a 
double-bind. "The mind", he w r i t e s , " c o n t a i n s only transforms, p e r c e p t s , 
images e t c . , and r u l e s f o r making these transforms, p e r c e p t s , images 
e t c . " I n the case of the double-bind we a r e " t a l k i n g about some s o r t 
of tangle i n the r u l e s f o r making the transforms and about the 
a c q u i s i t i o n and c u l t i v a t i o n of such t a n g l e s " . The double-bind i s one 
of a genus f o r syndromes to which Bateson a t t a c h e s the l a b e l ' t r a n s c o n t e x t u a l ' 
I t seems t h a t both those whose l i f e i s e n r i c h e d by 
t r a n s c o n t e x t u a l g i f t s and those who are 
impoverished by t r a n s c o n t e x t u a l confusions are 
a l i k e i n one r e s p e c t ; f o r them there i s . a l w a y s 
or o f t e n a 'double take'. A f a l l i n g l e a f , the 
g r e e t i n g of a f r i e n d , or a 'primrose by the 
r i v e r ' s brim' i s not ' j u s t t h a t and nothing more'. 
Exogenous experience may be framed i n the context 
of dreams, and i n t e r n a l thought may be p r o j e c t e d 
i n t o the contexts of the e x t e r n a l world. And so 
on. F o r a l l t h i s we seek a p a r t i a l e x p l a n a t i o n 
i n l e a r n i n g and experience ( i b i d . p.238). 
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I n the case of s c h i z o p h r e n i a : 
The p a r t i c u l a r p r o p o s i t i o n s which I b e l i e v e to be 
important...are those formal a b s t r a c t i o n s which 
d e s c r i b e and determine i n t e r — p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s . . . 
I say 'describe and determine' but even t h i s i s 
inadequate. B e t t e r would be to say that the 
r e l a t i o n s h i p i s the exchange of these messages; 
or that the r e l a t i o n s h i p i s immanent i n these 
messages. P s y c h o l o g i s t s commonly speak as i f 
the a b s t r a c t i o n s of r e l a t i o n s h i p ('dependency', 
' h o s t i l i t y ' , 'love' e t c . ) were r e a l things which 
are to be d e s c r i b e d or 'expressed' by messages. 
T h i s i s epistemology backwards; i n t r u t h , the 
messages c o n s t i t u t e the r e l a t i o n s h i p s and words 
l i k e 'dependency' are v e r b a l l y coded d e s c r i p t i o n s 
of p a t t e r n s immanent i n the combination of exchanged 
messages ( i b i d . p.240). 
I n the l a t e r paper he summarises h i s p o s i t i o n thus: 
Conventional epistemology, which we c a l l ' s a n i t y ' , 
boggles a t the r e a l i z a t i o n t h a t ' p r o p e r t i e s ' are 
only d i f f e r e n c e s and e x i s t only i n context, only 
i n r e l a t i o n s h i p . We a b s t r a c t from r e l a t i o n s h i p and 
from the experiences of i n t e r a c t i o n to c r e a t e 
' o b j e c t s ' and to endow them w i t h c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . 
We l i k e w i s e boggle a t the p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t our own 
c h a r a c t e r i s only r e a l i n r e l a t i o n s h i p . We 
a b s t r a c t from the experiences of i n t e r a c t i o n 
and d i f f e r e n c e to c r e a t e a ' s e l f which s h a l l 
continue ( s h a l l be ' r e a l ' or t h i n g i s h ) even 
without r e l a t i o n s h i p . An e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l c r i s i s 
i s provoked by e n f o r c i n g the i d e a that even thi n g s 
have c h a r a c t e r only by t h e i r d i f f e r e n c e s and 
i n t e r a c t i o n s . I f these f e e l i n g s (which f o r me 
are l i k e f e a r of l o s s of balance or support) are 
indeed r e l a t e d to the s c h i z o p h r e n i a s , then i t 
appears t h a t s c h i z o p h r e n i a should be thought of 
as a response to e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l t r a n s i t i o n , or 
to t h r e a t of t r a n s i t i o n , whether the t r a n s i t i o n 
i t s e l f would be f o r b e t t e r or f o r worse i s another 
q u e s t i o n (1976, p . x v - x v i ) . 
From these quotations we can see what Bateson i s p o i n t i n g towards 
when he s t r e s s e s t h a t h i s d i s c u s s i o n s of s c h i z o p h r e n i a are not " t h e o r i e s 
i n the o r d i n a r y sense, but are more l i k e new languages or perhaps 
e p i s t e m o l o g i e s " (1966, p.415). The whole d i s c u s s i o n around the double-
bind i s of i n t e r e s t to us from a number of p o i n t s of view. The idea of 
s c h i z o p h r e n i a as a "response to e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l t r a n s i t i o n or t h r e a t of 
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t r a n s i t i o n " i s an apt f o r m u l a t i o n by which to capture something of what 
i s happening to Joseph. E a r l y on i n the 'dome' sequence i n U n i t X V I I , f o r 
example, Joseph t e l l s us t h a t people keep changing t h e i r names, h i m s e l f 
i n c l u d e d , and he then s a y s : "You get to a p o i n t where you say, 'Have I 
hurt h i s f e e l i n g s or has he h u r t mine?' " Joseph c l e a r l y f i n d s i t very 
d i f f i c u l t to a b s t r a c t from the experience of i n t e r a c t i o n and d i f f e r e n c e 
to c r e a t e a s e l f ; he t hreatens to become so entangled w i t h other people 
as to l o s e the d i s t i n c t i v e n e s s of h i s s e l f a l t o g e t h e r . And what f o l l o w s 
on from t h i s , the d e s c r i p t i o n of the dome environment i n a l l i t s d e t a i l , 
can I t h i n k be read as the response to a t h r e a t of t r a n s i t i o n . That the 
t h r e a t i s r e a l i s t o l d to us i n h i s remarks about f l y i n g p a r t i c l e s , and 
about the dangers of going o u t s i d e . And what i n e f f e c t he does i s to 
manufacture f o r h i m s e l f a symbolic refuge, w i t h s e v e r a l l a y e r s of 
c o v e r i n g (house/dome/sea), that w i l l p r o t e c t him from the v i o l a t i o n s and 
f l u c t u a t i o n s of i n t i m a t e r e l a t i o n s w i t h other people. L i k e Watt, i n 
Samuel Beckett's novel of t h a t name/ Joseph f i n d s t h a t the world i s a 
t u r b u l e n t p l a c e ; the s o l u t i o n t h a t Watt (whose "imagi n a t i o n had never 
been a l i v e l y one") adopted was to t r y to t r a p the world i n words and 
then put i t away. His whole a c t i v i t y was a "wrapping up s a f e i n words" 
to make "a p i l l o w of o l d words, fo r h i s head". Joseph's imagination i s 
c e r t a i n l y l i v e l i e r . N e v e r t h e l e s s i n the f o l l o w i n g quotations he g i v e s 
e x p r e s s i o n both to the w i l d dance of meaning and to a form of s o l u t i o n 
t h a t i s not so d i f f e r e n t from Watt's. Joseph t o l d me on one o c c a s i o n 
t h a t most n o v e l i s t s were i n p s y c h i a t r i c h o s p i t a l "on t h e s e t h e r a p e u t i c 
drugs... they're wanting new i d e a s from people a l l the time". I t seems 
t h a t he has h i m s e l f been i n v o l v e d i n a w r i t i n g p r o j e c t which has now 
come to an end: "A very i n t e r s t i n g p r o j e c t . . . a l m o s t everybody taken i l l 
l i k e . . . t h a t ' s my r e p o r t . . . A l l to do w i t h language r e a l l y . . . A l l s o r t s of 
new words, phrases, and so on..Poetry, and b i t s of poetry, w r i t t e n i n 
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the ground l i k e . . . O u r farm produced poetry, n o v e l s , p o r t r a i t s , things 
l i k e that...A very i n t e r e s t i n g p r o j e c t . . . U n f o r t u n a t e l y i t h o s p i t a l i z e d 
us a l l . . . I ' m compiling a book on what happened". 
A few weeks e a r l i e r he t o l d me t h a t he was keen on re a d i n g when he 
was younger. One of h i s f a v o u r i t e books was the Concise Oxford D i c t i o n a r y . 
The Concise Oxford D i c t i o n a r y contained the answer to e v e r y t h i n g : s i x 
d i f f e r e n t ways of s p e l l i n g every word t h a t has ever been w r i t t e n , together 
w i t h the name o f every person and of every town. Then, however, the 
dance s t a r t e d up again: "People kept changing t h e i r names so I bought 
another book c a l l e d Who's Who. When I bought those two books I j u s t 
l e f t c o l l e g e . I n those days only the te a c h e r had them, t i l l we found 
them i n the t e a c h e r ' s desk. We a l l l e f t s c h o o l a f t e r a very s h o r t time 
and went to work i n the p i t . . . A l l you have to do i s go i n t o a l i b r a r y 
and you can read the books a t any time...Through Who's Who and the 
Concise Oxford D i c t i o n a r y we lea r n e d how to make timber and produce 
s t e e l " . 
However, the r e a l t h r u s t of Bateson's d i s c u s s i o n i s not merely to 
r e d i r e c t our t h i n k i n g about s c h i z o p h r e n i c s ; i t i s a l s o to demand t h a t 
we r e - c a s t some of our conventional assumptions about the c o n s t r u c t i o n 
and a c t i v i t y of the ' s e l f . I t i s to these matters t h a t we s h a l l now 
turn. 
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IV.2. Close to the Door 
Bateson gives the l i e to our conv e n t i o n a l assumptions about ' s e l f -
hood' : "We a b s t r a c t from the experience of i n t e r a c t i o n and d i f f e r e n c e 
to c r e a t e a ' s e l f which s h a l l continue ( s h a l l be ' r e a l ' or ' t h i n g i s h ' ) 
even without r e l a t i o n s h i p " (1976, p . x v i ) . We have met the idiom of 
the ' t h i n g i s h ' , and the order of the person t h a t i t e n f o r c e s , before. 
An opposing conception i s s e t out most f o r c i b l y i n the work of Norman 0. 
Brown. B u i l d i n g i n p a r t i c u l a r on the i n s i g h t s of K l e i n i a n psychoanalysts 
f o r whom, i n opp o s i t i o n to the c l a s s i c a l F r e u d i a n s , the d i a l e c t i c of 
the i n t r o j e c t i o n and p r o j e c t i o n of good and bad o b j e c t s provides the 
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b a s i s f o r the d i s c r i m i n a t i o n between i n s i d e and o u t s i d e , Brown speaks 
to the ferment and a g i t a t i o n i n the order of the person. "The s e l f " , 
he w r i t e s , "being made by p r o j e c t i o n and i n t r o j e c t i o n , to have a s e l f 
i s to have enemies, and to be a s e l f i s to be a t war (the war of every 
man a g a i n s t every man). To a b o l i s h war, t h e r e f o r e , i s to a b o l i s h the 
s e l f ; and the war to end war i s t o t a l war; to have no more enemies or 
s e l f " (1966, p.149). Joseph knew about war. I once asked him, i n the 
context o f a d i s c u s s i o n about l i f e on the ward, whether he t a l k e d to 
other people as much as he did to me: 
" L i k e I say they d e c l a r e d war f i v e y e a r s ago". 
"They?" 
"The world". 
As we saw e a r l i e r , Joseph, i n a way tha t he could not a l l e v i a t e , 
was i n e x t r i c a b l y tangled up wi t h o t h e r s . Brown w r i t e s : "A person i s 
never h i m s e l f but always a mask; a person never owns h i s own-person, but 
always r e p r e s e n t s another by whom he i s possessed" ( i b i d . p.98). And he 
quotes from Joan R i v i e r e : "...other persons are i n f a c t t h e r e f o r e p a r t s 
of o u r s e l v e s . And we o u r s e l v e s s i m i l a r l y have, and have had, e f f e c t s 
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and i n f l u e n c e s , intended or not, on a l l others who have had an emotional 
r e l a t i o n to us, have loved us or hated us. We are members of each other" 
( i b i d . p.147). Joseph, i n h i s own way, perhaps t r i e s to say the same 
th i n g when i n the 'dome' sequence he t e l l s us th a t animals are p a r t of 
us. 
"The s o u l ( s e l f ) " , w r i t e s Brown, "we c a l l our own i s an i l l u s i o n . 
The r e a l p s y c h o a n a l y t i c a l c o n t r i b u t i o n to ego-psychology i s the r e v e l a t i o n 
t h a t the ego i s a b i t of the o u t s i d e world swallowed or i n t r o j e c t e d ; or 
r a t h e r a b i t of the ou t s i d e world t h a t we i n s i s t on pretending we have 
swallowed. The nucleus of one's own s e l f i s the in c o r p o r a t e d other" 
( i b i d . p.144). Moreover: 
P s y c h o a n a l y s i s d i s c l o s e s the pathology of the 
process whereby the normal sense of being a 
s e l f s e p a r a t e from the e x t e r n a l world was 
co n s t r u c t e d . Contrary to what i s taken f o r 
granted i n the l u n a t i c s t a t e c a l l e d normalcy 
or common sense, the d i s t i n c t i o n between 
s e l f and e x t e r n a l world i s not an immutable 
f a c t but an a r t i f i c i a l c o n s t r u c t i o n . I t i s 
a boundary l i n e ; l i k e a l l boundaries not 
n a t u r a l but con v e n t i o n a l ; l i k e a l l boundaries 
based on love and hate ( i b i d . p.142). 
Furthermore: 
The e x i s t e n c e of the ' l e t ' s pretend' boundary 
does not prevent the continuance of the r e a l 
t r a f f i c a c r o s s i t . . . T h e dualism of the s e l f 
and e x t e r n a l world i s b u i l t up by a constant 
process of r e c i p r o c a l exchange between the two. 
The s e l f as a s t a b l e substance enduring through 
time, an i d e n t i t y , i s maintained by c o n s t a n t l y 
absorbing good p a r t s (or people) from the 
ou t s i d e world and e x p e l l i n g bad p a r t s from the 
i n n e r world. 'There i s a c o n t i n u a l unconscious 
wandering of other p e r s o n a l i t i e s i n t o o u t s e l v e s ' 
( i b i d . pp.146-7). 
Brown's trenchant and s p a r k l i n g p r e s e n t a t i o n helps us i n two 
d i r e c t i o n s a t once. I t helps us to understand the f l u c t u a t i o n s i n the 
order of the person t h a t are a c t i v e w i t h i n Joseph: Brown's i l l u s t r a t i o n s , 
and those of Joseph, are able to i l l u m i n a t e each other. I t helps us a l s o 
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to grasp an ambiguity and r e l a t i v i t y i n our o r d e r i n g of o u r s e l v e s to 
which conventional renderings of mental and s o c i a l order are compellingly 
opposed. Brown's w r i t i n g , however, o f t e n tends towards the enigmatic, 
and has the e f f e c t sometimes of u n l e a s h i n g on us a s e t of nightmarish 
e n c a p s u l a t i o n s of an a l i e n world t h a t we cannot e a s i l y put to work i n 
examining the p r a c t i c e s and responses w i t h i n our own c u l t u r e . To 
demonstrate the f o r c e s t h a t Brown i s t a l k i n g about, and the c u l t u r a l 
r e s i s t a n c e to t h e i r r e c o g n i t i o n , we have to t u r n to a source t h a t i s 
more f i r m l y grounded i n everyday l i f e i n the s o c i a l world. 
Help i n t h i s d i r e c t i o n i s forthcoming from the work of the E n g l i s h 
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p s y c h i a t r i s t R.D. S c o t t . I n a number of papers S c o t t has d e s c r i b e d the 
c u l t u r a l f o r c e s t h a t i n t r u d e both i n t o the f a m i l i e s of s c h i z o p h r e n i c s 
themselves, and i n t o our d i s c u s s i o n of such f a m i l i e s . I n a r e c e n t 
review of h i s r e s e a r c h he confesses t h a t he was f o r a long time s u s p i c i o u s 
of approaches that appeared to i n s e r t a c u l t u r a l or p o l i t i c a l dimension 
i n t o the d i s c u s s i o n of the whole problem. However s l o w l y : 
I t became c l e a r t h a t the r e l a t i o n between a 
s c h i z o p h r e n i c and h i s s i g n i f i c a n t others d i d 
indeed c o n t a i n a c u l t u r a l dimension g r e a t e r 
than I had r e a l i s e d . F u r t h e r r e s e a r c h has 
shown t h a t c r i t i c a l i s s u e s i n these 
r e l a t i o n s h i p s embody very pure e x p r e s s i o n s 
of the c u l t u r a l v a l u e s p r e v a i l i n g i n our 
s o c i e t y concerning mental i l l n e s s and the 
use of mental h o s p i t a l s by s o c i e t y (1975, p.161). 
The c r u c i a l term i n h i s a n a l y s i s i s what he c a l l s " i d e n t i t y w a r f a r e " : 
. . . t h a t c u t - t h r o a t type of 'him or me' warfare which 
the mental p a t i e n t conducts w i t h h i s n e a r e s t and 
most s i g n i f i c a n t o t h e r s , and they w i t h him. I 
have termed i t ' i d e n t i t y w a r f a r e ' s i n c e the very 
meaning of the other person as a person i s a t 
s t a k e . I t i s q u i t e c e n t r a l to the i n t e r a c t i o n 
of s c h i z o p h r e n i c s w i t h t h e i r f a m i l i e s and i s 
o f t e n missed by o b s e r v e r s , because they see 
the p a t i e n t as 'mental' ( i b i d . p.160). 
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S c o t t i n s t a n c e s the b a t t l e f o r p s y c h i c s u r v i v a l or " i d e n t i t y w a r f a r e " 
as f o l l o w s . The i n t e r a c t i o n i s between a mother and her son: 
'John and I have always been ve r y c l o s e together. 
Suddenly when he came from abroad, i t was a 
s t r a n g e r . ' 
John: 'Do you r e a l l y think so?' 
Mother: ' I can only speak the t r u t h as I see 
i t and i t does have a d i s t r e s s i n g e f f e c t on 
me when you i n s i s t t h a t you are the same, 
because i t j u s t means I am not the same. 
Because I do know that t h a t i s the way i t 
has taken me.' ( i b i d . p.163). 
We can, I t h i n k , see here once again the c r i t i c a l entanglement of 
people w i t h each other. " I t i s a r u l e " , S c o t t goes on to say, " t h a t the 
s c h i z o p h r e n i c p a t i e n t c a r r i e s the c o n f l i c t between the p a r e n t s ; a 
c o n f l i c t which they may have d i f f i c u l t y i n s u r v i v i n g i f the c h i l d l e a v e s 
home...Now t h i s d e s c r i p t i o n of the u l t i m a t e type of interdependence found 
between members of these f a m i l i e s sounds most extreme. Yet i t may 
e a s i l y go unperceived because i t produces g r e a t r e s i s t a n c e to change" 
( i b i d . p.164). However r e l a t i o n s between p a t i e n t and parents may become 
untenable such t h a t they "can no longer l i v e together f o r more than 
s h o r t periods without a c r i s i s l e a d i n g to e x t r u s i o n of the p a t i e n t from 
the f a m i l y " . Yet "the p a t i e n t i s extruded but not cut o f f from the 
fami l y . There i s , i n f a c t , an i n c r e a s e d entanglement between p a t i e n t 
and p a r e n t s . . . E x t r u s i o n through u n t e n a b i l i t y does not r e p r e s e n t 
s e p a r a t i o n . The p a t i e n t ' s l i f e i s not only a r r e s t e d but he i s t i e d by 
an o f t e n a g o n i s i n g l i f e - l i n e to h i s f a m i l y " ( i b i d . pp.166-7). 
The d i s t i n c t i o n between ' t e n a b i l i t y ' and ' u n t e n a b i l i t y ' i s c e n t r a l 
to S c o t t ' s d i s c u s s i o n and d e r i v e s from p r o f i l e s which express how f a m i l y 
members p e r c e i v e each other on the dimensions of ' w e l l n e s s ' and ' i l l n e s s ' . 
The p r o f i l e s i n c o r p o r a t e a s e t of terms t h a t f a m i l i e s normally use to make 
a t t r i b u t i o n s of e i t h e r ' w e l l n e s s ' or ' i l l n e s s ' . S c o t t found that t h e r e 
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was an abrupt gap s e p a r a t i n g the viewpoints e x p r e s s i n g how the parents 
see themselves, and expect to be seen by the p a t i e n t s , and those 
e x p r e s s i n g how the parents see the p a t i e n t s . T h i s l i n e of demarcation 
S c o t t terms the ' W e l l - I l l ' L i n e . 
I n the case of the tenable r e l a t i o n the p a t i e n t tends to see h i s 
parents a t about the same l e v e l as they see themselves, and expect the 
p a t i e n t to see them. I n the untenable r e l a t i o n , i n c o n t r a s t , the 
p a t i e n t adopts a view which p l a c e s h i s parents w e l l below the ' W e l l - I l l ' 
L i n e . S c o t t d e s c r i b e s how i n such f a m i l i e s one may o f t e n see the 
" i d e n t i t i e s of mother and s o n . . . o s c i l l a t e around the ' W e l l - I l l ' L i n e " . 
Thus, f o r example: 
When we, as p r o f e s s i o n a l s , are c a l l e d i n a t the 
time of the f i r s t p s y c h o t i c c r i s i s we are i n v i t e d , 
o f t e n a t gun p o i n t , to say ' I t ' s him, not me' by 
g i v i n g our o f f i c i a l s e a l by p l a c i n g a d i a g n o s i s 
on 'him'. Should we take a r e l a t i v e p o s i t i o n 
standing f i r m l y on the ' W e l l - I l l ' Line...we should 
f i n d o u r s e l v e s on the f i r i n g l i n e of an i d e n t i t y 
war between p a t i e n t and parent, and would be 
l i k e l y to s u f f e r a t t a c k s on our p r o f e s s i o n a l 
i d e n t i t y . That i s to say, we are l i k e l y to be 
charged by the r e l a t i v e s w i t h being very 
i r r e s p o n s i b l e doctors who should be reported to 
a higher a u t h o r i t y ; o r, more t h r e a t e n i n g , depart 
from the house having been made to f e e l t h a t the 
mother might provoke the son to do something 
d i s a s t r o u s , such as s e t t i n g f i r e to the house, 
and then make us f e e l r e s p o n s i b l e f o r i t ( i b i d . p.163). 
Joseph has c l e a r l y s u f f e r e d the o s c i l l a t i o n s of i d e n t i t y around the 
' W e l l - I l l ' L i n e . I t o l d him one day t h a t I was going to v i s i t h i s 
pare n t s . Some minutes l a t e r he remarked t h a t : "A man can't work u n l e s s 
h i s mother i s p s y c h i a t r i c a l l y f i t . P s y c h i a t r y i s dependency on t a b l e t s . . 
We didn't q u i t e understand this...We thought ' s u r e l y to God we weren't 
put on t h i s e a r t h ot l i v e on t a b l e t s a l l the time'. E v e n t u a l l y we threw 
them away, and they locked us up". 
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And then a f t e r a pause: "An undertaker once s a i d to me: 'Take no 
n o t i c e of p s y c h i a t r i s t s and p s y c h o l o g i s t s ; there's many a man has been 
k i l l e d by h i s mother'. So as soon as he s a i d t h a t I bought a gun. He 
s a i d t h e r e ' s not a woman on e a r t h didn't want her son born the opposite 
sex. He s a i d the r i g h t t h i n g to do was to look a f t e r your mother and 
make sure she's p h y s i c a l l y and mentally happy. But the danger i s t h a t 
when she gets too w e l l s h e ' l l want to look a f t e r you, and k i l l you. 
You mustn't put her i n a p r i s o n because when she gets out and you 
haven't v i s i t e d h e r s h e ' l l k i l l you". 
One can surmise t h a t the r e l a t i o n s between Joseph and h i s parents 
are, i n S c o t t ' s terms, untenable. Untenable p a t i e n t s , S c o t t t e l l s us, 
may be extruded from the f a m i l y , but they cannot i n the proper sense 
of the word, l e a v e home. And they cannot l e a v e home because they are 
so i n t o l e r a b l y 'bound' to t h e i r parents t h a t they are unable to form 
enduring r e l a t i o n s h i p s elsewhere. S c o t t t e l l s us t h a t most of these 
'untenable' p a t i e n t s spend t h e i r time away from home e i t h e r i n h o s p i t a l 
or d r i f t i n g ; only "very o c c a s i o n a l l y i n conducting a p o s i t i v e and 
on-going l i f e " ( i b i d . p.166). And Joseph, we w i l l r e c a l l , t e l l s us 
e x a c t l y t h a t : between home, h o s p i t a l , and a l i f e on the roads he can 
envisage no other p o s s i b i l i t y . Even those who do s e p a r a t e p h y s i c a l l y 
are on a "long l e a s h of l o y a l t y to t h e i r p a r e n t s " ( i b i d . p.167), an image 
t h a t i s echoed i n Joseph's remark th a t immediately followed those quoted 
above, t h a t h i s mother " l i v e d i n a house, but she had a l a r g e r i n g which 
wouldn't come o f f , t i e d to a mile of g u i t a r s t r i n g , so she could only 
walk a s h o r t way". 
I n Joseph the b a t t l e f o r h i s own i d e n t i t y r a g e s , and we would h a r d l y 
expect him to accommodate the e x p r e s s i o n of h i s e x p e r i e n c e to meet h i s 
parents' requirements. S c o t t remarks of tenable p a t i e n t - p a r e n t r e l a t i o n s 
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t h a t very o f t e n these are a form of s y m b i o t i c s u r v i v a l ; the p a t i e n t 
p e r c e i v e s h i s parents i n the way that they want to b e . p e r c e i v e d by him, 
and does not u s u a l l y have the agency, or w i l l , to f r e e h i m s e l f from the 
f a m i l y . From one point of view one may regard him as ' s e t t l e d ' , but he 
l i v e s an a r r e s t e d l i f e . Arthur, as we noted e a r l i e r , s a i d t h a t he 
sometimes thought t h a t he would have more ' s e l f - r e l i a n c e ' i f he l e f t 
home and found board and lodgings f o r h i m s e l f : "Only i t ' s my mother, 
I don't want to upset her". Here once again then we have the c o n t r a s t 
between Joseph and Arthur t h a t we d e s c r i b e d e a r l i e r . 
S c o t t w r i t e s i n c o n c l u s i o n : 
. . . i f we as p r o f e s s i o n a l s are not to be the 
'experts' who are the guardians of so many 
p a i n f u l i s s u e s which f a m i l i e s , without 
p r i o r thought as a r u l e , expect to sweep 
under the c a r p e t i n the name of ' i l l n e s s ' 
some r e l a t i v i t y i n how we see and t r e a t 
mental i l l n e s s i s r e q u i r e d . . . 
And of the ' W e l l - I l l 1 L i n e : 
We may now see i t as being connected w i t h 
powerful c u l t u r a l f o r c e s . We, as p r o f e s s i o n a l s , 
have had a hand i n c r e a t i n g t h i s l i n e . When 
as 'experts' we gave o f f i c i a l r e c o g n i t i o n to 
who was ' i l l ' we may have missed the c r u c i a l 
other h a l f : t h a t we a l s o gave o f f i c i a l r e c o g n i t i o n 
to who was ' w e l l ' . We may not have r e a l i s e d t h a t 
around t h i s l i n e rages the war of i d e n t i t i e s 
( i b i d . p.183). 
S c o t t i s of course w r i t i n g about a h i a t u s i n a number of very 
s p e c i f i c domestic spaces. I t would, however, be wrong to i s o l a t e the 
understanding that he g i v e s us w i t h i n these e n c l a v e s . As h i s own 
emphasis on ' c u l t u r a l f o r c e s ' b r i n g s out, the l i v e s of s c h i z o p h r e n i c s 
and t h e i r f a m i l i e s are enfolded w i t h i n h a b i t s of response and r e l a t i o n 
t h a t are e q u a l l y our own. 
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IV.3. Havoc Within Doors 
E r v i n g Goffman has coined h i s own term to d e s c r i b e the h i a t u s i n 
the domestic space; he c a l l s i t the ' i n s a n i t y of p l a c e ' . Nowhere e l s e 
i n the f i e l d of s o c i a l psychology can we f i n d anything to equal Goffman's 
achievement i n t r y i n g to map the d e t a i l of how the c o n s t r u c t i o n s and 
p r a c t i c e s of 'mental i l l n e s s ' develop i n response to v i o l a t i o n s and d i s -
r u p t i o n s of p e r s o n a l and s o c i a l order. E a r l i e r on we prefaced our 
p r e s e n t a t i o n of Joseph w i t h Goffman's q u e s t i o n regarding the type of 
' s o c i a l d e l i c t ' represented by p s y c h o t i c behaviour. I t i s to the 
answers t h a t he provides t h a t we must now t u r n . I s h a l l t r y to show 
tha t w h i l s t on the one hand Goffman's account s e r v e s to strengthen our 
own, y e t on the other, i n c e r t a i n c r u c i a l r e s p e c t s , i t i s o l a t e s the 
whole problem of s c h i z o p h r e n i a s t i l l f u r t h e r from our understanding. 
I n two papers, 'Mental Symptoms and P u b l i c Order', and 'The 
I n s a n i t y of P l a c e ' , t h a t have both a c q u i r e d a w e l l - d e s e r v e d r e p u t a t i o n , 
Goffman s e t s out to u n r a v e l some of the p e r p l e x i t i e s around the forms 
of d e v i a t i o n t h a t we come to see as symptoms of mental i l l n e s s . The 
f i r s t paper t r e a t s s p e c i f i c a l l y of p s y c h o t i c behaviour; the second, 
w h i l s t not e x c l u s i v e l y about p s y c h o s i s , e n l a r g e s on the d i s c u s s i o n of 
symptoms th a t was begun i n the e a r l i e r paper and examines i n some d e t a i l 
the havoc t h a t c e r t a i n kinds of d i s t u r b e d behaviour can b r i n g about i n 
f a m i l y s e t t i n g s . I n e f f e c t the t a s k t h a t Goffman s e t s h i m s e l f i n both 
these papers i s to t r y to e s t a b l i s h the c h a r a c t e r of the v i o l a t i o n s of 
p e r s o n a l and s o c i a l order t h a t the p s y c h o t i c i n f l i c t s i n a way t h a t the 
conventional language of 'symptomatology' i s unable to do. 
"What p s y c h i a t r i s t s see as mental i l l n e s s ' 1 , Goffman t e l l s us, "the 
l a y p u b l i c u s u a l l y f i r s t sees as o f f e n s i v e behaviour - behaviour worthy 
of s c o r n , h o s t i l i t y and other n e g a t i v e s a n c t i o n s " (1964, p.137). 
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P s y c h i a t r y , i n c o n t r a s t , i n t e r p o s e s a t e c h n i c a l p e r s p e c t i v e . Goffman 
i s not a p p r e c i a t i v e : " I r e f r a i n from e n l a r g i n g here on how unfortunate 
i t has been f o r many offenders to have been granted t h i s medical good 
fo r t u n e " ( i b i d ) . Moreover the r a p i d s h i f t i n p e r s p e c t i v e from 
impropriety to mental symptom has meant th a t " p s y c h i a t r i s t s have tended 
to f a i l to be much b e t t e r than laymen i n t h e i r assessment of the 
impropriety of a given a c t " ( i b i d . p.138). Against a background of 
s o c i a l s e t t i n g s such as the work-place, the household, and the neighbour-
hood he frames h i s own c r i t i c a l requirement i n the f o l l o w i n g way: 
P s y c h o s i s must be seen, i n i t i a l l y a t l e a s t , as an 
i n f r a c t i o n of the s o c i a l order t h a t obtains i n these 
p l a c e s . The other s i d e of the study of symptoms 
i s the study of p u b l i c order, the study of behaviour 
i n p u b l i c and semi-public places...Common c r i m i n a l s , 
we say, offend the property order; t r a i t o r s the 
p o l i t i c a l order; incestuous couples the k i n s h i p 
order...We must ask then: what type of s o c i a l order 
i s s p e c i f i c a l l y r e l a t e d to p s y c h o t i c behaviour? 
( i b i d . , p.139, p.141) 
That t h i s i s the r i g h t course to pursue f o l l o w s from the d i s t i n c t i o n 
t h a t he makes between medical and mental symptoms: 
Mental symptoms a r e not, by and l a r g e , i n c i d e n t a l l y 
a s o c i a l i n f r a c t i o n . As f a r as the p a t i e n t ' s 
others are concerned the troublesome a c t s do not 
merely happen to c o i n c i d e p a r t l y w i t h what i s 
s o c i a l l y o f f e n s i v e as i s t r u e of medical symptoms; 
r a t h e r these troublesome a c t s are p e r c e i v e d , a t 
l e a s t i n i t i a l l y , to be i n t r i n s i c a l l y a matter of 
w i l f u l s o c i a l d e v i a t i o n . 
And he goes on: 
Mental symptoms a r e n e i t h e r something i n themselves 
or what i s so l a b e l l e d ; mental symptoms are a c t s by 
an i n d i v i d u a l which openly p r o c l a i m to others t h a t 
he must have assumptions about h i m s e l f which the 
r e l e v a n t b i t of s o c i a l o r g a n i z a t i o n can n e i t h e r 
a l l o w him nor do much about. 
I t f o l l o w s t h a t i f the p a t i e n t p e r s i s t s i n h i s 
symptomatic behaviour then he must c r e a t e o r g a n i z a t i o n a l 
havoc and havoc i n the minds of members. Although 
the imputation of mental i l l n e s s i s s u r e l y a l a s t d i t c h 
attempt to cope w i t h a d i s r u p t e r who must be, but cannot 
be, contained, t h i s imputation i n i t s e l f i s not l i k e l y to 
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r e s o l v e the s i t u a t i o n . Havoc w i l l occur even when 
a l l the members are convinced t h a t the troublemaker 
i s q u i t e mad f o r t h i s d e f i n i t i o n does not i n i t s e l f 
f r e e them from l i v i n g i n a s o c i a l system i n which he 
p l a y s a d i s r u p t i v e p a r t . . . I t i s t h i s havoc t h a t 
p s y c h i a t r i s t s have d i s m a l l y f a i l e d to examine and 
t h a t s o c i o l o g i s t s ignore when they t r e a t mental 
i l l n e s s merely as a l a b e l l i n g process (1971, pp.356-7). 
T h i s i s w e l l s a i d ; i t b r i n g s out c l e a r l y the way i n which medical 
and mental symptoms d i f f e r . Medical symptoms s t r i k e only a t the 
i n d i v i d u a l organism; mental symptoms, i n c o n t r a s t , reach out i n t o the 
s t r u c t u r e s of meaning and a s s o c i a t i o n w i t h i n which they occur and l i v e 
out t h e i r l i f e . And the type of s o c i a l order t h a t i s s p e c i f i c a l l y 
r e l a t e d to the symptomatology of p s y c h o t i c behaviour i s t h a t form of 
order which governs s i t u a t i o n a l p r o p r i e t y : 
When persons come i n t o one another's immediate p h y s i c a l 
presence they become a c c e s s i b l e to each other i n unique 
ways. There a r i s e the p o s s i b i l i t i e s of p h y s i c a l and 
s e x u a l a s s a u l t , of a c c o s t i n g and being dragged i n t o 
unwanted s t a t e s of t a l k , of o f f e n d i n g and importuning 
through the use of words, of t r a n s g r e s s i n g c e r t a i n 
t e r r i t o r i e s of the s e l f of the other, of showing 
d i s r e g a r d and d i s r e s p e c t f o r the g a t h e r i n g present 
and the s o c i a l o c c a s i o n under whose au s p i c e s the 
gathering i s h e l d . The r u l e s of f a c e - t o - f a c e conduct 
o b t a i n i n g i n a given community e s t a b l i s h the form t h a t 
f a c e - t o - f a c e co-mingling i s to take, and there r e s u l t s 
a k i n d of King's Peace, guaranteeing t h a t persons w i l l 
r e s p e c t one another through the a v a i l a b l e idiom of 
r e s p e c t , keep t h e i r s o c i a l p l a c e and t h e i r i n t e r p e r s o n a l 
commitments, allow and not e x p l o i t a t r a f f i c flow of 
words and bodies and show regard f o r the s o c i a l o c c a s i o n . 
Offenses a g a i n s t these r u l i n g s c o n s t i t u t e s i t u a t i o n a l 
improprieties...When a p a t i e n t a c t s i n a c l a s s i c a l l y 
p s y c h o t i c way, i t i s r e l a t i v e to these v a r i o u s r u l e s , 
and the u n i t s of a s s o c i a t i o n they support, t h a t he i s 
a c t i v e (1964, pp.146-7). 
The r u l i n g s of s i t u a t i o n a l p r o p r i e t y are e s t a b l i s h e d through 
boundaries, whether of mutual presence or of s o c i a l o r g a n i z a t i o n . I t i s 
these t h a t the p s y c h o t i c f l a u n t s . I n the f i r s t paper the focus i s 
l a r g e l y on s o c i a l , e x t r a — f a m i l i a l s e t t i n g s ; i n the second the d i s r u p t i o n 
i s brought home. Once again Goffman s t r e s s e s t h a t the d i s r u p t i o n i s 
always of forms of order. The p a t i e n t may, f o r example, harbour 
b i z a r r e i d e a s , but b i z a r r e n e s s i t s e l f i s not the i s s u e : 
Even when the p a t i e n t h a l l u c i n a t e s or develops 
e x o t i c b e l i e f s the b e l i e f s of the f a m i l y i s not 
simply t h a t a member has c r a z y notions but t h a t 
he i s not keeping h i s p l a c e i n r e l a t i o n s h i p s . . . 
The i s s u e here i s not t h a t the f a m i l y f i n d s t h a t 
home l i f e i s made unpleasant by the s i c k person. 
Perhaps most home l i f e i s unpleasant. The i s s u e 
i s t h a t meaningful e x i s t e n c e i s threatened (1971, pp.365-6). 
I n an e a r l i e r s e c t i o n of the same paper Goffman d e f i n e s 'person' and 
' s e l f i n the f o l l o w i n g way: 
V i r t u a l d e f i n i t i o n s of an i n d i v i d u a l may be 
'accorded' - t h a t i s , readable i n the conduct 
of agencies seen as e x t e r n a l to the i n d i v i d u a l 
h i m s e l f . These d e f i n i t i o n s c o n s t i t u t e the 
i n d i v i d u a l ' s 'person'. Corresponding to these 
accorded d e f i n i t i o n s about him there w i l l be 
v i r t u a l l y 'acted' ones, p r o j e c t e d through what 
i s seen as h i s own conduct. These assumptions 
c o n s t i t u t e the i n d i v i d u a l ' s ' s e l f . Person and 
s e l f a r e p o r t r a i t s of the same i n d i v i d u a l , the 
f i r s t encoded i n the a c t i o n of o t h e r s , the second 
i n the a c t i o n s of the s u b j e c t h i m s e l f ( i b i d . pp.340-1). 
He now puts the notions of the s e l f and of the person to work to 
enl a r g e on the t h r e a t to the 'meaningful'. 
...the s e l f i s the code t h a t makes sense out of 
almost a l l the i n d i v i d u a l ' s a c t i v i t i e s and 
provides a b a s i s f o r o r g a n i z i n g them. The s e l f 
i s what can be read about the i n d i v i d u a l by 
i n t e r p r e t i n g the p l a c e he takes i n an o r g a n i z a t i o n 
of s o c i a l a c t i v i t y , as confirmed by h i s e x p r e s s i v e 
behaviour. The i n d i v i d u a l ' s f a i l u r e to encode 
through deeds and e x p r e s s i v e cues a workable 
d e f i n i t i o n of h i m s e l f , one which c l o s e l y enmeshed o t h e r s 
can accord him through the regard they show h i s person, 
i s to block and t r i p up and t h r e a t e n them i n almost 
every movement t h a t they make. The s e l v e s t h a t had 
been the r e c i p r o c a l of h i s a r e undermined... I n c e a s i n g 
to know the s i c k person they cease to be sure of them-
s e l v e s . I n c e a s i n g to be sure of him and themselves 
they can even cease to be sure of t h e i r way of knowing. 
A deep bewilderment r e s u l t s . Confirmations t h a t 
e v e r y t h i n g i s p r e d i c t a b l e and as i t should be cease 
to f l o w from h i s p r e s e n t a t i o n s . The q u e s t i o n as to 
what i t i s t h a t i s going on i s not redundantly answered 
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a t every t u r n but must be c o n s t a n t l y f e r r e t e d 
out anew. And l i f e i s s a i d to become l i k e a 
bad dream ( i b i d . pp.366-67, second emphasis added). 
I n a b r i l l i a n t p i e c e of w r i t i n g Goffman b r i n g s out what d i s t u r b s 
and d i s r u p t s about the behaviour of the p s y c h o t i c . He s i t u a t e s i n a 
f a m i l i a l frame what Bateson was p o i n t i n g towards i n h i s remarks about 
s c h i z o p h r e n i a as a "response to e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l t r a n s i t i o n , or t h r e a t 
of t r a n s i t i o n " . I t i s our own epistemology - our way of knowing -
that i s put i n jeopardy as much as the s c h i z o p h r e n i c ' s . Nevertheless 
we need to be c a u t i o u s i n t u r n i n g our reading of Goffman to our own 
account. He t e l l s us t h a t "meaningful e x i s t e n c e i s threatened" by 
the behaviour of the p a t i e n t , y e t only two pages e a r l i e r he w r i t e s 
t h a t : "The deepest nature of an i n d i v i d u a l i s only skin-deep, the 
deepness of h i s o t h e r s ' s k i n " ( i b i d , p.363). Moreover the p a t i e n t 
by i n f l i c t i n g the havoc of p l a c e "reminds us what our e v e r y t h i n g i s , 
and then reminds us t h a t t h i s e v e r y t h i n g i s not v e r y much" ( i b i d . p.390). 
I n the e a r l i e r paper he summarises h i s p o s i t i o n on the ' i m p r o p r i e t i e s ' 
of the p s y c h o t i c thus: 
These i m p r o p r i e t i e s a r e not i n the f i r s t i n s t a n c e 
a l i n g u i s t i c type of i n t e r p e r s o n a l communication 
but examples of p u b l i c misconduct - a d e f e c t not i n 
information t r a n s m i s s i o n or i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i n g , 
but i n the decorum and demeanor th a t r e g u l a t e f a c e -
t o - f a c e a s s o c i a t i o n . I t i s i n t h i s world of 
sanctioned forms of a s s o c i a t i o n t h a t p s y c h o t i c 
symptoms have t h e i r n a t u r a l home...Rules f o r behaviour 
w h i l e i n the presence of o t h e r s , and by v i r t u e of the 
presence of o t h e r s , a r e the r u l e s t h a t make o r d e r l y 
f a c e - t o - f a c e communication of the l i n g u i s t i c k i n d 
p o s s i b l e ; but these r u l e s and the many i n f r a c t i o n s 
of them which p s y c h o t i c s and other cut-ups s y s t e m a t i c a l l y 
e x h i b i t , a r e not themselves to be considered f i r s t of 
a l l as communications; they a r e f i r s t of a l l guide-
l i n e s (and t h e i r d i s r u p t i o n ) of s o c i a l o r g a n i z a t i o n , 
the organized a s s o c i a t i o n of persons p r e s e n t to one 
another (1964, p.148), 
Goffman leads us to the b r i n k and then p u l l s us s w i f t l y back from 
i t ; or b e t t e r , denies t h a t i t i s a b r i n k a t a l l : the 'meaningful' 
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i s a f t e r a l l r e a l l y q u i t e meaningless. I n h i s own h i g h l y o r i g i n a l 
way Goffman i s as c o n s e r v a t i v e as the gentlemen of the p s y c h i a t r i c 
establishment whom he c a s t i g a t e s so s e v e r e l y . The t h r u s t of our 
e a r l i e r d i s c u s s i o n has been to point our way to a view of things t h a t 
a s s e r t s the p r o v i s i o n a l , r e l a t i v e , and thereby p r e c a r i o u s c h a r a c t e r 
of our mental and s o c i a l o r d e r i n g s ; i n Bateson's terms a r e a c t i o n 
away from the " o l d e r , r e a l i s t i c or ' t h i n g i s h ' epistemology". I t 
seemed to us t h a t to do t h i s was i n any case to provide a more a c c u r a t e 
account of our pe r s o n a l and s o c i a l l i v e s , and more d i r e c t l y r e l e v a n t 
to our p a r t i c u l a r purposes, we could not hope to understand the 
sc h i z o p h r e n i c , or the whole problem of s c h i z o p h r e n i a as a s o c i a l and 
c u l t u r a l a f f a i r , without i t . Goffman's world, by c o n t r a s t , i s as 
' t h i n g i f i e d ' as we could expect to f i n d . The p s y c h o t i c d i s r u p t s a 
s o c i a l order to be s u r e , but the r e i s no suggestion t h a t the terms of 
the order a r e anything other than immutable. L i f e a t home may be "~ 
unpleasant and meaningless but we could not expect i t to be any 
d i f f e r e n t . And as f a r as " p s y c h o t i c s and other cut-ups" a r e concerned 
an a l t e r n a t i v e mode of response and r e l a t i o n i s not only not p o s s i b l e , 
i t i s not even d e s i r a b l e . Goffman pours s c o r n on those p s y c h i a t r i s t s 
who have laboured to make sense of p s y c h o t i c communications "under 
the telephone-booth b i a s t h a t what the p a t i e n t was engaged i n was 
somehow a type of t a l k i n g , of information imparting, the problem being 
th a t the l i n e was busy, the connection d e f e c t i v e , the p a r t y a t the 
other end shy, cagey, a f r a i d to t a l k or i n s i s t e n t t h a t a code be 
used" ( i b i d . p.139). Where Goffman s t a r t s by removing the p s y c h o t i c 
from the c l o s e d c i t a d e l s of medical thought and p r a c t i c e , and r e s t o r i n g 
him to a pe r s o n a l and s o c i a l dynamic, a t the end of the day we have, 
I t h i n k , to say t h a t he enforces a r e n u n c i a t i o n t h a t i s every b i t as 
severe; there i s no p l a c e i n Goffman's house - whether i t i s the f a m i l y 
space or the l a r g e r s o c i a l space - f o r a 'cut-up' such as Joseph: 
we may have a good d e a l to say about him from a f a r , but from c l o s e -
there i s nothing to be s a i d , or heard. 
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IV.4. C l o s i n g the Door 
Much as we may bera t e Goffman we cannot do without him. For what 
the w r i t i n g s of Goffman and R. D. S c o t t draw our a t t e n t i o n to are the 
requirements t h a t a r e made of s c i e n c e from w i t h i n the t i g h t l y k n i t 
domestic spaces w i t h i n which we l i v e out our i n t i m a c i e s . The best 
evidence of such p r e s s u r e comes from what was u n t i l r e c e n t l y an u n l i k e l y 
source: the r e l a t i v e s of s c h i z o p h r e n i c s themselves. P r e v i o u s l y kept 
from the door, or allowed only - u s u a l l y i n one's and two's -
i n t o the doctor's surgery, the r e l a t i v e s of s c h i z o p h r e n i c s have f o r c e d 
t h e i r way i n t o the i n s t i t u t i o n of s c h i z o p h r e n i a and now stand f i r m l y 
i n i t s midst, making t h e i r case w i t h i n c r e a s i n g coherence, and demanding 
to be heard. U n l i k e other maladies s c h i z o p h r e n i a had never had a 
s p e c i a l i s t s o c i e t y of i t s own. From n i n e t e e n t h century r e c o r d s we 
l e a r n of i n s t a n c e s of p r e s s u r e put by f a m i l i e s on the medical p r o f e s s i o n : 
p r e s s u r e to i n c a r c e r a t e an unwanted r e l a t i v e or to seek r e d r e s s f o r the 
abysmal c o n d i t i o n s i n an a s y l u m . ^ But none of these add up to a 
c o l l e c t i v e e f f o r t . That we do not meet u n t i l 1970 w i t h the foundation 
of the N a t i o n a l S c h i z o p h r e n i a F e l l o w s h i p . ^ I n May of t h a t year the 
f a t h e r of a young c h r o n i c s c h i z o p h r e n i c wrote an a r t i c l e f o r 'The Times' 
i n which he d e s c r i b e d the c o l l a p s e of h i s son i n h i s second year a t 
u n i v e r s i t y , and the d i f f i c u l t i e s of the f a m i l y i n making sense of the 
s i t u a t i o n and g e t t i n g p r a c t i c a l help. I n a subsequent f e a t u r e a r t i c l e 
'The Times' commented: "On almost any s p e c i f i c p oint on which the 
f a m i l y d e s p e r a t e l y needed a d v i c e they met w i t h weary p l a t i t u d e s . ' F a i l u r e 
i n c o o r d i n a t i o n and communication', our correspondent wrote, 'seem to 
hang about the management of s c h i z o p h r e n i a almost l i k e a grim parody of 
12 
the c o n d i t i o n i t s e l f " . 
The w r i t e r ' s concern i n the o r i g i n a l a r t i c l e was "simply to v e n t i l a t e 
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some of the ways i n which p u b l i c understanding of the c o n d i t i o n and 
p r o v i s i o n f o r i t were lagging behind". But such was the extent of the 
13 
response to the a r t i c l e from f a m i l i e s a c r o s s the country - but l a r g e l y , 
14 
we may note, from the South E a s t - t h a t i t was decided to e s t a b l i s h a 
s o c i e t y . From sm a l l beginnings the s o c i e t y has burgeoned. I t has 
published a number of r e p o r t s , sponsored r e s e a r c h , and had c o n s i d e r a b l e 
impact i n government c i r c l e s . ^ 
Why, we may want to ask, d i d a l l these s t i r r i n g s s u r f a c e a t the 
time t h a t they did? P u b l i c i n a t t e n t i o n to the f a t e of the s c h i z o p h r e n i c 
i s , a f t e r a l l , h a r d l y a novel phenomenon. To t h i s there a r e a t l e a s t 
two answers. One i s t h a t ever s i n c e the Mental H e a l t h Act of 1959 
the trend has been towards community c a r e ; no more could f a m i l i e s 
assume t h a t they would be r e l i e v e d of the burden of t h e i r s i c k r e l a t i v e s 
f o r the r e s t of t h e i r days. As Goffman puts i t : "The noti o n i s abroad 
th a t the goal i s not to cure the p a t i e n t but to c o n t a i n him i n a 
ni c h e i n f r e e s o c i e t y where he can be t o l e r a t e d " (1971, p.336). I n 
s h o r t , the f a m i l y was having a harder time of i t than h e r e t o f o r e . The 
second answer i s t h a t during the l a t e f i f t i e s and throughout the s i x t i e s 
a s e t of i d e a s were promulgated t h a t a s s e r t e d the need f o r a language 
of d e s c r i p t i o n t h a t focused on the v i c i s s i t u d e s of the s c h i z o p h r e n i c ' s 
16 
r e l a t i o n s w i t h the immediate o t h e r s i n the s e t t i n g i n which he l i v e d ; 
i n the popular imagination, and o c c a s i o n a l l y i n s c i e n t i f i c e x p o s i t i o n , 
s e v e r a l of these i d e a s appeared to i m p l i c a t e the f a m i l y i n the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y 
f o r c a u s ing the p a t i e n t ' s c o n d i t i o n i n the f i r s t p l a c e . Through the 
organ of the N a t i o n a l S c h i z o p h r e n i a F e l l o w s h i p the f a m i l y f i g h t s back. 
I n 1974 the F e l l o w s h i p p u b l i s h e d a r e p o r t e n t i t l e d : " L i v i n g w i t h 
S c h i z o p h r e n i a : by the R e l a t i v e s " . I n the f o l l o w i n g e x t r a c t a mother 
d e s c r i b e s the dilemmas of her husband and h e r s e l f i n r e l a t i o n to t h e i r 
s c h i z o p h r e n i c daughter: 
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My husband i s a s c i e n t i s t of - I suppose one can say -
n a t i o n a l eminence. He f e e l s t h a t the c e n t r a l q u e s t i o n 
i s : does one s a c r i f i c e o n e s e l f and one's w i f e f o r the 
sake of the s c h i z o p h r e n i c son or daughter? Looking 
a f t e r the p a t i e n t . , , a t home w i l l stop any work of a 
c r e a t i v e s o r t . We both f e e l t h a t the end r e s u l t 
f o r p a r e n t s of our type and temperament would be our 
own breakdown. 
Whenever Ruth i s a t home, he f e e l s c o n t i n u a l l y i r r i t a t e d 
by her l a c k of purpose and i d l e n e s s , and has to hold 
h i m s e l f i n check. He says she i s not the s o r t of 
person he would choose to spend time w i t h or make a 
f r i e n d of. He t h i n k s a fundamental i n s t i n c t i s 
i n v o l v e d , which causes both animals and human beings 
to peck the oddity, to r i d themselves of the one who 
does not conform. 
He has a sense of stigma, and always a f e a r of Ruth 
a r r i v i n g unexpectedly during a b u s i n e s s or s o c i a l 
meeting w i t h persons who don't understand. U n t i l 
r e c e n t l y he had an i n t e n s e f e a r of Ruth's i l l n e s s 
being known, and the p r e s s "making a s t o r y " of i t , 
because he happens to have a c q u i r e d a name as a 
s c i e n t i s t . 
On a p r a c t i c a l l e v e l - he says t h e r e f o r e much e a s i e r 
to accept - i s the f e a r of f i r e i n the home, and the 
sense of being u n j u s t when making a w i l l which 
unavoidably d i f f e r e n t i a t e s between our i l l daughter 
and our h e a l t h y c h i l d r e n . 
. . . s o c i a l l i f e has been much reduced, e.g., c e s s a t i o n 
of club memberships, l o s s of confidence, d i f f i c u l t y i n 
making new f r i e n d s , because whenever one meets people 
one i s asked: how i s your daughter? And r e p l y i n g to 
t h i s e i t h e r means t e l l i n g a l i e and saying,"Oh, she's 
p r e t t y w e l l , she was home l a s t weekend, she was t r a i n e d 
as a p h y s i o t h e r a p i s t but has no job a t the moment,"etc. 
Or one s a y s , "She's s t i l l i n h o s p i t a l , no cure i s i n 
s i g h t , v i s i t i n g her i s i n t e n s e l y d e p r e s s i n g " and so b r i n g i n g 
i n t o the f r o n t of one's mind the a n x i e t i e s and m i s e r i e s 
which I f e e l to be l i k e those experienced by parents whose 
c h i l d d i e s , except I have sometimes thought t h a t to be 
c l e a n e r . 
I t would c e r t a i n l y help i f t h e r e was a stream of information 
coming i n about r e s e a r c h i n t o mental i l l n e s s , but one 
f e e l s a k i n d of h o p e l e s s n e s s , and a doubt whether anything 
i s being done a t a l l . I f i t i s , why cannot we hear about 
i t ? We need to be given hope f o r the f u t u r e . 
...A d i f f i c u l t y I have s i n c e she has been i n h o s p i t a l i s 
t h a t I have a horror of the other p a t i e n t s and the i d e a 
of mental u n c o n t r o l , so t h a t v i s i t i n g her i s an o r d e a l and 
I must put on a f a l s e f a c e , 
(Of Ruth's s i s t e r ) She has f e l t much embarrassment when Ruth 
has made scenes, e.g., w i t h a s c h o o l f r i e n d when Ruth and I 
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went to v i s i t her a t sch o o l . She did not understand 
the r eason f o r Ruth's behaviour a t the time, and had 
no i d e a t h a t she was i l l . She says she j u s t thought 
Ruth was the end...She...is nervous of Ruth coming 
unexpectedly to her home when othe r s a r e present who 
might not understand, because of p o s s i b l e e f f e c t s upon 
her husband and h i s c a r e e r . 
My e a r l i e s t r e a c t i o n s to Ruth's oddness before she was 
diagnosed as being m e n t a l l y i l l were a sense of f a i l u r e , 
then g u i l t a t having f a i l e d . There was acute embarrassment 
on shopping e x p e d i t i o n s , and l a t e r a r e l u c t a n c e to i n v i t e 
f r i e n d s - even o l d f r i e n d s - to the house f o r f e a r of 
s u b j e c t i n g them to embarrassment. 
... I t h i n k we have had a c e r t a i n amount of good l u c k i n 
g e t t i n g Ruth i n f o r treatment when i t was needed. I 
had the f e e l i n g t h a t s t r i n g s were being p u l l e d , and a 
doctor a t —- H o s p i t a l assured my husband and me t h a t 
Ruth would be looked a f t e r because of my husband's 
c o n t r i b u t i o n - i n other words t h a t he was doing work of 
some importance to the country. 
...Many times when I have gone to see the h o s p i t a l doctor 
and longing f o r a t r u t h f u l r e p o r t about Ruth, I have 
been greeted w i t h the words "How do you t h i n k Ruth i s ? " , 
and once even "What do you t h i n k i s the matter w i t h 
Ruth?" 
There i s a d r e a d f u l c o n f l i c t i n our minds between the 
longing to see her become w e l l enough to l i v e a normal 
l i f e , and the near-wish f o r her to remain i l l enough 
to s t a y i n h o s p i t a l so t h a t we do not have to cope w i t h 
her. 
...At home, we are i n the dark a l l the time as to what 
to expect from the p a t i e n t , how to t a l k to her, what 
a t t i t u d e s to take up, and how f a r to go along w i t h her when 
she t a l k s s t r a n g e l y (NSF, 1974, pp.8-11). 
These accounts were assembled to i l l u m i n a t e the p r a c t i c a l d i f f i c u l t i e s 
of r e l a t i v e s i n contending w i t h a s c h i z o p h r e n i c i n the home and t h i s , i n 
a mass of d e t a i l , they a c h i e v e i n a way t h a t can le a v e us i n no doubt: 
l i f e w i t h a s c h i z o p h r e n i c i s l i f e turned upside down. From another 
p o i n t of view we can read them to look f o r a b n o r m a l i t i e s i n the p a t t e r n 
of r e l a t i v e s ' responses: how f a r , we might ask, a r e the d i f f i c u l t i e s 
of t h e i r own making, born of a f a i l u r e to a l l o w t h e i r o f f s p r i n g adequate 
autonomy or of an undue r i g i d i t y i n t h e i r e x p e c t a t i o n s ? And we would not 
need to look v e r y f a r to f i n d evidence of t h i s k i n d : the s c i e n t i s t i n 
our example i s c l e a r l y l i m i t e d i n h i s c a p a c i t y f o r emotional response, h i s 
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w i f e ' s f e a r s of "mental u n c o n t r o l " i n the f a c e of her daughter and other 
p a t i e n t s suggests a form of p e r s o n a l i t y o r g a n i z a t i o n t h a t must work hard 
to fend o f f chaos, and so on. But such a reading would I t h i n k be 
m i s l e a d i n g ; to read the accounts i n t h i s way would be to i s o l a t e the 
p r o t a g o n i s t s from t h e i r c u l t u r a l context. The l i m i t a t i o n s of response 
th a t we can i d e n t i f y a r e l i m i t a t i o n s of c u l t u r a l norm and requirement. 
What speaks through these accounts are not the q u i r k s and d e v i a t i o n s of 
i n d i v i d u a l a c t o r s but forms of response and o r g a n i z a t i o n t h a t express 
both the order of the person and the order of s o c i e t y . And i t i s 
here t h a t our chosen example i s of p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t . Now c l e a r l y 
t h i s account i s not i n every r e s p e c t r e p r e s e n t a t i v e ; not every s c h i z o -
p h r e n i c has an eminent s c i e n t i s t f o r a f a t h e r . But i t does, 1 t h i n k , 
h i g h l i g h t what i s d i s r u p t i v e about s c h i z o p h r e n i c behaviour. What i s 
d i s r u p t e d here - i n the r e f e r e n c e s to ' c r e a t i v e work', to 'purpose', to 
b u s i n e s s and s o c i a l meetings, and to c a r e e r p r o s p e c t s - i s an achievement 
of meaning th a t i s a t one and the same time i n t i m a t e l y p e r s o n a l and 
p r e c i s e l y s o c i a l . I t would be hard to imagine a s t a r k e r s e t of c o n t r a s t s 
the eminent s c i e n t i s t "doing work of some importance to the country" as 
a g a i n s t the i d l e and p u r p o s e l e s s Ruth; the v o i c e of order and reason 
as a g a i n s t the strange musings of the s c h i z o p h r e n i c . Ruth t h r e a t e n s 
the terms of the s o c i a l and p e r s o n a l order t h a t s c i e n c e accomplishes; 
s c i e n c e , i n r e p l y , has nothing to say: i t can only peck a t the oddity, 
r i d i t s e l f of the one who does not conform. To ask of s c i e n c e t h a t 
i t e s t a b l i s h a d i f f e r e n t mode of response and r e l a t i o n to Ruth would 
17 
be to ask t h a t i t make something d i f f e r e n t of i t s e l f . 
The mother i n our example ma,kes a p l e a f o r f u r t h e r r e s e a r c h ; "we 
need" she w r i t e s "to be given hope f o r the f u t u r e " . The N a t i o n a l 
Schizophrenia F e l l o w s h i p has, to date, sponsored two p i e c e s of r e s e a r c h : 
one a study of the problems experienced by those who have a s c h i z o p h r e n i c 
221 
l i v i n g a t home, undertaken on the F e l l o w s h i p ' s behalf by the I n s t i t u t e 
18 
of P s y c h i a t r y , and the other a study of s c h i z o p h r e n i c b r a i n t i s s u e s t h a t 
19 
has r e c e i v e d wide coverage i n the q u a r t e r l y n e w s l e t t e r s . We can, 
I t h i n k , begin to understand a l i t t l e more c l e a r l y the f o r c e of David 
Morgan's remarks t h a t we quoted i n the i n t r o d u c t i o n to the e f f e c t t h a t 
i n our time "the r a t i o n a l i t y of s c i e n c e has become accepted a p r i o r i as 
a symbol of order, coherence and t r u t h . I t s i d e o l o g i c a l f u n c t i o n 
c o n s t i t u t e s an i n t e g r a t i n g system of shared o r i e n t a t i o n s and s o c i a l 
b e l i e f s which render otherwise i n e x p l i c a b l e s i t u a t i o n s amenable to 
r a t i o n a l a p p r a i s a l and t e c h n i c a l c o n t r o l " . Furthermore "the symbols 
of order a r e most l i k e l y to be s t r e s s e d i n r e l a t i o n to human problems 
we l e a s t understand" (1975, pp.279-80). Thus do we r e s t o r e our sense 
of the h a b i t u a l and the taken-for--granted from the 'deep bewilderment' 
that the s c h i z o p h r e n i c i n f l i c t s upon us; s c i e n c e i s summoned to do i t s 
duty and to show us t h a t when the next day dawns the bad dreams w i l l 
fade and once again we w i l l know. 
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IV.5. The I n t e r - C a t e g o r i c a l 
I n our d i s c u s s i o n of Joseph we introduced the image of the house. 
The house of comedy, we w i l l r e c a l l , kept i t s doors open and was 
r e c e p t i v e to the l i f e of the f i e l d s ; the house of tragedy, by c o n t r a s t , 
kept i t s doors f i r m l y shut. Michael Long borrows from N i e t z s c h e ' s 
c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n of S o c r a t i c man i n the ' B i r t h of Tragedy' to d e s c r i b e 
the k i n d of c u l t u r a l attachment we might expect to f i n d i n the house 
w i t h i t s doors c l o s e d : 
The c i v i l i z a t i o n of S o c r a t i c man i s a ' p r e t e n t i o u s 
l i e ' s e t up by 'benighted s o u l s ' who are 'strong i n 
the sense of t h e i r own s a n i t y ' . I t i s a 'bourgeois 
m e d i o c r i t y ' committed to what i s ' s e n s i b l e ' and to 
' t r i v i a l ignoble cheer', and i t s 'dubious enlightenment' 
has a ' c o r r o s i v e i n f l u e n c e upon i n s t i n c t u a l l i f e ' . I t s 
' o p t i m i s t i c d i a l e c t i c s ' assume t h a t the u n i v e r s e i s 
knowable, even t h a t nature can be conquered and c o r r e c t e d . 
Thus 'the whip of i t s s y l l o g i s m s ' ; thus i t s attempt to 
'staunch the e t e r n a l wound of being'. I t i s a matter 
of ' d r a s t i c s e c u l a r i z a t i o n ' w i t h no sense of the 
l i m i t a t i o n s of i t s l o g i c , bent upon c a p t u r i n g the world 
i n i t s 'Alexandrian n e t ' , reducing i t to an 'Alexandrian 
Utopia' (1976, p.18). 
N i e t z s c h e , Michael Long suggests, p r e s e n t s us w i t h : 
...a powerful and s u g g e s t i v e p i c t u r e of man c i v i l i z e d , 
c u l t u r e d or educated i n the most d e l i m i t i n g of s e n s e s , 
of c i v i l i z e d man who conceives of h i s c u l t u r e as a 
powerful and comprehensive a r t i f i c e b u i l t to p r o t e c t 
him from a nature which i s now defined as i n f e r i o r and 
f e l t to r e q u i r e no acknowledgement from him. The 
knowledge of c u l t u r e ' s r e l a t i v e p a r t i a l i t y which 
tragedy c o n t a i n s , and the sense of r e l a t i v i t y w i t h which 
i t looks upon the i d e a of mental and s o c i a l order, i s 
something which can be looked upon by t h i s s p i r i t only 
w i t h incomprehension or f e a r C i b i d . p.18-19). 
Brutus, i n Shakespeare's ' J u l i u s Caesar', "works w i t h N i e t z s c h e ' s 
S o c r a t i c assumption t h a t the u n i v e r s e i s knowable, and being known, 
c o r r i g i b l e ; and w i t h t h a t k i n d of language which Schopenhauer would c a l l 
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'conceptual' as opposed to 'p e r c e p t i v e ' , too h i g h up i n the ' e d i f i c e of 
r e f l e c t i o n ' to do anything except g r o s s l y d i s t o r t " ( i b i d . p.25). 
Brutus, and othe r s l i k e him, m i s r e p r e s e n t the world by c o d i f y i n g 
t h e i r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s i n "concepts and a b s t r a c t i o n s which a r e i n e p t l y 
stubborn and r i g i d " ( i b i d . p.14). To adopt a l e s s obdurate stance i s 
to have to s u f f e r d i f f i c u l t t e n s i o n s . Moreover: 
...to do so r e q u i r e s a f l e x i b i l i t y , an openness, a 
consciousness of ambiguity and r e l a t i v i t y to which...the 
v e r y n e c e s s i t y of s o c i a l and mental o r d e r i n g i s 
com p e l l i n g l y opposed. The e x i g e n c i e s of s o c i a l and 
pers o n a l l i f e . . . d r i v e c i v i l i z e d men to f e a r f l u x as an 
undermining, u n s t a b l e , and unsafe i n c u r s i o n i n t o t h e i r 
named and i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d worlds. I t i s a ne c e s s a r y 
f u n c t i o n of the dynamics of s o c i a l l i f e to encourage 
t h i s tendency towards o v e r - r i g i d i t y , over-attachment, 
or normativeness, so t h a t any man's own p a r t i c u l a r 
s t r u c t u r e tends to take on the s i g n i f i c a n c e f o r him 
of an a b s o l u t e . And what i s not contained w i t h i n i t 
i s then c a l l e d ( s o c i a l l y ) d i s o r d e r and ( p s y c h o l o g i c a l l y ) 
madness ( i b i d . p.35). 
To abandon the house a l t o g e t h e r , or to pay no heed to the i r r e g u l a r i t y 
of the t r a f f i c a c r o s s i t s boundaries, i s to do without s t r u c t u r e ; e q u a l l y 
to hold the doors so f i r m t h a t nothing may c r o s s i t s t h r e s h o l d except 
on our own terms i s to g i v e o u r s e l v e s over to a d e l i m i t i n g and uncomprehend-
ing obduracy. Joseph, as we saw, c a r r i e d w i t h i n him a c o n f l i c t between 
a v e r s i o n of a r t and a v e r s i o n of s c i e n c e . He f a s h i o n s the o p p o s i t i o n 
to h i s own d e v i s i n g but as a mode of d i s c r i m i n a t i o n i t i s , i n i t s o r i g i n 
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and f u n c t i o n , deeply and i d e n t i f i a b l y c u l t u r a l . P i e r r e Guiraud, i n 
the context of a d i s c u s s i o n of some of the p r i n c i p l e modes of s i g n i f i c a t i o n 
which correspond to the s c i e n c e / a r t s p o l a r i t y , w r i t e s : 
Comprehension i s e x e r c i s e d on an o b j e c t ; emotion on a 
s u b j e c t . But above a l l to com-prehend 'to put together', 
i n t e l - l i g e r e , 'to bind together', i s an a c t of o r g a n i z a t i o n , 
an o r d e r i n g of s e n s a t i o n s p e r c e i v e d , whereas emotion i s 
a d i s o r d e r i n g and an overwhelming of the senses. Two 
e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t modes of p e r c e p t i o n - and consequently 
of meaning - a r e involved...Consequently, t h e r e i s a 
mutual r e p u l s i o n both between l o g i c a l s i g n s and emotion, 
224 
and between e x p r e s s i v e s i g n s and comprehension. The 
s e m i o l o g i c a l modes of i n t e l l e c t u a l knowledge have no 
bearing on a f f e c t i v e e x p e r i e n c e , and v i c e v e r s a . 
T h i s i s what makes the s c i e n t i f i c study of a f f e c t i v e 
phenomena so d i f f i c u l t and so p r e c a r i o u s , given the 
i m p o s s i b i l i t y of d e f i n i n g and s t r u c t u r i n g ( i e . of 
comprehending) terms such as p a s s i o n , d e s i r e , or 
emotion (1975, pp.9-10, emphasis i n the o r i g i n a l ) . 
For Joseph emotion and d e s i r e d i d indeed t h r e a t e n to "overwhelm the 
senses". The s o l u t i o n he t r i e s to b r i n g to bear i s to r i d h i m s e l f of 
f e e l i n g , of the f l u x of experience, a l t o g e t h e r . For Joseph the 
' d i f f i c u l t t e n s i o n ' i s too d i f f i c u l t ; i t t h r e a t e n s to be i m p o s s i b l e . 
There can be no comfortable movement back and f o r t h between the house 
and the f i e l d s . Yet f o r us, too, to develop an a l t e r n a t i v e mode of 
response and r e l a t i o n to Joseph and othe r s l i k e him, a mode of response 
and r e l a t i o n t h a t i s n e i t h e r a matter of a c l o s e d nor of an open door, 
n e i t h e r a r e p u d i a t i o n nor a c e l e b r a t i o n , does not come e a s i l y ; as we 
noted i n the i n t r o d u c t i o n we f i n d i n the i n s t i t u t i o n of s c h i z o p h r e n i a 
a mixture of tongues and i t i s easy to f a l l a t h r a l l to b i n a r i e s t h a t 
f a l s i f y . 
R. D. S c o t t , i n h i s d i s c u s s i o n of the f a m i l i e s of s c h i z o p h r e n i c s , 
d e s c r i b e s the b a t t l e f o r i d e n t i t y t h a t rages round what he terms the 
' W e l l - I l l ' L i n e . A s i m i l a r emphasis i s given us by Norman 0. Brown. 
But f o r Brown: "The c o n c l u s i o n of the whole matter i s , break down the 
boundaries, the w a l l s . Down w i t h defence mechanisms, character-armor; 
disarmament. Ephesians I I , 14: For he i s our peace, who hath made 
both one, and h a t h broken down the middle w a l l of p a r t i t i o n between u s " 
(1966, p.149). And: "The s o l u t i o n to the problem of i d e n t i t y i s , get 
l o s t . Or as i t says i n the New Testament: 'He t h a t f i n d e t h h i s own 
psyche s h a l l l o s e i t , and he t h a t l o s e t h h i s psyche f o r my sake s h a l l 
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f i n d i t ' " ( i b i d . p.161), For Brown the "proper response to poetry 
i s not c r i t i s m but poetry" ( i b i d . p.205); to madness, by i m p l i c a t i o n , 
the proper response i s madness. But t h a t has not been, nor should i t 
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be, our response. Brown draws our a t t e n t i o n t o the f a l s i f i c a t i o n s of 
response t h a t are c h a r a c t e r i s t i c , and f o r t h a t we must be g r a t e f u l . 
But what he then does i s t o enforce on us a f a l s i f i c a t i o n t h a t , i t seems 
to me, i s every b i t as misguided. The c r i t i c a l emphasis i n the 
w r i t i n g s of R. D. Scott i s on the a c t i v i t y round the boundary l i n e . The 
l i n e i t s e l f may s h i f t , but the s i g n i f i c a n c e and meaningfulness of the 
boundary - as a personal and c u l t u r a l a f f a i r - i s not d i s s i p a t e d . 
And i t i s here t h a t the d i f f i c u l t tensions to which Michael Long draws 
our a t t e n t i o n are t o be found. For Brown there can be no a c t i v i t y 
round the boundary because there i s no boundary l e f t . Somewhere we 
must draw the l i n e ; j u s t as much as the r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of the normal 
order who f a l l amock under the t h r u s t of h i s polemic Brown i s a t h r a l l 
to a binary t h a t f a l s i f i e s . 
To l i v e close to the boundary l i n e i s t o a l l o w the r e l a t i v i t y of 
our own orderings. Just how d i f f i c u l t t h i s i s f o r us i s evident from 
the remarks t h a t Mary Douglas makes about Emile Durkheim. Durkheim, 
Mary Douglas argues, demonstrated the s o c i a l f a c t o r s c o n t r o l l i n g thought. 
His discovery was about: 
...the process of c a t e g o r i z a t i o n . He claimed t o 
r e v e a l the s o c i a l f a c t o r s which bound the categories 
and r e l a t e d them t o one another. When the process 
has worked through the i n d i v i d u a l i s shown using a 
set of conceptual t o o l s generated from outside himself 
and e x e r t i n g over him the a u t h o r i t y of an e x t e r n a l , 
o b j e c t i v e power (1975, p . x i i i ) . 
Durkheim's theory of the sacred i s a theory about how knowledge of the 
universe i s s o c i a l l y constructed. The known universe i s the product 
of human convention and so too i s the idea of God as i t s u l t i m a t e p o i n t 
of appeal: 
Durkheim saw t h a t r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f s are p u l l e d t h i s way 
and t h a t i n men's haggling and j u s t i f y i n g of ways to 
l i v e together. He could see t h a t i n a l l small i s o l a t e d 
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t r i b a l s o c i e t i e s men create t h e i r e n t i r e knowledge of 
t h e i r universe i n t h i s manner. They covenant 
i m p l i c i t l y to breed a host of imaginary powers, a l l 
dangerous, to watch over t h e i r agreed m o r a l i t y and 
to punish d e f e c t o r s . But having t a c i t l y colluded 
t o set up t h e i r awesome cosmos, the i n i t i a l convention 
i s b u ried. Delusion i s necessary. For unless the 
sacred beings are c r e d i t e d w i t h autonomous existence 
t h e i r coercive power i s weakened, and w i t h i t the 
f r a g i l e s o c i a l agreement which gave them being. A 
good p a r t of the human predicament i s always t o be 
unaware of the mind's own generative powers and to 
be l i m i t e d by concepts of the mind's own f a s h i o n i n g 
( i b i d , p . x i v , emphasis added). 
The argument i s d i r e c t l y capable of extension t o our own s o c i e t y . 
The sacred which f o r us must be protected i s , as Mary Douglas p o i n t s 
out, s c i e n t i f i c t r u t h ; a "commitment to a non-context-dependent sense 
of t r u t h (as correspondence t o r e a l i t y ) " ( i b i d , p . x v i ) . But f o r 
Durkheim the e x t r a p o l a t i o n was not t o be made. For h i s own s o c i e t y 
he continued t o b e l i e v e i n ' o b j e c t i v e s c i e n t i f i c t r u t h ' : h i s "concern 
t o p r o t e c t h i s own c o g n i t i v e commitments from s c r u t i n y prevented him 
from developing h i s sociology of knowledge" ( i b i d , p . x i i ) . Nor was 
Durkheim alone i n h i s h e s i t a t i o n : "the b a r r i e r t h a t i n h i b i t e d him may 
w e l l have been the same t h a t has stopped others since from c a r r y i n g 
h i s programme through" ( i b i d . p . x i ) . The boundaries, Mary Douglas 
suggests, which we " r a l l y i n s t i n c t i v e l y t o p r o t e c t from the t h r e a t of 
r e l a t i v i s m would seem to hedge something very sacred. The volumes 
which are w r i t t e n t o defend t h a t t h i n g t e s t i f y t o i t s o b s c u r i t y and 
d i f f i c u l t y of access. R e l a t i v i t y would seem to sum up a l l the t h r e a t s 
t o our c o g n i t i v e s e c u r i t y " ( i b i d , p . x v i i ) . As a consequence boundaries 
may o f t e n be " i n e x p l i c a b l e since the reasons f o r any p a r t i c u l a r ways of 
d e f i n i n g the sacred are embedded i n the s o c i a l consensus which i t 
p r o t e c t s " ( i b i d . p.xv)» 
Mary Douglas's dis c u s s i o n of the r e l a t i v e enriches our understanding. 
Taken beyond a discussion of s c h o l a r l y productions, however, and i n t o the 
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more i n t i m a t e devisings t h a t are the s t u f f of our s o c i a l and personal 
l i v e s , Mary Douglas loses her courage: boundaries are enforced as 
s t r o n g l y as ever they were i n Durkheim, I n 'Natural Symbols' she sets 
out t o describe how ideas and s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s are t i e d together i n the 
l i f e of s o c i e t y , "We can concentrate", she w r i t e s , "upon the i n t e r a c t i o n 
of i n d i v i d u a l s w i t h i n two dimensions. One i s order, c l a s s i f i c a t i o n , 
the symbolic system. The other i s pressure, the experience of having 
no o p t i o n but t o consent to the overwhelming demands of other people" 
(1973, p.81). The f i r s t of these dimensions she terms ' g r i d ' and the 
second 'group'. Put them together i n the form of a diagram and we have 
t h i s ; 
Grid. 
system of shared, c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s 
+ 
ego i n c r e a s i n g l y 
e x e r t i n g pressure 
t h a t c o n t r o l s 
other + 
people 
Group 
ego i n c r e a s i n g l y 
c o n t r o l l e d by other 
peoples pressure 
+ 
p r i v a t e system of c l a s s i f i c a t i o n 
(FIGURE I I I ) ( i b i d > p t 8 4 ) . 
C l a s s i f i c a t i o n may be more or less organized, more or less coherent, 
f o r d i f f e r e n t areas of human experience. Hence on the v e r t i c a l l i n e i n 
the diagram we have a movement from maximum coherence and o r g a n i z a t i o n at 
the top and lower ends towards in c r e a s i n g incoherence at zero. Moreover 
a given form of c l a s s i f i c a t i o n may be shared by some and not by o t h e r s , 
and hence the d i s t i n c t i o n between c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s t h a t are p r i v a t e and 
those t h a t are p u b l i c . The scope and coherent a r t i c u l a t i o n of the system 
of c l a s s i f i c a t i o n i s a measure of the s t r e n g t h of the c o n t r o l system 
i n t h a t s o c i e t y , Mary Douglas w r i t e s ; 
I t i s axiomatic t h a t a steady p a t t e r n of c o n t r o l i s 
needed f o r a coherent system of c l a s s i f i c a t i o n . 
The more d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e places i n the c o n t r o l system 
and the more these are co-ordinated i n t o a l a s t i n g 
h i e r a r c h y of r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s , the more the p u b l i c 
c l a s s i f i c a t i o n system d i f f e r e n t i a t e s i t s categories 
( i b i d . p.86). 
I n such a s o c i e t y the g u i d i n g cosmology w i l l be progressive and 
r a t i o n a l ; the meanings t h a t are generated w i l l be r e l a t i v e l y f i x e d and 
unchanging. The wider the scope of the c l a s s i f i c a t i o n the more 
pressure w i l l be exerted on other people through c l a s s i f i c a t i o n . As 
Mary Douglas puts i t : "the most e f f e c t i v e way t o bind other people i s 
by appeal to c l a s s i f i c a t i o n " (1975, p.219). I n a s o c i e t y i n which the 
forms of c l a s s i f i c a t i o n are less developed and standardised, i n c o n t r a s t , 
pressure i s exerted not through c l a s s i f i c a t i o n but by personal appeal. 
For Mary Douglas c l a s s i f i c a t i o n , l i k e r i t u a l , i s a necessary 
requirement: i t provides us w i t h a set of unchallenged categories t h a t 
enables us to take our place i n the order of t h i n g s . B u i l d i n g on 
B a s i l Bernstein's d i s t i n c t i o n s between personal and p o s i t i o n o r i e n t e d 
f a m i l i e s , and between elaborated personal codes and elaborated o b j e c t 
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codes, Mary Douglas warns of the dangers of r e a r i n g c h i l d r e n by 
personal elaborated speech code methods: 
.the c h i l d i s f r e e d from a system of r i g i d 
p o s i t i o n s , but made a prison e r of a system of 
f e e l i n g s and a b s t r a c t p r i n c i p l e s . . . T h i s produces 
a c h i l d a c u t e l y s e n s i t i v e to the f e e l i n g s of others 
and i n t e r e s t e d i n h i s own i n t e r n a l s t a t e s . I t f o l l o w s 
t h a t such an education w i l l predispose a person t o 
e t h i c a l pre-occupations f o r w h i l e i t opens up h i s 
vocabulary of f e e l i n g i t also denies him any sense of 
p a t t e r n i n h i s s o c i a l l i f e , He must t h e r e f o r e look 
f o r some j u s t i f i c a t i o n of h i s existence outside the 
performance of set rules,,.unquestioned boundaries 
have never been p a r t of h i s upbringing (1973, p«48, 
pp.57-8, p.54.). 
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Now we a l l know what t h i s means taken t o extremes: endless 
digressions on the v i c i s s i t u d e s of the ' s e l f . I n a l a t e r chapter 
Mary Douglas comments a p t l y ; "Experimenting w i t h consciousness becomes 
the most personal form of experience, c o n t r i b u t i n g l e a s t to the widest 
s o c i a l system, and t h e r e f o r e most approved" ( I b i d . p.194). She a l i g n s the 
mode w i t h a n t i - r i t u a l i s t tendencies. The r e j e c t i o n of r i t u a l , she 
t e l l s us, involves an " e x a l t a t i o n of the inner experience and d e n i g r a t i o n 
of i t s standardized expression" ( i b i d . p.40). The a n t i - r i t u a l i s t 
values "incoherent speech" and "suspects speech t h a t comes i n standard 
u n i t s , polished w i t h constant use; t h i s i s the hard c o i n of s o c i a l 
i n t e r c o u r s e , not t o be t r u s t e d as expressing the speaker's t r u e mind" 
( i b i d . p.74). R i t u a l , l i k e the r e s t r i c t e d code i n Bernstein's f o r m u l a t i o n , 
i s grounded i n a s e n s i t i v i t y t o condensed symbols; utterances generated 
by the r e s t r i c t e d code, Mary Douglas t e l l s us, "convey i n f o r m a t i o n , 
yes, but they also express the s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e , embellish and r e i n f o r c e 
i t " ( i b i d . p.44). And the a n t i - r i t u a l i s t w i l l have no t r u c k w i t h 
e i t h e r of them. Very s k i l f u l l y Mary Douglas gives the l i e t o the 
c e l e b r a t i o n of the absence of a l l mediations: 
These very people who p r e f e r unstructured intimacy 
i n t h e i r s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s defeat t h e i r wish f o r 
communication wit h o u t words. For only a r i t u a l 
s t r u c t u r e makes possible a wordless channel of 
communication t h a t i s not e n t i r e l y incoherent ( i b i d . p.74). 
S u r p r i s i n g though i t may seem, Norman 0. Brown s i t s i n t h i s company. 
This i s indeed the s o c i a l tendency t h a t has been responsible f o r the 
c e l e b r a t i o n of the schizophrenic and of the schizophrenic experience i n 
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recent years. 
However we cannot leave i t there f o r Mary Douglas's purpose i s not 
merely t o c h a r a c t e r i z e the v i c i s s i t u d e s and c o n t r a d i c t i o n s of a d e f i n a b l e 
s o c i a l type but t o develop a general set of categories f o r i n v e s t i g a t i n g 
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how we order ourselves - our experience and our actions - i n r e l a t i o n t o 
each other. And the dis c u s s i o n , as we have.seen, turns round a r e c u r r i n g 
set of b i n a r i e s : personal and p o s i t i o n o r i e n t e d f a m i l i e s ; r i t u a l and 
a n t i ' - r i t u a l ; c l a s s i f i c a t i o n and absence of c l a s s i f i c a t i o n ; coherence 
and incoherence; maximum c o n t r o l by others and maximum freedom of 
c o n t r o l by others. Now the d i f f i c u l t y r e s i d e s , I t h i n k , not so much i n 
the terms themselves but i n the use t h a t Mary Douglas makes of them. 
Simply s t a t e d , i t can be put thus: where the a n t i - r i t u a l i s t 'enshrines' 
incoherence, Mary Douglas 'enshrines' coherence. Her c r i t i q u e of the 
a n t i - r i t u a l i s t i s apt. Yet something i s l a c k i n g : a p a r t i c u l a r stance 
towards incoherence i s met by a response t h a t e x a c t l y matches i t . An 
a d u l a t i o n of a mode of behaviour becomes confused w i t h the behaviour 
i t s e l f . 
Missing i n her p r e s e n t a t i o n i s any sense of the i n t e r p l a y , of the 
movement back and f o r t h , between c l a s s i f i c a t i o n and i t s absence, between 
coherence and incoherence, between v a r y i n g degrees of a r t i c u l a c y and 
i n a r t i c u l a c y . Once again, then, we are brought back t o the image of the 
house i n r e l a t i o n t o the f i e l d s ; Mary Douglas w i l l not allow us, as 
R, D. Scott encourages us t o do, to stand too close t o the door. For -
to t u r n Arnold Van Gennep's (1960) image of s o c i e t y as a house t o our 
own purpose - close t o the door l i e dangers; dangers l i e i n the 
t r a n s i t i o n a l and p r o v i s i o n a l , i n the r e c o g n i t i o n of the r e l a t i v e . By 
an a p p l i c a t i o n of the ' p u r i t y r u l e ' t h a t she h e r s e l f describes so w e l l 
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i n another c o n t e x t , Mary Douglas banishes from her m o r a l i t y the capacity 
of the s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e t o recognise the p r o v i s i o n a l character of i t s 
own orderings; the orderings not only of the exte r n a l s of s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e 
but also of consciousness; of the s e l f , f o r example, as a p r o v i s i o n a l 
and t h e r e f o r e v u l n e r a b l e c o n s t r u c t i o n , For Mary Douglas, t o bind other 
people by c l a s s i f i c a t i o n i s a sensible m o r a l i t y ; i t provides us w i t h a 
231 
sense of p a t t e r n . Pressure by appeal, i n c o n t r a s t , exposes us t o a 
world of i n d i v i d u a t e d , unanchored meanings. But we must beware; f o r 
what c l a s s i f i c a t i o n also does i s t o e s t a b l i s h f o r the members of any 
given s o c i e t y the responses of which they are capable. I f we bind by 
c l a s s i f i c a t i o n we may no longer n o t i c e <- be capable of responding to -
the other person: we are bound by the terms of our own c l a s s i f i c a t i o n . 
This i s one aspect of the dilemma t h a t the schizophrenic presents f o r 
us; and hence, i n p a r t , the shape of the ideas and responses t h a t have 
developed around him, responses t h a t have had as t h e i r aim t o ensure t h a t 
a convention remain b u r i e d . 
I f we are not t o i s o l a t e the schizophrenic from our understanding 
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a l t o g e t h e r we have, I t h i n k , t o encourage a form of response and 
r e l a t i o n t h a t moves back and f o r t h between the house and the f i e l d s 
round about, between c l a s s i f i c a t i o n and i t s absence", between coherence 
and incoherence, between comprehension and emotion, and between the 
formal and the personal; t o take up abode, t h a t i s , i n an intermediary 
area t h a t i s n e i t h e r t h a t of ' t h i s i s meaningless' nor t h a t of ' t h i s 
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means t h a t ' . ' Without categories we cannot manage, but we have also -
to borrow a term from Theodore Lidz - t o explore the i n t e r - c a t e g o r i c a l 
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domain t h a t l i e s between categories. To ch a r a c t e r i s e the schizophrenic 
process as a voyage i s a t r a v e s t y every b i t as severe as the d i s t o r t i o n s 
i n f l i c t e d on i t by those aspects of the language of science we have 
considered. I n both cases the schizophrenic i s banished from the s o c i a l 
space t h a t includes ourselves: i n the one case i n t o the i n f i n i t e expanse 
of a transcendental landscape, i n the other i n t o the p u r i t y of a c l i n i c a l 
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space w i t h i n which t o view him 'as he r e a l l y i s ' . R. D. Scott 
encourages us to take up a p o s i t i o n i n the s o c i a l world t h a t i s close t o 
the ' W e l l - I l l ' L i n e , and t h i s , l e t us be c l e a r , must draw us w e l l away 
from a safe anchorage i n the upper two quadrants of Mary Douglas's 
diagram (Figure I I I ) . 
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We have enlarged.the purview on schizophrenia beyond a focus on a 
s p e c i f i c disease e n t i t y to include a system of ideas and p r a c t i c e s t h a t 
has been generated around c e r t a i n kinds of behaviour t h a t are d i f f i c u l t 
f o r us to understand and t o t o l e r a t e . The formal c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n s of 
the language and thought of the schizophrenic t h a t we have studied we 
have found to be wanting; success, even where i t was apparent, could not 
j u s t l y be regarded as a si g n o f t r u t h and correspondence w i t h nature. 
As Paul Feyerabend puts i t : 
...the suspicion arises t h a t the absence of major 
d i f f i c u l t i e s i s a r e s u l t of the decrease of content 
brought about by the e l i m i n a t i o n of a l t e r n a t i v e s 
and of f a c t s t h a t can be discovered w i t h t h e i r help. 
I n other words the suspicion a r i s e s t h a t t h i s a l l e g e d 
success i s due to the f a c t t h a t the theory, when 
extended beyond i t s s t a r t i n g p o i n t , was turned i n t o 
r i g i d i d e o l o g y . . . I t s 'success' i s e n t i r e l y man-made 
(1975, pp.43-4, emphasis i n the o r i g i n a l ) . 
The system of ideas and p r a c t i c e s t h a t men have made we have termed 
the i n s t i t u t i o n o f schizophrenia. Much of the a c t i v i t y i n the 
i n s t i t u t i o n , we have suggested, i s a s p e c i a l case of ' p o l l u t i o n behaviour 1 
i t has the f u n c t i o n of r i t u a l s of separation and demarcation by which 
boundaries are r e p a i r e d and order r e s t o r e d . The schizophrenic i n t r u d e s 
i n t o , and p u l l s a t the margins o f , those forms of order, relevance, 
and r e l a t i o n to which i n our c u l t u r e we most s t r o n g l y adhere; the 
turbulence i s both t o our intimacy and to those l a r g e r p a t t e r n s of 
b e l i e f and assumption t h a t , framed as p r a c t i c e s and i n s t i t u t i o n s , order 
our s o c i a l world. I n schizophrenia the problem of personal order i n the 
c u l t u r e shows i t s e l f ; e q u a l l y the c u l t u r e asserts the terms of i t s own 
order i n the response t h a t i t gives t o the schizophrenic. Required of 
science i s t h a t i t fend o f f these i n t r u s i o n s and mould the schizophrenic 
to the image t h a t i t has of i t a e l f . The turbulence i s hedged around i n 
an enclave of i t s own and the self-image of the normal man i s thereby 
, 30 restored. 
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To ' l i s t e n ' to a schizophrenic i s to r e q u i r e something of ourselves 
t h a t our c u l t u r e does not e a s i l y allow; to take a schizophrenic s e r i o u s l y 
to allow him t o 'mean' - i s i n a sense already to transgress the l i n e s 
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of the c u l t u r e . From another p o i n t o f view any attempt to provide an 
a l t e r n a t i v e formal c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n of the schizophrenic's way of 
engaging w i t h the worl d must s t a r t from a model of language use t h a t 
i s grounded i n an analysis of the 'conventional' character of language 
32 
fu n c t i o n s w i t h i n the scope of a wide range of meaning p o t e n t i a l . 
Here again then, we have another v e r s i o n of our ' i n t e r - c a t e g o r i c a l ' 
requirement. 
At the end of the day we can only conclude w i t h a f o r m u l a t i o n t h a t 
i s uncomfortable: one has, I t h i n k , to i n s i s t on the pain and despair 
t h a t i s in v o l v e d i n becoming psychotic; psychosis i s not a mode of being 
t h a t one would wish on anyone, and to involve oneself a t a l l c l o s e l y w i t h 
someone who i s psychotic i s at the best o f times d i f f i c u l t ; and yet one 
wants also t o say t h a t we would be much poorer f o r being a l t o g e t h e r 
. 33 witho u t i t . 
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IV. Notes 
1. Roger Brown recounts how he cannot " f o r g e t the p l a i n t i v e remark 
made by the young p a t i e n t i n the novel ' I Never Promised You a 
Rose Garden', a remark made to h e r . . . p s y c h i a t r i s t : 'Doctor, my 
d i f f e r e n c e i s not my disease' " (1973, pp.402-3). 
2. An idiom f o r e n f o r c i n g our s t r i c t u r e s i n a more t e c h n i c a l v e i n i s 
given to us by the philosophy of science. Our d i f f i c u l t i e s , we 
can suggest, have not so much been w i t h the competing i n t e r p r e t a t -
ions t h a t can be made of a given o b j e c t , as w i t h the very c o n s t r u c t i o n 
of t h a t o b j e c t . As Dominique Lecourt puts i t i n a c r i t i c a l study 
of the w r i t i n g s of Gaston Bachelard, the s c i e n t i s t , when he 
discusses an o b j e c t , i s discussing a ' r e s u l t ' ; and he quotes 
Bachelard: "The o b j e c t i s only i n s t i t u t e d at the end of a long 
process of r a t i o n a l o b j e c t i v i t y " (1975, p.53). Furthermore, 
"the datum or given i s r e l a t i v e to the c u l t u r e , i t i s n e c e s s a r i l y 
i m p l i e d i n a construction...A given has to be received. I t w i l l 
never be possible to d i s s o c i a t e completely the order of the given 
and the method of i t s d e s c r i p t i o n " ( i b i d . p.44). A l l of the 
studies t h a t we have considered abandon the s i t u a t i o n of dialogue 
between two p a r t i e s and replace i t by a form of s c i e n t i f i c 
i n s t r u m e n t a t i o n . I n Bachelard's idiom s c i e n t i f i c instruments are 
" m a t e r i a l i z e d t h e o r i e s " . Lecourt comments: "Bachelard ceaselessly 
stressed t h a t i t i s one of the most c h a r a c t e r i s t i c ~ f e a t u r e s — o f " t h e 
contemporary sciences t h a t they are ' a r t i f i c i a l i s t ' , t h a t they 
contain as one of t h e i r e s s e n t i a l components a technique f o r the 
production of phenomena; what i n parody fashion he has c a l l e d a 
'phenomeno-technics' and which i s the o b j e c t of t h a t new 
d i s c i p l i n e . . . ' t e c h n i c a l m a t e r i a l i s m ' . " The n o t i o n of 'phenomeno-
tec h n i c s ' , Lecourt continues, "enables us to understand i n what 
sense the word 'production' i s t o be understood: not only the 
t h e o r e t i c a l production of concepts, but i n d i s s o c i a b l y the m a t e r i a l 
production of the o b j e c t of t h e o r e t i c a l labour; of what can no 
longer be c a l l e d i t s 'data' or 'givens' (donnees) but r a t h e r i t s 
' m a t e r i a l ' " ( i b i d . p.137). I n our discussion of personal 
const r u c t theory, we w i l l r e c a l l , we found ourselves having t o 
introduce a range of data t h a t the procedures of the approach had 
excluded. A more developed expression of our a c t i v i t y would be t o 
view i t as not so much an a d d i t i v e cumulation t o a given range of 
'data' as the i n t e r r u p t i o n of a given t h e o r e t i c a l ' m a t e r i a l i z a t i o n ' 
by another form of o b j e c t . For f u r t h e r discussion see Bachelard 
(1953). 
The whole tendency i s the expression o f a hope; a hope, as Thomas 
Kuhn puts i t , of being able t o " r e t r i e v e a realm i n which experience 
i s again s t a b l e once and f o r a l l " , where our concern i s not w i t h 
" d i f f e r e n t perceptions but r a t h e r w i t h d i f f e r e n t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s 
of the unequivocal data" (1962, pp.125-6). I n our own p r e s e n t a t i o n 
of Joseph we have t r i e d t o r e s i s t the temptation to f o r t i f y the 
o b j e c t of our discussion. We .began by s e t t i n g out a series of 
items of i n t e r a c t i o n t h a t included Joseph and then c a r r i e d the 
discussion forward i n t o a commentary t h a t endeavoured to show the 
f l u c t u a t i o n s of a s e l f i n attempting to devise a mode of l i v i n g 
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f o r i t s e l f . From one p o i n t of view we began w i t h 'raw data' t h a t 
we then a s s i m i l a t e d i n t o a s e r i e s of c o n s t r u c t i o n s . However the 
o r i g i n a l items were themselves selected from a l a r g e r whole, and 
abstracted from the i n t e r - p e r s o n a l encounters i n which they were 
generated. Moreover the commentary f a r from b u i l d i n g on f i x e d and 
s t a b l e items of observation sought to b r i n g out d i f f e r e n t features 
t h a t were i m p l i c i t w i t h i n the data but t h a t the data i t s e l f - as a 
set o f abstracted items - could not i t s e l f d i s c l o s e . As Kuhn 
puts i t : "Rather than being an i n t e r p r e t e r the s c i e n t i s t who 
embraces a new paradigm i s l i k e the man wearing i n v e r t e d lenses. 
Confronting the same set o f o b j e c t s as b e f o r e , and knowing t h a t 
he does so, he nevertheless f i n d s them transformed through and 
through i n many of t h e i r d e t a i l s " ( i b i d . pp.121-2). 
3 . i . 
I n our e a r l i e r discussion the s p e c i f i c r e p i d u a t i o n t h a t we i d e n t i f i e d 
was of the_schizophrenic's language. I t was here t h a t obduration 
and the r e n u n c i a t i o n of r e l a t i v i t y made i t s e l f f e l t most s t r o n g l y . 
The whole tendency i s best described under the heading 'the domination 
of the t e x t ' . Norman 0. Brown puts the matter most t r e n c h a n t l y : 
"Protestant l i t e r a l i s m : the crux i s the r e d u c t i o n o f meaning to a 
s i n g l e meaning-univocation. Luther's word i s ' E i n d e u t i g k e i t ' : the 
' s i n g l e , simple s o l i d , and s t a b l e meaning' of s c r i p t u r e . . . T o e s t a b l i s h 
the t e x t , 'die feste S c h r i f t ' , a mighty f o r t r e s s : the a u t h o r i t a t i v e 
t e x t " (1966, pp.192-3). The c o n t r a s t i s w i t h "broken speech; speech 
broken by s i l e n c e . To l e t the s i l e n c e i n i s symbolism. ' I n symbol 
there .is concealment and y e t r e v e l a t i o n : here t h e r e f o r e , by Silence 
and by Speech a c t i n g together, comes a double s i g n i f i c a n c e ' " 
( i b i d . p.190). 
3. i i . 
A more developed c r i t i q u e of the same tendency i s t o be found i n 
the work of the Russian l i n g u i s t V.N. Volosinov. Volosinov 
i d e n t i f i e s as a major trend of thought i n the approach to our 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n language what he terms 'abstract o b j e c t i v i s m ' , 
where language "stands before the speaker as an i n v i o l a b l e , 
i n c o n t e s t a b l e norm which the i n d i v i d u a l f o r h i s p a r t can only 
accept" (1973, p.53). The o r i e n t a t i o n of a b s t r a c t o b j e c t i v i s m 
derives from p h i l o l o g y : "European l i n g u i s t i c thought formed 
and matured over concern w i t h the cadavers of w r i t t e n languages; 
almost a l l i t s basic c a t e g o r i e s , i t s basic approaches and 
techniques, were worked out i n the process of r e v i v i n g those 
cadavers" ( i b i d . p.71). 
And he continues: 
Guided by p h i l o l o g i c a l need l i n g u i s t i c s has always 
taken as i t s p o i n t of departure the f i n i s h e d monologic 
utterance, the ancient w r i t t e n monument, considering 
i t the u l t i m a t e realium. A l l i t s methods and 
categories were elaborated i n i t s work on t h i s k i n d 
of defunct monologic u t t e r a n c e , or r a t h e r on a 
series of such utterances...The p h i l o l o g i c a l - l i n g u i s t 
tears the monument out of t h a t r e a l domain and views 
i t as i f i t were a s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t i s o l a t e d e n t i t y . 
He brings to bear on i t not an a c t i v e i d e o l o g i c a l 
understanding but a completely passive k i n d of 
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understanding, i n which there i s not a f l i c k e r of 
response, as there would be i n any a u t h e n t i c k i n d 
of understanding ( i b i d . pp.72-3). 
And f i n a l l y : "Formalism and s y s t e m a t i c i t y are the t y p i c a l 
d i s t i n g u i s h i n g marks o f any k i n d o f t h i n k i n g focused on a ready-
made and, so to speak, ar r e s t e d o b j e c t " ( i b i d . p.78). 
Furthermore a ' t e x t u a l ' approach of the k i n d he describes misleads 
i n another way i n t h a t i t confuses the process of understanding 
w i t h the process of r e c o g n i t i o n : 
These are thoroughly d i f f e r e n t processes. Only a 
sign can be understood; what i s recognized i s a 
s i g n a l . A s i g n a l i s an i n t e r n a l l y f i x e d , s i n g u l a r 
t h i n g t h a t does not i n f a c t stand f o r anything 
e l s e , or r e l e c t or r e f r a c t anything, b ut i s 
simply a t e c h n i c a l means f o r i n d i c a t i n g t h i s 
or t h a t o b j e c t (some d e f i n i t e f i x e d , o b j e c t ) 
or t h i s o r t h a t a c t i o n ( l i k e w i s e d e f i n i t e and 
f i x e d " ( i b i d . p.69). 
Furthermore: 
The c o n s t i t u e n t f a c t o r f o r understanding the 
l i n g u i s t i c form i s not r e c o g n i t i o n of 'the 
same t h i n g ' but understanding i n the proper 
sense of the word, i . e . , - o r i e n t a t i o n i n the 
p a r t i c u l a r given context and i n the p a r t i c u l a r 
given s i t u a t i o n : o r i e n t a t i o n i n the dynamic 
process of becoming and not ' o r i e n t a t i o n ' i n 
some i n e r t s t a t e ( i b i d ) . 
3 . i i i . 
Jlirgen Habermas (1970b) extends the c r i t i q u e o f a b s t r a c t o b j e c t i v i s m 
i n h i s remarks about Chomsky. Like Volo^inov Habermas i s concerned 
w i t h the d i s t i n c t i o n between a "completely passive k i n d of 
understanding", and an " a u t h e n t i c k i n d of understanding". The 
core of h i s c r i t i c i s m of Chomsky i s t h a t Chomsky's model of 
language i s monological. I t i s monological i n t h a t i t 
" c o n s i s t e n t l y a t t r i b u t e s the i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y of meaning - t h a t 
i s , the mutual sharing of i d e n t i c a l meanings - to the f a c t t h a t 
sender and re c e i v e r - each an e n t i t y f o r i t s e l f - are p r e v i o u s l y 
equipped w i t h the same programme. I t i s t h i s p re-established code 
th a t i s supposed to make communication p o s s i b l e " ( i b i d . p.361). 
To Chomsky's model of l i n g u i s t i c competence Habermas counterposes 
an a l t e r n a t i v e model. He w r i t e s : 
A s i t u a t i o n i n which speech, i . e . , the a p p l i c a t i o n 
of l i n g u i s t i c competence, becomes i n p r i n c i p l e 
p o s s i b l e , depends on a s t r u c t u r e of i n t e r -
s u b j e c t i v i t y which i s i n t u r n l i n g u i s t i c . This 
s t r u c t u r e i s generated n e i t h e r by the monologically 
mastered system of l i n g u i s t i c r u l e s , nor by the 
e x t r a - l i n g u i s t i c conditions of i t s performance. 
On the c o n t r a r y , i n order t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n 
normal discourse the speaker must have at h i s 
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d i s p o s a l , i n a d d i t i o n to h i s l i n g u i s t i c competence, 
basic q u a l i f i c a t i o n s of speech and symbolic 
i n t e r a c t i o n (role-behaviour) which we may c a l l 
communicative competence. Thus communicative 
competence means the mastery of an i d e a l speech 
s i t u a t i o n ( i b i d . p.367). 
3.iv . 
See also Williams (1977). Williams develops the h i s t o r i c a l context 
f o r the 'domination of the t e x t ' . E a r l y a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l procedures, 
he t e l l s us, were "determined by the f a c t t h a t a language almost 
i n v a r i a b l y presented i t s e l f i n s p e c i f i c past t e x t s : f i n i s h e d 
monologic utterances. Actual speech, even when i t was a v a i l a b l e , 
was seen as derived, e i t h e r h i s t o r i c a l l y i n t o vernaculars, or 
p r a c t i c a l l y i n t o speech acts which were instances of the fundamental 
( t e x t u a l ) forms of the language" ( i b i d . p.27). He continues: 
Language-use could then h a r d l y ever be seen as 
i t s e l f a c t i v e and c o n s t i t u t i v e . And t h i s was 
r e i n f o r c e d by the p o l i t i c a l r e l a t i o n s o f the 
observer-observed, where the 'language-habits' 
s t u d i e d , over a range from the speech of conquered 
and dominated peoples to the ' d i a l e c t s ' of 
o u t l y i n g or s o c i a l l y i n f e r i o r groups, 
t h e o r e t i c a l l y matched against the observer's 
standard, were regarded as a t most 'behaviour' 
r a t h e r than independent, c r e a t i v e , s e l f - d i r e c t i v e 
l i f e ( i b i d ) . 
And t h i s same tendency then c a r r i e d over i n t o s t r u c t u r a l l i n g u i s t i c s . 
S t r u c t u r a l l i n g u i s t i c s had to do w i t h o u t 'standard' or ' c l a s s i c a l ' 
t e x t s , but speech i t s e l f was converted i n t o a ' t e x t ' . "Language", 
as Williams puts i t , "came t o be seen as a f i x e d , o b j e c t i v e , and 
i n these senses 'given'^ system, which had t h e o r e t i c a l and 
p r a c t i c a l p r i o r i t y over what were described as 'utterances'...Thus 
the l i v i n g speech of human beings i n t h e i r s p e c i f i c s o c i a l 
r e l a t i o n s h i p s i n the world was t h e o r e t i c a l l y reduced t o instances 
and examples of a system which l a y beyond them" ( i b i d ) . 
3. v. 
Taking i n t o account the s t r i c t u r e s t h a t are o u t l i n e d here, i n an 
appendix t o s e c t i o n IV we provide some suggestions as to the 
requirements f o r a formal c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n of the schizophrenic's 
r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h the world based on ' i n s t i t u t i o n a l ' theories of 
language use. 
4. To remind ourselves, the theory of the double-bind as set out by 
Bateson, e t . a l . (1956) postulates t h a t the schizophrenic has been 
subjected over considerable periods of time t o c o n t r a d i c t o r y 
patterns of communication. The necessary i n g r e d i e n t s f o r a 
double-bind s i t u a t i o n are: 
i ) two or more persons; 
i i ) a primary negative i n j u n c t i o n (e.g., 'Do not do so 
and so or I w i l l punish you'); 
i i i ) a secondary i n j u n c t i o n , c o n f l i c t i n g w i t h the 
f i r s t , a t a more a b s t r a c t l e v e l ; 
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i v ) a t e r t i a r y negative i n j u n c t i o n p r o h i b i t i n g 
the v i c t i m f r o m e s c a p i n g from the f i e l d . 
5. The best review of recent research and discussion i n the double-bind 
t r a d i t i o n i s S l u z k i and Ransom, eds. (1976). S l u z k i and Ransom 
ta b u l a t e the numerous research programmes and d o c t o r a l theses t h a t 
have t r i e d to discover adequate o p e r a t i o n a l measures f o r the 
double-bind. They p o i n t t o the "gap between the idea of a 
double-bind and research done i n the name of i t " , and stress as 
the " s i n g l e greatest source of confusion or e r r o r " a tendency 
towards r e i f i c a t i o n or misplaced concreteness ( i b i d . p.151, p.160). 
Gina Abeles concludes a c r i t i c a l review: 
Somewhere i n the process of i s o l a t i n g paradox 
(as the k i n d of c o n t r a d i c t i o n e x e m p l i f i e d i n 
the double-bind) from i t s r e l a t i o n s h i p context 
(which i s what i s being c o n t r a d i c t e d ) i n an 
attempt to c l a r i f y these as e s s e n t i a l f e a t u r e s , 
and i n r e j o i n i n g the c l a r i f i e d i s o l a t e s w i t h i n 
the experimental paradigm, something c r u c i a l i s 
l o s t ( i b i d . p.145). 
6. S l u z k i and Ransom comment a p t l y : 
'Double-bind language' embodies general p r i n c i p l e s 
which are a t the most ex e m p l i f i e d and i l l u s t r a t e d 
i n a given set of data. I f i t can be shown t h a t 
the phenomena of schizophrenia are d e r i v a b l e from 
such basic premises as t h a t the name i s d i f f e r e n t 
from the t h i n g named, and t h a t communication 
always occurs on more than one l e v e l at a time, 
and t h a t l e a r n i n g consists of h i e r a r c h i c a l l y 
o rganizing events i n t o classes and c o n s t r u c t i n g 
rules r e l a t i n g to events i n those classes, then 
we should f e e l we know a l i t t l e more about how 
n a t u r a l h i s t o r y i s l i m i t e d and shaped 
(1976, p.320). 
7. Beckett (1963). 
8. See, f o r discussion, the s e c t i o n on p r o j e c t i o n i n Laplanche and 
P o n t a l i s , 'The Language of Psychoanalysis' (1973). Anna Freud, 
f o r example, takes the view t h a t p r o j e c t i o n and i n t r o j e c t i o n 
depend on the d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n of the ego from the outside w o r l d . 
See, e.g., R i v i e r e (1955) f o r the K l e i n i a n view. 
9. See i n a d d i t i o n to the source quoted Scott (1967, 1973a, 1973b). 
I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g t o note t h a t although i n my view Scott's 
researches are the most d e t a i l e d and i l l u m i n a t i n g t h a t have been 
undertaken i n t h i s country i n the 'schizophrenic f a m i l y ' t r a d i t i o n -
much b e t t e r than, f o r example, Laing and Esterson (1964) - they 
receive no mention i n H i r s c h and L e f f ' s (1975) 'comprehensive' 
review o f studies of abnormalities i n the parents of schizophrenics. 
See also Note 19 below. 
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10. See, f o r example, the instances c i t e d i n S k u l l (1975, 1976). 
11. I n Section I , Note 3, we r e f e r r e d t o the Schizophrenia A s s o c i a t i o n 
of Great B r i t a i n . Glamorous t i t l e n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g t h i s i s an 
'odd-ball' a s s o c i a t i o n - dogmatically committed to megavitamin 
therapy - w i t h a small membership and of l i m i t e d s i g n i f i c a n c e . 
12. 'The Times', October 21st, 1970. The o r i g i n a l a r t i c l e appeared i n 
May 1970. 
13. " 'How marvellous to hear of the formation of the Schizophrenia 
Fellowship', wrote Mrs. Jones from Essex. ' I want to jump onto 
my r o o f - t o p and shout out t h a t I have schizophrenia i n my f a m i l y , 
a f t e r 20 years' i s o l a t i o n . ' " From l e a f l e t : 'What i s the 
N a t i o n a l Schizophrenia Fellowship?' (no d a t e ) . 
14. The N a t i o n a l Schizophrenia Fellowship i s managed by a r e t i n u e of 
suburban f a i t h f u l i n , of a l l places, Surbiton, Surrey - t o be 
exact only a few s t r e e t s away from the present w r i t e r ' s p o i n t 
of o r i g i n . 
15. See, f o r example, 'Social P r o v i s i o n f o r Sufferers from Chronic 
Schizophrenia'. Recommendations submitted to the Secretary of 
State, Department of Health and Social S e c u r i t y , the Rt. Hon. 
Barbara Castle, M.P., N a t i o n a l Schizophrenia Fellowship, June, 1974. 
16. I n p a r t i c u l a r , of course, the w r i t i n g s of the s o - c a l l e d ' a n t i - p s y c h i a t r y ' 
school. See Laing (1967) and Cooper (1967). For a general 
treatment of the whole c o n s t e l l a t i o n of ideas to which these belong 
see Pearson (1975). 
17. Other examples i n the same c o l l e c t i o n berate the p s y c h i a t r i c services 
f o r c o n t r i b u t i n g to the f a m i l y ' s d i f f i c u l t i e s . One r e l a t i v e provides 
a number of examples: 
Inte r v i e w s between doctors and r e l a t i v e s seem to be 
out o f favour. The p a t i e n t must be present also. 
This gags r e l a t i v e s and i s extremely p a i n f u l , and 
does not make f o r a u s e f u l exchange of views. 
No one should be i n h o s p i t a l , o r , i f they are, they 
should remain there f o r the s h o r t e s t possible time, 
regardless of anyone else's views, or of what the 
consequences w i l l be... 
No one should be admitted to h o s p i t a l against t h e i r 
w i l l , i . e . , compulsorily. 
Schizophrenia i s not an i l l n e s s . 
I t i s caused by the f a m i l y who are s i c k e r than 
the p a t i e n t . 
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The r e l a t i o n s h i p between a schizophrenic and 
h i s or.her r e l a t i v e s i s governed by 'double 
bind ' forms of communication... 
P a t i e n t s are responsible f o r t h e i r actions 
and should t h e r e f o r e decide what they do 
and where they go, regardless of the e f f e c t 
on anyone else...(NSF, 1974, p.19). 
The w r i t e r t e l l s us t h a t these are the p r e v a i l i n g " p s y c h i a t r i c 
theories and p o l i c i e s of some o f the medical and n u r s i n g s t a f f 
at A's h o s p i t a l " . No one reading examples such as t h i s can give 
much credence to the the o r i e s of Thomas Szasz i n whose view i t i s 
the medical establishment t h a t , i n p u r s u i t of i t s own aggrandize-
ment, confines against t h e i r w i l l hapless f o l k who have done no 
more than 'disagree' (see Szasz 1976 f o r a discussion s p e c i f i c a l l y 
bearing on schizophrenia). The p o i n t we wish to make i s not t h a t 
there i s nothing t o say about the p s y c h i a t r i c establishment; 
r a t h e r we want to redress the balance from perspectives which appear 
to suggest t h a t the whole issue around schizophrenia i s t o be 
fought out i n a c o n f l i c t between ' i l l n e s s ' and 'deviance'. Grand 
ideas about i t s e l f p s y c h i a t r y c e r t a i n l y has, and one of the more 
i r o n i c e f f e c t s of Szasz's onslaughts has been to pander to j u s t 
these. 
18. See Creer and Wing (1974). 
1 9 . i . 
Thus Dr. Edward B i r d of Addenbrokes H o s p i t a l , Cambridge, i s 
c a r r y i n g out research on the b r a i n tissues o f p a t i e n t s "who d i e 
a f t e r having had the diagnosis of schizophrenia made at some 
p o i n t during t h e i r l i f e " . Dr. B i r d i s anxious to accrue samples 
and r e l a t i v e s are i n v i t e d to c a l l him as soon as possible a f t e r 
the demise of the p a t i e n t . (Report on NSF Special Research P r o j e c t , 
NSF Newsletter, March 1976, pp.10-11.) 
1 9 . i i . 
The Fellowship claims not to espouse any p a r t i c u l a r p o i n t of view, 
but i t i s cle a r t h a t t h e i r tastes are s e l e c t i v e . Thus, f o r example, 
R.D. Scott i s not popular w i t h the Fellowship. I n a review of 
Forre s t and A f f l e c k , eds. (1975) we read: 
I t may be u s e f u l to have Dr. R.D. Scott's own 
account of h i s c o n t r o v e r s i a l experiments w i t h 
f a m i l y therapy at Napsbury. But before rushing 
out to j o i n the 'blame the f a m i l y school'...the 
reader should have h i s a t t e n t i o n drawn to the... 
Mauds ley Monograph by Hirsch and L e f f which f i n d s 
no evidence f o r the theory t h a t f a m i l y deviance 
(meaning pressures, obsessions, possessiveness, 
muddled i n t e r - f a m i l y communications, Bateson's 
'double-bind' e t c . ) causes schizophrenia 
(NSF Newsletter, October 1975, p.9). 
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What i s i n t e r e s t i n g ahout t h i s i s t h a t an account which i s presented 
i n one framework i s r a p i d l y t r a n s l a t e d i n t o another. A c a r e f u l 
reading of Scott's. work w i l l r e v e a l t h a t he i s not concerned to 
make any claims about the causes of schizophrenia. What he 
attempts t o do i s t o view p a t t e r n s of response and a t t r i b u t i o n , 
both w i t h i n and i n r e l a t i o n t o , schizophrenic f a m i l i e s as 
a s s e r t i n g a s p e c i f i c a l l y c u l t u r a l framework of order and 
r e l a t i o n . That i s , he provides us w i t h the basis of a language 
f o r t a l k i n g about (and t h e r e f o r e engaging w i t h ) d i f f i c u l t and 
p e r p l e x i n g states o f a f f a i r s i n terms t h a t are at once personal 
and s o c i a l . The reviewer's i n v o c a t i o n of 'causes', then, has 
r e a l l y n o t h i n g to do w i t h science as such, and e v e r y t h i n g to do 
w i t h the requirement t o expunge from any d e s c r i p t i o n of what i s 
t a k i n g place i n and around schizophrenics anything t h a t i s 
remotely personal. 
20. Liam Hudson (1968) has unfolded f o r us the sets of ideas and images 
t h a t i n the popular imagination c l u s t e r round the a r t s and sciences. 
Joseph i s caught between a number of c o n f l i c t i n g evaluations t h a t 
t u r n on the arts-science d i s t i n c t i o n , thus: 
Feminine 
Sexual Promiscuity 
Pleasure 
Soft 
L i f e 
Animate 
Masculine 
Sexual R e s t r a i n t 
Value 
Hard 
Death 
Inanimate 
Joseph f e e l s himself t o be more dead than a l i v e ; science stands f o r 
the h o r r i f i c and the a r t i f i c i a l ; a r t f o r peace and the l i f e of 
f e e l i n g ; but f e e l i n g b r i n g s i t s own t e r r o r s of a complete 
d i s i n t e g r a t i o n of s e l f ; to be a man and t o be valued i s t o work 
and t o be r e s t r a i n e d ; not to be r e s t r a i n e d i s to r i s k becoming 
the woman t h a t h i s mother wanted him to be, or t o indulge i n a 
rampant promiscuity t h a t gives b i r t h to t e r r i b l e h y b r i d s ; yet t o 
be r e s t r a i n e d i s t o repudiate l i f e and p r o c r e a t i o n and thus h i s 
own manhood; t a b l e t s , l i k e science, are a r t i f i c i a l , but b e t t e r 
the a r t i f i c i a l and the mechanical, b e t t e r a dead s e l f , than no 
s e l f at a l l . 
21. Let me give the quote i n f u l l so there can be no mistaking Brown's 
c r i t i c a l i n t e n t i o n : 
The mad t r u t h : the boundary between s a n i t y and 
i n s a n i t y i s a f a l s e one. The proper outcome of 
psychoanalysis i s the a b o l i t i o n of the boundary, 
the h e a l i n g of the s p l i t , the i n t e g r a t i o n of the 
human race...Dionysus, the mad god, breaks down 
the boundaries; releases the p r i s o n e r s ; abolishes 
repression; and abolishes the p r i n c i p i u m 
i n d i v i d u a t i o n i s , s u b s t i t u t i n g f o r i t the u n i t y 
of man and the u n i t y of man w i t h nature. I n 
t h i s age of schizophrenia, w i t h the atom, the 
i n d i v i d u a l s e l f , the boundaries d i s i n t e g r a t i n g , 
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there i s , f o r those who would save our souls, 
the ego-psychologists, 'the Problem of I d e n t i t y ' . 
But the breakdown i s to be made i n t o a breakthrough; 
as Conrad s a i d , i n the d e s t r u c t i v e element immerse. 
The soul t h a t we can c a l l our own i s not a r e a l one. 
The s o l u t i o n t o the problem of i d e n t i t y i s , get 
l o s t . Or as i t says i n the New Testament: 'He 
t h a t f i n d e t h h i s own psyche s h a l l lose i t , and 
he t h a t l o s e t h h i s psyche f o r my sake s h a l l f i n d 
i t ' (1966, p.161). 
One wonders what s o r t of response Brown would have given to Joseph; 
or b e t t e r , what Joseph would have made of Brown. 
22. See f o r discussion Bernstein (1971). 
23. See, i n p a r t i c u l a r , R.D. Laing's 'The P o l i t i c s of Experience' (1967). 
I n a programme note to an e x h i b i t i o n of p a i n t i n g s by Mary Barnes, 
a woman who had been diagnosed as a schizophrenic, and who l i v e d 
at Kingsley H a l l , a community i n the P h i l a d e l p h i a Association of 
which Laing i s chairman, Laing wrote: 
I n her p a i n t i n g , Mary puts outside h e r s e l f , w i t h 
the minimum mediation, what i s i n s i d e her...Mary 
gives us the 'other side' of the flesh...The 
f l e s h pour s o i , where s p i r i t and matter, raped 
and r a p i n g , are capable, sometimes, despite 
t h e i r worst i n t e n t i o n s , of a scarcely c r e d i b l e 
c h a s t i t y . I t has to do w i t h i n c a r n a t i o n . A l l 
our words are misleading (Barnes and Berke, 
1971, pp.310-11). 
24. See i n p a r t i c u l a r her inaugural l e c t u r e a t U n i v e r s i t y College, 
London, 'In the Nature of Things' ( i n : Douglas, 1975). I n 
t h i s l e c t u r e she describes the o p e r a t i o n of what she terms the 
' p u r i t y r u l e ' , the means by which we support a d i v i s i o n between 
nature and c u l t u r e , by which, i n e f f e c t , we repudiate the 
r e c o g n i t i o n o f the r e l a t i v e : 
The more h i e r a r c h i s e d the s o c i a l system, the 
stronger the c o n t r o l demanded. Soc i a l distance 
measures i t s e l f by distance from organic 
processes...The p u r i t y r u l e i s a c o n t r o l system 
to which communicating humans a l l submit. I t 
imposes a scale of values which esteem formal 
r e l a t i o n s more than i n t i m a t e ones... consciousness 
of the knowledge we owe t o our animal being 
i s v e i l e d by the p u r i t y r u l e . The f i r s t step 
i n achieving o b j e c t i v i t y i s t o discount 
messages about ourselves t h a t are c a r r i e d i n 
the p u r i t y r u l e . I t i s the nub o f our 
d i f f i c u l t y i n seeing ourselves as things 
i n nature (1975, p.214, 216, 217). 
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25. Harold Searles w r i t e s : "Becoming able to deal s k i l f u l l y w i t h 
schizophrenic communication re q u i r e s one, more than anything e l s e , 
to become able to endure seeing, and at l e a s t momentarily sharing 
a t a f e e l i n g l e v e l , the world i n which the schizophrenic i n d i v i d u a l 
l i v e s " (1965, p.428). I would want t o stress t h i s f u r t h e r and 
say t h a t i n order to do e f f e c t i v e work w i t h a psychotic one has t o 
be able t o a l l o w w i t h i n oneself the p o s s i b i l i t y - as d i s t i n c t from 
the a c t u a l i t y - at both a t h e o r e t i c a l l e v e l and a t a c e r t a i n l e v e l 
of f e e l i n g , of one's own psychosis. Needless t o say t h i s c a r r i e s 
i t s r i s k s . See f o r example L e s l i e Farber's essay 'Schizophrenia 
and the Mad Psychotherapist' i n Farber (1966). 
26. One of the few w r i t e r s i n t h i s country t o work i n t h i s d i f f i c u l t 
i ntermediary area between the 'formal' and the 'personal' i s Raymond 
Williams. See Williams (1970, 1975, 1977). I n a review i n 'The 
L i s t e n e r ' (10th February, 1972) of a discussion i n a Manchester 
Cinema (shown on BBC TV) immediately a f t e r the showing of Garnett 
and Loach's 'Family L i f e 1 , Williams wrote: 
One g i r l asked ( t w i c e , because she wasn't 
understood) where you went i n t h i s s o c i e t y 
a f t e r a humane psychological treatment. 
And i t ' s a r e a l question, though I know 
one of the answers ( ' f i g h t the system'). 
I t wasn't answered. Suppose one said 
contemporary c a p i t a l i s m i s breaking down 
the l a s t s o c i a l t i e s t h a t are i n c o n s i s t e n t 
w i t h i t s k i n d of m o b i l i t y : the f a m i l y , 
the l o c a l community, p r o v i n c i a l settlements. 
Who then i s being l i b e r a t e d i n t o what? 
And the question was there but the form 
couldn't answer i t : i t had set i t up the 
other way round...Brecht said t h a t to get 
people t h i n k i n g c r i t i c a l l y we had to a l t e r 
dramatic form: move away from s i n g l e imposed 
meanings and the s e l e c t i v e o r g a n i s a t i o n o f 
sympathy; promote complex seeing w i t h i n the 
form and not leave i t to subsequent discussion. 
Some r e a l c o n t r a d i c t i o n arises then between the 
dramatic form and the dramatic i n t e n t i o n w i t h i n 
which i t was held. 
Williams puts i t w e l l ; i t i s the promotion of "complex seeing" t h a t 
captures our own emphasis. 
27. B a s i l B e r n s t e i n w r i t e s : 
An i n d i v i d u a l going i n t o the a r t s i s l i k e l y to 
possess an elaborated code o r i e n t e d t o the 
person; w h i l s t an i n d i v i d u a l going i n t o the 
sciences, p a r t i c u l a r l y the a p p l i e d sciences, 
i s l i k e l y t o possess an elaborated code o r i e n t e d 
t o o b j e c t r e l a t i o n s . CP. Snow's two c u l t u r e s 
may b e . r e l a t e d to the experiences d i f f e r e n t i a t e d 
through these two modes of an elaborated code. 
To be able to switch from one mode to the other 
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may i n v o l v e a r e c o g n i t i o n o f , and an a b i l i t y t o 
t r a n s l a t e v e r b a l l y , d i f f e r e n t orders of experience. 
I t may also i n v o l v e a r e c o g n i t i o n o f , and an 
a b i l i t y to manage, the d i f f e r e n t types of r o l e 
r e l a t i o n s which these modes of speech promote 
(1971, p.133, emphasis i n the o r i g i n a l ) . 
This i s a b i t crude b u t i t does p o i n t the way t o a r e c o g n i t i o n of 
the complexities t h a t are involved i n n e g o t i a t i n g t r a n s i t i o n s 
between d i f f e r e n t orders o f experience. 
28. Theodore Lidz i n h i s discussion of the o r i g i n s of schizophrenic 
thought disturbances t e l l s us t h a t there are "many ways i n which... 
i n t r a - f a m i l i a l communications and t r a n s a c t i o n s i n t e r f e r e w i t h the 
c h i l d ' s gaining a f i r m and coherent grounding i n the c u l t u r e ' s 
system of meanings and reasoning, confuse h i s grasp of the world 
and h i s c a p a c i t i e s t o r e l a t e meaningfully to o t h e r s " (1971, p.204). 
Moreover: 
With f a i l u r e t o i n c u l c a t e proper c a t e g o r i z a t i o n 
the c h i l d i s not only deprived of an e s s e n t i a l 
means of f i l t e r i n g out the extraneous and 
i n a p p r o p r i a t e , but may spend much o f the time 
preoccupied w i t h the m a t e r i a l t h a t l i e s between 
categories. This i n t e r - c a t e g o r i c a l w o r l d . . . 
concerns m a t e r i a l i n v o l v i n g the f u s i o n between 
the s e l f and the mother, the childhood polymorphous 
perverse wishes and f a n t a s i e s , the c a n n i b a l i s t i c 
impulses, the dream-like notions of being of the 
opposite sex or hermaphroditic, the grandiose 
triumphs over a parent, and other such m a t e r i a l 
t h a t i s e l i m i n a t e d from awareness as a c h i l d 
grows up, and can have l i t t l e conscious 
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n and f o r which no c l e a r - c u t 
c a t e g o r i z a t i o n can e x i s t . The schizophrenic 
p a t i e n t when caught i n dilemmas t h a t are 
i n s o l u b l e t o him not only breaks through the 
confines placed by the meanings and l o g i c of 
h i s c u l t u r e but w i l l , at times, f i n d refuge i n 
t h i s i n t e r - c a t e g o r i c a l realm where, among 
other t h i n g s , the burdens of being an i n d i v i d u a l 
s e l f have vanished ( i b i d . p.205). 
And of the i n t e r - c a t e g o r i c a l w o r l d as i t erupts i n t o the p a t i e n t ' s 
t a l k : 
I t i s not j u s t the e r u p t i o n of h i s i n t e r n a l i z e d 
v e r s i o n of r e a l i t y t h a t i s somewhat a k i n to 
ours, but more of a nether w o r l d , a w o r l d t h a t 
i s a n t i p o d a l , composed of what we have learned 
even to keep out o f most of our f a n t a s i e s and 
perhaps even out of our dreams ( i b i d . pp.205—6). 
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The n o t i o n of an ' i n t e r - c a t e g o r i c a l world' i s i l l u m i n a t i n g ; 
the t r o u b l e w i t h i t i n Lidz's. p r e s e n t a t i o n , however, i s t h a t 
i t i s ranged against a P i a g e t i a n model o f the normal a d u l t 
as i n h a b i t i n g a f i r m l y bounded category space i n which he 
has a permanent s e c u r i t y of tenure. There i s no sense o f the 
s e l f having to work t o ; s u s t a i n i t s e l f . We might pose the 
r e l a t i o n s h i p between the ' c a t e g o r i c a l ' and the ' i n t e r - c a t e g o r i c a l ' 
i n a d i f f e r e n t way and say t h a t the category, as i t were, f l o a t s 
on the sea of the i n t e r - c a t e g o r i c a l , and must, on occasions, work 
hard to keep i t s e l f a f l o a t . Equally i t i s the sea t h a t gives 
the category nourishment. Such a f o r m u l a t i o n allows f o r the 
p o s s i b i l i t y of excursions between the ' c a t e g o r i c a l ' and the 
' i n t e r - c a t e g o r i c a l ' . Lidz dispatches the schizophrenic to the 
opposite pole from P i a g e t i a n r a t i o n a l i t y : "...a world i n t o 
which we, as t h e r a p i s t s , have grave d i f f i c u l t y i n p e n e t r a t i n g , 
about which we have but fragmentary glimpses, but which erupts 
i n t o the p a t i e n t ' s t a l k and associations as from another 
world" ( i b i d . p.205). This k i n d of h i s t r i o n i c may make the 
servants of the ' s o c i o - c e n t r i c ' f e e l much b e t t e r but as, f o r 
example, a c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n of Joseph i t i s an absurd 
exaggeration. 
See, also, Lidz (1975). 
29. Thus Paul Feyerabend on science's r e t r e a t from the murky 
perceptions o f everyday l i f e : 
...our h a b i t of saying 'the t a b l e i s brown' 
when we view i t under normal circumstances, 
w i t h our sense i n good order, but 'the t a b l e 
seems to be brown' when e i t h e r the l i g h t i n g 
c o nditions are poor or when we f e e l unsure 
i n our capacity of observation expresses the 
b e l i e f t h a t there are f a m i l i a r circumstances 
when our senses are capable of seeing the 
world 'as i t r e a l l y i s ' and other, equally 
f a m i l i a r circumstances, when they are deceived... 
A l l these are a b s t r a c t , and h i g h l y d o u b t f u l , 
assumptions which shape our view of the world 
w i t h o u t being accessible to a d i r e c t c r i t i c i s m 
(1975, p.31). 
30. Our discussion may be c l a r i f i e d by a q u o t a t i o n from a paper e n t i t l e d 
'The Human L i m i t s of Nature' by the h i s t o r i a n of science, R.M. Young. 
Quotations w i t h i n the passage c i t e d are from a discussion by Trent 
Schroyer (1971), a d i s c i p l e of Jlirgen Habermas: 
'Contemporary science and technology serve as a 
new s t r a t e g y f o r l e g i t i m a t i n g power and p r i v i l e g e . ' 
'Insofar as the p r a c t i c e of the s c i e n t i f i c estab-
lishment i s h e l d to be n e u t r a l ' and a p p l i c a b l e to 
a l l aspects of s o c i e t y 'while a c t u a l l y j u s t i f y i n g 
the extension of r e p r e s s i v e c o n t r o l systems, we 
can assert t h a t the contemporary self—image of 
science f u n c t i o n s as an all-embracing t e c h n o c r a t i c 
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ideology.' The gap...between the general 
p r i n c i p l e s of s c i e n t i f i c n a t u r a l i s m and 
p a r t i c u l a r problems of man i n s o c i e t y , 
has been f i l l e d by the s c i e n t i s t i c . s e l f - i m a g e 
of science. Where knowledge i s absent, 
e x t r a p o l a t i o n f i l l s the domain o f the moral, 
and p o l i t i c a l debate about the c o n f l i c t i n g 
goals and i n t e r e s t s of men. 'Scientism means 
science's b e l i e f i n i t s e l f : t h a t i s , the 
c o n v i c t i o n t h a t we can no longer understand 
science as one form of possible knowledge, 
but r a t h e r must i d e n t i f y a l l knowledge w i t h 
science. 1 Indeed Schroyer claims t h a t 'the 
s c i e n t i s t i c image of science has become a 
dominant l e g i t i m a t i n g system of advanced 
i n d u s t r i a l s o c i e t y ' (1973, pp.261-2). 
The q u o t a t i o n introduces other, more o v e r t l y p o l i t i c a l , aspects of 
the problem t h a t have not concerned us i n t h i s essay. However, Young' 
remark about the gap between the p r i n c i p l e s of s c i e n t i f i c n a t u r a l i s m 
and p a r t i c u l a r problems of man i n s o c i e t y , and the way i n which t h i s 
gap has been f i l l e d , captures very w e l l the emphasis we have been 
t r y i n g t o make. 
S i i r a l a w r i t e s : 
Language is . . . a n i n s t i t u t i o n , and i n s t i t u t i o n s 
serve mostly the^average', not the marginal. 
As f a r as schizophrenia i s concerned, there 
are l i m i t s i n language, at l e a s t i n t h e i r 
r e p o r t i n g form, t o carry the message. These 
l i m i t s may be transcended by means of 
a r t i s t i c use of language or by means of 
somebody, l i k e the schizophrenic, himself 
embodying the message or i t s response... 
Language as an i n s t i t u t i o n i s also the 
r e s u l t of c e r t a i n p r a c t i c e s , s t y l e s and 
word i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s adopted by s o c i e t i e s 
and f i x e d through t r a d i t i o n a l i z e d i n t e r e s t s . 
P a r t i c u l a r d i f f i c u l t i e s are even encountered 
speaking about, not only out o f , schizophrenia 
when the ways of l i n g u i s t i c expression r e a d i l y 
a v a i l a b l e tend t o suggest too much purposefulness, 
consciousness, and centredness i n a person, 
w h i l e being a t the same time poor on e t h i c a l 
nuances as to the s p e c i f i c g r a v i t y of c e r t a i n 
e x i s t e n t i a l s i t u a t i o n s . The nature and place 
of language i n man's l i v i n g together seems to 
make i t amenable to become a possession of the 
'average m a j o r i t y ' i n such a delusionary 
absoluteness, t h a t there i s no more place f o r 
an appeal l i k e schizophrenia to reach i n t o 
dialogue w i t h i n the confines of language 
(1972, p.144, emphasis i n the o r i g i n a l ) . 
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This i s a f u n c t i o n a l argument. See f o r example M.A.K. H a l l i d a y 
(1973). H a l l i d a y , i n a masterly foreword to the researches of 
B a s i l Bernstein and h i s associates, restores some c l a r i t y to the 
muddle around the problem of language i n the discussion of 
educational f a i l u r e . He d i s t i n g u i s h e s between two main versions 
of the 'language f a i l u r e ' theory, a ' d e f i c i t ' v e r s i o n , and a 
' d i f f e r e n c e ' v e r s i o n . Both of these he shows to be f a l s e ; the 
' d e f i c i t ' v e r s i o n because there i s "no convincing evidence t h a t 
c h i l d r e n who f a i l i n school have a smaller a v a i l a b l e vocabulary, 
or a less r i c h grammatical system than those who succeed" 
(1973, p . x i ) ; the ' d i f f e r e n c e ' v e r s i o n because i t t r e a t s as a 
l i n g u i s t i c disadvantage what i s i n f a c t a s o c i a l disadvantage: 
the c h i l d ' s "disadvantage i s a s o c i a l one. This does not mean 
t h a t i t i s not r e a l ; but i t means t h a t i t i s misleading to 
t r e a t i t as i f i t was l i n g u i s t i c and to seek to apply l i n g u i s t i c 
remedies" ( i b i d , p . x i i i ) . From B a s i l Bernstein's work a d i f f e r e n t 
perspective emerges. We are led t o see t h a t there "may be 
d i f f e r e n c e s i n the r e l a t i v e o r i e n t a t i o n of d i f f e r e n t s o c i a l groups 
towards the various fu n c t i o n s of language i n given contexts and 
towards the d i f f e r e n t areas of meaning t h a t may be explored 
w i t h i n a given f u n c t i o n " ( i b i d , p . x i v ) . The r o l e of language i s 
thus re c a s t : "We can i n t e r p r e t the codes, from a l i n g u i s t i c 
p o i n t of view, as d i f f e r e n c e s of o r i e n t a t i o n w i t h i n the t o t a l 
semiotic p o t e n t i a l . . . F o r any p a r t i c u l a r s u b - c u l t u r e , c e r t a i n 
f u n c t i o n s o f language, or areas of meaning w i t h i n a given f u n c t i o n , 
may receive r e l a t i v e l y greater emphasis" ( i b i d . p.xv). I n order 
to understand the place t h a t language occupies i n Bernstein's 
theory: 
. . . i t i s necessary to t h i n k of language as 
meaning r a t h e r than of language as s t r u c t u r e . 
The problem can then be seen to be one of 
l i n g u i s t i c success r a t h e r than l i n g u i s t i c 
f a i l u r e . Every normal c h i l d has a f u l l y 
f u n c t i o n a l l i n g u i s t i c system; the d i f f i c u l t y 
i s t h a t of r e c o n c i l i n g one f u n c t i o n a l 
o r i e n t a t i o n w i t h another. The remedy w i l l not 
l i e i n the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f concentrated doses 
of l i n g u i s t i c s t r u c t u r e . I t may l i e i n p a r t i n 
the broadening of the f u n c t i o n a l perspective -
t h a t of the school, as much as t h a t of the 
i n d i v i d u a l p u p i l . T h i s , i n t u r n , demands a 
broadening of our own conceptions, e s p e c i a l l y 
our conceptions of meaning and of language 
( i b i d , p . x v i ) . 
Lest there be any doubt about the a p p l i c a b i l i t y o f t h i s k i n d of 
t h i n k i n g t o our own case see a paper by Richard Sanders (1971), 
'Implementation of a Programme f o r the Prevention of Psychosis'. 
Sanders - w i t h due reference to Bernstein.' - w r i t e s : " . . . c h i l d r e n 
i n schools, as w e l l as i n d i v i d u a l s i n mental h o s p i t a l s , who cannot 
adapt to the s o c i a l systems, need programs i n which they are 
t r a i n e d t o overcome t h e i r s o c i a l d e f i c i t s and maladaptations 
( i b i d . p.262). 
See a l s o , IV.Appendix. 
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Nothing of what we have w r i t t e n should be taken as i m p l y i n g 
anything about the causes of schizophrenia. We have t r i e d to 
say something about what discomforts us about the schizophrenic's 
behaviour and about what we do w i t h our discomfort. One t h i n g t h a t 
we do w i t h our discomfort i s to invoke explanations i n terms of 
causes and mechanisms. Thus: 
' I f we b o i l Redpath at 200JC. a l l t h a t i s l e f t when 
the water vapour i s gone i s some ashes etc . This 
i s a l l Redpath r e a l l y i s . 1 Saying t h i s might have 
a c e r t a i n charm, but would be misleading to say 
the l e a s t . The a t t r a c t i o n of c e r t a i n kinds of 
explanations i s overwhelming. At a given time the 
a t t r a c t i o n of a c e r t a i n k i n d of explanation i s 
greater than you can conceive. I n p a r t i c u l a r 
explanation of the k i n d 'This i s r e a l l y only 
t h i s ' ( W i t t g e n s t e i n , 1970, 'Lectures on 
A e s t h e t i c s 1 , I I I . 21-2). 
We have, then, t r i e d to show why i t i s t h a t people come to be asking 
questions l i k e 'What are the causes of schizophrenia?' These kinds 
of questions and the answers t h a t are provided may take away the 
discomfort but as i n t h e i r a p p l i c a t i o n to the puzzlement t h a t 
some a e s t h e t i c impressions induce i n us^ there i s a sense i n which 
they also take away the p i c t u r e ; to d e s i r e to get r i d of a l l our 
p e r p l e x i t y about Joseph i n t h i s way - W i t t g e n s t e i n t a l k s about 
"the s o r t of explanation one longs f o r " ( i b i d . I I I . 6 ) - i s to 
make a ' b o i l e d Redpath' of him. 
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IV. Appendix 
'Pieces of E x c a l i b u r ' 
i . 
We have dwelt a t some len g t h on the f a l s i f i c a t i o n s of the 
schizophrenic's behaviour and of h i s r e l a t i o n s w i t h the w o r l d t h a t are 
c u r r e n t i n the l i t e r a t u r e . I n these notes I t r y t o b u i l d on ' i n s t i t u t i o n a l 
t h e o r i e s of language use, as set out i n the w r i t i n g s o f W i t t g e n s t e i n , 
A u s t i n , Searle and Habermas i n p a r t i c u l a r , i n order to provide some 
suggestions as to the requirements f o r a formal c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n of the 
nature of the schizophrenic's r e l a t i o n s w i t h the w o r l d . 
i i . 
Jlirgen Habermas (1970b) sets out a model of what he terms 
'communicative competence' as f o l l o w s : 
A s i t u a t i o n i n which speech, i . e . , the a p p l i c a t i o n 
of l i n g u i s t i c competence, becomes i n p r i n c i p l e 
p o s s i b l e , depends on a s t r u c t u r e of i n t e r - s u b j e c t i v i t y 
which i s i n t u r n l i n g u i s t i c . This s t r u c t u r e i s 
generated n e i t h e r by the monologically mastered 
system of l i n g u i s t i c r u l e s , nor by the e x t r a - l i n g u i s t i c 
c o n d i t i o n s of i t s performance. On the c o n t r a r y , i n 
order t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n normal discourse the speaker 
must have at h i s d i s p o s a l , i n a d d i t i o n to h i s 
l i n g u i s t i c competence, basic q u a l i f i c a t i o n s of speech 
and symbolic i n t e r a c t i o n (role-behaviour) which we 
may c a l l communicative competence. Thus 
communicative competence means the mastery o f an 
i d e a l speech s i t u a t i o n ( i b i d . p.367). 
Habermas gives a more precise expression to h i s n o t i o n of 
communicative competence by t y i n g i t t o J.L. Austin's (1962) d e s c r i p t i o n 
of 'performative utterances'. A u s t i n d i s t i n g u i s h e s between the l e v e l s 
of 'saying something' and 'doing something'. A l a r g e number of expressions 
he argues, achieve t h e i r meaning not by r e f e r r i n g to something but by 
doing other s o r t s of t h i n g s . And those 'other s o r t s of t h i n g s ' are 
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conveyed by the idea of an ' i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e ' , i n c o n t r a s t to the 
' l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e ' . As we have seen, communicative competence means 
"the mastery of an i d e a l speech s i t u a t i o n " . The capacity to achieve 
communicative competence i n a s p e c i f i c speech s i t u a t i o n depends not on 
e x t r a - l i n g u i s t i c features of t h a t speech s i t u a t i o n but on the r e l a t i o n s h i p 
t h a t the subject establishes as from w i t h i n the speech act i t s e l f t o an 
i d e a l speech s i t u a t i o n . And i t i s through the i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e of 
utterances t h a t the basic features of the i d e a l speech s i t u a t i o n are 
generated and sustained. The s p e c i f i c features of the ' i d e a l speech 
s i t u a t i o n ' t o which Habermas pays a t t e n t i o n are what he terms "dialogue 
c o n s t i t u t i v e u n i v e r s a l s " . I t i s these t h a t " e s t a b l i s h i n the f i r s t 
place the form of i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y between any competent speakers 
capable of mutual understanding" ( i b i d . p.369). I n our p r e s e n t a t i o n of 
Joseph we set out some o f Habermas's notions regarding the s t r u c t u r a l 
c o nditions t h a t must be met i n order f o r normal communication to o b t a i n . 
His concern i n t h i s second paper i n the sequence i s to suggest t h a t 
these conditions - thus, f o r example, the capacity to d i f f e r e n t i a t e 
between objects w h i l s t at the same time a l l o w i n g f o r a form of i d e n t i f i c a t i o n 
between speaking subjects t h a t " j u s t cannot be grasped by a n a l y t i c a l l y 
c l e a r - c u t operations" - are a c t i v a t e d n e i t h e r by features e x t e r n a l to 
the speaking su b j e c t , nor by features i n t e r n a l t o the system of language 
as Chomsky describes i t , but from w i t h i n the speech act i t s e l f . To put 
the whole matter more simply, what Habermas sets out to do i s to 
p i n - p o i n t the elements t h a t are s p e c i f i c t o human, as opposed to ' t e x t u a l ' , 
modes of communication and understanding.^ 
i i i . 
John Searle (1969) provides us w i t h a d e t a i l e d treatment of 
' i l l o c u t i o n a r y a c t s', and the ' i l l o c u t i o n a r y f orces' t h a t these e n t a i l . 
" I n the case of i l l o c u t i o n a r y a c t s " , he w r i t e s , "we succeed i n doing 
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what we are t r y i n g to.do by g e t t i n g out audience to.recognise what we 
are t r y i n g t o do. But the ' e f f e c t ' on the hearer i s not a b e l i e f or 
response, i t consists simply i n the hearer understanding the utterance 
of the speaker" ( i b i d . p.47). And t h i s e f f e c t he terms the i l l o c u t i o n a r y 
e f f e c t . The account of meaning or understanding t h a t i s r e q u i r e d must 
show the connection "between one's meaning something by what one says, 
and what t h a t which one says a c t u a l l y means i n the language" ( i b i d . p.43); 
i t must, t h a t i s , capture "both the i n t e n t i o n a l and the conventional 
aspects, and e s p e c i a l l y the r e l a t i o n s h i p between them" ( i b i d . p.45). 
What he does, i n e f f e c t , under the r u b r i c of the e l u c i d a t i o n of a set of 
r u l e s or c o n d i t i o n s to determine a successful i l l o c u t i o n a r y a c t , i s t o 
deli n e a t e the v a r i e t y of i l l o c u t i o n a r y forces t h a t are at work i n speech 
a c t s . And i t i s the emphasis on the ' i l l o c u t i o n a r y ' as a non-reducible 
component of speech acts t h a t marks o f f what Searle terms " i n s t i t u t i o n a l 
t h e o r i e s of communication" such as h i s own and W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s , from 
"what might be c a l l e d n a t u r a l i s t i c t h e o r i e s of meaning, such as, e.g., 
2 
those which r e l y on a stimulus-response account of meaning" ( i b i d . p.71). 
i v . 
Accounts of meaning and understanding such as these e s t a b l i s h , as i t 
were, a general context w i t h i n which Joseph and others l i k e him may be 
viewed. However i t can I t h i n k be shown t h a t they are also able t o 
provide a more precise f o r m u l a t i o n of the p e r p l e x i t i e s t h a t Joseph 
presents us w i t h . To begin w i t h , Joseph as w e l l as saying something i s 
c l e a r l y doing something. Searle attempts to set out the c o n d i t i o n s f o r 
the successful execution of d i f f e r e n t types of i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts. Thus 
i n the case of a s s e r t i o n s , statements ( t h a t ) , a f f i r m a t i o n s e t c . , we need 
f o r any p r o p o s i t i o n p to be able to assume: ( i ) t h a t S has evidence f o r 
the t r u t h of p; ( i i ) t h a t i t i s not obvious t o both S and H t h a t H knows 
(does not need to be reminded o f , e t c . ) p ; ( i i i ) t h a t S believes p; and 
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( i v ) t h a t the statement counts as an undertaking to the e f f e c t t h a t p 
represents an a c t u a l s t a t e of a f f a i r s ( i b i d . , v i z . pp.66-7). 
Searle, i t should be s a i d , i s concerned w i t h ' i d e a l ' speech s i t u a t i o n s , 
s i t u a t i o n s i n which utterances are serious and l i t e r a l , r a t h e r than, say, 
metaphorical or s a r c a s t i c . The p r o v i s i o n may seem l i m i t i n g but i f we 
r e t u r n to the 'dome' sequence i n U n i t XVII we can see t h a t i t meets 
Searle's requirements very w e l l . Joseph gives us no i n d i c a t i o n , e i t h e r 
v e r b a l l y or non-v e r b a l l y , of the modality of h i s communication, and we 
are, I t h i n k , o b l i g e d t o assume tha t when he says "most people l i v e i n 
communities under b i g domes" t h a t t h i s i s a statement or a s s e r t i o n t h a t 
p i s the case. I n the utterance t h a t f o l l o w s he appears to cover 
himself : "Now you don't know the dome i s th e r e " . Yet i n e f f e c t t h i s 
only increases our d i f f i c u l t y f o r we are being i n v i t e d t o b e l i e v e t h a t 
Joseph has evidence f o r the t r u t h of something t h a t i s i n v i s i b l e to 
the r e s t of us. 
Later on i n the sequence Terence puts forward the view t h a t Joseph 
i s t a l k i n g s c i e n t i f i c a l l y about l i f e on Mars. I disagree, and i m p l i c i t l y 
assert the metaphorical status of Joseph's communications i n the past 
twenty minutes or so when I say t h a t i n my view Joseph i s discussing 
l i f e i n the h o s p i t a l . Joseph does not say as much e x p l i c i t l y , but the 
f a c t of the matter i s t h a t there i s n o t h i n g t h a t comes a f t e r my 
i n t e r v e n t i o n t o suggest t h a t Joseph disagrees w i t h the c o n s t r u c t i o n t h a t 
I placed upon h i s communications. Indeed, where before he t a l k e d about 
the i m p o s s i b i l i t y of going outside the dome, he now t a l k s about the 
i m p o s s i b i l i t y o f going outside the environment, and makes, i t p l a i n t h a t 
i t i s the h o s p i t a l t h a t he i s r e f e r r i n g t o . And where he now says " I t ' s 
a p i t y you couldn't have your own p r i v a t e dome", we are, I t h i n k , r i g h t 
to t r e a t t h i s , i n i t s immediate context, as a metaphorical statement. 
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Searle argues t h a t an account of meaning or understanding must 
show the connection between "one's meaning something by what one 
says, and what t h a t which one says a c t u a l l y means i n the language" 
( i b i d . p.43). What Joseph's utterances a c t u a l l y mean i n the language 
i s not d i f f i c u l t t o e s t a b l i s h ; there i s n o t h i n g , f o r the most p a r t , 
about h i s grammar or h i s capacity to form sentences t h a t i s out of 
order. The pu z z l i n g f e a t u r e of the communication resides i n the 
r e l a t i o n s h i p between the conventional and the i n t e n t i o n a l aspects of 
the meaning. Joseph appears t o f u l f i l the conventional conditions f o r 
the execution o f an i l l o c u t i o n a r y act o f s t a t i n g something; the 
a s c r i p t i o n t h a t must f o l l o w from t h i s i s t h a t Joseph i s deluded: he 
asserts the existence of a s t a t e of a f f a i r s t h a t i s p a t e n t l y f a l s e . 
Yet from the subsequent evidence i t seems t h a t he appears t o do so 
wi t h o u t i n t e n d i n g to do so. To t i d y the whole sequence i n t o an 
a s c r i p t i o n of delusion i s then misleading; i t i s only to ease our own 
minds t h a t we do t h i s . The puzzlement must needs stay w i t h us; there 
i s nothing about the evidence t h a t can take i t away f o r Joseph does 
no t declare the connection between what he means by what he says and 
what t h a t which he says a c t u a l l y means i n the language. 
Our use of Searle's ideas allow us t o say t h i s : Joseph i s c l e a r l y 
doing something as w e l l as saying something; h i s 'doing' takes the form 
of an i l l o c u t i o n a r y a c t i v i t y t h a t i s unconventional, and t h a t evokes i n 
us an i l l o c u t i o n a r y e f f e c t t h a t i s at best p u z z l i n g and a t worst c h a o t i c . 
Just what the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f Joseph's 'doing' are Searle's framework 
does not enable us to say. Our i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of the confusion around 
the metaphorical status o f Joseph's communications i s reminiscent of the 
observation of Bateson, e t . a l . (1956) t h a t the " p e c u l i a r i t y of the 
schizophrenic i s not t h a t he uses metaphors, but t h a t he uses unlabeled 
metaphors". Our f o r m u l a t i o n does however, even as i t stands, improve 
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upon Bateson's i n one .respect i n t h a t i t draws a t t e n t i o n to the a c t i v i t y 
of 'unlabeling' t h a t i n Bateson's p r e s e n t a t i o n has a r e l a t i v e l y i n e r t 
aspect. 
Discussion of the r e l a t i o n s h i p t h a t Joseph esta b l i s h e s between 
language and the w o r l d may be helped by a co n s i d e r a t i o n of some aspects 
of Wittgenstein's thought. I n the Tractatus (1922) W i t t g e n s t e i n 
delineates a metaphysical d o c t r i n e of what has been termed ' l o g i c a l 
atomism'. He postu l a t e s the existence of simple i n d e s t r u c t i b l e atoms 
and atomic states of a f f a i r s . A f a c t consists of a s t a t e of a f f a i r s . 
A s t a t e of a f f a i r s i s a combination of objects or t h i n g s . Objects are 
simple, w i t h o u t p a r t s , but they may combine i n t o complexes. The 
d i f f e r e n c e between such combinations i s the d i f f e r e n c e between states 
of a f f a i r s . W i t t g e n s t e i n was l a t e r to r e j e c t much of the argument o f 
the Tractatus but i n the P h i l o s o p h i c a l I n v e s t i g a t i o n s (1958) he sets 
out the r a t i o n a l e f o r h i s e a r l i e r f o r m u l a t i o n s : 
One i s tempted t o make an o b j e c t i o n against what i s 
o r d i n a r i l y c a l l e d a name. I t can be put l i k e t h i s : 
a name ought r e a l l y to s i g n i f y a simple. And f o r 
t h i s one might perhaps give the f o l l o w i n g reasons: 
the word 'Excalibur', say, i s a proper name i n the 
or d i n a r y sense. The sword Excalibur c o n s i s t s of 
parts combined i n a p a r t i c u l a r way. I f they are 
combined d i f f e r e n t l y Excalibur does not e x i s t . But 
i t i s cle a r t h a t the sentence 'Excalibur has a sharp 
blade' makes sense whether Excalibur i s s t i l l whole 
or i s broken up. But i f 'Excalibur' i s the name of 
an ob j e c t t h i s o b j e c t no longer e x i s t s when Ex c a l i b u r 
i s broken i n pieces; and as no o b j e c t would then 
correspond t o the name i t would have no meaning. 
But then the sentence 'Excalibur has a sharp blade' 
would contain a word t h a t had no meaning, and hence 
the sentence would be nonsense. But i t does make 
sense; so there must always be something corresponding 
to the words of which i t c o n s i s t s . So the word 
'Excalibur' must disappear when the sense i s analysed 
and i t s place be taken by words which name simples. 
I t w i l l be reasonable t o c a l l these words the r e a l 
names (1958, I , 39, emphasis i n the o r i g i n a l ) . 
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W i t t g e n s t e i n disposes of t h i s view on the grounds t h a t i t i s not 
t r u e t h a t a word has no meaning i f n o t h i n g corresponds t o i t ; to say 
t h a t i s to "confound the meaning of a name w i t h the bearer of the name": 
"When Mr. N.N. dies one says t h a t the bearer of the name d i e s , not t h a t 
the meaning dies. And i t would be nonsensical to say t h a t , f o r i f the 
name ceased to have meaning i t would make no sense to say 'Mr. N.N. 
i s dead' " ( i b i d . 1.40). 
I t i s , he argues, a mistake to t r e a t f a c t s and complexes of objects 
as i f they were a l i k e : 
A complex i s not l i k e a f a c t . I say, f o r instance, 
of a complex t h a t i t moves from one place to another 
but not of a f a c t . But t h a t t h i s complex i s now there 
i s a fact...To say t h a t a red c i r c l e consists of 
redness and c i r c u l a r i t y , or i s a complex of these . 
component p a r t s , i s a misuse of these words, and 
misleading (1969, p.200). 
I n the I n v e s t i g a t i o n s W i t t g e n s t e i n considers the statement "My 
broom i s i n the corner". The complex 'broom' consists of the component 
p a r t s of 'broomstick' and 'brush'. However the order 'Bring me the broom' 
i s t o be d i s t i n g u i s h e d from the order 'Bring me the broomstick and the 
brush which i s f i t t e d on i t ' : 
...does someone who says t h a t the broom i s i n the 
corner r e a l l y mean: the broomstick i s there and 
so i s the brush, and the broomstick i s f i t t e d i n 
the brush? I f we were to ask someone i f he meant 
t h i s he would probably say t h a t he had not thought 
s p e c i a l l y of the broomstick or s p e c i a l l y of the 
brush at a l l . And t h a t would be the r i g h t answer, 
f o r he meant to speak n e i t h e r of the s t i c k nor of 
the brush i n p a r t i c u l a r . . . T r u e , the broom i s taken 
to pieces when one separates broomstick and brush; 
but does i t f o l l o w t h a t the order to b r i n g the broom 
also consists of corresponding parts? (1958, 1,60). 
Anthony Kenny i n h i s monograph on W i t t g e n s t e i n t e l l s us t h a t " i n the 
Tractatus the use o f a word i s i t s r e l a t i o n to the p r i m i t i v e signs, and 
through them to the simples which they denote. I n the I n v e s t i g a t i o n s 
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the use of a word i s i t s p a r t i n a language-game, i n a form of l i f e " 
(1973, pp.222-23). W i t t g e n s t e i n himself described the t r a n s i t i o n from 
one work to the next i n the f o l l o w i n g terms. " I n the Tr a c t a t u s " , he 
s a i d , " I was unclear about ' l o g i c a l a n a l y s i s ' and the c l a r i f i c a t i o n i t 
suggests. At t h a t time I thought i t provided a 'connection between 
language and r e a l i t y 1 ". I n the I n v e s t i g a t i o n s the c r u c i a l problem 
became: "By what procedures do men e s t a b l i s h l i n k s between language 
and the r e a l world?" (quoted by Toulmin, 1969, p.62, p.67). 
For Joseph language i s c l e a r l y not a 'game' i n the sense i n which 
W i t t g e n s t e i n intends i t . There i s , f o r him, too much connection between 
language and r e a l i t y f o r t h a t t o be p o s s i b l e . The order of the world and 
the order of language act on each other. The states of a f f a i r s which 
language d e p i c t s , and the combinations o f which such states of a f f a i r s 
c o n s i s t , d i e , break up and move apart. 'Complexes' have become fragmented. 
Excalibur i s broken i n pieces; Excalibur i s a s t a t e of a f f a i r s t h a t includes 
among i t s component p a r t s Joseph, h i s mother and f a t h e r . One i s oneself 
an i n d i v i d u a l but one cannot be thought of apart from the whole 'space' -
the l a r g e r states o f a f f a i r s - i n which one e x i s t s . Anthony Kenny 
l i k e n s Wittgenstein's argument i n the Tractatus t o a game o f chess: 
"Every elementary p r o p o s i t i o n about the p o s i t i o n of one piece on one 
square pre-supposes the whole chess-board and a l l the p i e c e s . . . I t does 
not say anything about the other piece or squares...but as i t only makes 
sense as p a r t of the game of chess, i t pre-supposes the whole of 'chess 
space' " ( o p . c i t . p.93). 
From t h i s p o i n t of view an a l t e r a t i o n i n the l a r g e r s t a t e of a f f a i r s 
impacts upon the s e l f . Joseph i s committed to r e s t o r i n g the r e l a t i o n s 
between 'simples' t h a t the fragmentation of 'complexes' has d i s r u p t e d . 
The f e l t complexity of the r e l a t i o n between language and the world i s 
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given i n h i s remarks i n the opening o f the 'dome' sequence i n U n i t XVII 
t h a t he keeps changing h i s name and t h a t : "You get to a p o i n t where you 
say, 'Have I h u r t h i s f e e l i n g s or has he h u r t mine?' ". The 'simple' 
s o l u t i o n to the problem i s to compile a d i c t i o n a r y t h a t includes the 
name of every person and s i x d i f f e r e n t ways of s p e l l i n g the same word. 
There i s a sense i n which Joseph attempts to model h i s use of language 
on the Tra c t a t u s . However we can only understand t h i s from a d i f f e r e n t 
vantage p o i n t , namely one t h a t examines the procedures by which men 
e s t a b l i s h l i n k s between language and the world. W i t t g e n s t e i n d i r e c t s 
our a t t e n t i o n t o the p o t e n t i a l entanglement i n the r e l a t i o n s h i p 
speaker-language-hearer, an entanglement t h a t we noted e a r l i e r i n the 
course of our discussion of p r e v a i l i n g assumptions about how the ' s e l f 
i s constructed. At the l e v e l of the language game as a form of l i f e a 
word may s t i l l continue t o have meaning even i f nothing corresponds to 
i t , but a t the l e v e l of the p a r t i c i p a t i o n of the i n d i v i d u a l speaker 
w i t h i n such a form of l i f e the f l u c t u a t i o n s o f the world may be severely 
d i s r u p t i v e of meaning. Carried t o an extreme the i n d i v i d u a l may then 
t r y to change the nature of h i s p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n language as a form of 
l i f e , and thus the r e l a t i o n s h i p between language and the world. 
v i . 
With the help of Habermas we can give a more t e c h n i c a l expression to 
the change t h a t Joseph t r i e s to e f f e c t i n the nature of h i s p a r t i c i p a t i o n 
i n language. 
Habermas, we w i l l r e c a l l , argues t h a t the capacity to achieve 
communicative competence i n a s p e c i f i c speech s i t u a t i o n depends not on 
e x t r a - l i n g u i s t i c f eatures of t h a t speech s i t u a t i o n but on the r e l a t i o n s h i p 
t h a t the subject establishes as from w i t h i n the speech act - through 
i l l o c u t i o n a r y a c t i v i t y — to an i d e a l speech s i t u a t i o n . To s i m p l i f y 
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Habermas's discussion somewhat, as speaking subjects we are, i n e f f e c t , 
doing two kinds of t h i n g s . One i s to d i s t i n g u i s h between subject and 
o b j e c t , and to a f f i r m an a n a l y t i c a l r e c o g n i t i o n of the w o r l d as d i v i d e d 
i n t o bounded series of classes and cat e g o r i e s ; the second i s at one and 
the same time t o a f f i r m the ' I ' as a speaking subject i n i t s absolute 
n o n - i d e n t i t y i n r e l a t i o n to the other, and also to recognise the other 
as a subject f o r himself and r e c i p r o c a l l y . I t i s , i n s h o r t , as from 
w i t h i n the a c t i v i t y o f the speech act t h a t the order of the s e l f i s 
encoded. But the s e l f i s never a f i n i s h e d or an accomplished c o n s t r u c t i o n 
i n the way t h a t could be sai d of the r e c o g n i t i o n of classes of o b j e c t s . 
The n o t i o n of an i d e a l speech s i t u a t i o n e n t a i l s reference to a model of 
i n t e r - s u b j e c t i v i t y t h a t must always be sought a f t e r ; y e t f o r the s e l f to 
become a f i n i s h e d c o n s t r u c t i o n would be t o make of i t an ar r e s t e d o b j e c t , 
and thus to abandon the p e c u l i a r f i e l d o f speech i n which speaking 
subjects are embedded. Through i l l o c u t i o n a r y a c t i v i t y then, the human 
speaker generates an a c t i v i t y of selfhood t h a t i s wrested from the 
p o t e n t i a l confusion and turbulence of u n d i f f e r e n t i a t e d and unbounded 
being. 
The fundamental d i s r u p t i o n i n Joseph's case, I want to suggest, i s 
not a d i s r u p t i o n of language, but o f those features of the speech act by 
which the human speaker encodes himself as a s e l f i n a s i t u a t i o n o f 
dialogue w i t h another. The problem belongs n e i t h e r w i t h l i n g u i s t i c 
competence nor ( p r i m a r i l y ) w i t h contingent conventional aspects of 
appropriate behaviour i n s p e c i f i c speech s i t u a t i o n s . I t i s s t i l l , f o r 
a l l of t h a t , a 'conventional' problem but i t takes the conventional t o 
a deeper l e v e l . A consideration of Joseph's 'doing' must focus on the 
i n s e r t i o n of language as a system i n a f i e l d of human i n t e r — s u b j e c t i v i t y , 
and on the pragmatic devices t h a t we c o n v e n t i o n a l l y employ from w i t h i n 
such a f i e l d t o create s t a b l e items of i n t e r a c t i o n t h a t we term selves 
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i n r e l a t i o n t o each other. Derek B i c k e r t o n , i n the context of a 
discussion of metaphor (1969), puts the matter c l e a r l y when he w r i t e s 
t h a t : "Meaning e x i s t s , i f anywhere, only i n the r e l a t i o n s h i p 
speaker-language-hearer, not i n any one of the t h r e e , and l e a s t of a l l 
i n any connection between language and the e x t r a - l i n g u i s t i c universe" 
( i b i d . p.38). 
The complications i n the r e l a t i o n s h i p speaker-language-hearer are, 
as we have seen, apparent i n Joseph's opening remarks i n the 'dome' 
sequence i n U n i t X V I I . As a more formal c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n of our 
discussion of the same sequence i n IV . 1 . we can say t h a t what f o l l o w s 
a f t e r t h i s i s an attempt by Joseph t o f i n d a s o l u t i o n to such complications. 
What he does i s t o render himself i n Habermas's sense communicatively 
incompetent; t h a t i s , he uses h i s l i n g u i s t i c competence - language as a 
system - t o sever i t from the s t r u c t u r e of i n t e r - s u b j e c t i v i t y i n which, 
f o r normally communicating speakers, i t i s embedded. Joseph, on some 
occasions at l e a s t , t r i e s to detach himself from the r e l a t i o n s h i p to the 
i d e a l speech s i t u a t i o n t h a t , f o r the normal speaker, i s e s t a b l i s h e d 
from w i t h i n the speech a c t . 
v i i . 
The approach t o language-use t h a t i s suggested by the model of 
communicative competence i s a m p l i f i e d i n a discussion by John Marshall 
(1971). Although he does not r e f e r to Habermas, Marshall i s l e d to 
roughly the same conclusion. Where Habermas speaks of models of 
communicative competence, Marshall speaks o f models of language 
competence. Marshall argues t h a t i n order to provide an adequate 
c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n of a language-using organism a " t r i - p a r t i t e i n t e r n a l 
o r g a n i z a t i o n must be imputed to the language user". He claims t h a t 
" 'symbol-using' animals are characterised by the i n t e r - r e l a t i o n s h i p s 
between three ( f u n c t i o n a l l y d i s t i n c t ) components of language a b i l i t y 
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w i t h i n an i n d i v i d u a l animal. These components are: ( i ) an i n t e r n a l 
model of the animal's w o r l d ; ( i i ) a grammar; ( i i i ) a model of appropriate 
i n t e r n a l state-changes (contingent upon the re c e p t i o n of s t r u c t u r e s 
generated by the grammar) i n another organism" ( i b i d . p.42). The 
r e l a t i o n s h i p s between these components are shown as f o l l o w s : 
INTERNAL 
MODEL OF 
+ EGO 
INTERNAL 
MODEL OF 
- EGO 
TRUE FALSE 
GRAMMAR 
( i b i d . p.43) 
(FIGURE IV) 
The diagram i s intended t o represent the f o l l o w i n g f a c t s : 
'States of the world' are associated w i t h sets of 
l i n g u i s t i c d e s c r i p t i o n s which are evaluated as tr u e 
or f a l s e of those s t a t e s ; the (covert) utterance 
of p a r t i c u l a r ( t r u t h - c o n d i t i o n a l l y evaluated) 
l i n g u i s t i c objects i s evaluated w i t h respect to 
appropriate state-changes i n (the model o f ) another 
organism. I submit t h a t n o t h i n g less than t h i s 
degree of i n t e r n a l o r g a n i s a t i o n i s r e q u i r e d i f 
we are to c r e d i t an animal w i t h l a n g u a g e - s k i l l s 
( i b i d . p.42). 
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From t h i s p o i n t o f view Joseph's speech h a b i t s are suggestive of a 
d i f f i c u l t y i n m a i n t a i n i n g a f u n c t i o n a l d i s t i n c t i o n between components 
( i ) and ( i i i ) , between h i s i n t e r n a l model of h i s own world and h i s 
i n t e r n a l model of the other's world. I n order t o t r y to overcome the 
d i f f i c u l t y , and the f e e l i n g s i t evokes i n him, he sets out t o develop 
an a l t e r n a t i v e model of language use, and t h e r e f o r e an a l t e r n a t i v e 
d e s c r i p t i o n of the w o r l d , t h a t w i l l e l i m i n a t e the s t r e s s f u l r e l a t i o n s h i p 
3 
between these components w i t h i n h i s i n t e r n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n , 
v i i i . 
Our discussion i n these notes enables us t o add t o the s t r i c t u r e s 
t h a t we have l a i d upon some of the w r i t i n g s of Goffman (1964, 1971). 
Goffman provides us w i t h a very f i n e c o n s i d e r a t i o n of the psychotic's 
v i o l a t i o n s of personal and s o c i a l order but there i s no t h i n g i n h i s 
analysis t h a t can help us d i s t i n g u i s h between the behaviour o f , say, 
Joseph and someone who i s merely a c t i n g the r o l e of a psychotic. That 
i s t o say, a l l of the features to which Goffman d i r e c t s our a t t e n t i o n 
are e x t e r n a l to the i n t e r n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n of the i n d i v i d u a l . I n 
Goffman's scheme of things i t cannot be otherwise f o r there i s no place 
i n i t f o r any form o f inner l i f e . For Goffman i t i s through the behavioural 
requirements and r e g u l a r i t i e s of s o c i a l s i t u a t i o n s t h a t the meaningful 
i s e s t a b l i s h e d . We would agree w i t h Goffman t h a t the features which the 
psychotic d i s r u p t s are c e r t a i n l y conventional, but i n these notes we 
have t r i e d to suggest t h a t these features have t o be summoned from 
w i t h i n i n d i v i d u a l s ; they are not 'given' as e x t e r n a l s . The use t h a t we 
have made of Habermas and others i n t h i s regard i s no doubt open t o 
improvement; i t does however seem l i k e l y t h a t i t i s i n ah intermediary 
or i n t e r - c a t e g o r i c a l area t h a t i s n e i t h e r p r o p e r l y 'inner' i n the sense 
i n which t r a d i t i o n a l psychoanalytic t h e o r i s i n g intends i t , nor 'outer' i n 
Goffman's sense, nor ' l i n g u i s t i c ' i n Chomsky's, t h a t the problem of 
psychotic communication belongs. 
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IV. Appendix: Notes 
1. For a u s e f u l discussion of the theory of communicative competence 
see McCarthy (1973). 
2. Useful discussions of Searle are Wootton (1975) and from a r a t h e r 
d i f f e r e n t standpoint Bennett (1976). 
3. Marshall w r i t e s : " I f i r m l y b e l i e v e t h a t the c e n t r a l problem f o r 
psychological t h e o r i e s of language-acquisition i s p r e c i s e l y what 
t r a d i t i o n a l m e n t a l i s t s thought i t was - namely, e x p l a i n i n g the 
development of 'symbolisation' " (1971, p.46). An i n t e r e s t i n g 
and worthwhile extension of the ideas t h a t we have set out here 
would be t o t i e them i n w i t h psychoanalytic considerations. 
I m p l i c i t both i n our discussion of the fragmentation of the 
'complex' i n W i t t g e n s t e i n and i n Habermas's own d e s c r i p t i o n s i s 
a view of the human subject t h a t f i n d s a more developed expression 
i n the w r i t i n g s of psychoanalysis. Paul Ricoeur i n h i s monumental 
study of Freud (1970) says of psychoanalysis t h a t i t i s "an 
e x e g e t i c a l science d e a l i n g w i t h r e l a t i o n s h i p s of meaning between 
s u b s t i t u t e objects and the p r i m o r d i a l (and l o s t ) i n s t i c t u a l 
o b j e c t s " ( i b i d . p.359). He r e t u r n s t o the theme of absence and 
loss l a t e r when he w r i t e s t h a t : 
We must always keep r e f l e c t i n g on the 
i m p l i c a t i o n of Freud's formula: 'The 
ego i s a p r e c i p i t a t e o f abandoned 
ob j e c t cathexes'. This reference to the 
abandoned o b j e c t , t h a t i s t o the work of 
mourning, brings us i n t o the very make-up 
of the ego. R e a l i t y , hard r e a l i t y , i s the 
c o r r e l a t e of t h i s i n t e r n a l i z e d absence. 
I t i s impossible to separate the ego's 
coherence and s t r u c t u r a l autonomy from 
the work of mourning w i t h o u t also 
abandoning the p e c u l i a r f i e l d of speech 
i n which psychoanalysis operates ( i b i d . p.372). 
I n a l l of Freud's work perhaps the most i l l u m i n a t i n g treatment of 
absence i s h i s d e s c r i p t i o n of the l i t t l e boy's game w i t h the r e e l 
and s t r i n g i n 'Beyond the Pleasure P r i n c i p l e ' (1920, p.13). The 
c h i l d stages the disappearance and r e t u r n of h i s mother under the 
symbolic guise of objects t h a t are w i t h i n h i s reach. A symbolic 
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n t h a t includes both the m a t e r i a l a c t i v i t y of the 
game i t s e l f and the words ('o'o'o'o', repre s e n t i n g the word ' f o r t ' 
according to Freud, and 'da') t h a t the c h i l d emits, allows the 
c h i l d to cope w i t h the disappearance of the mother. The a c t i v i t y 
of the game ensures f o r the c h i l d t h a t h i s a b i l i t y to 'mean' does 
not disappear when h i s mother disappears. The c h i l d attaches 
himself to a r e e l on a s t r i n g so t h a t the capacity f o r meaning 
can be detached from h i s r e a l mother. On s t r i n g . s e e f u r t h e r 
Winnicott (1971, Chapter 1 ) . Joseph, we w i l l r e c a l l , t e l l s us on 
one occasion t h a t h i s mother " l i v e d i n a house but she had a 
large r i n g which wouldn't come o f f t i e d t o a mile of g u i t a r s t r i n g , 
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so she could only walk a short way". See also Werner and Kaplan 
(1963): 
Out of the common m a t r i x w i t h a shared o b j e c t . . . 
f o l l o w s not only a progressive p o l a r i z a t i o n or 
d i s t a n c i n g between mother and c h i l d , but 
simultaneously a d i s t a n c i n g between symbolic 
v e h i c l e (word) and the o b j e c t f o r which i t 
stands ( i b i d . p.73). 
Terence once asked me i n a s t a t e of r e a l p e r p l e x i t y how a man and a 
woman who were separated - suppose, he s a i d , the man went away to 
sea - managed to make love. (His i m p l i c i t s u p p o s i t i o n was t h a t 
they d i d make love because: they had, a f t e r a l l , as husband and w i f e , 
been made one f l e s h . ) "Do they do i t through t h e i r l e t t e r s ? " he 
asked me. One answer to h i s puzzle i s Donne: 
D u l l sublunary lovers love 
(Whose soul i s sense) cannot admit 
Absence, because i t doth remove 
Those things which elemented i t . 
But we by a love, so much r e f i n ' d , 
That our selves know not what i t i s , 
Inter-assured of the mind, 
Care lesse, eyes, l i p s , and hands to misse. 
Our two soules t h e r e f o r e , which are one, 
Though I must goe, endure not y e t 
A breach, but an expansion, 
Like gold t o ayery thinnesse beate. 
I f they be two, they are two so 
As s t i f f e t w i n compasses are two, 
Thy soule the f i x t f o o t , make no show 
To move, but doth, i f the' other doe. 
And though i t i n the center s i t , 
Yet when the other f a r doth rome, 
I t leanes, and hearkens a f t e r i t , 
And grows e r e c t , as t h a t comes home. 
Such w i l t thou be to mee, who must 
Like t h ' other f o o t , o b l i q u e l y runne; 
Thy firmnes makes my c i r c l e j u s t , 
And makes me end, where I begunne 
(From: 'A V a l e d i c t i o n : Forbidding Mourning') 
Among the best psychoanalytic discussions of schizophrenia t h a t bear 
on problems of symbolisation are Freud (1915), Bion (1967, :1970), 
Deleuze (1968) and L e c l a i r e (1971). 
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